Why were Wehrmacht Logistics so bad?

Now, one common joke about the Wehrmacht is that their logistics were bad, especially when it comes to Operation Barbarossa. And this is usually explained with the lack of trucks, hubris and other aspects. Yet, I think, that this view is might be a bit too simple and does not encompass the whole situation. So, I think we need to take a look at the bigger picture and by this, I mean let’s look at the globe and also expand the timeline.
Cover colorization by vonKickass.
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» SOURCES «
Groß, Gerhard P.: Mythos und Wirklichkeit. Die Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d. Ä. bis Heusinger (Zeitalter der Weltkriege, Band 9). Ferdinand Schönigh: Paderborn, 2012. (ENGLISH VERSION BELOW)
Groß, Gerhard P.; Zabecki, David T. (Ed.): The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger (Foreign Military Studies), University Press of Kentucky, 2018.
Creveld, Martin van: Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004
Cambridge History of the First World War. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2016 (2014).
Davie, H. G. W. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army - Motor Transport, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 31:4, 2018, p. 474-501, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360
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Davie, H. G. W. The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941-1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30:2, 2017, 321-346, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2017.1308120
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...
Murray, Williamson: The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939-1941. In: Cooling, Benjamin Franklin (ed.): Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Office of Air Force History: Washington DC, United States (1990), p. 71-113
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Hrsg.): Deutsche Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 in sechs Bänden. Bernard & Graefe Verlag; München, 1983.
Kahn, Martin: ‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated’: Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War Potential before Operation Barbarossa, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25:2 (2012), p. 220-240, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.676498
Link to this article: dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.20...
Citino, Robert M.: The German Way of War. From the Thirty Years’
Ou, Si-Fu: China’s A2AD and Its Geographic Perspective
Scholik, Nikolaus: Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert - Handbuch & Lexikon
» LICENSE «
Cover: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-289-1091-26 / Dinstühler / CC-BY-SA 3.0
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#Wehrmacht #Logistics #WW2

[@MorningGI0ry]

Allies: Horsepower Germans: Literal horsepower

[@theholyhay1555]

OldEtonian not all the allies had full mechanization, France was the worst and United States was the Best

[@nicobruin8618]

@@theholyhay1555 You don't need trucks If you're fighting a defensive war and have a healthy railway system.

[@RouGeZH]

@@theholyhay1555 France worst? That country had a higher number of truck per inhabitant than Germany so check again.

[@sevenproxies4255]

In some situations, horses are prefarable to motorized vehicles though.

[@theholyhay1555]

RouGeZH not comparing it to Axis but Allies powers. My bad

[@finnkrogstad2541]

Amateurs make videos about tactics, but professionals make videos about logistics.

[@edgy6562]

In my eyes, the key to a good strategy, first and foremost, should be a good logistics line.

[@khaccanhle1930]

I see what you did there. 😋

[@cgross82]

LOL!

[@aboomination897]

The Germans knew about their weakness.

[@daveybernard1056]

"What are you kids doing in there?" "We're strategizing about logistics. Don't tell MOM!"

[@danielstickney2400]

The emphasis on trucks vs horses ignores the fact that all WWII armies, even the two most mechanized (US and UK), were primarily dependent upon railroads for their continental logistics. Even the famous "Red Ball Express" could not keep Patton's third army supplied. Horses, trucks, porters, whatever were only used to address what modern logisticians refer to as the "Last Mile Problem", e.g. delivery from the railheads to the troops in the field. The US shipped 1500 locomotives to England in preparation for D-day. Soviet Railway battalions did amazing work with little resources. Even in China the war was fought for and around railroads anywhere the transportation network did not depend upon rivers. Check out the book "Steel Rails to Victory" for a good overview of railway operations by both sides.

[@yewisemountaingoat528]

"Even the famous "Red Ball Express" could not keep Patton's third army supplied. Horses, trucks, porters, whatever were only used to address what modern logisticians refer to as the "Last Mile Problem", e.g. delivery from the railheads to the troops in the field" Might more be due to the fact allied bombings and sabotage had extensively destroyed the French railroad network. The plan was to destroy them from being used by the Germans. Naturally this also meant that they would *also* be unavailable for allied use once they invaded France. Eisenhower also insisted on engaging the Germans on a broad front. The idea was to stretch them thin. Considering they were already really stretched thin by having the majority of their divisions tied up on the Eastern Front the basic logic behind this was sound. Now unfortunately this did put a severe a strain on said Red Ball Express.

[@DOMINIK99013]

@@yewisemountaingoat528 Bridge can take time to make, but railroad its posible make very fastly if you have lots of French hands work on it. Railway wasnt important only for allies logistic, but also for French economy, so it must be priority.

[@mihaiserafim]

The Germans improvised a lot, to the detriment of the civilian population. The problem is that you cannot count on this to work every time. Case and point the captured Soviet fuel didn't work with German engines.

[@mihaiserafim]

@Secure White Existence I think you misunderstood. I was referring to the fact that the German soldiers took food from the civilian population and the tankers fueled their tanks at petrol stations or supply depots.

[@LAHFaust]

@Secure White Existence the Germans most certainly captured fuel depots, and immediately ran into the issue of their tanks running on gasoline while most Soviet tanks ran on diesel.

[@Achates72]

@@LAHFaust While their tanks may of run on gasoline their transport trucks were diesel fueled. I am going to go out on a limb here and say the German army found a use for any captured diesel fuel.

[@iannordin5250]

This is something that is often overlooked but critical to understanding the loss of German momentum: so much of their logistical strategy was dependent on looting and pillaging. Many of the german logisticians were rebuffed for their concern over the military loosing steam by overly enthusiastic officers who were certain that they could requester enough goods from conquered territory to carry them until they had secured their main objectives. This never happened.

[@chuckschillingvideos]

You can't improvise fuel!

[@thedukeofdeathpt6262]

"An Army marches on it's stomach" Napoleon Bonapart

[@melvillesperryn9268]

Germany didn't have enough fuel for the number of trucks complete mechanization would have demanded, hence the reliance on horse-drawn transport. This affected the rate at which supplies could be brought up. The German Army also operated with a much smaller 'tail' (admin & logistic troops) than the British and US armies. It is ironic that this meant they depended on quick victories and extended conflicts usually resulted in their defeat, In Barbarossa, they had enough supplies for only a relatively short period, after which the offensive came to a halt..France collapsed before the German ran out of supplies, although it was close and communications were better. North Africa shows the effect of the supply difficulties, With Rommel being forced back every time he ran out of supplies,

[@kimjanek646]

when you built over 100 different vehicles and have like 100 different shell types for your anti-tank, flak and artillery units, it's no wonder why you end up with logistical problems. Then you capture vehicles and guns from 5-8 different nations and also try to keep them running... well.

[@vatanak8146]

why did they have so many round types? why wont the usual HE-FRAG and APDT work?

[@Jupiter__001_]

@@vatanak8146 HEAT is always nice, also regular HE is good for attacking small infantry fortifications. Also, the original comment probably also includes different calibres as different "types".

[@bryanread6663]

There's a reason why they say that professionals talk logistics. The logistics people absolutely need to keep track of who has an AK74 and who has an AR-15, to use your example. They need to know which unit gets a truckload of 5.45x39 mm ammo and which one gets 5.56x45mm ammo. Getting it wrong means that nobody has any usable ammo. Real life isn't Hearts of Iron; using captured equipment makes the logistics problem harder, not easier. Also, just because there were only 4 major types of shells doesn't mean there were only 4 types of shells. The logistics guys still need to pay attention to where the smoke shells, and star shells, and cannister rounds, etc. are going.

[@dongilleo9743]

The German static infantry divisions in France in 1944, defending against a potential Allied invasion, were armed with a miscellaneous collection of artillery guns captured from Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and France, along with some German guns. All of these were in various calibers. It was fine as long as the divisions weren't engaged in combat. It made use of captured weapons, while saving the majority of new manufactured German guns for German units on the front lines in the east. Once the invasion took place, the multiple different weapons made resupply near impossible. Each unit might have several combat days worth of ammunition for their guns, but once that was used up, getting more was difficult, especially with the Allied air forces interdicting German supply lines.

[@danielstickney2400]

@basedand lulzpilled Multiply that four types of shells by the number of calibers, Now multiply the number of calibers by the number of chamberings. Now multiply the number of chamberings by the number of different loadings in cases where the shell casing is the same but the propellent charge differs based upon the barrel length. You're already up to what, 45 or 50 different variations just in 8.8 cm. And remember If a case of shells chambered for the 8.8 cm L71 is delivered to a unit equipped with the 8.8 cm L43 all of the time, materials, and labor to produce, pack and ship those shells is totally wasted because that unit can't use them and can't afford to drag them around until they can turn them in. Finally remember that they had absolutely no computers and had to track all of this stuff with index cards and paper spreadsheets.

[@DC9622]

The key to the Wehrmacht logistics was the German Railways. That is why before and during Normandy, the strategic and tactical airforces focused on there destruction.

[@noobster4779]

which as it turned out was highly ineffective. The railway was often repaired in hours after the attack. Similar with most bombings of german industries. Far less effective as commanly believed. The only part were strategic bombing was as efficent as expected was destroying cities, though on a moral standpoint it was actually counterefficent. Most bombed civilians just had a harder resolve to fight then to surrender after the bombings. Best example would be the british civilians during the Blitz.

[@Explosivefox109]

Yes, they where the only target apart from petrochemical industry that the allies bombed that had any meaningful impact on the armed forces. Factories could be moved underground or dispersed.

[@dosadnizub]

Actually, bombing train compositions, bridges, maintenance depots had a continuous strangling effect on an already struggling supply chain, so yeah, in this context it was effective

[@DC9622]

Explosivefox109 uktvplay.uktv.co.uk/shows/war-factories/watch-online/. Uk program worth watching. If you disperse you need the railroad to move parts. Interestingly they produced the most aircraft in 1944, but nothing in comparison to the Allies. Problem no fuel to train pilots, who had minimal hours and were easy for the Allied pilots to deal with.

[@filthyweaboo2694]

As shown during WW1, trucks>trains.

[@princeofcupspoc9073]

I believe it was Yamashita who turned down additional divisions for the campaign in Malaya, due to the fact that he could not supply them. Of course he's on the short list for greatest Generals in history.

[@dermotrooney9584]

Nice one. Thanks. I've been looking for an example like that for a while and though I've skimmed Malaya I'd not picked up on that.

[@nickmitsialis]

similarly an author I saw on CSpan 2 non fiction books YEARS ago (can't remember name) commented that the Japanese infantryman was an excellent light infantryman because his 'kit' was so light-and that was mainly because Japan didn't have the industrial or logistical capacity to provide the army anything other than the most basic infantry weapons and equipment (was it because the Navy had the lion's share of industrial output, perhaps?);

[@KuK137]

@Armadio That was one of FEW scumbag axis war criminals who got he deserved...

[@IrishCarney]

@@nickmitsialis I can't help but think, though, that the failure to supply the infantry with steel helmets at the very least had a hugely negative influence on the outcome, and overall was not at all worth the savings.

[@nickmitsialis]

@@IrishCarney not sure if it was cutting corners or simply they lacked the industrial material. That being said, the IJN seemed to be very well equipped.

[@umjackd]

I'd be interested in comparison at some point of the German rail supply system versus the French truck system in the First World War, since Ludendorff claimed this was the source of Entente success.

[@happytime2781]

If I remember correctly in I WW French troops was transported in huge number by taxis/civil cars. Something like Operation Dynamo/Dunkirk evacuation where next to military vessels fishermans and others went to pick up british troops to.

[@danielstickney2400]

@@happytime2781 The famous "Taxi cabs of the Marne" just gave them the idea, after that the French military went for trucks in a big way. Verdun was supplied by truck. Private autos were still rare at the time but France did have the world's largest and most advanced motor industry. The French already produced what were arguably the two most advanced trucks in the world, the Renault and the all-wheel-drive Latil. Anything they couldn't make themselves they ordered from the US which helped jumpstart the US auto industry. They also bought horses overseas but they quickly learned that four horses took up as much shipping space as one truck that could do ten times as much work, a lesson the US took to heart when they joined the war in 1917 and sent trucks instead of horses. Ironically one of the most important roles for the trucks was carrying fodder for the horses as hauling fodder in horse-drawn wagons is a real exercise in diminishing returns.

[@happytime2781]

@@danielstickney2400 thanks buddy it was nice to learn something new. I love the comparision between cars trucks and horses. Have a great day :)

[@jeffmoore9487]

@@danielstickney2400 Sending trucks to carry horse food. I wonder if Germany was doing the same in Barbarossa?

[@michaelkane1379]

Logistics were exact. They said 500 miles and 500 miles were given. The idiots were them that didn't listen.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

I died when you said that we the US is usually not at war with Canada or Mexico. I just thought back to... interesting times in American history. Great video Bernhard.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

should have said in the 20th century, I see now that the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) is pretty much ending at the beginning of the time-line I picked for that video 1848 onward.

[@501Mobius]

Few countries of any substantial size didn't go to war with their neighbor at one time or another.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

@@501Mobius true.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized it's not you. The wars just amuse me especially when one considers the current relationship between Canada the US and Mexico.

[@WarReport.]

War of 1812: Canada's war for independence. Burnt down the white house and toasted the king at the President's table. As for Mexico, good bye to half your territory.

[@grandadmiralzaarin4962]

Logistics win wars. Bullets don't fly without supply. Without adequate food, fuel, ammunition and supplies it doesn't matter how powerful your front line is, it won't be able to sustain itself.

[@daveybernard1056]

What all California gun owners are about to learn, now that we have to pass police background checks merely to purchase ammo. I'm sure our street gangs will run out of illegal ammo and illegal drugs any moment now.

[@Topfblende]

Bullets, fuel, and food also don't matter if the individuals using them are incompetent. Putting those resources in the right place at the right time with as few screw ups as possible is just as important as having them to begin with.

[@grandadmiralzaarin4962]

@@Topfblende you still require those supplies to win or even fight. An army without food, munitions and support withers on the vine. You can have the greatest strategic and tactical genius alive but if he can't feed or equip his army it is an arrow at the end of its flight. A spent force.

[@leftcoaster67]

@@daveybernard1056 Canada has tougher gun laws than California. I've had no problem purchasing ammo.

[@pikiwiki]

The Iron Bank!

[@paulthiessen6467]

We don’t think of it, but ship is the most efficient way to move goods. The Russian steppe is a greater barrier than the Atlantic from an efficiency standpoint

[@pnutz_2]

the bottleneck with shipping is the docks, whereas on land it's the train station

[@khaccanhle1930]

A ship can only unload as much as the crane capacity and dock space. LST was a rather new invention.

[@KuraIthys]

That was true a long time ago. Then trains happened, and suddenly it wasn't so clear-cut. Then containerised freight happened and ocean freight regained it's supremacy. Though, for land transportation the train still reigns supreme in efficiency (but not flexibility or speed.)

[@iannordin5250]

Depends. The problem with shipping - especially at that time - is that there is a hard weight and space limit. This is part of the reason the US never invested much in heavy vehicles till the end of the war.

[@unclejoeoakland]

@@KuraIthys while freight rail made transport and logistics over land a far more practical proposition, I think that at no point did the rate at which boats could move X tons of freight over Y miles consuming Z fuel ever get bested. Between that and the facts that trains are terrible before inclines and that the tracks must be basically perfect the entire route, it all answers to the original comment; the vast interior of Russia is as real a barrier as any ocean. As an aside, obtaining a port which is free of ice all year and has ready access to open seas has been a preoccupation for the Russian government of every era, regardless of regime or political bent.

[@rickyricardo5441]

The Marine Corp General was concerned with logistics because he had to make sure his supply of crayons was well stocked.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

lol

[@nilloc93]

I need to stop watching your videos because you quote a book and I go "hey that sounds interesting i'll just click that amazon link and....... where did my paycheck go?"

[@zainmudassir2964]

To Jeff Bezos who flew to space but not really

[@leftcoaster67]

German Field Marshall Edwin Rommel once commented: “Battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired.”

[@pikiwiki]

Yeah. He was smart.

[@bmxdoe]

Don't you mean Erwin?

[@simohayho8622]

In Africa yes

[@fulcrum2951]

Who's Edwin Rommel?

[@iannordin5250]

@@fulcrum2951 the wehraboos would have you believe he was jesus

[@arnabdas7019]

I don’t know whether it matters to you or not but I enjoyed the video and learned a lot.

[@levyburns4163]

The bit about logistics vs. tactics requiring context is very astute. Great content.

[@LewisRenovation]

Thanks for another great video!!

[@JimFortune]

Thank you for a good description of how the USMC differs from other US Armed Forces. I get a bit exasperated telling people in Poland that I was NOT in the Army. And no, Marines are not Marynarz (Polish for Sailor).

[@knutdergroe9757]

Or, The common German.... I usual resort too Elite Naval infantry, but better ! SEMPER FI, BROTHER

[@romaliop]

Army often refers to the whole military in colloquial use. No point getting wound up over semantics.

[@JimFortune]

@@romaliop Obviously you were never a Marine.

[@romaliop]

@@JimFortune Most people you'll meet weren't. I'm just saying that you read too much into a misunderstanding.

[@JimFortune]

@@romaliop So I should just leave you blissful in your ignorance?

[@hugod2000]

well made video. thank you for posting.

[@Sandwich13455]

What a great chanel to have discovered!,very informative,so it is,yes indeed,let me tell ya!

[@TheJoeSwanon]

Great video as always

[@jeffreytam7684]

The German logistical system failed to bring me to this video in time. I am two days late.

[@DukeJon1969]

Always very insightful

[@Strothy2]

just put a support logistics company onto the division... -20% attrition ftw!

[@iiNeedSkins]

Excellent as always.

[@stuartm2106]

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics" That Marine General was quoting British Army General Archibald Wavell who beat him by about 40 years.

[@Splattle101]

Good analysis overall, and good analysis of that very parochial quote from the Marine officer.

[@martincotterill823]

Very interesting, thank you!

[@markcantemail8018]

Nice video , Thank you .

[@nerome619]

excellent work

[@majordbag2]

Why were Wehrmacht Logistics so bad? The answer to that is Easy: The had an Austrian running their military :P

[@kloschuessel773]

Today the austrians have better roads than the rest of the germans and probably a much better railway as well, since its pretty bad. The swiss do for sure

[@ChallisVenstra]

I got your joke. And I laughed. I think Austria, I think Hotzendorff.

[@seththomas9105]

@@ChallisVenstra I think Austria, I think "Shrimp on the barbie, Mate!"

[@simohayho8622]

That Austrian didnt run the military tbh

[@seththomas9105]

@@simohayho8622 Uhhh..... yeah he did. He made himself military chief of staff because he was "such a military genius".

[@arailway8809]

I truly enjoyed your presentation. Could you make one that smelled more of motor oil and steam?

[@treyriver5676]

Aside from the excellent argument presented even if Germany wanted to correct the issue the function of resource allotment prevents much change as there was only so much "stuff" and it had to be divided combat arms was provided for first, thus logistics had to be second at best.

[@dylanmilne6683]

Maybe it's not that the logistics were SO poor but that the campaigns were SO big.

[@briankearney5994]

What about experience fighting in Africa in WW1? Were any lessons learned there and incorporated into German military thinking, or was this largely overlooked as it involved colonial troops?

[@kategrant2728]

There were other unique problems to the East Africa theater that made it largely inapplicable. 1) It didn't even rely on Horse and Rail. The largest source of transport was human porters, carrying loads on their backs. This massively changed the supply situation and made it very inapplicable to Europe. 2) Huge geographic differences.Tanzania is about 3 times the size of Germany. It's covered in tropical swamps and Savannah, terrain that the German Army would never operate in again. 3) The most relevant supply experiences for the Campaign were from the British, and to a lesser extent, Belgian side. They were the ones having to set their operations to the pace that the ports in Dar es Salaam could supply. The German supply situation was basically a Napoleonic 'live off the land' situation. Whenever they ran low on supplies, they'd usually just raid the British for more. This worked because they basically had no artillery for most of the war, so it was just rifle ammunition and food that was really needed. 4) The extremely small numbers involved. Even if you count every newly minted Schutztruppe and native militia, you're looking about 30,000 men for the German Force. That's extremely small compared to the Western Front and even the Romanian Front. It's even worse if you look at officers, and officers who survived the war. Literally less than 20 officers were with von Lettow-Vorbek at the end. That's not enough to really percolate any ideas into your army.

[@dongilleo9743]

@@kategrant2728 If anything, the German campaign points out the basic underlying problems with the German military. They were able to run rings around their British and other enemies for quite a while, but while suffering a continual attrition. By the end of the war, the German forces had fought with great tenacity and bravery, but were never able to overcome the basic force ratio against them. The British had superior numbers and supplies to the point that no amount of German maneuver could overcome. WW2 in Europe was the same situation on a bigger scale. The German panzers could and did blitzkrieg their way around hapless enemies, but they could never alter the basic economic, logistic and supply advantage the Allies had, which they were able to apply to wear Germany down in a war of attrition. Concerning the German effort in Africa in WW1, in the past year I obtained a very interesting book that gives much more coverage to this area that usually receives little. African Kaiser: General Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck and The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918 by Robert Gaudi

[@kategrant2728]

@@dongilleo9743 Thanks for the book recommend. More good works on East African history are hard to come by.

[@dongilleo9743]

@@kategrant2728 You're welcome. I consider myself to be a well read student of military history, although not specifically of WW1. Still, reading this book was interesting. WW1 in Africa usually gets little if any mention in standard histories. There was so much I had never heard of, like the campaigns in German Southwest Africa and other territories, or Germany's attempt to resupply it's forces in East Africa by means of a long range Zeppelin trip, or how England's colonial attitudes and policies often caused them as much or more trouble than the Germans did.

[@gagamba9198]

Informative video. You ought to do a video on battlefield communications, which are a force multiplier. For example, the Germans were wise to install radios, up to three I recall, in its tanks.

[@richardmeyeroff7397]

I definitely agree!

[@noobster4779]

When the potential frontline and enemy staging area is only around 100km from your main economical and logistical centre you dont put logistic first. First objective is to secure that area by pushing the enemy away from it.

[@pRahvi0]

Indeed. When you can literally shoot the enemy from the backyard of your factory, it's somewhat less of concern how to deliver the equipment far.

[@andrerousseau5730]

I think an investigative video describing the 3m breitspurbahn projekt would be of interest particularly with relevance to it's military carrying capacity had it been implemented.

[@nirfz]

You mention the somewhat focus of the german logistics on a short period of fighting as well as the regions inside and around the borders. Does that also mean that the logistic was kind of "surprised" to have to operate so far outside the planned area of interest? So one could assume that if they had known before the war that it would bring them so far into russia they would have changed their logistical strategies or at least adjusted earlier and planned accordingly? (I mean in WW1 it took the US quite some time to build up and prepare while under no threat itself to be able to take part so i assume that such an adjustement during fighting would not be that possible)

[@klobiforpresident2254]

All German planning assumed a short war in the east - a reasonable assumption, given what they knew. Certainly planning for a long war would have been different.

[@pierQRzt180]

3.44 The English version is a bit confusing. You wrote "still being the strongest as the overall weaker at the decisive point in each case". I would have written: "[...] being the strongest in decisive points/situations although being the weaker force in the overall picture" (I am pratically leaving away the "an dem jeweils") Just my idea, as the German part flows much better than the english part here (then again, we are not professional translators)

[@s.sestric9929]

"YOU HAD HORSES!!!! WHAT WERE YOU THINKING???"

[@dankoz6340]

Always a pleasure to hear about logistics.

[@DanHageeStuff]

I LOVE this video...I have always contended that the simplest reason for Germany's defeat in WW2 was that Germany entered a Strategic World War with a Theater war fighting philosophy and Order of Battle. No lengthy history of colonies so no appreciation of the need for logistics matching the time and space challenges their conquests thrust upon them.

[@dulls8475]

Or is that because they had no colonies (I know a few) that they never had the infrastructure to transport over long distances? I am sure they were aware of the need for logistics. I always thought that Hitler's lack of respect for his enemies lead him to plan for a short war not a long one etc...So logistics were not as well developed as they could have been.

[@f__kyoudegenerates]

@@dulls8475 It was their socialist economy and autarky that was the problem.

[@SLDFMechWarrior]

So Patton was wrong about Germany being on the its last legs when he saw their carts in France.

[@neocomp92]

The Germans did not do enough research on Logistik Kompanies and build enough infrastructures to the front. Too busy researching Panzers and Mobile Warfare doctrine

[@cossaizy6309]

The german was literally lets conquer everything before our fuel and food run out

[@kaiserkiefer1760]

Char Zy fuck bro it nearly worked let’s not egg em on😂

[@dongilleo9743]

Historically, Germany had always had fewer resources than it's surrounding potential enemies that had greater resources. German warfare as far back as 1870 depended on fighting quick, fast, wars of maneuver, rather than longer wars of attrition that they did not believe they could win. Economic concerns directed a lot of German military operations during WW2. Germany invaded the Balkans and Greece, and launched the airborne assault on Crete, to protect German oil supply from Romania. German invaded Norway to secure shipments of iron ore from Sweden. Germany invaded the Soviet Union to secure grain, minerals, oil, etc, that it needed to fight a prolonged war. Individually, the best, most capable men probably went into combat units. Few if any men ever were awarded an Iron Cross for bravery, or received a promotion, for meritorious action working in supply and logistics. Japan had a similar problem. Every Japanese officer wanted to be a glorious combat commander. Far too few wanted to be experts in electronics, radar operators, engineering, etc; all fields in which the Americans had a good head start and continued to build on through the war.

[@coachmen8508]

This is worthy of far more than 117000 subscribers

[@donneale7555]

Victory through Airpower by Disney of all people discussed this concept very well I found it remarkably well thought out and fairly simple to follow The best part is that so did the Allied command when shown the movie during there Quebec meeting, which led to the air war

[@user-xj1jk5rr4q]

Speaking about the Barbarossa, Halder wrote in his diary that particular problems with army supply during summer 1941 or even further were caused by unsatisfactory performance of head of railways in Poland. And it was identified only several months after beginning of the war. Does this statement find a verification in documents?

[@peterkluwer8913]

Hello! It is a very good experience to be enlightened by your excellent videos, so thank you! I have a theory, that unfortunately I haven't got the sources to prove, though you might be able to help me out. When one looks at the way the nations perceive war and think about war, Germany seems like they treat war as an art. That means, its intuitive, experienced based and "ad hoc" way of doing things. I get this thought from German military writings, because rarely you read the instructive "If A happens, you must do B". On the other hand, reading american (and what little translated litterature I have on the Soviets) sources, it seems much more stringent and instructive. "In this situation, you react thus" with an emphasis on synchronisation, uniformity and clarity. It is easy to understand why the different nations would do it thus, since the Soviets and Americans are to train large "citizen armies", where clear and instructive doctrines are necessary, since the individual commander, doesn't have time to reach the experience level needed to treat war as a craft or an art. The relevance to logistics, is that logistics can be easily treated as a science. I.e. facts, numbers and figures - and except when "organising" stuff, having intuition and improvisation isn't all that needed. On the other hand, I can almost imagine how the operational artisan and the craftsman of war, in the Wehrmacht, must have looked down on disdain upon the "technical" services and the "nerdy" officers who tried to rationalise the logistics system. (I refer here to the video on the most unsuccesful general, that you did) Is this train of thought completely derailed or is there some merit to it?

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

hmmm, I can't really confirm that theory/thesis. First aspect that clearly breaks with that is the fact that the Germans were extremely good with using their trains for mobilization (1870/71), which is scheduling trains etc. which is rather stringent from what I understand. The less instructive nature seems to be more based on assuming a high-level of education and responsibility, which is more reflected in Auftragstaktik as well. Whereas the US and Soviets were faced with building an army from scratch (US) and lower education levels (and also "trust") (SU). The other aspect is that Germans were and are very analytical and logical. So, I can't see the "art" aspect. I think it is more down to the line that logistics was not seen as crucial nor as particularly glorious. In that regard I think this was the same for all and is also true for "civilians" look at how many people watch tactics vs. logistics videos. Commander vs. "bean counter".

[@peterkluwer8913]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized first of all, thank you for answering with these good points. I would mostly agree with you, but I do have some rebuttals. On the trains, yes it is rather stringent, but implying that stringent is an impossibility with an intuitive way of war, is not accurate. Also, if the Wehrmacht is percieved as a homogeneous unit, it can be problematic. Leaning on "A Genius for War" by Trevor N Depuy (I know it got bad reviews, but it was none the less instructive), the transport department of the general staff was only one of several departments. If we draw that argument even further out, the rail services were driven by civilian or paramilitary administrations. You have some very good points of trust and education, although I see them more as a complimenting argument to my initial point - that is, that part of the basis for being able to adopt a "art of war"-doctrine would be very high level of education (Look at the route an officer had to take to get on the general staff course). For the soviets, there general understanding, for lack of a better word, of the world as being scientific, also helps explain why they would adopt a scientific way of war. The cultural element is very important, and I think that would be the nail in the proverbial coffin for my thesis. I simply do not know if the upper echelon of the german armed forces, despised "REMFs" more or less than they did in other armies - I would tend towards that they did, since most of the germans best generals were generally known for flair and brilliance tactically and operational - whereas the greater allied commanders, such as Montgomery (with the exception of Market Garden), Omar Bradley and Bill Slim, where known to be very methodical in their approach to operations. But, on this I can only speculate - as I said, I do not know enough of this.

[@MrAmptech]

I removed my question because I realized it was not worth the effort

[@bbrf033]

Well done

[@etiennesauve3386]

To me, that logistics quote is often used my amateurs that want want to look professional. Strategy, tactics, logistics, training and technologies are importants factors in an armed conflict and the importance of each of them will depend on the context.

[@mathewm7136]

One star generals argue strategy, four star generals discuss logistics.

[@fulcrum2951]

Logistics is part of strategy

[@mikeypeinado383]

Logistics is the most vital and crucial aspect of war. Do u know for every one soldier it took 12 men on logistic teams to follow. It's nuts . How much it cost and how they were able to operate . Outstanding

[@MarcosElMalo2]

Logisistics is an important subsystem or component of the war-making system. We conceptualize it as a discrete component, but it also blends (or bleeds) into other subsystems. Bernard touched on this: The Wehrmacht didn’t just have a problem of getting supplies to the front, but they had the even bigger problem of the soldiers keeping any sort of pace with the tanks. Even those infantry units equipped with trucks had to contend with terrible conditions of roads (which got even worse after rain). Without relatively equal mobility among the branches, combined arms doctrine falls apart. Envelopment strategies are not as effective (or doomed to failure) if the main force infantry is a day or more behind the tanks. Put another way, war-making system is a country’s war-making capacity. The German leadership was well aware of their limitations in raw materials. industrial capacity, and transport but at the same time chose to ignore it in their planning. They had a misplaced faith that it would somehow work itself out.

[@MarcosElMalo2]

@@fulcrum2951 It should be. To some degree, it always is-most military leaders understand the importance of protecting your lines of communication and supply.

[@nk_3332]

The only quibble is Nathan Bedford Forrest (not known for fighting Canada or Mexico) said 'I get there first with the most men', countrified into Get there firstest with the mostest. So even when fighting in a Continental War situation, logistics is always foremost on the mind of an American commander. Ironically, at work the 'hidden factory' and 'tribal knowledge' to make failing systems work are always problems. Because the next worker may not know the hidden solution. So we have to both preserve and standardize the tribal knowledge into doctrine and eliminate the need for the hidden factory.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

well, "the first and the most" was something the Germans were pretty good at, see 1870.

[@awf6554]

Thats an exception that proves the rule. The US had experience campaigning in the sparse interior with infrastructure more similar to Russia than to Germany or France.

[@klosmu]

Would be nice to see a "Context Matters!" t-shirt :)

[@Riceball01]

That would be something Matt Easton would like.

[@ruisperkele741]

Wehrmacht logistics weren't bad. They were poorly managed and thus insufficient. One does not simply walk in to Moscow.

[@bradleyl3]

Have you read “Operation Barbarossa: A complete Organizational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation?” I have only read excerpts, but Nigel Askey makes a pretty compelling case of Germany’s significant advantage in logistics at the beginning of Barbarossa. He seems to debunk the idea of the German Army being largely horse drawn. Yes, they had a lot of horses, as did every army at the time. They also had a tremendous amount of cargo capacity in vehicles at the beginning. I would be interested in your thoughts as he seems to describe a lot of detail and analysis to prove his hypotheses.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

I have the book, but hadn't time to look at it yet. Thanks for the hint!

[@MaxSluiman]

Interesting, again!

[@MagisterMagnificum]

"You want logistics? Join the Army. Marines make do!" - Lt Nathaniel Fick, Generation Kill

[@binaway]

In the late 1800's The Prussians sent officers to the USA to study the rail logistics of the Barnum & Bailey Circus.

[@Romanov117]

Simple: Horses and Trains With a small Force of automobiles.

[@NenekAtuk89]

Imperial Japanese Army also suffered the same problem of overstretched (if not weak) logistics. It became apparent in their campaign to invade India through Imphal and Kohima in 1944. So poor the road accessibility and connectivity in Burma, the IJA driven through Indian-Burmese border with little provisions to increase their speed and surprise against the British Army, hopeful to replenish their dwindling ammo and food through foraging the invaded territories and the abandoned British supply depot. Unfortunately, the IJA faced tougher resistance from the British Army. In the end, the IJA had to relied on an air-dropped supply provided by the RAF that were intended for the besieged British troops. In the end, IJA had to withdrew after horrendous losses of men and the arrival of rainy monsoon season.

[@xiangli2452]

This is 2019, shouldn't Stahel's 3 books and the Germany and WW2 v4 be used in this video? Though the two Davie Journal papers were cited as reference, but the contents were barely touched.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

You missed the point of the video.

[@yux.tn.3641]

yeah, for Germany invading Netherlands, Belgium or Denmark = they are fairly close and small so the war can be over soon...yet USSR IS MASSIVE AND FURTHER AWAY

[@redseagaming7832]

You are correct it gets harder to supply your armies the bigger and farther away that country is from your own

[@daviddevault8700]

The Continental US is huge. Vast areas are semi populated wilderness. It takes days to get across Texas and California. Just the boarder of Texas and Mexico is more than twice the size of the western front of WW1. Yes we have historically had to fight along both boarders but not often and not always against the our neighbors just along that territory. Many other states take over 8 hours to drive across. Add in Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands and many other places. If the US were invaded along the boarder, most of the country would not be a war zone.

[@luciusgarvous]

died when you mentioned Bethesda games LOL

[@btbucks]

Where never able to upgrade the Mark I horse to the Mark II horse.

[@dosrios57]

I have read the German Hobnail boot was a Dertiment in WW2 causing Frostbite through Conduction the the freezing Ground into the boot via the Hobnail.

[@davidenko2468]

was it not russian train lines being different to european ones ? slowing down munitions troops etc to russian front

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

that is one of the superficial reasons or better not a real reason, because that was well known. The Germans didn't invade Russia/Soviet Union for the first time not to mention international trade etc.

[@davidenko2468]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized just one part of a much larger problem then thankyou for the reply great videos love them

[@AlexanderSeven]

Not only different gauge, but Soviets also tried to completely destroy railway infrastructure when retreating - repair facilities, water stations etc, making using of Soviet railways hard.

[@HaqqAttak]

They would get to a certain point and there would be no more trains. They would have to convoy hundreds of kilometers risking partisan and air attack the entire way.

[@12hairyjohn]

David Stahel points out that Soviet locomotive wre larger due to a lower population density, so the Wehrmacht had to build more coaling stations than the soviets originally had. The larger Soviet locomotives also had a larger volume to surface area, and all ther things being equal would lose heat.

[@Colin-kh6kp]

Barbarossa was the most insanely optimistic human endeavor ever conceived.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

> Barbarossa was the most insanely optimistic human endeavor ever conceived. maybe, but there are a lot of contenders, see Afghanistan (several options), Vietnam, etc.

[@willied88m]

You can call artillery the King of battle and infantry the queen of battle ! But logistics is the ace of spades♠️! A professional army moves on beans, bullets, fuel, and morale!🇺🇸

[@Schmidt54]

Wann bekommst du eigentlich deinen Lehrstuhl an einer Uni? WIrd mal Zeit. :)

[@Iceburg814]

I wrote a research paper about why logistics was one of the main reasons Germany lost WWII. Germany also overdesigned much of their equipment, tanks being a great example. It made it harder to fix and repair and created supply chain oil. Failure to crush the British at Dunkirk due to logistics. Failure to listen to Rommel about North Africa and the importance of capturing oil in the Middle East. Not being properly prepared for the invasion of Russia, as well as many other errors.

[@keithplymale2374]

Gulf War 1 was as much a logistics war as a fighting war. Without the ability to deploy and sustain the land, air and sea forces the tactical victory could never have happened.

[@jamestheotherone742]

Or Gulf War2, or the Vietnam war, or the Korean war, all the way back to the Roman campaigns. Pretty much any war where you are projecting power. You backward plan from what/where you need to be at some point, and the hard work is getting it all there.

[@keithplymale2374]

@@jamestheotherone742 I was thinking back to something I read in the 1990's that was an example of what the GW 1 logistics effort was like. It was as if you had taken a city of 600,000 people, transported that city, down to the last tree, dog, cat and blade of grass, several thousand miles to a barren desert, sustained and supplied and kept that city running like normal for 6 months, and then transported it back with out loosing a single tree, dog, cat or blade of grass.

[@jamestheotherone742]

@@keithplymale2374 It lost plenty of grass. They just took triplicates of everything.

[@yewisemountaingoat528]

Keith Plymale Hate to say this but I believe the outcome of Gulf War 1 was a foregone conclusion. A significant percentage of Saddam's troops were veterans from the Iran-Iraq war and most tank forces were dug down because they had little fuel for training let alone any active warfare. You might as well have blindfolded the Iraqi troops. Most of them had little to no will or reason to fight for Saddam Hussein anyway and were not very motivated.

[@od1452]

Thanks again for an interesting topic. I remember reading somewhere (Guderian ? ) the SS and Luftwaffe received winter clothing sooner because their branches prioritized the effort. The Army chose other priorities . I don't know if this is true.( If it was Guderian, he could just be finding scapegoats.) I know some writers imply that it was because of political chicanery by the SS and Luftwaffe. But if Guderian (?) is correct.. The Army must have thought the welfare of troops and loss of combat effectiveness due to inadequate clothing was of lesser importance. This implies to me a different agenda or strategy...or the hope victory was just around the corner.

[@nattygsbord]

In what context? The German army did have winter clothes in 1941, but they reached the troops in the frontline later than needed because the railway transport system was overloaded in late 1941, and the German army had to make a tough choice between transporting food, fuel, ammunition and winter clothes. And the German army thought that ammunition seemed more important than clothes because there was heavy fighting going on and much ammo would be needed in the final struggle in Russia to take Moscow. But the priority was wrong in hindsight now when we know that 1941 would be one of the coldest Russian winters in history, and that many German troops therefore would freeze to death or get injured by the frost. And in 1942 did the German 6th army in Stalingrad not get their winter clothes because the Luftwaffe fucked up and packed their transport planes with useless shit instead of providing the troops with warm clothes.

[@stuartm2106]

@@nattygsbord I read that the AGC commander Bock prioritised fuel and ammunition over winter clothing so he could launch the thrust against Moscow. He was gambling that he could capture Moscow before the real cold weather set in and lost the gamble.

[@thomasjamison2050]

Somewhere this is a well known quote by a German general regarding the logistics of invading Russia. It roughly equates to 'we will quickly get into a depth of 500 km and then the logistics will fail.' The Germans were too enamored of the short war idea as actual history shows they could in fact sustain for several years in the East. They might well have done better to take their cue from WWI when they went into Russia without going too far East but also took pains to prepare for the winter weather. German kill/capture ratios indicate that had they kept their range of operations more shallow and, at the same time, stuck with highly mobile tactics, they could have drained off the Soviet manpower resources effectively, though not without cost.

[@DasKeksmonster]

Können sie die Videos auch in Deutsch machen oder deutschen Untertitel hinzufügen?

[@macro2k7]

logistics are though bigger force multipliers than you have allowed, dictating whether you can use your whole force,and for how long you can do so. Where american divisions can split into 3 and each force has resources for extended multi day operations a german equivalent striking force shrinks in time as it has to leave more out of fuel/out of ammo units stranded behind each day. When you get to the point that heavy resource intensive assets like artillery mid war get rationed to several rounds a day the goose is cooked even if germany defends well with the resources it has. on an unrelated point (but following up on a video you did about how the ussr built up its mortar assets) I cant help feeling that mortar use and how to counter it became one of the most important factors on the eastern front. Germany's air force didnt seem to make quick enough use of photoreconnaissance, or interdiction of supplies. That german artillery was often outranged by ussr gun tubes meant that germany was losing the long tube side of the counterbattery battle. When half the artillery weight pummelling your troops is mortar based though, that is a big problem compounded. Mortars are much easier to dig in and camouflage and in WW2 we are a long way from having radar directed counter battery fire. If your airforce cannot put interdiction pressure on and limit supplies then not being able to effectively counter all these tubes is going to hurt your infantry in a huge way

[@dongilleo9743]

Germany made greater and greater use of mortars as the war went on. In terms of manufacturing, they were cheaper, needed fewer resources and materials, and were easier to make than more traditional artillery pieces. This was important for German industry trying to keep up with the devastating losses of equipment being suffered on every front, especially in the east.

[@volvo1354]

Barbarossa planning seemed to negate the fact that there were few paved highways in the Soviet Union road network, and the rail gauge in the USSR was different than that of Western Europe - causing the Germans to rely on captured locomotives and rail cars.

[@volvo1354]

@@divyanshsukhija6344 I steadfastly agree

[@fulcrum2951]

Amateurs types in "amateurs talks strategy, professionals study logistics" but professionals includes contexts

[@watcherzero5256]

You do have the applaud the speed the advancing German army was converting Russian gauge rails to Standard Gauge to allow rail logistics to keep up with the front.

[@klobiforpresident2254]

Indeed, especially since partisans were a thing.

[@mitchrichards1532]

The issues with Barbarossa are indeed very complex. One that I'd like to see brought into the light and get more attention is medical. Wehrmacht medical services, medical logistics, etc. were inadequate and heavily contributed to personnel wastage. See for example the scathing review of German medical practices at the end of the war as surveyed by the U.S. Army Medical Corps. After nearly six years of fighting, the Germans were still struggling with typhus, mostly due to poor sanitary practices, and hospital standards were considered sub-par to say the least.

[@paolob.5667]

I think part of the answer is "they were 1000km long"

[@BelleDividends]

Also, while German logistics sucked in Russia, better than to solely focus on trucks were their problems trains and a lack of fuel.

[@84sp84]

I would also suspect the German logistics suffered as the war drug on from a constant “sweeping out” of personnel in the rear areas as replacements for frontline losses. A bad situation was steadily being made worse.

[@jamestheotherone742]

Not so much. Your logistics gets "easier" when you are on the defense or in retreat. Your supply lines and frontal areas get shorter, making transport easier when you aren't chasing advancing units. As combat units were attritted, many support units became superfluous. A division that is now the size of a brigade, does not need a division sized staff, etc. The German army, like any organization, had its share of malingers that were avoiding front line duty.

[@gregorykrajeski6255]

Did you say "the Faster Games" when you meant "the Hunger Games" or did I mishear?

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

Didn't say neither, I think you mean the passage with Bethesda games.

[@gregorykrajeski6255]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized When you mis-hear something your mind tries to make up some story to explain it no matter how far fetched. Thanks for the clarification!

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

I was so confused when I read your comment, until I remembered I made a Bethesda Games joke there, because I was like "wtf I don't say anything about games"... then it dawned on me. Yeah, I know that problem. There was Running Wild song a friend and me tried to transcribe before a festival in 2000, when we had no access to the lyrics and one part came out as "Jeff was born at midnight" and this was clearly not the line of the song :D

[@daniellastuart3145]

The first real conflict were British had think about logistics was in Spain during the Napoleonic wars

[@user_____M]

I watched your entire video and I still have no idea why the German logistics were bad, you just stated some situations and that's about it. :|

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

you don't fix something, which you don't consider broken.

[@DagarCoH]

Basically two aspects: Germany always focused on quick, decisive victories. That was the case in the prussian-austrian and in the german-french wars in the 19th and in the first world war in the 20th century. While this did not succeed in the latter case, that was not an aspect of failing logistics but a failure to deliver such a decisive blow to the enemy. While Germany always tried to improve on every aspect of their military, logistics always had been sufficient and, despite being improved, never were set up for thousands of km of transport for millions of troops over several years, because that was not the kind of war they fought. Russia had been expected by all sides to yield quickly, which was also backed by historical evidence from WW1 and their campaigns in between the wars, as well as the fact that there was unrest in the coubtry, just as it had been in 1914. No one expected the Soviets not to surrender, and by doing so, they denied the germans their expected and needed quick victory they were also used to from Poland, Norway and France. Logistics had been planned out for quite some penetration into SU territory, but not as far as Germany actually had to go, because it just seemed unlikely. Basically, it's as if you were planning a camping weekend for two and then were faced with having to organize food and shelter for twenty people for a month in the wild.

[@kittymervine6115]

one oddity...trains for the Concentration Camps kept rolling. the resources both in Germany and the new territory conquered, to deal with the numbers of Jewish and other undesirable civilians was huge. Even upon entering Russia, bullets and officers and men were busy killing thousands and even filming it. Which is why today on KZbin you can see some of these mass executions and think "Wouldn't this all be better spent on the enemy soldiers?" Mind you, the making of a movie even had a great strain on resources at the end of the war, with troops serving as extras and trains delivering supplies. Sadly not many were able to see the masterpiece this movie was supposed to be, but the waste of resources on solving the Jewish problem (hey they cost the Germans victory in WWI, right?) and the silly movie produced that was to inspire everyone to victory despite most movie theaters being closed due to bombing....my own German relatives, who kept in close touch with the US cousins, when the US joined in...then they gave up. The last ones alive still blamed Germany for not stopping Japan! (Mind you, finding out the full truth about the "solution" they became fans of defeat)

[@Boric78]

Good this. Don't comment as much as I should - but this was excellent. Also love that you, Bismarck and the Sea King "Drach" are finally getting the Kudos's you deserve. Perhaps when the Great Grey Beards / Mustaches head to the Great Tank Museum in the sky or at least, Eastbourne - they can give you the job? I shall look forward to Drachs' justification to Parliament, why HMS Edinburgh is wasted on the Thames and should be his.

[@Boric78]

HMS Belfast - always doing that. Its like a mental block. Been round it twice, for F*c*s Shake!

[@martinmartinmartin2996]

Why is the explanations of the Nazis, and the behavior of the Waffen SS in the Operation Barbarossa NOT even mentioned?

[@valenrn8657]

Logistics without raw materials to back it up means little. Logistics involves raw materials mining, materials production, and movement. For raw materials, the British Empire has access to two large land continents from Canada and Australia.

[@matheusimon7316]

How someone dislike your videos

[@greggjennings2649]

the logistics problems were a result of the German military culture that valued combat troops over support troops. commonly disrespecting non-combat ranks. Scientists and engineers were held in low regard, often not wanting their rating displayed on their uniform as having a technical rating meant being disrespected by combat officers, even when outranking them. Hitler himself said "The war will not be lost because of a supply problem!" somehow believing it could be fixed simply by ordering it to be so. The biggest problem was that the German high command learned exactly the wrong lesson from the war with France. The 1st great blunder was in turning away from Dunkirk to march on Paris. This only worked because Paris was so close to the sea, effectively cutting France into pieces. It was simply not possible to drive the panzers to the pacific. The engines would not hold up, even if they could be supplied with fuel. Notice also that while German planes, tanks and other equipment was the best of the era, once it broke down, there were no parts available to repair it. Most planes ending up abandoned, so too with panzers, once the transmission blew out there was none to replace it with. Both the T-34 and the Sherman showed the advantage of building lots of inferior tanks fast over custom panzers that could not be repaired or replaced.

[@mikereger1186]

Questions: Of US aid shipped to the USSR, how much of it was trucks and logistic or transport vehicles? And what proportion, year on year, did this contribute to Soviet logistics capability?

[@garyevans3421]

The Marine interest in logistics can be boiled down in their experience in the Guadacanal campaign. Their transport ships were loaded in the normal efficient of space method to get them to New Zealand. Then absolute chaos broke out on the docks as they had to unload absolutely everything and reload for an invasion so ammo and provisions could be unloaded in a hurry which is profligate in space on ships. It’s a minor miracle that the Marines held on and eventually prevailed on slim rations in the face of several devastating defeats of the US Navy mostly by holding the only airfield on the island.

[@clydecessna737]

It's difficult imagine how Germany could have built a logistic system that would be sufficient for maintaining a front along the Grozny Moscow axis; the strategic ambitions were simply too great. The use of terror to protect interior lines in the conquered lands was self defeating. Remember that Germany would have suffered atomic annihilation even if its armies had reached Vladivostok. German strategies of both WW1 and WW2 were fundamentally unrealistic; Germany was being led by insular men with poor education that could not conceive of something like US Steel at Gary Indiana or Liberty ship production on new sites like Richmond California. Never let ideology drive strategy.

[@rustammamin5726]

In WW1 Germany+Austria-Hungary had good chances to win. So the questions remains about WW2. The only question that remains: Why Germany begun to prepare to WW2? Definitely it is not because of ideology - countries does not begin wars because of ideology.