I will have to watch it! BTW Lydia McGrew told me that she found some of your work on editorial fatigue helpful in her recent series critiquing it.

@ this really means a lot to me. I have so much respect for her and you all - you can’t imagine! I’m just a guy trying to do my little thing. Thanks!!

Glad it's been helpful to you!

Well given how many people appear to be quoting from them, it would be hard to imagine them all inventing these quotations. Eusebius in particular argues against Papias' Millenialism. It would be very strange for him to be inventing quotations just to argue against them. And the vast vast majority of ancient literature has not survived until the present. It's not all that surprising that Papias' writings have not survived.

Unfortunately it is. This is why I don't really take matters of "consensus" among biblical scholars very seriously anymore. Their methodology is atrocious.

And if you look at Hebrew manuscripts of Matthew, although quite corrupted, they show a lot of originality in the Q and M sections particularly. They also contain seemingly random insertions of "At that time Jesus said to his disciples".

I think that Clement probably is independent of Papias and Irenaeus. As it happens, I also think that Papias and Irenaeus are independent.

Thank you. As always, I appreciate your kind comments. 😊

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 By the way, I love interviewing apologists/philosophers on my channel, so if there's ever a topic you want to talk about, I'd love to have you on. I always send the recordings over to my guests so they can post on their channels as well. It's an open invitation if you ever had a topic you wanted to discuss. I personally loved your video on the historicity of the book of Acts. I think that'd be a great conversation. Let me know if you're interested!

​@@theepitomeministry thanks, I would be honored

The first premise seems straightforwardly false to me. If one thinks that induction is certifiable a priori, then it doesn't assume the uniformity of nature or anything else for that matter. The second premise is also dubious. Induction yields probabilistic justification for propositions based upon a sampling of some class. It has never been a guarantee of truth. So occasional irregularities or false positives don't negate the justification afforded by induction. I find the wording of the third premise vague. What does it mean to break a regularity? Does this just mean to not be regular event? In other words, do all irregular events break regularity? If so, then what we have here isn't an inductive argument against miracles. It's an inductive argument against all irregular events. And I'm happy enough to grant that, as with all other irregular events, they are inductively improbable by definition. But that hardly means that one can't rationally believe in them when there is good evidence for them.

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I wanted to ask two questions for clarification purposes. When you say "If one thinks that induction is certifiable a priori, then it doesn't assume the uniformity.." What do you mean by "If one thinks that induction is certifiable a priori"? And the second question is when you say "It's an inductive argument against all irregular events. And I'm happy enough to grant that... But that hardly means that one can't rationally believe in them when there is good evidence for them." If you grant the argument against irregular events. What are the alternative methods to proving that miracles (or irregular events) have "good evidence" for them? Especially since most are transmitted via testimony (induction). Like do you have any thing in mind that as to what this might look like with an example?

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Sorry about the ping, I was wondering If I could get an update.

denying premise 3 of either this argument or your argument would be asinine

Did you not watch the whole video before commenting? He decisively refutes that parody argument.

​@@theepitomeministryI'm not going to watch a 3 hour video on this argument. these two arguments rise and fall together and it's clear that he doesn't even understand logical modality if he thinks premise 3 is contentious (in either version)

if the strategy for defending this argument is just going to be "you didn't sit through 3 hour video" that's pretty sad

@iruleandyoudont9 There is literally timestamps in the description. You can find the relevant section and watch the few minutes on it, though the previous sections are helpful for context. The arguments do not fall together, and he explains why. I thought the same thing when I first saw the syllogism, but I know his videos are always thorough, so I sat through the 3 hours, and sure enough, he decisively refuted the argument, just like I knew he would. You don't have to do the same, but don't pretend as if he hasn't dealt with your argument. I had the same one, and he did.

Bro, nice: "ChatGPT, give me 8 parodies of the modal argument that show I have no idea what I'm talking about or about philosophy, so I can comment 10 minutes after a 3-hour video gets published, clearly showing I don't care to understand the topic."

​@@howardparkes8787 nevermind that each of these parody arguments contains a false and/or nonsensical premise. 😉

​@@faithbecauseofreason8381 like your own premise

​@@thomasbardoux1692He refuted parody arguments in the video. You are cringe af 😂

@@giftedtheos démonstration by comparison are not parody arguments. They expose the lack of logic in the original argument

Dangerous to distrust the united testimony of modern scholars or of the Church Fathers?

@ Grammatically and following the sense, it must be the fathers.

@ There is no ambiguity. The last noun in agreement mentioned: the fathers.

Reading through your comment, it seems to me that we have very different understandings of the role that the laws of logic play. You seem to think of them as imposing themselves upon the world by prohibiting contradictions from obtaining. I view them as purely descriptive necessary truths. I’ll try to illustrate by discussing some of your remarks. “You asserted that there could be a world with no human minds, but this does not mean, …, that that particular world could rationally exist without laws of logic.” Well I didn’t merely assert this. I stated that this was a conceivable state of affairs. And given that conceivability is our guide for determining what is possible, then it follows that such a state of affairs is indeed possible. “Do you believe that it is possible for a world made up of only rocks to violate the law of non-contradiction?” No, because a contradiction involves two propositions which assert mutually incompatible things. A world made up of only rocks contains no propositions and, therefore, no contradictions. Such a world also doesn’t include the law of non-contradiction. The world can still be described (from within our world) and all true descriptions of it will be non-contradictory. But the law of non-contradiction (LNC) doesn’t exist in that world because, as I said, no propositions exist in that world. “In this world, is it possible for these rocks to be rocks and not be rocks? Is it possible for water to exist and not exist in this world? Is it possible for these rocks to be humans but also not be humans?” I think you are confusing the LNC with the reality of objects being what they are. The LNC asserts that contradictory propositions cannot be true at the same time and in the same sense. It has nothing to do with rocks not being rocks. Rocks aren’t propositions. “In order for this hypothetical world to be a world of rocks and not a world of rocks that are rocks and not rocks in the same way it must also honor the law of non-contradiction, excluded-middle, and law of identity, which would imply that this world was created by a Divine Mind if you concede that laws of logic are thoughts.” Again, laws of logic are about propositions - not physical objects. The LNC doesn’t somehow stop contradictions from obtaining which would, in the absence of the LNC, otherwise obtain. Or at least, you’re going to need substantial argumentation to establish this if that’s your belief. But then you are not even operating upon Anderson and Welty’s conception of a logical law anymore. “If you respond, no it is impossible for those rocks to be rocks and not rocks in the same way because the laws of logic exist in another world about this rock world, then my question is: have human minds always existed across all possible worlds?” Yeah, that wouldn’t be my response. My response to what I understand your position to be would be that laws of logic are simply not necessary for retaining the identity of physical objects. Objects can retain identity without needing a law which keeps them that way. And if you think that they do need such a law, then my objection will be that this leads to an infinite regress of ever more basic laws. If you think that the LNC is needed to keep a rock as a rock, then I’m going to ask what keeps the LNC as itself? You’re going to have to posit a more basic law. But then what keeps that law as itself? You’ll need still another law and so on forever. Alternatively you could say that the LNC keeps itself as itself without the need for a more basic law. But if that’s allowed, then you can’t object to me saying that no deeper grounding is needed for physical objects to just remain as they are. “In short, if you believe that laws of logic are thoughts and if you believe that there was a time when human minds (or other finite alien minds in all possible worlds) didn’t exist then you have to concede that the laws of logic are Divine thoughts.” I most certainly do not have to concede that. And the video explains why. I deny that necessary truths have to necessarily exist. And I deny what seems to be the key premise of your version of this argument that logical laws are needed in order for objects to retain their identity.

I think you’re misunderstanding my argument in various ways. “Let's say that I didn't know that billiard balls caused other billiard balls to move on a pool table. Given your argument, the best explanation for their movement would be indeterminism until someone showed me otherwise.” But I did show otherwise or, at least, I attempted to. I explained that the movement only occurs when contact is made between billiard balls moreover the movement is in a trajectory and a t a velocity which is determined by the angle at which the contact is made. These factors help to explain why causation is the best explanation for the movement. “This seems incredibly strange... that the plausibility of indeterminism is dictated by our ignorance of a phenomenon.” Yeah, that’s a simple misstatement of the argument. The justification arises from the simplicity of the hypothesis (all else being equal). It doesn’t arise from ignorance. “It gets even stranger, given that you concede determinism for the majority of phenomenon in the universe, and selectively choose indeterminism for things where antecedents aren't obvious.” Granting determination in some cases is not granting determinism. Determinism, by definition, is an exhaustive thesis. “If simplicity is the goal, wouldn't it be much simpler to suppose that everything is deterministic, and that my ignorance of a phenomenon has no effect on the world?” That would not be simpler since it would commit you to a host of unevidenced determinition relations. “To me, a world that is split between deterministic and indeterministic processes based on our current level of understanding is the least simple thing imaginable.” How? A world which is indeterministic entails fewer relations than a determinsitic world. Erog, an indeterministic world is simpler since it contains fewer total entities. This is simple math, my friend. “And to top it all off, mental states DO have antecedents. To say that they don't is to ignore pretty much all of neuroscience. Mental states are preceded by brain states full stop.” I never denied that certain mental states have physical correlates or even causes. IDK why you’re acting like I did. My position is that deliberate decisions are not sufficiently determined by anything. That’s what you would need to demonstrate and nothing in contemporary neuroscience even comes close to demonstrating this. “Even if you were able to justify indeterminism for mental states, you would still be left explaining how a non determined mental state could result in something we intended to happen.” Well I did explain this. My view is that the causation is direct. There is no intermediary mechanism. But I don’t actually have to explain this because one can know that something is the case without knowing how or why it is the case. “The origin of every choice, given that it's not determined, would need to be random, which doesn't sound like free will to me.” I already dealt with this objection in another video.

“At very best, this mental world is a projector screen driven entirely by the physical world. There are no mental states that aren't preceded by physical brain states, so mental states have no causal powers, they are simply reflections of what the physical world is doing.” That’s perfectly comestible with substance dualism along emergent dualist lines. So that doesn’t defeat the argument. “Given that the name of this channel is Faith because of reason, I'm wondering if this initial step of showing substance dualism is pointing towards God, and if so, how is this done? I'm going to check out the other videos so I might answer my own question.” Correct. I addressed this question in the first video in this series where I introduced the mind-body problem.

SD states that the mind and body are different. IDK of any proponent of SD who claims that the two are "contrary". What's the problem supposed to be exactly? It sounds like you're just asking a question as to how the mind and body interact. But that's not a problem. I can ask the physicalist the same question: how do physical entities interact? Is that now a problem for physicalism? Yeah, the interaction works both ways. The mind can affect the body AND the body can affect the mind. SD has never denied that damaging the body or brain can affect the mind. I don't think you know what incoherence is.

You just yada yada over the interaction problem! Yeah, so here we go again - how does SD explain the following: I can point to how brain damage can change memories and personality and ask how believers in the SD can explain this. Because it can't just be that the brain damage is blocking signals from the soul. Things like memory, personality, consciousness are supposed to persist after death, which means they must be stored in the soul, so they should be unaffected by brain damage. Yet that's not what we see. Instead, we see exactly what we'd expect if the brain produced these things. @@faithbecauseofreason8381

“As described, I am unable to find a relevant difference between what you are calling free will and a metaphysical random number generator.” I was very careful to specify that, on my view, free decisions must be deliberate. Do you think that random number generators are deliberate? “I definitely do not see it as useful for anchoring moral responsibility.” I don’t believe in moral responsibility. I suspect that the notion is unintelligible (see my video on the moral argument for details). My theory of free will makes no mention or use of the notion.

@ By _deliberate_ I understand you to mean the output of some type of deliberation process. All that does is locate the random number generator like functionality in the deliberation process. I still don’t see the relevant difference. The reason I mentioned moral responsibility is because that is what motivates most free will advocacy. I’m curious. If you don’t believe in moral responsibility, what motivates your advocacy of free will? Is it to counter problem-of-evil type arguments?

Would be nice if you watch the video and see what he is actually claiming instead of attacking strawman

@WorldCrucified _Would be nice if you read my comment and see what I am actually claiming instead of attacking a strawman._ See how stupid that sounds? I did watch the video. And what strawman do you think I'm attacking? The only claim I made is that none of the arguments presented even mention substances. A proper response to this claim would be to provide a timestamp where an argument does, in fact, mention substances. If you can find one, please provide it.

@@BlueEyesDY He wasn't arguing for substance dualism clown

@@WorldCrucified 0:45 _I begin the task of arguing affirmatively for substance dualism_

One would have to add an additional argument that property dualism is reducible to substance dualism. I think that such arguments are available are successful, but you are correct that I didn't offer such an argument in the video. Still, even property dualism is enough to close the door on physicalism and should, perhaps, make one more sympathetic to substance dualism.

But when it comes to the ontology of mentality, identifying exactly what it is that's present in appearance is required for us to transcend an incomplete account which relies on merely identifying neural correlates of particular mental phenomena. I agree with your first point however. It's actually hard to nail down what physicalism is allowed to entail. I prefer being precise and affirming that if we give an entire account of the brain, the body, the external world and all their functions, there is still something we would be leaving out, namely qualia. So, for any position which tries to reduce qualia to the aforementioned aspects of reality, it must be false. Given this, at lest some forms of non-reductive physicalism are really forms of dualism insofar as they posit something in addition to the brain and rest of the body to account for consciousness.

(1) He never said that this argument shows that substance dualism is true, but it shows that physicalism is false which makes substance dualism more probable. Also I don't see how this argument is compatible with non-reductive physicalism. This argument shows supervenience on the physical is false.

How do you figure that they are question-begging?

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 because you're denying thoughts have certain physical properties (spatiotemporal extension for example) on the basis of some conceptual analysis of thought that presupposes the falsity of physicalism. I have a very strong seeming that my thoughts occur at a place and time, or across an interval of time. my thoughts are not happening on some other planet, they're happening here on earth, at a fairly specific location on its surface etc.

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 sorry I tried to reply but it's not showing up for me. not sure if it's a glitch, sorry if it shows up as a duplicate. but basically I think the way that it's being denied that thoughts have physical properties is by appealing to a conceptual analysis of thought that presupposes physicalism is false. it seems plain to me that my thoughts occur at a fairly specific place and time (or over a certain time interval) and that my thoughts occur at a particular location on the Earth's surface (not on some other planet).

​@@iruleandyoudont9 meaning no offense, but I don't see how this addresses the reasons offered for thinking that mental states differ from brain states let alone show that they are question begging. I offered several reasons for thinking that the two are different. One of those was that (at least some) mental states are known infallibly whereas no physical state can be known infallibly since there is always a possibility of misperception when it comes to physical objects. How is that question-begging? You're free to reject the idea that mental states are known infallibly or try to defend the idea that we can infallibly know physical states. But I don't see how it's question-begging.

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 yeah again, it's question-begging to say that physicalism is false by appealing to a conceptual analysis of thought that presupposes physicalism is false. and yeah I reject that we have infallible knowledge of anything and I have arguments for that. you didn't give any actual arguments to secure the position that we have any infallible knowledge. you built all these things into your conceptual analysis of thought

I argued that there is a lot more to it than a mere seeming.

The is incorrect. Certain versions of substance dualism, like hylomorphic substance dualism (SD), or others that embrace a holistic perspective of mind and body, offer detailed accounts of matter that circumvent the interaction problem. For example, hylomorphism suggests that substances consist of both matter and form, promoting a holistic view where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. On the other hand, modern idealists, while often adopting the physicalist's view on matter, fail to provide a robust metaphysical explanation of its composition or even dismiss its reality. Furthermore, the interaction problem becomes irrelevant when nature is viewed through a teleological and holistic framework. This viewpoint is well-articulated by David Bentley Hart in his new book on the philosophy of mind, "Full of Gods." Hart, an idealist, contends that the interaction objection against SD is inherently nonsensical, stemming from a mechanistic understanding of mereology (the study of how wholes are composed of parts) Thus, it appears that "modern" idealists might be the ones with a metaphysically impoverished view, lacking a comprehensive philosophy of nature.

Wait until the final video in the series. I'll argue there that any plausible version of idealism (namely a dual aspect idealism) is not substantially different from substance dualism. It's just semantic differences at that point.

​@@WorldCrucifiedthere is no interaction problem. IDK why anyone ever thought there was.

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 very excited to see it. You’re doing awesome work.

@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Yeah I would say even if one is familiar with Descartes actual view there is no interaction problem.