737Max Update! 14 Apr 23

[@lardyify]

The spar fittings are solid aluminium. There are two terminal fittings attaching the front spar to the fuselage structure at station 1016 and three fittings attaching the rear spar at, if memory serves correctly, station 1066. They are, like most Boeing primary structure, fail safe meaning if one element fails the other can take the entire load. Boeing fins are made, from front spar to rear spar, of 2024 aluminium. The rudder is supported on forged aluminium ribs aft of the rear spar. The space between the rear spar and the rudder is home to the hydraulic actuators that power the rudder. The panels which enclose the aft ribs are made from composite material. Although composite, they are load-carrying secondary structure and very robust. Years ago, on D checks, we would remove the vertical fin to inspect the terminal fittings but that was on 737-200s. I’ve never had reason to remove the fin on later aircraft, although it is common to remove the horizontal stabilisers whose terminal fittings are subject to corrosion. I’ve never understood why corrosion should be a problem on the one but not the other. I suspect the forces are higher on the hori stab due to their being in line with the jet efflux from the engines, especially during rotation.

[@ajg617]

I'm trying to think of a Boeing commercial that has lost a vertical stab? Maybe one 707? Even with the 737 rudder hard-overs, they didn't come off. And as Mentour Pilot would say, kudos for Boeing to even self report this issue at the expense of the bottom line whatever the result might actually be.

[@thereissomecoolstuff]

Very detailed comment. If it affects storage and current build AC that number will be very small. There are very few planes in Storage in Seattle. Boeing also has been at 38 ac a month prior to covid.

[@chrisjohnson4666]

​@ajg617 i know for awhile early B52s had problems with vertical stabilizers I believe one fell off in a storm plane landed safely... Early B17s had stabilizer issues mainly size issue and control authority... Im trying to remember if a 700 series ever lost a tail??? If I recall correctly the B52 falling off scared the whiz out of Boeing and they beefed up stabilizers on ot of their designs...

[@chrisjohnson4666]

​@@ajg617 upon some quick research an E6 did in fact lose its tail but seems it was unique to that airframe...

[@mountainflyhigh]

Just slap some doublers on that shit - problem solved ;-)

[@joemeyer6876]

This is me guessing: (because I was an RII Inspector on 737s at an MRO): I’m guessing that the chamfered edges of the bolt holes (2 each) of the fitting in question, we’re not to spec. . . But that’s just guessing. . . What’s distressing is treating this as a repair issue in/during the manufacturing process. . . Repair manuals are for ‘after the fact,’ not during. . . This is more a non conforming part issue, and that’s on Spirit. . . Kudos to the inspector who wrote it up, whatever it turns out to be.

[@zoner__]

And if the edge was not to spec. What would happen?

[@uzlonewolf]

@@zoner__ No one knows as it has not been studied. Could be fine, could develop cracks and fall off. This is why it's important that parts be made to spec.

[@offcenterconcepthaus]

Makes you wonder. Can't be material/tolerance issue -- "non-standard" manufacturing issue sounds pretty cryptic.

[@joemeyer6876]

@zoner The bolts that go in those holes are chamfered too, and if the radiuses aren’t the same, the torque isn’t uniform. . . but this is just a guess. It could be something else . . .

[@ajg617]

So what exactly is a "non standard manufacturing process...used during the installation of the two fittings"? Does that really mean an installation that does not follow Boeing's installation procedures as opposed to non-conforming fittings?

[@Retr0racin]

I spent 34 years on the 737 Circus line in Renton, on my 3rd year of retirment. Back in the 90`s I assembled that dorsel fin part before it was off loaded along with 90% of the other parts we assmbled in house. Not a day goes by that I miss that place:-)

[@Raprada]

Such a shame to hear, we know you and your fellow Renton and Everett workers took pride in your works and it shows with the great planes that came out from there.

[@sblack48]

Boeing is not the only one. In fact they were late to the game. At Bombardier not only are the major sub assemblies farmed out, the detailed design is also farmed out to reduce costs. The wing shape and design requirements are handed to MHI or Triumph or whoever and they go off and design and build it and you get what you get. This started with the Global Express in the mid 90s. The wings, fuselage tubes, tail group and cockpit section all come from different countries and are stuck together at the final line. I think Airbus was always doing it that way because they started as a consortium. Gulfstream has outsourced their wings, dunno about the rest. It sucks for many reasons but like many other industries it is here to stay.

[@Retr0racin]

@@sblack48 Boeing paid Toyota to teach us just in time and to put a whole freaking airplane on a platform and have a moving line lol

[@chuckhiggins15]

Hi. The B-29 was the best that Boeing put out. Had over 3000 crew hrs in Korea. Even people were lost, Boeing was there. I attended the 50 year B-29 Boeing Rollout

[@Retr0racin]

@@chuckhiggins15 The building in Renton I worked at for 34 years was where they built them. I used to love finding old pictures and seeing what it was like at present time. Lol they sold more than half the property back to the city so it's a much smaller footprint now.

[@slunasaurusrex]

This is what happens when you replace leadership of an engineering company with MBA's. Engineering companies need to be led by Engineers. Licensed engineers take a oath of duty to the public to do the right thing. MBA's only care about the bottom line.

[@gerardjohnson2106]

Exactly

[@Jojos25]

You need both and even humanities.

[@kevino.7348]

You have no idea how this issue happened. How can you let engineers off the hook so easily? It’s now the standard mantra “blame the bean counters” or “blame the MBAs”. So now it’s never an engineer’s fault?

[@Jojos25]

@@kevino.7348 Also, I've seen companies get stagnant and fail after being run 100% by engineers. Literally you need experts of all areas in a company like Boeing, diversity is key. I think this is just an acquired mantra from last year's Netflix documentary.

[@stephenstange4194]

While I agree that this is a generalization, it is directionally correct. Too many companies today are being run by people who neither understand the product nor the customer.

[@underdog2594]

"You can buy a man's time. You can buy a man's physical presence at a certain place. You can even buy a measured number of skilled muscular motions per hour or day. But you cannot buy enthusiasm. You cannot buy initiative. You cannot buy loyalty. You cannot buy the devotion of hearts, minds, and souls." - Clarence Francis

[@wendygerrish4964]

Yes but decent competitive pay..it helps

[@underdog2594]

@@wendygerrish4964 True. I think Clarence Francis meant that as an employer or manager, one must earn an employee's enthusiasm, initiative, loyalty, devotion, etc. Leadership, integrity, and engagement are paramount to achieving a desired end state.

[@johnkruton9708]

Spirit was converted many years back from a union shop to a non union. So there you go. No pension for new union workers means no 20 year incentive to build quality into airplanes because the effort you put in today pays off when you retire. NOPE. Not anymore. Everyone wants to take as much money every year they can because that’s all they can do. Both engineering and manufacturing. Execs and salaried always get more every year. The yadda yadda from management continues just like when we merged in the late 90’s.

[@Dennis-vh8tz]

@@johnkruton9708 Or no union to protect whistleblowers, or employees who insist on taking the time required to do the job correctly, makes short cuts more likely to happen and less likely to be reported.

[@donwoodward6951]

pay according to economy, and a future of financial security will get you devotion to craft, and quality workmanship. .... in most cases....

[@jimduke5545]

Juan-I noted that you demonstrated what appeared to be several inches (more than 2) of pedal travel while showing what the pilot did on AAL587. In fact, the rudder pedal travel distance available to the pilot at 250kias was approximately 1.8 inches from center (as opposed to 4 inches when doing routine flight control checks or a V1 engine loss). This, less than 1/2 what the pilot routinely observed during flight control checks and/or V1-cut training, may hav seemed to be a jammed flight control or a rudder control reversal. Both of these flight control hazards were “hot topics” due to B737 accidents during the 90s. HF plays a significant role in all mishaps. We will never know what the pilot perceived during the SECOND (relatively minor/major severity) wake encounter which caused the previously unknown catastrophic hazard of full and abrupt flight control movement BELOW maneuvering speed. As you said, now we do know-in particular respect to the rudder. Several latent hazards aligned in the AAL587 tragedy: wake turbulence, untrained rudder pedal travel limiter system, unknown design maneuver speed definition caveats, trained emphasis on rudder for roll control assistance,… Bottom line: no wake encounter(s) during that departure-no accident that flight. Please remind your viewers that we now have a wake encounter reporting system. It took over 15 years after the tragedy of AAL587 to convince the Air Navigation Service Provider that they needed to manage the risk and reporting is part of Safety Risk Management. All it takes for the pilot is to key the mike and make a PIREP. See the AIM/AIP for a suggested severity “key.” ATC is required to log the report of these failures to provide adequate separation. It’s their job under IFR to provide separation. From the radar scope, controllers have no idea if their mitigations (7110.65) actually work. Only the pilots (and pax/flight attendants!!) know when a wake is encountered and if it isn’t reported-it didn’t happen. Thanks for your terrific channel.

[@turricanedtc3764]

If it's OK, I'd like to add that in the case of AA587 it wasn't just a *one-two*, as Juan illustrates. It was multiple concurrent reversals in a very short space of time - the AAMP training that FO Molin attended seemed to be using the MD-80 types as a basis, and due to the rear-mounted engines on that type, the rudder had considerably less yaw authority because it did not have to counteract anything like the yaw force inherent to asymmetric thrust from a wing-mounted high-bypass turbofan. Even then it would seem that what Molin took away from that training wasn't what it should have been, as he was subsequently cited multiple times for being too aggressive with the rudder pedals in situations which did not warrant significant use of the rudder at that stage. This wasn't necessarily his fault - something about the concept of encountering wake turbulence seems to have unnerved him, and I'm sure the Delta 9750 training accident (in which an entire crew was lost when their DC-9 became uncontrollable due to a wake turbulence encounter late in the approach) cast a long shadow within the piloting community. Following AA587, the US piloting community and unions (within AA in particular) had a tough time accepting that rudder input was capable of causing catastrophic failure of the vertical stabiliser attachment points, and zeroed in on the use of composites in the construction of the airframe; highlighting those attachment points in particular. I remember at the time several of FO Molin's colleagues on AA's Airbus A300 fleet insisting they be reassigned to another type (which de facto meant Boeing or MD), such was their conviction that Airbus's construction technique was flawed. I even remember one pilot using the relative toughness of a (French) Citroen 2CV versus an (American) Ford F100 pickup to "demonstrate" the point. The reality of the situation was that once the structural loads applied to the vertical stabiliser by those rudder pedal inputs were calculated, the cumulative effect not only exceeded the "ultimate" structural load designed in, the structure itself remained intact well beyond the loadings at which it was expected to fail, and those loadings were comparable to - if not in excess of - those expected to cause failure in all-aluminium equivalents. It's interesting that Juan brings up concerns over use of composites over two decades after the fact.

[@jimduke5545]

@@turricanedtc3764 it’s ok by me to add on😎 However, what evidence is there that the rudder pedals (hence force by EITHER pilot) moved the rudder rather than, perhaps, an outside force such as a wake? Or, perhaps, a combination of outside force (hard one way) then inside (hard the other way, and then …? Quick answer: there is none. Just conjecture and innuendo. Wikipedia is particularly shameful on this one but they are citing the ntsb, so it seems like a fact. Without force transducers on the rudder pedals, (read: evidence), the crew actions (could have been either pilot on the pedals) are reverse engineered by the same community of interest who months/years prior was proud of finding and publishing that the outside forces could move a B737 rudder to its stop and jam it into an unrecoverable spin. (Fortunately, one crew, with providence, awareness, airspeed and altitude was able to recover.) Also, be careful characterizing pilot community positions. The world’s largest pilot union and non-governmental safety organization (ALPA) was very careful to avoid speculation on exactly what you claim they “had a tough time accepting.” WakeNet USA and other forums held discussions on this and there were questions about the facts supporting the hypothesis but you are going to have to point to your source that they ever said anything like what you claim. Even if the forces on the rudder were crew induced (by either pilot-it is prudent for a Captain to “follow along” on the flight controls on a normal departure/approach. These guys just had a wake encounter moments before the second wake encounter…). you should recall, that for decades, training on the basic definition of Va (design maneuvering speed) taught pilots that full and abrupt movement of the flight controls could not break the airplane when flying below that speed. Only after this tragedy did the caveat for the rudder (yaw axis) become known to the pilot community. Bottom line: no second wake encounter, no accident that day (Unless the first encounter damaged the rudder attachment). We (you, me, the ntsb) really don’t know. There was an extraordinary amount of pressure not to increase the separation standards because of this accident. What the ANSP or regulator did NOT do was manage the wake encounter risk in any in other way, either, for a long time. It finally took the A380/B748 introduction to meaningfully address the risk and even then, it was not a smooth process. Cheers

[@turricanedtc3764]

@@jimduke5545 - Thanks for the response! You ask "what evidence is there that the rudder pedals ... moved the rudder rather than ... an outside force such as a wake?" - To the best of my knowledge, the 600 series was fitted with an advanced DFDR which instrumented and logged rudder pedal input and actual rudder deflection separately. You also ask me "...be careful characterizing pilot community positions". I am always careful in that sense - over two decades of interacting with the PPRuNe forum network taught me that I had to "pick my battles" - there's a photo of me (a "lowly" commercial software engineer) in a Level-D A320 simulator as a result of my being correct regarding an aspect of the AF447 accident. As to evidence that there was a strong push within ALPA and the US piloting community to present the use of composite attachments as the problem, the fact that several of the AA A300 flight crew insisted on being reassigned to Boeing/MD types is proof in itself, no? You say "[I] should recall, that for decades, training on ... Va ... taught pilots that full and abrupt movement ... could not break the airplane when flying below that speed" - if that was the case, then that training was deficient. Whether we're talking metal or composites, it is a matter of Engineering Materials 101 that repeated bending forces in either direction in quick succession will cause fatigue and structural failure of that material. The problem is neither full nor abrupt movement in and of itself - rather repeated full and abrupt movements in opposite directions. Then there's "it is prudent for a Captain to “follow along” on the flight controls on a normal departure/approach" - I may not be an ATPL, but that's the first I've heard of it... In fact I've heard precisely the opposite from those ATPL folks I have spoken to. Once you're qualified to be on the flight deck of an airliner, the expectation has to be that you can handle the aircraft without assistance. Furthermore, while there may have been one or two wake encounters from the departing B747, an A300 is also considered a "heavy" in ATC terms - the momentum and inertia it carries makes the type completely capable of riding out a wake turbulence encounter with little-to-no corrective action required. To the best of my recollection, the major change with regard to wake separation for ATC internationally actually came well before this accident as a result of the introduction of the B757 - because the super-efficient "supercritical" wing design on the type caused wake vortices way in excess of aircraft several times larger.

[@jimduke5545]

@@turricanedtc3764 ok, You might want to know that the American pilots havent been in ALPA since 1963. As for the dfdr, yep. The accident A300 dfdr was capable of recording flight control position and pilot input forces. However, that aircraft was exempted from adding the measurement sensors for flight control input forces. It did have the flight control position sensors and the regulator and operator (AAL) felt that the input force sensors was not practical to install. ALPA (the one that the American pilots don’t belong to) did comment on the relaxed interpretation of 121.344 in the advisory circular. They may have mentioned that in casual conversations with APA (the AAL pilot union) and maybe even the ntsb. These things happen😇 Good on you for your work on AF447. Thank you. You may have surmised that I am an ATP. I don’t know what pprune has to do with this but I’d do agree that a properly trained experienced first officer with whom I have flown with on previous flights doesn’t get my feet (and sometimes hand-it’s where the push talk is) on the flight controls. I guarantee that after an upset, my feet would be lightly on the rudders to do my job-monitoring-more closely. As PIC, I have had to take over the controls on only a few occasions, but being more closely aware of the situation (monitoring) makes it much safer. I was trained that way, I trained others that way and I have flight checked others for their monitoring skills. (BTW, the FBW airbuses do have coupled rudders. Only the side sticks leave one “unaware” of what inputs are being applied. You are far, far behind the times on wake separation standards. The 757 category is no more in many parts of the world. There’s no reason for you to be aware of pairwise wake separation standards within Eurocontrol, the FAA and ICAO. Your assumption that the roll inertia and mass of a smaller heavy encountering the wake of the largest heavy is not supported by the calculations used for the 7 wake categories (A thru G) now used in which the A306 is a “small” heavy (cat C) and the 747-400 is a “large” heavy (cat B). Their engineering assumptions and calculations are suspect in some cases but I am just pointing out that the ANSP wake separation standards state of the art now supports the 757 in the same category as an E190 and F70. (MGTOW 273000 lbs, 114000lbs and 88000 lbs, respectively) l assure you that I would rather be in a 757 than the embraer or Fokker when encountering any wake of the other within , say, a 757/f50 pairing, but on the radar…it’s legal to have minimum radar separation between these any pair within the cat D grouping, regardless of which aircraft is leading/following. Engineering 😱 Larger wake on the 757??? Well, check your sources. The wingspan, and therefore the spanwise center of lift/vortex centers are conventional. The problem with the 757 was that the wakes were as strong as expected (15m gamma) but they lasted longer than expected (due to the efficient wing). winglets actually decrease the decay rate-wakes last even longer. 757s are also really hard to slow down and go down so pilots of the leading 757 were often high on the approach path to slowdown then intercept the vertical path from above after getting configured-hence the advisory circular/AIP emphasis on larger (757 and above) flying the glide slope on approach. It’s a helpful “system” mitigation, just like offsetting downwind when above and upwind when at a lower flight level on the tracks in rvsm. I hope you have a self driving Tesla. Very few pilots (test pilots are the exception) are willing to trust the “don’t do anything concept” to permit “riding out a wake turbulence encounter with little-to-no corrective action.” It isn’t in the DNA. In fact, the latest training on upset recovery defines wake encounters as an “upset.” The REQUIRED response is to verbalize “upset “, disconnect the autopilot and autothrottles, push (to unload the wings), roll (to put the lift vector away from the ground), thrust or throttle (to recover airspeed, maintain or to decrease it depending on circumstance) and stabilize (to a safe, desired aircraft state). This is regulator approved industry standard training. In the professional pilots mind, this is directive action and mandatory-like a TCAS RA. You know more about materials engineering than I do. I won’t question shear calculations of fasteners. Please don’t question the professionalism of your pilot or the safety professionals within their ranks.

[@rael5469]

"now we do know-in particular respect to the rudder. " The A320 ECAM in direct law actually says "Rudder With Care" .....and they aren't kidding. I rolled the A320 (sim) just as we crossed the airport fence, in Direct Law. The instructor told us that line pilots have no problem flying in direct law.

[@garypocklington3396]

I would recommend reading ‘Flying Blind’ by Peter Robison. It tells the story of the 737 Max and the problems that beset it when it was being developed. If I remember correctly it highlights how a change in culture at Boeing caused some of their problems.

[@chuckhiggins15]

This FAA A&P (IA), With all the 737 STC ? alterations, AMLs, a Type Certificate Change should occured. Humm ??

[@jonassattler4489]

The first half was quite good, essentially a hostile history of Boeing, going over its failures and describing the transformation away from an "Engineers company". The second part, focusing on the MAX was very bad though, it practically did not contain any relevant information about the failure. The failure was the consequence of malpractice in software development, which is practically ignored in the entire book. How any book can attempt to cover such a failure without even bothering to describe the basics of how SW is developed in the aerospace industry is quite ridicolous. The name DO178 isn't even found, that alone should be enough to disqualify it...

[@rox3815]

It never ceases to amaze me the time and effort you apply to each of your videos thanks Juan👍

[@wokewokerman5280]

...amen....

[@bizjetfixr8352]

Take a gander of the pics of the fuselage being transported by rail from ICT. Vertical stab attach fitting are present (and covered), so they were installed by Spirit. For what its worth, the Spirit work force are Boeing people who changed companies when Boeing dumped the ICT factory. For those who don't know, there is a "type certificate" which is the FAA approval of the aircraft design, and the "Production Certificate" which is the FAAs approval of the whole manufacturing process, insuring that they can build an airplane identical to the type certificate. One wonders how they do their "QC" at subcontractors. One of my former OEM buddies said that one of the Wichita OEMs wanted to move major assembly work to Mexico, but was nixed by the FAA, because they couldn't sell the FAA on "QC" One also wonders how many more "quality lapses" Boeing has, but doesn't know about. Not really that big of a deal. Shortened inspection intervals on aircraft in service. Boeing will put together a few crews to work the attachment fitting replacements. Assuming they can find people with an adequate skill level. Engineering will have to build some tools to position the replacement fittings. The big hold up might be the fasteners needed to attach the new fittings. Like about every other airplane part, Hucks/Hi-Locs/Cherry/etc. fasteners are hard to find in stock, 90-120 day lead times. Spirit has been doing some "3-D printing". Why are 2019 and later installations bad?

[@Tomxman]

Yes Vma supposed to allow full control input

[@6StringPassion.]

What the FAA says: “based on the facts and data Boeing presented, the FAA validated the company’s assessment that there is no immediate safety issue.” What we heard: "Boeing is still working to understate the full scale of the problem."

[@mikercflyer7383]

That’s why the old saying in the machine shop, That qualify can not be inspected into the the part.

[@raccoon874]

*For those who were unaware, Spirit AeroSystems (SPR) used to be part of Boeing.*

[@jcsrst]

It's not surprising that any American business doesn't want to talk about potential problems with their products because their stock prices drop immediately. This of course disincentives truth telling.

[@markspc1]

Great video Juan. It is sad to see that Boeing has lost its luster. My last job at Boeing, Everett, was on the 787, and we always had issues with Spirit Aerospace. I think Spirit Aerospace once was part of Boeing, and as with all Boeing's cost cutting measure, they cutting off their nose to spite their face.

[@jti2007]

Spirit Aerospace was Boeing Wichita before the divesture of the civilian aircraft production in ICT.

[@charleskennedy1712]

Cutting your nose off to spite your face means to deliberately self harm to avoid loss of pride. That’s not what’s happening here

[@vincentsutter1071]

@@jti2007 He noted this part was produced in iNDIA. My brother had numerous issues at Navistar when they outsourced work to India.

[@ant2312]

@@charleskennedy1712 doesn't matter, you're still trying to defend this debacle

[@charleskennedy1712]

@@ant2312 absolutely I am not defending any of it, modern day Boeing are a complete disgrace and I avoid flying them in solidarity with the crews of the two crashed Maxes who Boeing tried to blame. I’d rather fly a witch’s broom than a Boeing

[@couespursuit7350]

Thank you Juan for the better coverage on this. Per the AW&ST article sited, at min 3:07, it sounds like the procedure to attach the two fittings was not performed according to the method spelled out for this attachment, the problem not being the quality of the part. This sounds vey much like the AA maintenance done on the DC-10 engines where the engines were removed and reattached using a non approved method that resulted in a wing engine ripping of a DC-10 in flight out of Chicago O'hare.

[@bmwlane8834]

In case some don't understand "station" it's a measure in inches from a reference datum point at the nose or beyond the nose. Water line is measured from a low point vertical in inches.

[@rael5469]

"a reference datum point at the nose or beyond the nose. " Quite correct.

[@xoxo2008oxox]

Was watching VRrail fan video camera feeds and you can sometimes see the fuselages on train cars...most are the front fuselage sections, wrapped in green.

[@jonbeno9926]

Right on Juan! I'm glad to hear you are joining the Van's Air Force! You should definitely keep us posted on progress weather through your channel or on The channel you mentioned. Thanks for the great content on the 737.

[@Indy1977TX]

Thank Juan, rode with my family on a Max8 yesterday and will be watching this story develop as that is precious cargo.

[@markhwirth7718]

Love your detailed explanations Juan . It seems to me that there needs to be more qualified supervision at Boeing . It’s pretty scary the whole process seems to be a can of worms all in the name of the dollar! How many other safety issues are being missed ? I guess we as pilots just have to keep planning for the worst and hoping for the best ! It’s our job !

[@hb1338]

Watch the video. The problems occurred outside Boeing.

[@markhwirth7718]

It doesn’t matter where the problem originated ! Boeing is responsible for its product and if they can’t keep track of what goes into their aircraft they need more qualified personnel to over see what goes on ! In aviation there is a saying that everyone involved should go by right down to the person that sweeps the hanger floor ( True Safety Is No Accident ). Sincerely Captain Mark H Wirth

[@blue81blue81]

This isn't unusual in mass manufacturing. We just don't know about most of it. At least they caught it in production. Thats what auto recalls are. Faults that weren't discovered before build. Thats why auto makers give you a multi year warranty. .....The real crime for Boeing was the MCAS cover up that resulted in the two crashes and the grounding here in the states. In order to rush a new design to compete with Airbus Boeing hung two engines on an old platform that didn't exactly fit....and mickey moused it so airlines didn't have to re-train 737 pilots. Money. It's always the money. As others pointed out those who knew about this never answered for it and Boeing as a whole got away with it. This is the world we live in.

[@guitarhillbilly1482]

Spot On. In my opinion it was criminal what Boeing did concerning MCAS and no Executives went to jail.

[@allan6344]

Another great blancolirio video. Aviation Week still understands the business. One Mile at a Time is a passenger whining blog and very limited in knowing what it takes for the airline to get their butts to their destination. My engineering career was in the passenger and cargo sections.

[@hankmirrow2191]

Juan why dont you do a fly over of Owens Lake no one is showing where the eastern sierra snowmelt is going too?

[@guitarhillbilly1482]

Source: Aviation Weekly Boeing is still working to identify the precise number of affected aircraft, but the source confirmed the issue affects airframes built from 2019 until now. Affected variants include the 737-7, -8, -8200, and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, Boeing confirmed. While not all airframes in those variants are affected, Boeing said the identified population is large. Affected aircraft in Boeing’s inventory must undergo repairs before the FAA can approve them as conforming with the company’s design. It is not clear how long the repairs will take. Boeing said all future rear fuselage sections coming from Spirit will conform to design standards. In-service aircraft will have to be repaired as well, but because the issue is not deemed an immediate safety risk, it will be done via a routine service bulletin and likely airworthiness directive. Boeing’s statement described the problem as “a non-standard manufacturing process ... used during the installation of two fittings.” The Boeing source said the issue is “around the mechanical attachment procedures” and how the fittings were attached to the supporting structure. Boeing is working with both Spirit and the FAA to finalize inspection processes for the production system, aircraft in inventory, and the in-service fleet. On the 737, STA 1016 is where the fuselage structural join is between Section 46 (aft body) and Section 48 (tail cone). The 1016 station marks where the aft pressure bulkhead sits in the fuselage. The vertical stabilizer attaches to the fuselage at the forward and aft spars with main connection points indicated at or close to STA 1016 (forward) and STA 1085.56 (aft). According to structural repair documents available for the 737-800, the principal parts of the structure associated with the issue are most likely to be ATA 55-30-90 part numbers related to the vertical stabilizer front spar terminal fittings and intermediate fittings forward of the rear spar terminal fittings.

[@richardlewis4288]

AA587 cycling of rudder was in great part due to an unsafe Airbus rudder limiting system. The rudder pedal travel at elevated airspeeds was so significantly reduced as to make cycling full travel easy. It’s not the same as in aircraft which reduces the rudder travel and pedal travel remains constant.

[@ajg617]

The findings of that investigation still bother me today.

[@richardlewis4288]

It bothers me that it was so expedient to blame the first officer (I’m sure with Airbus’s blessing) and not be honest with the root cause of the cycling rudder

[@ajg617]

@@richardlewis4288 Exactly. Stupid design. If you can't use the rudder pedals to the physical limit they allow why are they there?

[@robertbutsch1802]

@@ajg617The rudder reversals by the FO loaded up the vertical fin beyond its design limits.

[@richardlewis4288]

@@robertbutsch1802 He was doing full reversals because the rudder pedal throws were decreasing with additional airspeed. For example an aircraft with a rudder input ratio changer you would have consistent rudder pedal inputs but the rudder travel would decrease with increasing airspeed. You could have small pedal inputs and commensurately very small rudder movement. With the A300-600 rudder small pedal inputs were actually maximum pedal movements as the pedals were the limiting input.

[@doneB830]

I’m always relieved when a problem is found, it’s the problems that are not found which is the worry.

[@TheChiefEng]

It seems Boeing would be better served by going back to be an aeronautical engineering company where the main focus should be on engineering and not on concerns about wall street.

[@maxb4074]

Wall Street dominates all aspects of American life now. How? For one thing, they are aided by Washington (Goldman Sachs was the leading campaign contributor to a Presidential candidate in at least one recent election).

[@bobdobalina838]

Well doesn't look like that's going to happen as they move 1st from Seattle to Chicago then Chicago to near Washington DC Getting ever closer to Wall Street

[@waynemayo1661]

I totally agree, but that ship has sailed. Unless Congress can muster the courage to reassert FAA's overview and inspection powers. Sadly, I do not see this as likely-it was done as a (foolishly shortsighted) cost saving device to keep the FAA's budget down. In today's political climate, barring an aviation catastrophe, that is unlikely. As long as profit is the only goal, and without government law/rule changes, will continue to have such profit at all costs decisions. Stock price is king--and provides bonuses for corporate executives.

[@Trebuchet48]

Don't forget that it was Phil Condit, an engineer, who sold Boeing and its soul to the Jack Welch apostles at McDonnell-Douglas.

[@JimWhitaker]

If they don't "keep Wall Street" happy, then they cease to exist.

[@jimc8609]

Isn’t this all a case of once again, companies jeopardizing quality for the sake of saving money and outsourcing ? Boeing used to be the greatest manufacturer in the US. Since the Bean Counter mentality has taken over it’s been downhill from then on. Get some pride in the product back. One more crash could total the whole company

[@iguanaamphibioustruck7352]

All industry has been affected and is gradually disappearing, not just Boeing.

[@lwilton]

All major structures have pretty much forever had major subassemblies (and virtually all components and minor assemblies) outsourced. The "Big 3" US auto makers, going back to the 1930s, get bolts, nuts, filters, instruments, suspension components, radios, floor mats, tires, hubcaps, etc. from outside suppliers. In the old days subassemblies were pretty much all made in the same country, and with the death of US manufacturing capabilities going back to the 1970s, less and less are (or physically can be) made in the US. Just because they are made outside the US doesn't make them inherently bad or substandard. It just means that if the assembler does find a problem with a component it can be very hard to get the defect corrected, or even acknowledged to be a defect, by the supplier.

[@uzlonewolf]

Boeing used to be the greatest manufacturer in the US, now they're the only major aircraft manufacturer in the US after buying up or driving out everyone else. Why innovate when you can create a monopoly and become the only choice?

[@uzlonewolf]

@@lwilton Boeing used to manufacturer almost all of their sub-assemblies themselves. Then the bean counters took over and they outsourced everything.

[@andrewahern3730]

@@uzlonewolf you really have zero clue how the real world works, huh? Why don’t you try reading the comment you responded to?

[@henrybartlett1986]

When is this going to end? I’m surprised they have an order book.

[@jtb52]

Wasn't Wichita a Boeing plant a few years back

[@flymachine]

Interestingly enough it was an NG that experienced an actual failure in the area of these fittings and ultimately a large section of the fin root fillet, I was sure the MAX structure especially in that area is exactly the same as the NG?

[@adrianklaver113]

The crux of the issue which is not really addressed in detail in the reporting I have seen is "around the mechanical attachment procedures". Does that mean no Loctite on the threads, no safety clip, oversize hole, or something else?

[@alexnutcasio936]

No Boeshield to prevent corrosion…..

[@tombolin7168]

Thank you Juan .

[@scottp.5161]

Great report Mr. Brown. I most certainly appreciate your new cursor as it is easy for my old eyes to locate.

[@sheldoniusRex]

I think most of you have it all wrong. This sounds like the quality control people caught this one. Maybe not as quickly as they would have liked, but certainly before this got too far out of hand. Also, this is an outside supplier issue. Not Boeing itself. As far as I'm concerned, someone at Boeing seems to have actually made the right call reporting this issue.

[@larz46north18]

flight test (mechanical) engineers possibly. those F18 tail sections had problems ALSO.

[@DrummerJohn]

Thank you for your A/P knowledge as well as your commercial pilot knowledge. Always riveting and on point to the facts! I would like be to fly the triple 7 knowing your at the helm.

[@yogeshsingla131]

Small Suggestion: Did you consider moving the PiP to the bottom left. That way it will feel you are also looking at the screen like the audience.

[@blancolirio]

what's a Pip...?

[@yogeshsingla131]

@@blancolirio Picture in Picture. I mean your face video.

[@Fubar_The_WEF]

Did they ever correct the initail failing of the MCAS system in that it relies on only one AOA sensor, where the equivalent airbus uses 3.

[@mgoo1713]

The hits just keep coming

[@TC.C]

Thank you Juan!

[@nicolestewart]

Not only do you make amazing videos, your community in the comments are amazing people with a ton of knowledge 😊❤

[@thenoliftshift855]

Thanks for keeping us informed!

[@rael5469]

LTV (Ling Tempco Vaught) in Dallas, TX used to build the tail section of 767 and 747.....everything from the pressure bulkhead aft. I used to work there. I'm not sure who built the other tails on the rest of Boeing's fleet.....or even if LTV still subs for Boeing. Ooops, Wiki says they went out of business in 2001. I've also done overhauls on the older 737s and got a close up look at typical stabilizer fittings. The metal attach lugs were built fail safe. A single fitting has two halves. A crack can propagate in one half of the fitting but is unlikely to go through both halves. For instance in the case of the American jet that went down soon after Sept 11th 2001, (with composite attach lugs) they claim the vertical stab was overloaded. BUT that Vertical stab was REPAIRED at the factory before delivery if I remember correctly. One of the lugs was de laminated during manufacture and I think they injected resin into it and installed fasteners through the de laminated area as a repair. Which was always puzzling to me. The customer is buying a new aircraft, not a repaired one. The factory should have taken the defective vertical stabilizer and trashed it. If you look at the NTSB photographs online .....I believe that the stab started to detach at the factory defective lug along a line of repair fasteners and then the others gave way. The defective lug broke along a straight line of repair fasteners. The other attach lugs broke jagged, as you might expect. They don't see it that way. But after 30 years in structural repair it is my opinion that the chain of events started at the "defective" lug and cascaded from there. There never should have even been a QUESTION of whether the repair area was involved.....because there never should have BEEN a repair on a vertical stabilizer attach lug. That's like the Jesus nut on a helicopter. If it fails you go "JESUS !"

[@RedArrow73]

There is no more LTV. Triumph Aerostructures bought that property, and little is known about them. I once worked there (B-1B) 84-85 before segueing to General Dynamics and F-16C-D's.

[@rael5469]

@@RedArrow73 Thanks for the info. I worked there briefly in '89. When I was there it was a hell hole. The day I quit there was a LONG line of people turning in their tools. They had a revolving door at that place. They always had an ad in the paper......and I found out why. Good for you moving over to GD. I was stationed at Carswell and my father in law worked at GD for 40 years. Funny thing is......his retirement plaque said: "Congratulations on 40 years at Lockheed Martin." he never did get used to that.

[@RedArrow73]

@@rael5469 No one with a beating heart or a soul gets used to Lockheed Martin

[@eddiec4536]

Did I miss something? What is the actual problem?

[@aaronvandenhouten2958]

Hey Juan, I love your channel. Would you take a look at the recent crash of a Cirrus SR22, N911TK in Jesup GA? The pilot was a decorated Navy Seal that had been injured in Mogadishu Somalia during the Black Hawk Down incident. Would love to see your analysis and I think it might be an important incident to highlight. Thanks.

[@kimberleytui179]

Remembering Japan Airlines 123.

[@haroldk724]

another report I seen earlier said there was a problem also the was either the pylons for the engine mounts or how the engines mounting point on the pylons also......did anyone see that was on one of the news channels and who ever that expert was...said that also needs addressing.......again I am not knowing anything on this techy stuff

[@anthonylehner3643]

That's some good information Juan!

[@dennisbailey4296]

And how do you fix this defect?? Do they not say??

[@GNX157]

This isn’t Spirits first serious problem. I recall a while back some employees came forward to FAA as whistleblowers to report problems with what I think was bulkhead surface and mating problems, and out of spec constructions and some really bad unapproved repair methods that were used. My recollection was it was all sorta swept under the rug and supposed to of been okay.

[@anthonylynch]

Isn't the aft pressure bulkhead flat on the Max 8, unlike the domed bulkhead on the 800 ?

[@richardgeorge8413]

Yes, same as the -900 series 737

[@albertcoia184]

The flat bulk head is a customer option and I don't think it's very common.

[@markspc1]

Hmm, flat pressure bulkhead ? The only aircraft/spacecraft that I know that had flat pressure bulkhead was the Space Shuttle. It was flat to save space, but not wright. I think that the Space Shuttle pressure bulkhead was 18 inch deep, and built like an overpass rail road bridge.

[@albertcoia184]

Yes, and I may be mistaken about it being available on the Max 8. Could just be flat on the 9 &10.

[@gasdive]

SpaceX learnt the hard way that outsourcing doesn't work in Aerospace. They bought spars rated and certified to double the design loads (more than the normal margin for rockets). After one failed in flight, destroying the rocket and payload they tested these "certified" spars and they all failed well below their certified level, some failed below the design load.

[@marcmcreynolds2827]

There may have been more to it: "NASA concluded that the most probable cause of the strut failure was a design error: instead of using a stainless-steel eye bolt made of aerospace-grade material, SpaceX chose an industrial-grade material without adequate screening and testing and overlooked the recommended safety margin." (Falcon 9 v1.1 Wikipedia) I have no first-hand knowledge regarding the above, but it wouldn't be the first time that SpaceX cut corners and someone paid the price (Amos-6).

[@gasdive]

@@marcmcreynolds2827 I think we're saying the same thing. Screening and testing means not believing the certification is worth the paper it's written on. They outsourced the testing and certification to the supplier. Same as Boeing did for these brackets.

[@rael5469]

"SpaceX learnt the hard way that outsourcing doesn't work in Aerospace. " Don't look now......but tens of thousands of us have lost our lives because "Aerospace" outsourced our X jobs. Pensions stolen. Heck...... widebody aircraft are now maintained in China. If you want an expert on these aircraft other than Jiffy Lube line maintenance....better call China. Substantial portions of them are also manufactured in China.

[@gasdive]

@@rael5469 other companies aren't as quick on the uptake.

[@moriver3857]

I don't get this. Not a safety issue for in service airplanes, but repairs in work for airplanes 8n production, and in storage, even though the stored airplanes have no significant cycles, and flight hours. Something doesn't add up.

[@daniels.9206]

Maybe I missed something but the 737 has been in production for a long time. Are these fittings new [new design] to the production? Or, are they the same fittings from the beginning? Also, is this a new subtractor that screwed up? This just doesn't make sense that this would happen.

[@coryh8452]

To my understanding the Max and NG fittings are the same. I install the Fin on the P8 and it has the same issue.

[@daniels.9206]

@@coryh8452 Thanks for the reply but what I meant was, are these fittings the same fitting as in the 1960's when the 737 began?

[@coryh8452]

@@daniels.9206 That I’m not sure of. What I was told was they have 3 suppliers the -9 is different and wasn’t affected. They are supplier installed, and that’s where it sounds like this hiccup came from. They said one of the supplier parts was out of specification, One was fine, and the other was a mixed bag.

[@jimamizzi1]

I cannot believe there still having issues with the max series aircraft

[@craig7350]

Glad to see you're not demonetized anymore, but the ad was wasted because I don't have a cat and don't need any cat food. Anyway, enjoyed the update.

[@TheGweilo701]

“Debacle” is probably the absolute nicest way you could have put that!

[@Ottos_ScLm_Race_videos_2009_on]

So is the 737 fuselage what we see on railroad flat cars in Ohio and Indiana???

[@SteamCrane]

Spirit is in Wichita, and ships fuselages to Renton on flat cars. Don't think fuselage parts come from east of Wichita. Which line in Ohio and Indiana?

[@FarkyDave]

I like your new mouse pointer.

[@tomcorniche3844]

I think the Passenger Confidence Index needle has just gone down another notch. There is an uneasy feeling I get around the Max. Stupidly I ignore and go aboard.

[@markodom3841]

Stupidly? Going aboard - no; commenting - yes

[@GNX157]

Juan, I wish you would get into the “nuts and bolts” of this assembly problem. It doesn’t seem to me that you covered it other than to say there’s an assembly problem.

[@mikedee8876]

Does this mean they are waiting for the first Tail/Rudder to snap off before grounding them again?

[@sblack48]

This is the same at every other company. I lived it for decades. You find an issue, investigate it, then you call in the FAA and brief them on the cause, the risks and the planned disposition. There is a formula based on the risk that determines how many flight hours you have to fix the issue. The fix could be anything from doing nothing to grounding the fleet. Then the FAA who have the final say decides if they agree. This is totally normal and EVERY mfg has MANY ongoing issues like this. The FAA always depends on the mfg or the airline, not because they have staffing issues but because otherwise you would need 1000s of faa employees standing over the shoulders of every designer and assembler. It has and always will be like this. As for the MCAS issue, there were very few people in Boeing who really knew the whole story of how bad that failure actually was. It was not Boeing as a whole who withheld the key information. It was certain key people and unfortunately they have never been singled out. The only guy they did charge was involved on the training side and was not responsible for what was an uncertifiable design which the case against him fell apart. So now every time a 737 max has a hydraulic failure or an engine failure or there is a crack somewhere it makes the news. Same thing happens on an a320 and nobody cares. Not that boeing doesn’t deserve to get roasted. They do, but this crap is being made to sound like it is a big deal and it isn’t

[@encinobalboa]

"What would happen if single AOA sensor failed" question was not adequately addressed and/or brushed under the table by FAA and Boeing. De facto self-certification was the problem.

[@blancolirio]

4 years!?! No, this is not normal.

[@sblack48]

@@blancolirio You’d be very surprised. I’ve seen unacceptable mfg practices discovered 15 yrs down the line. More than one. Airplanes or components in this case are being built, people leave and are replaced, documentation is not there or is ignored and a new practice is “born”. Then it is discovered and the Engineer says to the shop guy WTF ARE YOU DOING THAT?.?? The answer is very often, and it’s totally ridiculous, “but we’ve always done it that way”. I have 2 examples that immediately come to mind that I don’t dare repeat here. When you get 1000s of people at 100s of different companies making a very complex product over 20 or 30 years it’s pretty much impossible for it not to happen. Spirit made full disclosure, Boeing made full disclosure. It’s being fixed. The FAA is monitoring and has accepted the resolution. So I really don’t know where your “bean counters are still in charge” comes from. I guess sort of intense scrutiny is going to dog Boeing for years to come. And I guess they only have themselves to blame. But finding screwups like that after 4 yrs is not unusual at all. You operational pilots don’t have visibility on that stuff unless there is an incident. We Engineers review stacks of these on a monthly basis and there are always new ones coming.

[@sblack48]

@@encinobalboa the process usually works very well and it isn’t “self certification “. It’s more complex than that. It failed spectacularly here, but overall this system has given the world the safest transportation system in human history. It is important to find out exactly why it failed. I’ve worked in the system for years and such a failure was unheard of until now, and nobody expected it would be Boeing. I am disappointed the specific root causes and people responsible have not been publicly exposed

[@encinobalboa]

@@sblack48 "Until now" is the operative phrase. If it was just the engineers with unlimited budget like in the old days, self-cert worked. Not now with bottom line pressure from the accountants.

[@RealMash]

Wasn't a 747 lost in Jaan due to a non-standard repair of the aft Bulkhead?

[@guillermogutierrez710]

Yep, JAL 123, in 1985.

[@Andres_1970]

One row of fasteners instead of two, or something like that ?

[@BrianMorrison]

​@@Andres_1970 There were 2 rows of rivets but the added bulkhead doubler plate was too narrow so one row passed through 2 layers of metal instead of 3 layers.

[@Andres_1970]

@@BrianMorrison That was it then. Thanks

[@TheSoaringChannel]

Feel like covering the torrential and catastrophic flooding at FLL?

[@derheeheehee6941]

The pressure bulkhead on the max is not domed, it's flat.

[@Ro32da72]

As always, insightful and unbiased comment Juan; thank you.

[@Snaproll47518]

American Airlines was faulted in the Flt 587 accident. Both Airbus and Boeing warned AAL Management about the practice of using the rudder in turbulence but this was not passed along to previously trained pilots.

[@shenandoahhills7263]

Juan, you never fully explained what was done incorrectly in the attachment fittings. Were the fittings incorrectly manufactured or was the manner in which they were attached to the structure flawed? How was it that other subs could have correctly installed the fittings? Were the other fittings installed in India where the tail structure was originally produced? Why did they not install all the fittings at the same time?

[@blancolirio]

Because WE DONT KNOW!

[@williamreymond2669]

That Rear Pressure Bulkhead, what airline disaster was that? I cannot remember exactly it's been so long, but I seem to remember some airliner disaster past that some failure proximal to that junction played an important role. Can anyone with a better memory remember which disaster that was? Or was that just a fever dream?

[@toddabowden]

JAL 123

[@barrysheridan9186]

The betrayal of Boeing’s engineering prowess by it executive management is one of the worst corporate foul ups of all time. That is saying something given the mess many American companies have made in recent years.

[@williamreymond2669]

It's got to be difficult designing a major structural member that spans a junction between two other structures that experience very different and cyclical load regimes. You have a vertical stabilizer attached to both the pressurized fuselage and the tail cone assembly; one tends to change size and shape cyclically and the other which tends to stay much more the same. Jet airliner designers have been doing this for about seventy years now so the smart people involved are used to the idea that this joint is yet another one you need to pay attention to. So what really went wrong here? I guess we are going to find out.

[@toma5153]

Although these issues attract a lot of attention today, and that's a good thing, Boeing has historically had occasional severe problems from their suppliers (we'd call them "escapes" if they wound up getting into final assembly). Once caught it triggers a maelstrom of investigation, non-conformance reviews, rework or repair, AD's, etc. The problem causes an "Oh #$&%# !!" moment and people have to pick themselves up and start working the problem. The amount of rework and repair occurring on top of normal production can be pretty amazing. Folks in Supplier Quality Control often seemed to be a dispirited bunch.

[@lebaillidessavoies3889]

Would be curious to see how they work at spirit aerospace.....

[@cameronbrewer3966]

2 types of aft pressure bulkheads, conventional and flat. I wonder if the alert is for one type or both

[@rael5469]

Good question. I prefer the flat bulkhead but..... Boeing?????......couldn't you have moved the dang access hatch a few measly inches aft so we don't have to squeeze through the opening?

[@docdurdin]

Are we beginning to see that we are flying on Leggo Airplanes? There has been an ongoing argument that many of these parts come in not fitting properly.

[@ericfielding2540]

I flew on a 737 Max8 earlier this week. It was a nice flight and didn’t crash 😊. The interior is modern.

[@KennyLamTravel]

Agree, I flew on one yesterday. nicer than I expected.

[@daveevans2482]

I have flown on the 737 Max8 a few times. I find them to be noticeably quieter, with a roomier cabin than the conventional 737 (I fly SWA frequently, so my sample size for the 737 line is not insignificant).

[@michaelrathje5792]

I’m sorry, but I worked Everett plant for 28 years-looks pretty critical to me!

[@janvanhaaster2093]

Problems with the 737, the 767/KC46, the 777X, the 787....and while the 737 Max backlog is OK the 737 is losing the fight with the A320/A321 which is slowly going to a rate of 75/month; and which is winning sales at 65-35.

[@REDMAN298]

I`d like to see what these fittings look like and where they cheapen up in mfg.

[@joseph2095]

What exactly is the problem with the fittings? (specifically)

[@glennpowell3444]

I am always surprised that pressure bulk head "cones" are not the other way around i.e convex side inwards.A bit like a dam with its convex face towards the lake.?

[@oscar_charlie]

That works well in a dam because it has the solid earth to push against in compression. In a plane it's better to have the thin sheet metal work in tension (you don't have to worry about buckling), plus you get more pressurized cabin space with an outward bulkhead.

[@joesnead4513]

Great point!

[@guitarhillbilly1482]

THE BOEING 727 had a FLAT Aft Pressure Bulkhead that worked well but did require some repairs on the High Time/ Cycles airplanes. The B727 was built like a "tank" compared to the modern Boeing Airframes.

[@oscar_charlie]

@@guitarhillbilly1482 it also had a rear airstair door, it is a bit difficult to design a (regularly used by passengers) door in a non-flat bulkhead.

[@rael5469]

@@guitarhillbilly1482 "The B727 was built like a "tank" compared to the modern Boeing Airframes." And it had the fuel efficiency of a tank as well.

[@Rb-fp7mw]

Think i will go on an A320

[@lewisparker4488]

Remember the 747 Japanese aircraft that had a field repair on it's aft bulkhead. The bulkhead failed in flight later which was a serious event.

[@smokeless7774]

JAL Flight 123 out of Haneda August 12th 1985. Anything possibly out of spec around that pressure bulkhead certainly raises that ghost.

[@MattyEngland]

That was the 'Roller coaster' if I remember correctly.

[@BrianMorrison]

The error was made by Boeing's repair team, the overlapping doubler plates should have had a double row of rivets but the plate was too narrow and the second row of rivets went through 2 layers instead of 3 layers of metal. Eventually the repair suffered a fatigue failure.

[@drbichat5229]

I don’t know if it’s a good thing or a bad one that a company other than Boeing is building that part of the fuselage

[@trixie_737]

LOL..... Gotta love it! Juan is talking about ads and he is getting bombarded by AA and APA ads! I see Capt Andrea up there.....

[@reddog-ex4dx]

This is a big deal but not a huge deal. Not like the problem with MCAS. Both Boeing and Spirit Aerospace will come up with a fix. Since this is Friday, by Monday, all the stock market people will have forgotten about this and Boeing's and Spirit Aerospace's stock will bounce back. End of story.

[@heartoftherobot]

How about that mouse pointer! Lol

[@nicolassales8679]

Needs to be a mini luscombe!

[@Giroux68]

But the FAA grounded the max because of pilot error accidents?

[@bw162]

Can’t help that Boeing has moved their HQ from Seattle to Chicago and now to Arlington,VA. More important to be near DC then their primary mfg facilities.

[@brentbeacham9691]

Spirit just had a fin separation. 5/7 or 8.

[@outlet6989]

I heard "Nearer My God to Thee" was being played when the Titanic sank. Given how high these planes fly, that music should be played during boarding.

[@edharma1069]

"If it's Boeing I'm not going"

[@calibre_au6183]

​@@guitarhillbilly1482 try reading that again

[@guitarhillbilly1482]

@@calibre_au6183 Yep a reversal of the traditional statement.👍

[@redwingdetroit9671]

S that a bonding procedure juan or nuts and bolts

[@shakatrim9044]

Well done sir. Thank u

[@jdmillar86]

What we don't know is whether this is a substantial defect, a traceability issue, or what. Obviously its not good that it was missed for so long, and its serious whatever it is, but there's a fair chance this is something that violates compliance without materially affecting the properties of the structure.

[@keithnorris6348]

The World Record Has Not Only Been Broken It Has Been Smashed! Paper airplane designed by Boeing engineers breaks world distance record.

[@davidanderson4288]

Good intel Captain. Are you going to check with your engineering team for additional info?

[@turbofanlover]

So, even the affected planes that are already in service with airlines will ultimately have to be repaired, right?