5. Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand Duopoly Game (Game Theory Playlist 3)

[@AmaraJavieraLoretoSandovalUtre]

Sir, you have saved my exam today. thank you very much

[@farahramzi1221]

What a wonderful and complete explanation of Bertrand model.👍

[@nikimorgan4069]

thank you for making these! I go to UCSB and you are saving my grade right nowhaha

[@cansutheprodigy]

hocam bilkent üniversitesindeyim game theory sınavıma çalışıyorum ve anlatım şekliniz ve ingilizceniz konuyu anlamama çok yardımcı oluyor çok teşekkürler

[@kub1031]

hasker? 😂

[@tunapehlivan2408]

hello, we said that when p1=p2>c, there is no NE because both firms will cut prices until they reach c. So this means that in the long run p1=p2>c is the same thing as p1=p2=c because they end up in the same place and result either way. With this in mind, aren't we wrong in the sense that we have never actally examined p1=p2>c, rather we have only examined the situation a some steps before p1=p2=c? Knowing the game rules, both firms can simply see it for a fact that cutting prices while p1=p2>c does not mean getting all the customers but rather means starting a vicious cycle that will result in doing zero profit and that it is more benefitial for both to not undercut prices and stay on p1=p2>c than p1=p2=c.

[@longname6117]

The two firms have to have an agreement (collusion) which they both have to believe the other party won't change their strategy and lower the price to get all the customers. I think in traditional economics where players are assumed to be selfish (and in simultaneous games they do not know the other player's decision), it's not likely for them to stick to their words when there is immediate benefit, even if it may benefit them in the long term.

[@g_krou]

Very helpful video, could you explain what would happen if the firms had mixed strategies?

[@claudiaranocchia3273]

very nice explanation. Any videos or references on Bertrand Nash equilibrium with convex cost function?

[@МаратКарданов-ъ6ж]

Have you found the answer? If so, mind sharing? I have the same questiob

[@debanjanabhattacharjee5954]

Our prof has made his ppt based on this video 😂

[@vassilgeorgiev177]

case: p1=p2=c+1 should also be NE, since no incentive to lower (profits=0) or increase (profits=0), given other firms p

[@selcukozyurt]

Good thinking, but no! It is NOT a NE. Prices are not multiples of 1, so price c+0.99, for example, a profitable deviation, given that the other firm charges c+1. Hope that clears..

[@vassilgeorgiev177]

@@selcukozyurtokay that makes sense. What about a case with c+epsilon?

[@mansisinghal7187]

what would be nash equilibrium in bertrand Duopoly game if there are N producers?

[@selcukozyurt]

Number of players isn't important in Bertrand. If all firms have the same marginal cost, for example, then the NE would still be such that all firms pick the MC.

[@fergusjohnson3788]

@@selcukozyurt What if p1=p2

[@OfficialLakaka]

What does a Bertrand duopoly look like when products are differentiated?

[@MrJubilance]

Here this might help: "Oligopoly: Bertrand Competition with Differentiated Goods" kzbin.info/www/bejne/j6PRooiGjJ5pors

[@zixuantan474]

would there be a MSNE in this case?

[@immaculatengambi6532]

I think if you can assign probabilities to the prices 😊

[@dr.literary3139]

10:16 HAY MQ BİZDE COST YOK HOCAM

[@fergusjohnson3788]

Plz can u explain in the comments section What if p1=p2

[@fergusjohnson3788]

What if p1=p2

[@selcukozyurt]

I already do that, no? Price less than marginal cost c means begative profit. That can never be best response because zero profit with p=0 is always a valid strategy.

[@abushahdatmd.ibrahim3558]

Too many advertisements are played during the lecture. It is very disturbing.

[@flavio1683]

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[@mauriciolagosrogers3498]

even so, all those ads worth. Is the price to watch all af these amazing videos and save grades hahaha