The one thing I would like to distinguish -- and I hope you'll forgive what appears to be a semantic quibble (but I consider this psychologically very useful) -- is the word, "trust". To "require trust" in something -- in what I consider the most psychologically useful way -- actually means we lack evidence to support it, and perhaps even an abundance of evidence to contradict it. There's a reason I want to draw this psychological distinction: I encounter young people these days with serious trust issues towards new people they meet with the idea that "trust is earned", and typically they have a painful and unlucky history of seeing their trust betrayed which led them to develop these trust issues towards strangers. This is a very counter-productive mindset in my experience of conflating "having earned trust" with "requiring unearned trust", since their suspicion tends to ward away all of their potential allies. Many militant atheist types seem to have been wounded in a similar way, and made a similar mistake in conflating two different types of "trust". In my estimate, "unearned trust is invested." Investment is never without risks. "Unearned trust requires courage." If we seek to eliminate all the risks, we'll tend to work our way towards refusing to invest. So I want to refute the idea that a former scientific hypothesis elevated to theory requires much in the way of "trust" or "courage", since we have so much evidence demonstrating that it makes accurate predictions repeatedly -- even if there could be an edge case we've yet to discover in which it doesn't. And in the same way, I think a devout theist can say they don't "require much trust" at all now in the existence of God, even though they "have a great deal of trust" in His existence. They invested deeply in the existence of God, and have already repeatedly received a return on investment. Mind you, the way you use "having trust" is perfectly valid and typically the most common way I see of approaching the concept of "trust". For example, I deeply "trust" in my wife in one way, but with the way I want to suggest we think about it, I don't "require much trust" now at all since we've been married and devoted now for 15 years. I've already received so much return on investment that I'm no longer risking much at all. I did risk a lot when we first met and therefore "required trust the most" back then, but now I require very little even though I have very much.

Man i love your vids

What is Knowledge? 'Knowledge'; that which is perceived (by Consciousness)! To Exist is to be perceived (by Consciousness); to be perceived means to Exist. Nothing exists that is not perceived, nothing is perceived that does not exist! Thus, Existence is ALL-inclusive! One! Reality is predicated upon Existence! Thus, Reality is ALL-inclusive! One! Truth, being predicated on Reality must, also, be ALL-inclusive! One! Knowledge IS Truth! Truth IS Knowledge! Is Mind... One! What 'problem'? ;)

I agree that foreknowledge doesn't cause free agents to make the decision they will make in the future, yet it implies to me that the future could not have unfolded any other way. I am looking at free will not in terms of the idea that I'm the only entity "causing" my decisions, but rather that my future decisions aren't "fated" to be what they will be. ---- Free From Fate, Not Free From External Causes That is to say, I am questioning a form of free will vs. foreknowledge where "free will" is defined as "free from fate", not "free from external forces." After all, something could be free from external forces and not free from fate (in a predetermined world), and likewise could be free from fate but not external forces (in an indeterministic world whose forces are still constraining our choices to no alternative options in any given moment). Using an engineering analogy, if we design a simulation and can perfectly anticipate the output of the simulation in advance without any risk of error, then the results of the simulation were predetermined. If we can't anticipate the output of the simulation in advance, we either have a gap in our foreknowledge or the results of the simulation were not predetermined (in which case it would be impossible to predict what it would output in advance, since its output would vary and produce endless alternatives each time we run it even if all initial parameters of the simulation remain identical). Given what I can consciously understand as an agent experiencing time in a linear fashion, am I creating new possible futures with my decision to type this comment in this moment as I'm consciously experiencing it presently, or was I always going to foreseeably type this comment? ---- God Expressing Regret? Also the Judeo-Christian God often appeared to behave as though He was unable to foresee the results in advance, as with the regret leading to the Biblical flood in Genesis. It seems odd at the very least for a being to express regret over perfectly foreseeable results, with perfect foreknowledge of what would happen in advance. ---- Omnipotent Without Foreknowledge is Not a Contradiction Are there any theistic views that sees God's omniscience as constrained in ways that can't foresee the future because we have free will? I don't see that as a limitation on such a being's power -- to be able to design a simulation whose results are spontaneously unfolding from moment to moment in ways that cannot be foreseen. This wouldn't be a contradiction like a God that designs a rock so heavy that he can't lift it. As a programmer, I can easily design a simulation where I am absent any limitations to lift any possible rock I create in the simulation and cause it to fly around, since I have absolute power over the simulation. I have no limitations as a programmer on what my simulation can do as long as I have absolute power over its programming and state. However, it's not a constraint on one's power to design a dynamic simulation whose results are not predetermined, whose agents are spontaneously shaping its outputs in ways that are truly indeterministic, and therefore unforeseeable. If I did that, I would have absolute power to intervene with the simulation, but it would be impossible for me to predict its results in advance -- by design! That's precisely what such a dynamic simulation would be: unforeseeable in its results by definition, since the results are being dynamically-generated as the simulation is running. Also at least using our human intuitions, that's precisely why we'd seek to design and run such a simulation in the first place: to discover its unforeseeable results.

The theistic problem of free will was always the most challenging for me to wrestle with, although the gap I find difficult to close isn't between omnipotence and free will: an omnipotent being can create beings free to choose as they see fit. Rather, I struggle with what I perceive to be a gap between omniscience and free will. If omniscience means the ability to see the future, then it seems impossible to see it if we are free to shape it spontaneously with our decisions. If a being knows what I'm going to do before I do it, along with the entirety of my life decisions in advance, then I could not have possibly shaped my life any other way than it was capable of being preconceived in advance. Either my fate was already sealed in advance while I was destined to do everything I did so far and will do in the future, or else my decisions should not be foreseeable in advance even by a creator who gave me the ability to dynamically shape the future with every decision I'm making, including now. At least any other way is working beyond my ability to comprehend.

TNG is my favorite TV series of all time! Even though I consider myself a fairly stubborn empirical type, you covered a certain type of functionally "necessary truth" which we must consider true even if it's not. That's one of the cases where my pragmatic side takes over. Aside from free will, I always used the example of the miserable nihilist for this type of pragmatically "necessary truth". The nihilist's claim paradoxically "can't be true even if it is", because anyone who believes there's no true value to be discovered in the world will render their lives counter-productively devoid of value. It's not actually a paradox in my opinion even though it appears that way, since the definition of "true" is being overloaded: the pragmatic vs. the analytical. It may be the case that some things are analytically false (or perhaps forever beyond our reach to know for sure), but still pragmatically true.

The question always seemed immediately nonsensical to me. The simple answer I see is, "No, a being of infinite power cannot design a rock he can't lift, because He can lift any possible rock. It is possible He can design a rock He won't lift, but not one He can't." That's not a limit on his power to "be unable to be unable to do" something. Is there something wrong with my logic in this case? I always saw the answer as so simply and obviously, "no, a being that has no constraints cannot be constrained."

I always found Stoicism such a wise philosophy. It overlaps to a degree with Buddhist philosophy which is popular here in Japan, particularly with respect to the dichotomy of control. We also have a saying, "しょうがない" ("shouganai") which is a part of our everyday speech to remind each other of this dichotomy. Roughly translated, it means, "It can't be helped." For example, if we encounter someone complaining about the bad weather, we say, "shouganai". Many people outside of Japan often find this a dismissive and callous statement, but it's not meant to be. It's meant to remind us that we should not complain or get upset about that which we can't control. As with the Serenity Prayer: >> God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference. -- Reinhold Niebuhr We constantly tell each other, "shouganai" to help cultivate this wisdom.

My brain can't seem to comprehend this style of thinking. It's only in cases when I'm making a snap decision instinctively, such as pushing someone off the road to protect them from a speeding car, that I don't think about possible consequences for the simple reason that I lack the time to do so. That said, I do find it impractical to judge the ethical weight of an action based on its actual consequences. For example, it would be impractical to consider drunk driving acceptable when the drunk driver arrives home safely, since no one could have foreseen that happening in advance. What we can foresee is that if many people drove drunk, it would pose a public safety hazard which would work towards societal collapse. However, if a drunk encounters someone severely injured in critical condition, and no one else is around to drive, then I would consider it ethical for even that drunk to drive the wounded person to the hospital, as the risk of his intoxication causing a traffic accident seems lesser than the near-guarantee of the critically wounded dying absent immediate aid. Ideally no one ever gets drunk in the first place, and then we don't have to consider such exceptions.

How much contextualization does Kant find appropriate if I may ask? For example, if we contextualize men and women separately and say, "All men should do this, but no woman should do this," or vice versa, is that considered a contradiction to the categorical imperative? How about if we say, "All undercover agents should lie repeatedly to maintain their cover, but not ordinary people?" Or, "All adults who pass their driving test should be able to drive while sober, but no children should be able to drive?" Or, "All citizens should be provided this, but not non-citizens?" I'm a heuristic consequentialist, so I see questioning what everyone should do merely a form of aggregated, heuristic consequentialist evaluation, and a useful way to think consequentially. It's generally too difficult to ask what the foreseeable consequences (or expectancies within a probability field) are if only one person does something one time, but easier to tell by considering the consequences if everyone does something all the time (or if that one person repeats this behavior many times habitually). For example, it might be difficult to tell that smoking cigarettes is unethical if we only have one person in mind, given that there exist anomalies where smokers live past 100 years of age without developing the associated health problems or becoming so addicted that they turn into chain-smokers (Emma Morano, e.g.). Yet it's much easier to tell that smoking cigarettes is unethical (moving us towards our extinction) if we imagine the foreseeable consequences when everyone is a habitual chain-smoker. Yet I think practicality demands contextualization and not the most generalized form of universalization, and sometimes even arriving at moral rules that apply to only one individual and no one else (ex: what is specifically ethical vs. unethical for the prime minister of a particular nation), but always recursively questioning the functional benefits to a society as a whole even in the most heavily contextualized cases. The degree of contextualization vs. generalization I always found appropriate is with respect to the threshold in which we can clearly trace back predictable consequences to a society. For example, I must concede that it's probably quite harmless to a society if a person smokes cigarettes a few times in their life without addiction, but presently even medical professionals can't foresee who can do that without becoming addicted. So I generalize, as a form of risk-aversion given my limited predictive ability, and say, "No one should ever smoke cigarettes even once; it's too risky." If we accumulate more reliable data, we might be able to contextualize this a bit further to, "People who are prone to nicotine addiction should never smoke cigarettes even once," but I find that an impractical degree of contextualization at the moment since since we can't reliably tell -- without significant risk of errors -- who those people are. We shouldn't contextualize further than we can confidently predict the consequences/expectancies, especially in cases where errors resulting from over-contextualization are very costly.

I seem to be some form of heuristic consequentialist, but neither a utilitarian nor egoist from what I can tell. Are there any philosophers that share a similar view as mine? I'll try to lay out what appear to be my differences and will ask forgiveness for my long-windedness. While I root the desired consequence as survival, much of the heuristic mindset and distribution of responsibilities applies no matter what type of probable consequences we are pursuing. ---- Not a Hedonist Pleasure isn't good and pain isn't bad. On the contrary, pain is often very good (required for us to function) and many pleasures are very bad (counter-productive to our function). A person might subjectively wish their deteriorating knees didn't ache when they walked, but if they ceased to feel that pain, they will soon find the damage they're obliviously doing to their knees rendering them unable to walk and ultimately function as human beings. Also even higher pleasures can be malfunctional in excess. A person who pursues intellectual pleasures to the detriment of their health or the survival of their loved ones, for example, would not be well-adapted, and in serious excess might be as detrimental to their proper function as one who uses narcotics. ---- Not an Egoist A parent who neglects their child's needs is maladapted even if that's in their self-interest to do so. After all, if all parents neglected their children, our species would go extinct in a single generation as a foreseeable consequence. Also "self-interest" seems hopelessly subjective. ---- Not Impartial It is impractical to expect impartiality from any human being, in the same way it is impractical and malfunctional for a parent to trust complete strangers to equally participate in raising their children. Practicality demands we distribute our responsibilities in a proximal fashion, prioritizing family above community, community above nation, and nation above the entire species, our species above other species, the person directly in front of us over the person on the other side of the planet. Anything else seems hopelessly ambitious. We are not the Borg with a shared hive mind, but rather a species with severe epistemic gaps between each other and limited, unshared resources. Optimization demands prioritization, as the constraints of nature typically involves trade-offs rather than pure benefits. Those who try to optimize everything tend to optimize nothing at all, and so it's for these practical reasons that each individual must prioritize their own localized group above others. A parent who equally prioritizes all children in the world is bound to fail to optimally care for their own. This is not to suggest a rabid form of tribalism and in-group bias that results in prejudice and needless conflicts. After all, such needless conflicts are malfunctional with cascading risks even for the in-group. It is simply a matter of effective prioritization and proximal distribution of responsibilities given our human limitations. ---- Rule Partiality Rules are often a practical necessity to functionally navigate the world. But as with people, we should not be impartial to them and prioritize certain rules above others. Protecting those who depend on us should take functional priority to "don't lie" and "don't steal", for example. After all, it is almost certainly better-adapted that we deceive the axe murderer in the Kantian scenario and call the police, or even attack them in self-defense, than reveal the truthful whereabouts of their desired victim. ---- Intent, and Malevolence is Negligence Malevolence can be viewed as simply another form of negligence, typically gross negligence. Our emotional impulses are the most primitively-evolved, subconsciously-consequentialist way of navigating the world, and typically in ways where we aren't even consciously thinking about the possible consequences at all. As such, it is prone to produce highly malfunctional results especially in civilized societies. I don't draw the deontological distinction that a malfunction produced from benevolent negligence is "less unethical" than a malfunction produced from malevolence. After all, a malfunction resulting from a benevolent but negligent engineer of a nuclear power plant is not practically "more functional" than a child malevolently retaliating in vengeful anger. When a person is in a critical role where they cannot afford to be negligent, even the most benevolent intent or the most virtuous character isn't going to suffice. They must do their best to think consequentially and determine the foreseeable expectancies of their actions or else the results can be catastrophic. This doesn't mean we ignore intentions. It is practical to distinguish manslaughter from intentional homicide, yet not because the latter is "more unethical" than the other. It's because the functional approach to deter would-be criminals and reduce recidivism is also certainly different between the two. We should encourage each other to behave with benevolent intent as it's generally well-adapted for collective survival and discourage malevolence, yet benevolent intent alone does not suffice. ---- Expectancies, Not Actual Consequences Given that we're navigating so many epistemic uncertainties, any practical consequentialist framework deals with expectancies rather than results. A skilled Poker player does not assume they made a good decision calling all-in with Deuces against Aces, even if they luckily beat Aces after the draw and win the pot. ---- Habitual Well-adapted behavior often needs to be practiced, as maladapted habits need to be disciplined. Skilled Poker players discipline their emotional impulses, as a stream of bad luck can cause them to "tilt" and become very upset in ways that cloud their decisions. A well-adapted moral agent strives to do the same, as with the case of the Stoics and Buddhists and virtue ethicists. As habitual creatures, it is not merely about well-adapted singular actions, but developing well-adapted habits. ---- Aggregate Evaluation A drunk driver shouldn't assume they made an ethical/functional decision simply because they managed to arrive home safely. As another heuristic form of evaluation, we should factor in repeats of the situation (either habitually and from other people repeating the same behavior), and evaluate whether the behavior was well-adapted or maladapted in aggregate. If everyone habitually drove drunk, that would almost certainly be maladapted for our collective survival. ---- The Recursive Function of Evaluation The recursive function of making an ethical evaluation is to determine whether to encourage or discourage a particular decision and has consequences in its own right. A parent might correctly identify that their child is behaving in ways and intentions well-adapted to survival, but might reward and spoil them with a most unhealthy treat counter-productive to their health. A consequentialist evaluation should not merely stop at identifying what's most likely right or wrong, but also apply that consequentialist heuristic evaluation of how to best respond. ---- Epistemic Humility and Prioritizing the Foreseeable If a parent were to face the unfortunate scenario where both their child and an award-winning cancer researcher were drowning, they should prioritize rescuing their child first given our epistemic limitations. This is the most practically and foreseeably functional, even if it might seem hypothetically less functional. We cannot predict the long-term consequences of a cancer researcher drowning beyond hypotheticals. We can confidently predict that if all parents were to neglect their children in their greatest time of need using aggregate evaluation, our species would quickly go extinct.

That's always how I intuitively understood it and argued it as an engineer who roots ethics in survival and tends to view everything in terms of functionality and practicality. To derive an objective ought, like objectively true moral facts, don't we merely need to define a core function for human beings, as airplanes ought to fly and computers ought to compute? So I always attempted it this way: P1: What something "ought/should" do describes its function, as knives ought to cut and computers should compute. P2: The function of a social species is to cooperatively survive. P3: Human beings are a social species. C: Therefore, human beings ought to cooperatively survive. I often receive accusations of committing a naturalistic fallacy, but I am not merely observing that the function of human beings is to cooperatively survive or conflating what's good for the mere fact that it's a natural property. It is a functional requirement even for a human ethical system itself to function: P1: For an ethical system to function, its followers must persist. P2: Humans that follow an ethical system contradictory to survival cannot persist. C: A functional ethical system must be harmonious with the collective survival and reproduction of its followers. A group of philosophers who conclude that it's "bad" for human beings to breathe oxygen will perish within minutes of asphyxiation along with their malfunctional ethical system, for a most blatant example. Also it can demonstrate quickly why hedonistic ideals are objectively malfunctional. P1: Humans that can barely feel pain fail to recognize the damage being done to their bodies. P2: Humans that can barely recognize damage to their bodies are maladapted for survival. C: Humans ought to feel plenty of pain [i.e., pain is good and functional]. From this we should be able to derive many other moral facts based on the root function for human followers of an ethical system to survive, as required for the ethical system itself to function: P: A society that protects the basic rights of its citizens is better-adapted for collective survival than one that violates them. C: We ought to protect basic human rights. P1: Unjust societies lack societal stability and devolve into vengeance. P2: A vengeful and unstable society is counter-productive to its collective survival. C: We ought establish a just society. We can also ethically justify the need for undercover law enforcers despite their need to habitually lie in ways that might pose ethical conflicts for deontologists, virtue ethicists, and theists. P1: Undercover law enforcers are functionally necessary to stop organized criminals. P2: Organized criminals threaten our collective survival. C: We ought to have undercover law enforcers to stop organized criminals. In this case, even though undercover law enforcers must habitually lie to potentially even innocent people to protect their cover, they are behaving in perfectly ethical ways as they are helping preserve our society rather than moving it closer to extinction. Of course, I can observe that I should never lie unless it's almost certainly beneficial to the survival of my loved ones and community, since the limits of my foresight and associated risk-aversion involved require me to just observe the general patterns that lying is maladapted for survival. If everyone lied, it would completely distort our ability to navigate the world and ultimately survive. Yet the undercover agent can see a very clear and functional need to lie to protect the survival of his society. At the end of the day, we're objectively either moving towards our preservation (ethical, well-adapted) or extinction (unethical, maladapted). Determining which direction can be incredibly complicated, demands epistemic humility and risk-aversion in the face of the sea of uncertainties, and even contextual -- as with determining the optimal human diet for a given person (but that doesn't mean that excess sugar consumption is only malfunctional when it's misaligned with someone's preferences or cultural values). "Complicated" isn't the same as "subjective". "Subjective" implies a judgment towards something which has no functional requirement. Humans have a functional requirement, as with human societies and their systems of ethics. Malfunctional ethical systems are prone to premature extinction, as with a maladapted species, and as buildings constructed on faulty foundations are doomed to collapse. This is the way I see it as an engineer along with my attempt to propose a solution to solve the never-ending metaethical debates with a clear and objective moral standard, rooted in a functional prerequisite, and divorced from any supernatural beliefs and unfalsifiable metaphysics.

I have been studying the psychology of moral, and, based on the articles I've read and the classes of Psychology from my university, there are different groups with different moral standards. We internalize moral by learning the rules, and, as we grow up, we learn even more with the feelings and cognitive interpretation.

Tip: please continue drinking tea/coffee during your videos it adds a nice touch

Yes, I’m nerd enough. Thank you for this and your other Pluralistic Universe videos.

Tip: please finish your tea/coffee before you start .

I wonder would Kant be happy to be translated into English? Perhaps he would be very angry.

Kant's CI brushes up on something frankly holy, though perhaps it doesn't quite reach it. I'm always reminded of two things: Matt 22:37-39 and Catch-22: - "From now on I'm thinking only of me." Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: "But, Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way." "Then," said Yossarian, "I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't I?

Anybody else here from the Angelicum Academy? 😆

Name one.

I’ve read it several times, & I cry every time. It’s nice to know that others do too.

Driving my car! It's the bane of my existence! So many variables that I have no control over. And the slowpoke who holds back a huge line of traffic through a no passing zone! My blood is boiling by the time I get to work. That's one thing I could try to reorient in my thought life. I would be better off for it.

philo-sophistry a blight on human-kind.

Just finished the audiobook & it was interesting but couldn’t understand the speeches. Thanks for your short analysis, great synopsis so far. I’ll listen to your other examinations of the other speeches as well.

I'm in a winter resort, it's freezing outside, it's almost midnight, I have neurology test on Monday, and I'm here watching this. Philosophy is awesome.

how old are you, sir?

Not in anyone's control is: * the place of his birth * the data of his birth * his self at the beginning of his birth * nobody was born by oneself So, the question is - what to control at all? If we control something, that area is too narrow. Actually, personally for me it is not nothing, but I must admit also that too many things are out of control

I really enjoyed this video, thank you kindly. Jan 🙂

Isn't this the opposite of the popular view? It seems like all the things we can't control are the things that people try the hardest to control.

In contrast to Jesus’ emphasis on love, compassion, and grace, Kant’s morality prioritizes rigid consistency and adherence to universal principles, often neglecting the flexibility needed for real-world moral dilemmas. By reducing morality to the cold, mechanical application of duty, Kant’s framework struggles to account for the emotional depth and relational aspects central to ethical life.

thank you

You hit the nail on the head with your analysis. Kant wasn't wrong per se, but he didn't understand sanctification. I'm reminded of Zosima from Dostoevsky: "Never be daunted by your own lack of courage in the attainment of love, nor be over-daunted even by your bad actions in this regard. I regret I can say nothing more cheerful to you, for in comparison to fanciful love, active love is a cruel and frightening thing."

Like the 👔

So now what about lobsters?

Cosmetics has all the answer.

Amazimg thanks man

Ergo, our Justice System is toxic for the Souls of our Society 🫠

this philosophy destroyed my narcissism

It's very interesting to me that ancient philosophers in a more brutal age tended to minimize the reality of suffering, while more modern and comfortable ones tend to magnify it.

“Justice is good for the soul… not always so good for the body.” Socrates

Kant rejects any notion of situational ethics or personal viewpoint as to morality but holds that truth is definite and unwavering.

Would be better to slow down when reading the text.

1:36 "Hitler's form of racism" Oy vey!

Hi, Ive been messing around learning this preface for a few days now and this is what ive come up with. First we have to start with some knowledge of Kant's Transcedental Aesthetic specifically phenomena and noumena. This is important because kant wont tell you what tf he talking about you have to figure it out some kind of way by reading him. Anyways in the preface the 2nd paragraph he sets up moral philosophy like this. All rational knowledge is material or formal. Material philosophy is two fold laws of nature and freedom. This is important disctinction and needs to be understood. Laws of nature is physics and think of a deterministic world without free will. That would be a complete naturistic world ruled by the laws of nature think of causality. A box moving on a ice block is subject to causality and everything in nature is also including humans. Our heart beats, we get hungry when we need food all biological processes. So thats the laws of nature so what is the laws of freedom? This is our free will. It is presupposed that we have free will here and arent living in a deterministic world. As such our free will and the choices we make do not exist in the laws of nature. They are independant and exist in the laws of freedom. The laws of freedom is where moral philosophy comes from. So for kant his whole epistimology exist in the phenomena and noumenal worlds. Freedom and morality exist in the noumenal world. We act out that morality in the phenomenal world. We act on impulses and our desires. Kants says that is us acting on behalf of the laws of nature. To act in accordance with morality and to be free we have to act on morality that is in our reason and outside of nature. This exist in the noumenal world and we can not know its nature. Now here's where it gets interesting. As human we also exist in both the phenomonal and noumenal world. We exist as we see ourselves and we exist in a thing in of itself outside of any of our understanding. This is where we get morality from. When we make a decision to act morally that decision originates in the noumenal realm but manifest itself in the phenomal world as an action. Think of Descartes and Princess Elisabeth and the mind body problem. Descartes cant answer how a thought that originates outside of ourself becomes the way we can move our body. And if he cant explain how then he must give way to the fact that thoughts are from our mind and exist in the natural world and we become determistic with no free will. Kant answers this by saying that our thoughts originate with reason and morality and freedom in the noumenal world and we act out our thoughts in the phenomal world. And then he beautifully dodges the why by using Hume's own concept that we can not know the full causality of any event. Therefore kant says knowing how an immaterial thought become a material action is beyond human understanding just like Hume says knowing the cause of any event is. This is why knowing how the transcendental aesthetic is key because Kant breaks down that its our senses that we percieve the noumenal world and our human mind creates suffering and desires and causes us to not be free and act according to nature and become less human. To be fully free we must act in accordance with the moral law free from any desire or selfishness. We must act bc its our duty not bc its a want.. I could go on and on but yeah that a brief synapses of the first 2 paragraphs of the Preface of the book. I dont suggest moving forward without understanding it tbh. Not just for the sake of the book but bc once you see what kant is doing its eye opening and powerful.