"Assessing the WWII Decision-Making of Admiral Chester Nimitz" with Trent Hone and Jon Parshall

00:00 - Trent Hone - "Organizing for Rapid Sensemaking: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as CINCPAC and CINCPOA"
28:34 - Jon Parshall - "What Was Nimitz Thinking?"

[@Drachinifel]

Excellent stuff as can only be expected from these fine gentlemen!

[@jameshope5365]

That's all I need to see. I'm subbing right now. I never miss a video on your channel.

[@chrisluttor2275]

My compliments to both Trent Hone and Jon Parshall for a great presentation. My one criticism is that Nimitz along with the entire US Naval Department took almost two years to fix the problems with the Mark 14 torpedoes. Nimitz's timeline could have been accelerated by at least six months if the US submarine fleet had achieved its 1944 successes in 1942.

[@watchface6836]

In Nimitz's defense, it took Admiral King riding their asses for BuOrd to finally get their feet moving on the Mk14.

[@johnfleet235]

Keep in mind, that Nimitz appointed Lockwood to command submarines. He and his staff finally identified the problems with the Mark 14 torpedo so those issues could be addressed. Nimitz back him to the hilt. In the end, when King had the facts supplied by Nimitz and Lockwood, he pushed BuOrd for a fix.

[@chrisluttor2275]

@@johnfleet235 Unfortunately, the statement about Lockwood becoming the Pacific submarine commander is incomplete. Without Admiral English's death, the reforms that have been described may never have happened. The BuOrd was more concerned about covering up its own mistakes than in getting things done.

[@MichaelStichauf]

Every time I think about the whole Mark-14 debacle, I get sick to my stomach! Bad leaders "pooh-pooh" their underlings and good leaders LISTEN and make changes. Those in charge of the Mark 14 program cost thousands of lives! Unacceptable!

[@johnfleet235]

@@chrisluttor2275 You are quite right about Admiral English. You can argue that the US Navy got lucky. It is a fact that the two submariners Lockwood and Nimitz made an excellent team. From my research, Nimitz worked very smoothly with Lockwood. It could have been worse. When English died, Christie could have been appointed instead of Lockwood.

[@EricDKaufman]

Thanks for having Drach on or I would have never discovered this FANTASTIC channel.

[@jeffreymartin8448]

The pic of Nimitz 'seeing with both eyes' at Trent's conclusion is absolutely sublime !

[@MichaelStichauf]

I never pass up a chance to watch Parshall on any kind of a podcast or any kind of a lecture! And this is the second or third time I've watched Trent Hone on this book of his. One of them was on Drach's show just yesterday

[@stefanlaskowski6660]

It's an excellent book.

[@v.mwilliams1101]

Thank you gentlemen, so very interesting. When listening to Mr Hone and Parshall it's 'the rest of the story'. Always providing the nitty gritty details.

[@gruntforever7437]

we were very lucky Nimitz was running the pacific. His gamble on Midway was the key decision of the entire pacific war

[@tylerrichards6456]

Maybe your Spanish mathematicians could run a model to see how many extra Shattered Sword copies get sold from each Parshall KZbin appearance. To the enormous benefit of your viewers, it’s ‘good Parshall’ every time.

[@MichaelStichauf]

So true!

[@manilajohn0182]

There are a number of major flaws in Shattered Sword. 1. The author's primary source- Senshi Sosho, or what they also call the Official Japanese History- is not an official history at all. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. The contents of each of the 102 volumes are the responsibility of the authors and of the War history Office. 2. They repeat the claim that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve, even though the source of that claim was a former member of Yamamoto's staff, that there is no evidence to support it, and much to refute it. 3. The central revelation of their book- that Japanese carrier flight decks were clear of attack aircraft when the dive bombers attacked- is false. USSBS statements from the senior surviving officers of both Kaga and Soryu directly contradict Parshall's and Tully's claim, and the time frame between the end of the dive bomber attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike shows clearly enough that Hiryu had her strike on her flight deck when the U.S. carriers attacked the other carriers. Both of the officers (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai of Kaga and Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara of Soryu) were mentioned in Shattered Sword repeatedly- but their USSBS statements were not. Since those USSBS statements were many decades in the past when Shattered sword was compiled, it's not at all likely that the authors were unaware of them. Just sayin...

[@bughunter1766]

@@manilajohn0182 Of the photos I can find online of Japanese carriers at midway, I can't find anything more than a couple of cap fighters on the decks of the burning ships. I admit the photos are not fantastic, but I believe they are good enough to tell the decks are empty. How long after the attacks the photos were taken is anyone's guess. Maybe they dumped the planes overboard somehow. That appears like it would have been a daunting process in the midst of the fires and explosions. I wonder if the controversy doesn't come from whether the planes were in the hanger deck or if they were up on the flight deck. Photos of the wrecks certainly suggest that the explosions took place below. That also stands to reason given that the bombs would have been set to explode with a delay after contact. Intentionally trying to get them to go off inside the ship. I certainly do not know the definitive answer.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@bughunter1766 The photographs that you're referring to were taken by B- 17s approximately 2- 2.5 hours prior to the dive bombing attack on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. Look for the last landing times of aircraft on each carrier. Both Soryu and Hiryu had ample time to spot 21 aircraft on their flight decks. Kaga had enough time to bring approximately 20 aircraft to her flight deck using 3 elevators, although few if any were likely spotted. This tallies exactly with McClusky's after- action report, where he said that the flight deck "...was covered with aircraft...". Cheers...

[@manilajohn0182]

@@bughunter1766 I know of no existing photos of either Kaga, Soryu, or Hiryu which were taken as the 1022 dive- bombing attack took place.

[@sparkey6746]

Outstanding presentations!

[@jsorbieus]

Parshall was great, as usual!

[@gordonbutler5142]

Great stuff!

[@MegaBloggs1]

great presentation-incorporating logistics and the command

[@mykofreder1682]

One thing missing from his aggressive principles probably because it was passive, do not push to destruction unless there is no choice, getting down to 1 or 2 carriers as the case at the end of 42 was something he would not do unless forced. Midway and the other places carriers were getting sunk were not of choice but defensive engagements on their front line. If they were missing a carrier at Midway, they could have put the air group on Midway, the Midway air group really didn't do much and better planes and pilots on Midway might have allowed them to do what they did from the carrier.

[@MegaBloggs1]

awesome study by jon et al

[@davidbourland8080]

Great lecture. The 'faded' Xs to mean damage or sunk are not easy to see. If you ever revise I suggest having the damaged a D or on a different side of the ship than the Sunk X.

[@peterpeterpumpkineater9451]

It appears that Yorktown was crucial twice. First, with her offensive/attacking input. Second, with the aspect of “operational” defense. If the crew had not been able to patch her up, to the point of steaming effectively, she wouldn’t have appeared to the Japanese as a “second” viable target to attack.

[@michaelwaldmeier1601]

Imagine what might have happened if the Yorktown had another boiler in operation during the battle and/or been able to restart a boiler after being hit.

[@cheesenoodles8316]

I read a review from the Japanese side, specifically the target was the US carriers ....not Midway. Midway did not have to be disabled or occupied....only the destination to have a carrier battle. As landing forces were allocated, the planning allowed the pitfall of diverting resources that should have been at the ready for carrier battle.

[@pakers2128]

I think the Japs thought if they captured Midway this would give more reason for the American carriers to come out to do battle.

[@michaelwaldmeier1601]

Can you comment in the future about what might have been needed to get at least one boiler reactivated on the Yorktown so I could move out of range of subs?

[@GlennHa]

We had the best "German Admiral" of WW2.....Admiral Nimitz. Fortunately, he was on our side. We also had the best "German General" of WW2....General Eisenhower.

[@valdorhightower]

I was wondering whether the Spanish Mathematician's model took into account factors like cultural differences, differing doctrines and levels of competency. Clearly Nagumo was out of his depth as a carrier force commander. I also wonder whether the model took into account a counterfactual in which Nagumo actually followed Yamato's orders in only using two carriers to strike Midway, keeping the other two carriers in reserve, to strike any American carriers that were detected.

[@manilajohn0182]

Yamamoto never ordered Nagumo to maintain two carriers in reserve for the attack on Midway. He recommended that Nagumo maintain half of his aircraft in reserve. One man- former Captain Yasuji Watanabe, who was a member of Yamamoto's staff- claimed postwar that Yamamoto issued a verbal order to Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve. Unfortunately for Watanabe, the Nagumo report contains neither a statement nor even a suggestion that Nagumo was ordered to do so. Yamamoto was intolerant of those who failed him. He relieved Admiral Takagi after the battle of the Coral Sea, Admiral Inoue for failures at both Coral Sea and prior to Guadalcanal, Admiral Abe after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and Admiral Hosogaya after the battle of the Komandorski Islands. If Nagumo had actually disobeyed an order from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet to retain half of his aircraft in reserve and had lost four fleet carriers as a result, it's more than safe to say that Nagumo would have been immediately relieved of his command. Instead, he went on to command Japanese carrier task forces in two further battles. A far more likely scenario is that Watanabe attempted to save face for his former chief by casting responsibility for the disaster at Midway onto the shoulders of Nagumo- who was certainly no friend of Yamamoto's. One cardinal principle of military operations is "One force, one objective". The Japanese violated this principle at Midway, and it was a major factor in their defeat. They attempted to both neutralize Midway and deal with any U.S. carriers which might intervene. Their initial plan called for neutralizing Midway and then dealing with any U.S. carriers which were expected to appear a few days later. War games prior to the battle revealed the potential for disaster if enemy carriers appeared while the Japanese were attacking Midway. This is the genesis for Yamamoto's recommendation to Nagumo, and it revealed a fundamental flaw in the Japanese plan- namely, that the Japanese had far too few aircraft to deal with both Midway and the U.S. carriers. The four carriers of the 1CSF were operating with approximately 20% fewer aircraft than they had available for the attack on Pearl Harbor- and they had no reserve aircraft (the additional fighters aboard the carriers were slated for the defense of Midway after the Japanese had captured it). The sole error which Nagumo made was to close the range on U.S. carriers after they had been discovered, and that was an expected aggressive action. After an unbroken series of victories until Midway, moving away from the reported location of enemy carriers would have raised the eyebrows of every flag officer in the Imperial Navy- and almost certainly would have been interpreted as a lack of aggressiveness on the part of Nagumo.

[@pakers2128]

the battle of midway had so many unusual events it defies analysis. I wonder if anyone has a analysis of how many events could have changed the outcome of the battle starting with the dawn flight from the Yorktown.

[@christopherrowe7460]

Tying this video's conclusion about Marc Mitscher and YORKTOWN to this channel's previous video with former-CNO The Honorable John F. Lehman (kzbin.info/www/bejne/mpvbaWyllsatj9E)... ADM Lehman remarks that today's US Navy won't allow one to get promoted beyond LCDR (O-4) if one makes any mistakes, and yet Capt. Mitscher gets promoted to RADM and later serves well as commander of the fast carriers of TF 58.

[@bullwinklejmoos]

Not just well, but excellent. He was a great commander who genuinely cared for those who served under him. It would have been tragic had he not been promoted and tasked with command of TF58.

[@lorrinbarth1969]

Joseoph Rochefort’s HYPO figures out the Japanese are going to invest Port Moresby by sea. Then HYPO finds the Japanese are going to invest the Midway Islands. Edwin Layton analyzes Rochefort’s material and presents it to his boss, Admiral Chester Nimitz, convincing him to send Admiral Frank Fletcher to sea with what remains of the American fleet. Fletcher wins two great sea battles. Fletcher, himself, seems to sniff out the third great sea battle, the battle of Eastern Solomons. Edwin Layton was also in the loop that results in the demise of Admiral Yamamoto. So what does Nimitz, the people person, do with three war winners on his staff? Fletcher goes to Alaska to count snowflakes. Rochefort is put in charge of a floating drydock and Layton drops into a dark hole somewhere on Nimitz’s staff till the conclusion of the war at which time he is put in charge of Naval Nets. So, what was Nimitz thinking?

[@ppumpkin3282]

He may have been a real snake, not wanted to share the spotlight. He certainly looks more like a military genius, if he hides the fact that he had the inside dope on IJN's plans. I can't understand why Rochefort never got the credit he deserved until years later.

[@DiviAugusti]

I believe the pulling of Fletcher was Admiral King’s doing. Rochefort was a political matter though I can’t recall what it was off hand.

[@pakers2128]

In the very long term the Pacific war was a war of attrition. US industrial ability vs Japan excellence in naval warfare. As Yamamoto observed Japan has no chance when the US industrial might get mobilized; also US had 3x population of Japan. Therefore Midway was the pursuit of the war of attrition.

[@alantoon5708]

The only major gaffe I could find in Chester Nimitz was has failure to relieve Bull Halsey after the typhoon incidents..

[@johnfleet235]

Alan, there are two reasons why he was not relieved. First, in the dark days of early 1942, Halsey stood by Nimitz and when other officers urged caution Halsey wanted to act aggressively. Nimitz assigned Halsey to deal with the Guadalcanal stalemate in October 1942 and Halsey rapidly got the US Navy to aggressively fight the Japanese and to break the stalemate. Second, Halsey was a hero to the public. You don't relieve military hero that public supports.

[@michaelwaldmeier1601]

@@johnfleet235 I expect that the Marines and Army on Guadalcanal thought highly of him too.

[@johnfleet235]

@@michaelwaldmeier1601 Agreed. To be fair, no Admiral in the past had under his command huge fleets of warships like Admirals Spruance and Halsey were asked to command. They were inventing command as they went along. They had no textbook on how to use aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc, they worked it out one step at a time.

[@michaelwaldmeier1601]

@@johnfleet235 They also had to develop fire control methods such as draining the fuel lines on carriers and learn how to effectively use radar and night flying and defense. From my perspective, the US Fleet recreated itself and much effort was given to team efforts. One of the by-products of the War was global peace on the seas.

[@pakers2128]

Actually IMHO Nimitz only had two carriers that participated. Hornet contributed nothing- AM battle nothing. destruction of Hiryu took off too late to participate. Never heard it said but the only effective weapon the carrier possessed was the dive bombers, which I assume Nimitz had great confidence.

[@jedibusiness789]

If Hornet engage along with Yorktown and Enterprise, Midway would be done by “lunch”. Would the four carriers chase down the Japanese battle group and destroyed it?

[@cragnamorra]

I think it probably wouldn't have been much different than what actually occurred. Continued surveillance, an afternoon strike with remaining aircraft (in this case, to further ensure that the burning IJN carriers went down), and then pretty conservative maneuvering that night to minimize the chance of US carriers getting caught in a night surface action. In other words, I think the two US commanders were probably right on the same spot along the risk-vs-reward spectrum that Fletcher (ostensibly still in tactical command aboard a functional Yorktown) would likely have taken similar decisions to what Spruance did historically. And why wouldn't they (either of them, in both situations)? The objective (destruction of the IJN carriers) had already been 100% achieved. So there's really not much reward (a few extra IJN cruisers?) remaining to counterbalance a still-very-considerable risk. The "calculated risk" equation had been reversed.

[@pakers2128]

Spruance made this observation in his after action report. Mitchner was incompetent. How many men did he kill will his incompetence?????

[@MegaBloggs1]

the attack on palau is an avoidable mistake-they should have struck at iwo jima in sept 44 rather than march 45

[@MegaBloggs1]

jon what if the torpedo bomber squadrons were slaughtered (happened) and the dive bomber squadrons missed the kutai butai and\or ran out of fuel(almost happened)-a major strike from the japanese would have sunk at least one more us carrier!

[@cragnamorra]

That somewhat bothers me about the model as well. There was a very high chance - in fact probability - that the Enterprise SBDs might have been just as ineffective as Hornet's, simply by not finding the Kido Butai. Even though McClusky makes that famous correct decision to turn north, just a 10-degree course difference or a randomly different cloud pattern might easily result in not spotting that destroyer to confirm his hunch and then point the way. In that scenario, the US morning strike sinks only one IJN carrier, and then it's a 3-vs-3 exchange of carrier strikes in the afternoon (with the Japanese air groups probably less depleted than the Americans', and also probably launching earlier). And that undesired "1-for-1 swap" ratio now becomes a "best-case" outcome. I perceive there's been a conscious trend in recent years to de-emphasize the "luck" factor in the US Midway victory. And many of the arguments I've read along those lines I agree with, lots of great insights. I believe we do have a much better understanding of this battle than was the case 30+ years ago. But I don't see any way to explain away - nor have I seen/read anyone try to argue otherwise - that it WAS amazingly lucky that Bombing Six and Scouting Six found Akagi/Kaga and delivered their devastating attack. Yes, absolutely McClusky made a critical and correct decision...but even then that call was not sufficient in and of itself. Rather, it held open the window of possibility which would have irrevocably closed had he chosen any other alternative (some of which were reasonable enough choices). But that's not the same thing as *guaranteeing* that he *would* find the Kido Butai.

[@MegaBloggs1]

Nah i believe the almighty intervened

[@navyreviewer]

What? I've never heard anyone question if Nimitz would have sent TF16 in without TF17. Irregardless of Zui's presence. Not only would he send 2 carriers to face 5 carriers he did send 2 carriers to face 5 at Santa Cruz. Yes Hiyo had to turn around just before the battle but no one knew that was going to happen and both sides were already heading to the proverbial ring. No Zuiho isnt Hiryu but that's still 2 v 5, Also it's been known for awhile Spruance blamed Mitcher for the loss of Yorktown after the battle. I do think that's unfair, it's getting pretty far into "what if." Let's say Hornets SBDs stayed with the TBDs, who knows what would have happened? I-168 still might have found Yorktown and sunk her. The flight to nowhere didnt help but to say that cost us Yorktown is a stretch. One thing that I dont think gets talked about enough is the areas of operation. It does seem when the carriers operated in the SWPAC area Halsey was in command (yes that included the Philippines), when it operated in the CENTPAC Spruance got the chair.

[@joshwhite3339]

IDK, It doesn't feel too far-fetched to me to say that if 2 carrier air groups sunk 3/4 IJN carriers, then 3 carrier air groups would be likely to sink 4/4. If 4/4 are sunk, then Yorktown isn't hit with two successive strikes, isn't left lame in the water, and then is far less likely to become a torpedo target for Tanabe (and far more likely to survive if it happens to get hit). It's certainly hypothetical, but hypotheticals are about the balance of probabilities, which in this case, seem quite reasonable.

[@davidharner5865]

'irregardlesz' is NOT a word.

[@navyreviewer]

@@davidharner5865 nobody cares. I could talk about English being a living language . Words are added all the time and the meaning of words change but that doesnt matter. Here is a lesson for you. Grammer matters not. Speling iz akualy not importent. The only rule is, can the reader understand you?

[@treyhelms5282]

I'm sure the "discrepancies" of HORNET's accounts of the battle vs ENTERPRISE's didn't endear Mitcher to Spruance. I'm not talking particulars, just the coverup. It's not a stretch to say that if HORNET's strike goes where the others did, it would make a difference. That's 50% more aircraft hitting the target. In the IJN carriers vulnerable state, it's not unreasonable to think HORNET's dive bombers would kill one carrier, with torp bombers and fighters providing further distraction. ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN bombers could still kill the others, regardless of what order the strikes showed up. (I'd love to see a what-if where someone figures out when HORNET's strike would arrive and what results might be.) I think Yamamoto only sent I-168 to kill YORKTOWN after hearing she was crippled. So if no HIRYU strike, no sending I-168 after YORKTOWN anyways. Cheers.

[@navyreviewer]

@@treyhelms5282 that's assuming someone would find Hiryu and hit her. She had moved off to the northwest. We're assuming a "best case" out come. That's dangerous.

[@thomasbernecky2078]

I could only stand the first ten minutes of Trent Hones' org chart before I wanted to stab both my eyes out, TFG for Jon Parshall's same comfy presentation he's been making lo' these last decades. Trent, sorry but no longer following you on Audible. You would have to pay me double what Big Pharma did to make me stay awake for any more mind-numbing presentations like that? Sport. Jon, when is 1942 out? 2042? You could put Pat Rothfuss,, part-time writer to shame?

[@thomasbernecky2078]

Yup, I've been drinking two Guinness, the adult chocolate milkshake. I'm now switching to Car Bombs. Jon please explain to Trent why adults sometimes need to drink?