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@jonathansnow1886
@jonathansnow1886 12 күн бұрын
My father was an inaugural instructor at the Navy Nuclear Power School in 1958. In grade school I made a poster of all these subs. But I just learned a lot more.
@danielgregg2530
@danielgregg2530 22 күн бұрын
I am so goddamned sick of having to look at strangers' spare bedrooms in order to learn about World War II on line. (And people wonder why the intellectually, culturally, and morally bankrupt win elections.)
@douglascoggeshall2490
@douglascoggeshall2490 Ай бұрын
2024-10-22 ... Thank you John P. for your outstanding dedication and scholarship.
@Aubury
@Aubury Ай бұрын
The Bismarck was caught and sunk only by carrier bourn swordfish. Taranto, three battleships put out of action by carrier aircraft. Carrier aircraft made Malta convoys possible. The battleship was no longer the premium weapon.
@SerikPoliasc
@SerikPoliasc Ай бұрын
Taylor Timothy Anderson Michelle Garcia Kevin
@MegaBloggs1
@MegaBloggs1 2 ай бұрын
why didnt Tanaka break radio silence on the 3rd after he was attacked TWICE on the 3rd by land based aircraft-he knew surprise was lost!?????
@ИринаКим-ъ5ч
@ИринаКим-ъ5ч 2 ай бұрын
Anderson Richard Williams Edward Rodriguez Brian
@kturkalo2129
@kturkalo2129 2 ай бұрын
I first read about Midway probably in the 1960s and the account never quite made sense to me. I always wondered how the destruction of a loaded flight deck would have sunk a carrier, much less 4 carriers. I had thought that this might have rendered the flight deck unusable, but would have left the ship(s) afloat. Planes exploding below decks makes much more sense.
@airplanes42
@airplanes42 2 ай бұрын
Why is this even an issue? It doesn't change the result whether the planes were on the flight deck or in the hangar.
@lanebaillio8326
@lanebaillio8326 2 ай бұрын
The
@SettledBatches
@SettledBatches 2 ай бұрын
19:15 - That's me, attempting to give you a verbal standing O! 26:57 - "CYA" memo, for those in the corporate world.
@richardgreen1383
@richardgreen1383 2 ай бұрын
I flew reciprocating aircraft in T-34s and T-28s in flight training as well as TS-2As (twin engined) and the then S-2Es in the fleet off the USS Randolph and USS Yorktown. I do not remember ever spending 20 minutes to warm up the engines as and air cooled engine warms up rapidly. On land we were heading to the runway in less than 5 minutes, and on the carriers, certainly no more than that if we were the first in line to the cat. There is a pre-start check list, then start, then pre-flight check list and then launch. Film of US Flight Deck operations show the ones in front of the pack starting first and within a short period of time they started their take off roll as the ranks in the back were just starting. You did not want to spend an excessive amount of time idling an air cooled engine, for while you got some air over the engine off the prop, you didn't get anywhere near what you got when airborne. Refueling US aircraft is done on the flight deck. However, when we were still flying props with avgas vs JP, the gasoline vapors would go down, and when leaving our readyroom to go up to the flight deck, once in the passage way you could smell the gasoline vapor in the air. That is the reason before fueling was done the announcement would be made to extinguish the smoking lamp (an old traditional command that basically said NO SMOKING). Once the fuel vapors were vented out of all compartments after completing fueling, the would announce that the smoking lamp was lit. I do not know if the use of JP fuel has the same issues or not.
@d.r.martin6301
@d.r.martin6301 2 ай бұрын
I don't want to watch the whole video, but is any mention given to Nimitz's terrible decision about Peleliu? If not, it should be.
@Vito_Tuxedo
@Vito_Tuxedo 2 ай бұрын
No, there's no mention of Peleliu as the unnecessary bloodbath that it was; however, that subject is completely irrelevant to Jon's presentation, and doesn't represent a contradiction to the Nimitzian operating mode as Trent describes it in his presentation. You'd have to watch all of Trent's piece to see why that's so. The short answer is that he's not out to worship at the Nimitz altar; rather, he shows that Nimitz's approach evolved as a complex adaptive system.
@TheLucanicLord
@TheLucanicLord 3 ай бұрын
I only know of one carrier sunk by a big gun ship, a British one with a dumb commander early in the war. Whereas the other way round, ignoring ones hit in port, there's Yamato and Musashi for starters.
@andrewboyle7331
@andrewboyle7331 3 ай бұрын
If John’s presenting I listen.
@BK-uf6qr
@BK-uf6qr 3 ай бұрын
I have such second hand pride hearing about Painter and the other great men. It was a time in our country that amazes me. Our country became what it silently was already…the greatest nation in the World.
@BK-uf6qr
@BK-uf6qr 3 ай бұрын
This is a fantastic splice of history. A story of a great American aided by great Americans. Doing what was thought impossible. Pure American drive following Pearl Harbor & the internalization that WW2 was a war for Allied survival. They restored American pride with grit.
@ronstewtsaw
@ronstewtsaw 3 ай бұрын
One of the hosts seemed to indicate that Hara's Japanese Destroyer Captain was biased. I read the book earlier this year (It's August 2024 now) and found it thrilling and fascinating. He certainly downplayed the atrocities of Nanking in one sentence. Can somebody tell me what is wrong with that book? Or direct me to a good critique?
@johnschuh8616
@johnschuh8616 3 ай бұрын
Comparing NIMITZ with EISENHOWER, Nimitz is much the more off successful war fighter, Of course, Ike had a political job to to as well as overall commander. But Nimitz ability to work with the Army was also very good. Over all, my favorite WW2 commander, while Ike is one of my favorite presidents. Had he, I am convinced, been able to serve a third term the Cuba mess would not have happened. Only thing, of course, is IKE’s health His heart was not in good shape at all.
@kennethdeanmiller7324
@kennethdeanmiller7324 3 ай бұрын
Yeah, considering that Nagumo had planes coming back from Midway that were low on fuel & needed to land & the strikes on the Japanese Carriers from the Midway aircraft, Nagumo didn't have the time to spot & launch a strike on the American Carriers. Cuz by the time the attacks were over he needed to start landing strike planes.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 2 ай бұрын
That was never an issue. Nagumo made the decision to launch a "grand scale" (meaning two- wave) attack in the 1030- 1100 time- frame. See the Nagumo Report.
@kennethdeanmiller7324
@kennethdeanmiller7324 3 ай бұрын
I find this whole thing rather hilarious. Because, in my mind, I NEVER thought or ever even imagined that the actual flight deck itself had a large number of aircraft on it. I didn't read Fuchido's book about Midway. I had imagined that underneath the flight decks were numerous aircraft with fuel tanks full & that they were hurriedly filling other planes with fuel and rearming them with armor piercing bombs while removing "HE bombs" that were to be used on Midway Island against land targets. AND if ALL those airplanes had been on the flight deck instead of down in the hanger they may have had a better chance. Cuz pilots could have started taking off & the fires would have been on top of the ship in an open air environment instead of confined & making every explosion lead to a chain reaction of another & then another explosion! Plus, those explosions being inside the hanger, also made the cast iron pipes that they used for pumping water to the fire fighting hoses were made to shatter. And so they had no water to fight the ever growing number of fires! But YEAH, I never read or even heard tale about the book Fuchida wrote saying that the flight decks were full of aircraft. If that had been true there would have been a large number of aircraft all around on the bottom of the ocean in the vicinity of each carrier. However, the ONLY aircraft that survived were either in the air or on the Hiryu. All the planes on Kaga, Akagi, & Soryu were burned or blown to pieces. If any planes within the hangers survived, I myself would be very amazed!!!
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын
Three of the carriers each had approximately 20 aircraft on their flight decks. Only one (Akagi) still had all of her attack aircraft in her hangars- and she had 6 zeros at the fantail in the process of taking off. See the USSBS statements of Soryu's executive officer and Kaga's air officer. The brief 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the beginning of launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- and the last landing time of aircraft on her flight deck- shows conclusively that Hiryu's first wave strike was also on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began.
@kennethdeanmiller7324
@kennethdeanmiller7324 2 ай бұрын
@manilajohn0182 I don't believe that, not even for a minute. Sounds like made up BS to me. Japanese XO's telling somebody something doesn't mean it's true.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 2 ай бұрын
@@kennethdeanmiller7324 Okay, if you don't want to believe the statements of officers whose primary responsibility involved knowing the status of their ship's air group, then don't. Just know that their statements mesh exactly with the after- action reports of both McClusky and Shumway, and that their primary source (Senshi Sosho) is not the official history that they claim it to be. Know also that the two authors left those USSBS statements out of their book, and that those statements knock the bottom out from under the central revelation of their book. Know also that the two authors interviewed former pilots who were in their 70s and 80s (and a couple in their 90s, I believe)- whose primary job did 'not' involve knowing the status of their ship's air group, whose statements were largely conditional, and none of whom provided a time of observation or a point of view of the flight deck. Lastly- know that the two authors passed over in silence the 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- meaning that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangar decks when the dive bomber attack began.
@ladyponfarr5479
@ladyponfarr5479 3 ай бұрын
The japanese are great at re writing history to suit them not reality.
@2Oldcoots
@2Oldcoots 4 ай бұрын
Nimitz had the value of "Surprise Attack" at Midway. Reason enough!
@chipsawdust5816
@chipsawdust5816 4 ай бұрын
I highly recommend reading Parshall/Tully's book Shatter Sword as it really details the entire way this battle folded out from Japan to DC. I just finished it a few days ago and was absolutely mesmerized by the story and how much my perception of Midway was changed.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 4 ай бұрын
Their work should be read with extreme caution. Their primary source is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (and it represents the view of Japanese veterans rather than historians anyway), and they omitted key statements from senior Japanese officers aboard the carriers at the battle which directly contradict the central "revelation" in their book. Buyer beware.
@chipsawdust5816
@chipsawdust5816 4 ай бұрын
@@manilajohn0182 I've read many histories of Midway and have found some enlightening things in this book and with their methodology. I'd need something more than an anonymous KZbin comment to disparage any "buyer beware" warnings about the book.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын
@@chipsawdust5816 Okay, here are a few items to start. 1. Their primary source- Senshi Sosho- is 'not' the official Japanese history which they claim it to be. 2. The central 'revelation' of their work- that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began- is false. The claim relies on conditional statements from former Japanese pilots who were in their 80s and even 90s. 3. They ignored after- action report statements of U.S. dive bomber pilots and gunners (from three squadrons aboard two carriers) that Japanese aircraft cluttered the flight decks of Kaga and Soryu, stating that they were telling "lurid tales" for which they can be "forgiven". They suggest that some U.S. pilots and gunners contradicted this when actually, none did. 4. They ignored the USSBS statement from the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) that her first wave strike for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on Soryu's flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 5. They ignored the USSBS statement from Kaga's air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20+ aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 6. The gloss over in silence the short 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory attack on the U.S. carriers because the authors’ own criteria for spotting and launching a strike shows that Hiryu’s strike had to have been on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began. 7. They state that repeated U.S. attacks and the rearming and launching of Japanese CAP fighters prevented the Japanese from spotting a strike in the early morning. In fact, the Naguno report makes clear that the Japanese planned a “grand scale” (two- wave) strike to be launched in the 1030- 1100 time frame. Additionally, both photographic and filmed interview evidence shows that the Japanese could and often did launch CAP fighters from abreast carriers’ islands. 8. They present as a fact that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve. In fact, this is a claim from ‘one’ man- who was a former member of Yamamoto’s staff. No evidence exists to support this claim.
@Greybeard213
@Greybeard213 4 ай бұрын
Google Translate is awesome!
@richardbennett1856
@richardbennett1856 4 ай бұрын
The splitting of Smaller Carriers to Alaska hamstrung Yamamoto. He had to comply if he wanted to attack Midway and have the logistical nightmare of an invasion force. I feel he relished a complicated deployment, but it cost him dearly.
@ETLee-db6cn
@ETLee-db6cn 4 ай бұрын
It seems to me that the Battle of Midway had not only a good Hornet / bad Hornet situation but also a good Enterprise / bad Enterprise one as well. The Enterprise dive bomber group initially failed to find yhe IJN CVs, but recovered by following a destroyer. If they'd missed that ship, or it had a cleverer Captain, the Enterprise dive bomber group might have done nothing, as Hornet's did historically.
@canuck_gamer3359
@canuck_gamer3359 4 ай бұрын
What was Mitscher's rationale for sending his planes in what turned out to be the wrong direction? Does anyone know?
@Vito_Tuxedo
@Vito_Tuxedo 2 ай бұрын
Mitscher believed that the Japanese had split their force into two task groups. He was so firmly convinced of that fiction that he ordered the "flight to nowhere", in direct contradiction of his orders. Then he falsified his After Action Report to cover his ayuss. I think Nimitz knew that Mitscher was being "economical with the truth" in his AAR, so he unplugged him from active command of any carrier group until 1944, where he redeemed himself.
@jadeekelgor2588
@jadeekelgor2588 4 ай бұрын
The fog of war and the chaos within is difficult to understand. It has always been up to the poets, scholars, and liars to interperate this for those who were not there.
@Red72618
@Red72618 4 ай бұрын
What if the German deploy the first helicopter to land for the German paratroopers without using the parachute
@greathornedowl3644
@greathornedowl3644 4 ай бұрын
Love a good, educational WW2 lecture, and Jonathan Parshall's lectures on the Battle of Midway and others fulfill my needs
@stischer47
@stischer47 5 ай бұрын
Nagumo was following IJN doctrine by landing the Midway attack group and THEN attacking the American ships.
@jordangouveia1863
@jordangouveia1863 5 ай бұрын
Adm Rickover, how many silver brazed SWJs in the reactor compartment failed the UT tests? Adm R none, I didn't allow sliver brazed SWJs in the reactor compartment.
@refuge42
@refuge42 5 ай бұрын
John your mythos quote is well written and quite applicable across most historical events. Curiously now that anyone with a phone and internet access can now say 'I was there' two bits to the storyline. Now you don't have to wait 60 years for records to appear or translations to be scribed, now you can get input and access to a world of knowledge in a matter of minutes. This has revolutionized our understanding of History and created whole new cottage industries of historical revision and storytelling. Of course with all this wonderful information comes an enormous tsunami of ignorance and opinion because people become instant experts with their 20 minutes of reading it online. 🤔😆
@philipmiller2618
@philipmiller2618 6 ай бұрын
Did the U. S. Navy knew at the start of the Pacific war that our torpedoes and torpedo planes were as bad as they were? Why did it take until early, say 1943, before they became decent?
@kennethdeanmiller7324
@kennethdeanmiller7324 3 ай бұрын
On "Battle 360" they show where USS Enterprise uses 9-10 torpedo planes to attack Japanese merchant ships at Kwajalen(spelling idk??)Harbor & NONE of their torpedoes exploded. And that is previous to Midway, I do believe. At that Harbor a Scout/dive bomber hit a merchant tanker in the channel leaving the lagoon. It trapped the other ships in the lagoon. And NONE of the torpedoes sent after these "sitting ducks" exploded. And they had to send dive bombers to do the job instead. Which leads me to think that at Midway they should have NEVER sent their torpedo planes towards the Japanese. That it was basically SUICIDE! And that's why Hornets air group had the infamous "flight to no where" MAYBE. Or at least part of their torpedo planes!
@RaymondMoffet
@RaymondMoffet 6 ай бұрын
Seth, shame on you! The movie Hanks and Spielberg should make of the PTW is the USS ENTERPRISE!!!!!! 20 BATTLE STARS a record that has never been beaten! Plus at the end of1942 she was the sole air craft carrier in the Pacific " USS ENTERPRISE vs JAPAN" Cudos to you and Captain Bill for an OUTSTANDING PROGRAM!!! Sgt. Raymond L. Moffet 25th Infantry Division Vietnam Vet
@canuck_gamer3359
@canuck_gamer3359 6 ай бұрын
I remember reading years ago a newspaper article about Fuchida's rendition of events coming into question in Japan. That was years ago but I am almost positive that they were talking about Pearl Harbor but it's interesting that (apparently) the Japanese were the first to discover and doubt his stories. He even claimed to have been on board the Missouri during the surrender ceremony!!! Apparently grandiose self advertising isn't something unique to North America lol.
@JimB1
@JimB1 6 ай бұрын
Pure drivel. Another 15 minutes wasted.
@genie7172
@genie7172 6 ай бұрын
Great video. I have read Fuchida’s account and after this video. Need to get Shattered Sword.
@t5ruxlee210
@t5ruxlee210 6 ай бұрын
A few super dominant battleships kept in home waters made sense to Japan and Germeny because their potential oil resources to fight a coming war were mostly remote, scant, and vulnerable. In Japan's/ Germany's case, again, making use of bigger fleets of mission ready, long range attack and reconnaisance submarines by 1938, would have paid huge dividends later.
@THOBRI
@THOBRI 6 ай бұрын
I am hearing that more and more that we weren't a distinct underdog going into this battle. We may have had a slight numerical advantage in planes. But we had poor equipment a carrier that was limping at best, very little experience and relied more than a little on bravery and pluck. Thank God I am not hearing that from you gentlemen.
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
Read Shattered Sword, enjoyed it, but did not find it that earth shattering or significantly different from the other books, such as Fuchida's account or Miracle at Midway or Incredible Victory. One question though about Parshalls question of the crowded decks and Fuchida's account is why such a discrepancy is present. Could it be faulty memory, or a translation problem?
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 6 ай бұрын
The answer to that is Senshi Sosho.
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
@@manilajohn0182 Please Clarify.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 6 ай бұрын
Senshi Sosho- the authors' primary source- is 'not' the official history that the authors claim it to be. The 102- volume series generally represents the view not of Japanese historians, but of Japanese veterans (a number of them worked on the series). A tendency in the series is to avoid that which might smear the officer corps of the Imperial Army or Navy. Regarding Midway for example, much of the responsibility for the defeat at Midway is placed onto the shoulders of a petty officer, while the fact that Japanese fighter exhibited poor aerial discipline and left the air above their carriers wide open to a dive bomber attack is glossed over. The reality is that the Japanese were overconfident and attempted too much with too few aircraft (the squadrons aboard the carriers were operating at from 10- 20% under authorized strength, and the ships carried no reserve aircraft). These are some of the likely reasons why the series was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. Additionally, the authors left out statements from the Executive officer of Soryu and the Air officer of Kaga which directly contradict their claim that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began (the former stated that the ship's strike of 21 aircraft was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch, while the latter stated that the ship had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck. They also pass over in silence the short 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike at 1050 on the U.S. carriers- which makes it clear that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangars. Lastly, the authors never provided any evidence that Fuchida was lying. He was actually a prime candidate for PTSD, as his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical significance at all- and Lt. Best corroborated much of Fuchida's statements regarding the U.S. attack on Akagi anyway. A likely reason why some Japanese don't like Fuchida is that he "slept with the enemy". He left Japan, moved to the U.S., and adopted Christianity after the war- so many Japanese likely see him as a turncoat of sorts. The work has a great deal of information regarding the details of Japanese carrier operations which can't be found in any other single volume- but the author's analysis of the battle is greatly flawed. The authors did establish however, that there was no strike 5 minutes away from launch. Genda stated postwar that they were about 15 minutes out- and based on performance of Japanese flight deck crews in early 1942, they were likely half an hour out at least. The aircraft of CarDiv 2 were ready for launch (they had no torpedo rearming issue), Kaga had approximately 20 of her 27- aircraft strike on her flight deck but with few if any spotted, and all of Akagi's strike aircraft were in her hangars. Cheers...
@coleparker
@coleparker 5 ай бұрын
@@manilajohn0182 Interesting points. Thanks for the info. Over confidence or Victory Disease, was one of the final conclusions the IJN General Staffs conclusions why the defeat at the battle occurred. Also, as Fuchida mentions, many of the Pilots were suffering from Combat exhaustion, which would be understandable considering they had been through extensive operations in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia region, which I also believe led to the lack of CAP discipline by the pilots. As for the below authorized strength levels of the Carrier squadrons, that is new to me, thanks for that. I suspect that was the case both because of extensive operational history, I mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the IJN's policy with regards to keeping squadrons and pilots assigned to the same carrier, and the slow replacement of both planes and pilots to those squadrons. As for the rest of your comment, I agree with your assessment of the book.
@manilajohn0182
@manilajohn0182 5 ай бұрын
@@coleparker You're welcome. The difference in individual squadron strengths between Pearl Harbor and Midway was small in number, but the percentage is accurate. No reserve aircraft for the squadrons was significant however, because of the different procedure for repairing damaged aircraft in the Imperial Navy.
@craigslinkman1348
@craigslinkman1348 6 ай бұрын
Nice to see a fellow student forum the operations department at the University of Minnesota Carlson School of Management at the university of Minnesota
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
This guy is amazing in his conclusions. First of all the Coral Sea battles was in fact the first actual Carrier vs Carrier battle, and thus there was a series of learning lessons for both sides. Also if his thesis is that Carrier dominance is a myth, why did the invasion force turn back, even though the Japanese had scored the tactical victory? Also, a similar argument could be made for the Midway campaign. Even though the IJN had lost four fleet Carriers, Yamamoto could have reorganized an ad hoc Carrier protection force with the two Aleutian Campaign Carriers, his light carriers in the Main fleet, in support of his massive battle fleet centered on the Yamato and achieved his objective; why didn't he. As far as the Battle of the Philippine Seas is concerned; it appears Ozawa never really intended to have a surface fleet action, but rather was relying on his remaining Navy Air Force with the Support of Land Based planes.
@f430ferrari5
@f430ferrari5 6 ай бұрын
His definition of carrier “dominance” is that those carriers are used as “offensive” weapons. Lead strike approach. What you are describing with the two mid size Aleutian carriers is a “support” role. You even label it Carrier Protection Force. And again why are you taking a close minded presentation with your suggestions. Ryujo and Junyo and the light carriers Zuiho and Hosho were not exactly carrying the proper planes as a “protection” force. It’s clearly obvious you saw my other reply to you but for whatever reason this channel chose to hide it. Now you better understand what the US Naval War College stated. While they are only disclosing the better usage of surface ships from the get go others have to simply understand in how the IJN could have devised a much better battle plan for Midway. Had the surface ships been put up front in various task forces and then had the carriers initially as a “protection” force then the IJN would have changed the plane mixture and this would have allowed more planes overall per carrier. I’ll continue further in a separate comment to better explain.
@f430ferrari5
@f430ferrari5 6 ай бұрын
Before continuing, did you watch the vid from Brighten Enlightenment. Do you think Parshall himself has watched it. I find it amazing that the vid has been out there for nearly 15 years and it doesn’t have much views but yet it’s a declassified film from the US Naval War College. So now back to the details related to the IJN carriers. Fighter planes are smaller and lighter than bomber planes. Less bombers means less bombs to carry also. Instead of 2/3 bombers just flip it where its 2/3 fighters for all 4 main carriers or perhaps just 2. There are endless combinations. Example: Akagi and Kaga could have been kept 2/3 bombers. Hiryu and Soryu switched to 2/3 fighter planes and Zuiho and Hosho done as the same. Or another option was to keep the 4 main carriers as 2/3 bombers but decide to bring Zuikaku and load her with all fighter planes or 2/3. The IJN could have still attacked the Aleutians but waited until after they took Midway and finished off the US Task Force. The bottom line is that the IJN had 9 carriers available along with 11 battleships, 22 cruisers and 64 destroyers. It don’t really matter what the US had because whatever it was it would be a lot smaller than what the IJN had. Everybody knew it. One war/battle strategy is look big but in reality small or look small but in reality big. The latter was the ticket for the IJN at Midway. Out of all the IJN vessels, one force which could have been assembled is an IJN “Expedition” Force. Their mission is to locate the enemy vessels which should be close by to Midway. This force is necessary to engage in vessel vs vessel combat. It has to be a fast “mobile” force with carrier support/CAP but it also has to have some “range/distance”. So instead of the Kido Butai which is Mobile Force consisting of 4 main carriers, it only has two which are Junyo and Ryujo. That’s around 90 planes. One fast Kongo class battleship plus 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers with subs up front. A separate carrier support trail force can be provided 100 miles back. Akagi and Kaga. The “Main” Force can be the Midway Atoll attack force. There is a night and day force. The night force approaches Midway at night. The remaining 3 Kongo class fast battleships along with Battleship Yamato shell Midway at night. The other 6 battleships are used in reserve when no threat of CAP exists. Carriers Zuikaku, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, and Hosho provide CAP for the surface ships. So explain what the US carrier planes do. All they know is that they spotted the alt “Main” Force one day earlier. They didn’t expect the attack to open at night. Even when the US carrier planes launch the first body of vessels they would spot is the lead expedition force which has Carriers Junyo and Ryujo. It’s the US torpedo planes also. They would no doubt go after the expedition force. But waves of IJN fighter planes come in from Akagi and Kaga. She’s armed 2/3 fighter planes. Now the IJN knows the US carriers are close by. Please note the US Midway planes were taken out by the battleships shelling. So as more US carrier planes launch where would they go. They know about the expedition force and know Midway is being shelled by battleships. The US doesn’t know where the IJN main carriers are other than they must be further west behind what they know/seen. Battle of Cora Sea should have taught the IJN a valuable lesson. US anti aircraft fire is good. It was even described as such by the IJN pilots and thus the new strategy should have been where fast surface ships chase down “wounded” US carriers. Bombers from Ryujo and Junyo would have been the first wave. Next would have been the much larger 2nd wave from Akagi and Kaga. All 3 US carriers would have been founded and hit. All would have slowed to 20 knots at best. The IJN destroyers and cruisers could do 35-36 knots. Even the Kongo class battleships could do 30 knots. The IJN planes would have bombed the US carriers and pushed them west on a collision course with the IJN vessels. The IJN long lance torpedos probably would have finished off the US Task Force.
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
@@f430ferrari5 The Aleutian Carriers were in the Offensive Roles as would have been the Zuiho. The downside of the three carriers would have been slow speed for the Ryujo and Junyo and limited Airplane capacity for all three. That is why I put them in the support role for a theoretical second strike. In fact, Yamamoto did recall the two Aleutian Carriers to protect the fleet. As for Hosho, its primary mission was anti submarine protection. But lets take a second point. Nagumo was in a tough decision making situation, especially since he was not a Carrier man per se. As you know, his group was tasked with both reducing Midway's Air Force and other defenses, with the idea of destroying the US Navy when it came out. This forced Nagumo to divide his operational air fleet, so that he could achieve the two objectives in one day if it should happen. Now both know that intelligence failure, and indecision at a critical moment cost the Japanese Navy the victory. My contention is that since Yamamoto's primary objective was to destroy the American fleet, he should have stress that to Nagumo who could have acted accordingly. Second, Yamamoto could have included the three Carriers I mentioned to attack the Midway defenses, while leaving the 4 fleet Carriers free to roam and seek out the USN Carriers.
@f430ferrari5
@f430ferrari5 6 ай бұрын
@@coleparker you continually demonstrate you can’t think outside of the box. You conveniently do so because in your biased mindset you can’t accept the IJN winning at Midway. This is despite the massive vessel advantage the IJN had over the US at Midway. And you’re wrong about primary objective because the American fleet may not show up. The “goal” was to destroy the American Fleet but the only known objective since Midway Atoll can’t move is capture it or at least attempt to do so and see if this lures in the American fleet. That is why I present to you the alt scenario “Expedition” Force. It’s small enough in size to lure the American fleet into battle. I am not sure why you repeat what I already know and have been trying to tell others. This is why the IJN battle plan for Midway was flawed. Yamamoto blew it not Nagumo. Had the Main Force which included battleships taken out Midway then the IJN Carrier Force could still serve two roles but one is supporting which is CAP. The other of course is aerial bombing the US carriers to at least slow them down until the IJN fast vessels can catch up. Think of the positioning. The Expedition Force would have been 100 miles non top of Midway and heading east. Point Luck was 300 miles NE of Midway and the US Task Force was well north west of Pearl Harbor. And no I don’t agree that any carrier planes are dedicated to initial bombing of Midway. That’s what the surface ships are for. The IJN carriers are needed for CAP. The US carrier pilots are now in the dilemma as to whom to go after. Battleships or “look” for carriers. The IJN fighter pilots are to take out as many US planes as possible. Just look at it this way: 1. Akagi 91 66+25 spare 2. Kaga 90 72+18 spare 3. Hiryu 73 4. Soryu 72 5. Zuikaku 84 6. Junyo 45 7. Ryujo 45 8. Zuiho 30 9. Hosho 15 In order or “maximize” the capacity more fighter planes were necessary. That’s why the 2/3 fighter plane mixture overall was necessary. Safe distance was also necessary so the planes could launch and provide CAP. Do the math. That’s 545 planes. 2/3 fighters equals 360 fighter planes. Hosho could only carry up to 15 A5M’s but they were good enough to shoot down 3 SBD dive bombers in Feb 1942 in the Marshall Island battle. The main purpose of the battleship shelling on Midway is to ensure no US planes can take off or land on it. Neutralizing it or softening it up for troop invasion is just gravy at this point of the battle. Your flawed approach is that you’re risking 4 fleet carriers to roam and seek out US carriers. That didn’t need to happen and you’re risking the 4 IJN carriers to attack which is exactly what happened. The alt plan only has Junyo and Ryujo at risk. The IJN bomber planes would eventually catch up to Task Force 16 and 17 no matter where they are positioned. Most understand that the US very well could have lost at Midway had the IJN utilized the right battle plan. Remember. What is next if that occurred. There are no battles down south. The IJN has captured Midway and they may have used their carrier bomber planes to hit certain isolated spots but continuous shelling would have take place day and night to ensure easier take over of the Atoll. Please note that any invasion/occupation force would have been further west at a safe distance until victory was ensured. So timing wise this works out. They key now is “patrolling” Midway and with what. The IJN had around 30 oil tankers of which around at least 16 were Kawasaki Fleet oilers which meant they had decent speed and could refuel vessels at sea. The IJN already had Truk and Wake Island. The IJN already had a supply line running and with the IJN now having Midway it was impossible for any US subs to travel down south. So the Battle of Hawaii is now looming. Remember that Shokaku was repaired by July 1942. Carrier Hiyo was completed also. 53 planes. So now the IJN has 11 carriers plus 3 escort carriers to move planes on to Midway. Medium range bombers. Battleship Musashi was completed in August 1942. So why would the IJN change any strategy at this point. Just lead with the surface ships with subs out front. Carriers again behind. Are you going to claim Hawaii can be defended. If yes then explain in detail how. Which vessels. The US doesn’t have much left in 1942. This is why the war lasted until 1945. Yes the US was furiously trying to build vessels but only destroyers were being pumped out and those were dedicated to the Atlantic to deal with the German U-boats. We should all just be happy that the IJN blew it at Midway. There is a reason why it’s called the Miracle at Midway.
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
@@f430ferrari5 And I am totally amazed how you have misinterpreted my comment. I am saying that IJN could have won the battle of Midway even with the sinking of 4 carriers. My Comment was also pointing out the flaws in the initial strategy and tactics by Yamamoto and Nagumo, which could have been negated by some of the proposed actions that I mentioned. As for your other points, about the Defense of Hawaii and a theoretical attack on it by the IJN. The big flaw in their Capture of Midway, would have been to support the Island Garrison, which even the Japanese general Naval staff, was doubtful it could do, Given the islands Proximity to Bombers from Hawaii as well as submarine Attacks etc, and the arrival of sections of the Atlantic Fleet, and battleships still on the West coast. Also do not forget that the USN and USAAF had been training pilots since 1940. As for the War lasting Until 1945, that was primarily due to the Germany first Policy, which prioritized material being sent to North Africa and Europe.
@coleparker
@coleparker 6 ай бұрын
Interesting discussion. FitzSimonds is correct when he points out he is not Naval historian. He ignores the early battles in the German Norway campaign where the Luftwaffe basically drove back the Royal Navy Battleship dominated fleet even after the latter had decimated the Kriegsmarine and Mediterranean Seas where the Luftwaffe, and Italian Airforce were pushing back the relief efforts to reinforce Malta. Also, even after Midway and Coral seas, it was shown in the Guadacanal actions that no fleet without aircraft either land based or Carrier based could operate during daylight hours.
@doverbeachcomber
@doverbeachcomber 7 ай бұрын
Just a note on presentation technique. It was 35 years ago that I first heard the warning to presenters not to cram large amounts of text onto one slide. For one thing, doing so necessarily makes the letters so small and the lines so long that the words are very hard to read. It also distracts the audience from the verbal remarks - the heart of any presentation - since the audience can now simply read the content right off the screen instead of listening. Yet even after so many years, here we are, with an expert with plenty of value to communicate, impairing his impact on his audience by making this same rookie mistake.
@pakers2128
@pakers2128 7 ай бұрын
Actually IMHO Nimitz only had two carriers that participated. Hornet contributed nothing- AM battle nothing. destruction of Hiryu took off too late to participate. Never heard it said but the only effective weapon the carrier possessed was the dive bombers, which I assume Nimitz had great confidence.
@tonydevos
@tonydevos 7 ай бұрын
John parshall, you are what the japanese call a tensai
@zenden6564
@zenden6564 7 ай бұрын
I thought Fujida was recovering the sick bay from an appendix operation, during that famous attack? Or is that mixed up?
@tonydevos
@tonydevos 7 ай бұрын
According to his account, he climbed out of sick bay because he didn't want to be cooped up
@audioworkshop1
@audioworkshop1 7 ай бұрын
Just listened to this on another site... Incredible job guys this is one I'll be adding to my library!