Are There Any Good Arguments for God? Ed Feser vs Graham Oppy

In this live debate, Dr. Ed Feser and Dr. Graham Oppy discuss whether there are any good arguments for God.
Link to their first discussion: • Can We "Prove" that Go...
Affiliate link to Dr. Feser's book: amzn.to/2Ym0eDD
Link to Ed Feser's Interview with Ben Shapiro: • Edward Feser | The Ben...
Link to Ed Feser's blog:edwardfeser.blogspot.com
Link to Graham Oppy's discussion with Josh Rasmussen: • Graham Oppy, Josh Rasm...
Link to Graham Oppy's discussion with Ben Arbour: • The Ontological Argume...
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#God #Arguments #Apologetics

[@daviddivad777]

do people realize we´re watching some of the top-shelf contemporary philosophers in action? Well done, Cameron.

[@danharte6645]

@Not Art Vandelay no, these guys reslly are seriously top shelf. Dont be fooled into thinking that the heavy lifting involved during this conversation in establishing mutual understandings is somehow sophomoreish. A cursory look at their written works should be more than enough to allow you to put that statement away

[@jacobkats3670]

@@danharte6645 I think he was kidding

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

No, not "well done." The WHOLE point of -- the only reason for-- people tuning in was to listen to an exchange on Feser's arguments for classical theism. Oppy filibustered. I am NOT claiming that Oppy's comments here were worthless, but they WERE out of place and inappropriate given the reason people tuned in.

[@roarblast7332]

Witch doctors? What?

[@emmashalliker6862]

Yeah, these dudes are both heavy hitters.

[@GhostLightPhilosophy]

Im prepared for the Dillahunty response of : “I’m just not convinced”

[@danglingondivineladders3994]

An Unabridged list of the beliefs of Matt Dilahunty: ?

[@GhostLightPhilosophy]

@@danglingondivineladders3994 I'm just not convinced thats an accurate list. I dont know

[@danglingondivineladders3994]

@@GhostLightPhilosophy you're not saying that you aren't certain that this is not the case are you?

[@GhostLightPhilosophy]

@@danglingondivineladders3994 I dont know and you dont know either. You just haven't convinced me that it is the case.

[@danglingondivineladders3994]

@@GhostLightPhilosophy I'm not convinced

[@Maximus5798]

Let me guess: Ed: Yes Graham: No

[@suntzu7727]

@G Will Nothing wrong with that. That's philosophy, everything should be questioned and made clear as much as possible. The problem is that they didn't have two more hours to get in depth concerning the actual philosophical issues

[@suntzu7727]

@G Will Well, to be fair Oppy considered it important because he thought that his understanding of how arguments work (or don't) was an argument against Feser's project and book in principle. Feser had to respond to it. There was no way out. You might have found it boring and others did too, but it was a point Oppy raised, it was related to Ed's proofs since he casted doubt on whether you can demonstrate something via that method in general and it had to be discussed.

[@suntzu7727]

@G Will You have a point in the sense that, in the end, his proposed method of discussing claims, instead of presenting arguments of the sort he dislike, will inevitably involve arguments which could in some sense be somewhat summed up in the way Ed does with his own if one wanted. So, in the end his objection did not amount to much. I can't say whether he was being dishonest or just confused. But on the other hand, what should Ed have done other than let him formulate it fully and then respond to it? Make no mistake, I was annoyed by the fact that it went that way, but for me the issue was that they didn't spend as much time discussing the specifics, not that the other part happened.

[@vincentiormetti3048]

@G Will Welcome to philosophy dude

[@talesama1788]

@G Will Sorry for the late reply, but that's not really fair to Oppy. If you look at his written work, you'll see that it's not true that Oppy thinks he can't provide substantial criticisms of arguments God. He has written extensively about them and arguments against God. From what little I've read, he doesn't seem to think that any of the arguments for or against are good enough, and obviously a claim like that requires consideration of what a good argument is and ought to be.

[@Paulogia]

Really good conversation, Cameron. Props.

[@PlavitPOi90]

Paulogia Nice to see you here Paul. Will you do some live debates in the future?

[@Paulogia]

@@PlavitPOi90 I prefer discussions to debates. Had a great chat with Inspiring Philosophy a few months back on Divine Hiddenness. I think Mike Winger on the Resurrection was my last formal debate. If you mean in front of a live audience, no plans but always open.

[@PlavitPOi90]

Paulogia Ok. Thanks for the answer.

[@giovannidaza4574]

@@Paulogia in your face

[@danielosetromera2090]

Feser is catholic, and unbelievably smart. This debate shows why the Aristotle/Aquinas (greatest catholic philosopher and theologian ever) combo, when correctly laid out, has so much intellectual power.

[@selwynr]

Agree, but doesn't mean any of them were right.

[@ndenman420]

There is a strong Platonic tradition within Catholicism that is also beautiful. See DC Schindler's books (Plato's critique of Impure Reason). The Platonic grounds reality in the Good, True, and Beautiful.

[@matswessling6600]

"intellectual power"?? what do you mean by that? I see it as totally impotent since it fails miserably to be useful in any way.

[@senatorpoopypants7182]

I love how oppy walks into a debate over Arguments for god and is more interested in arguing arguments. This man is a philosopher in the truest sense

[@gethimrock]

Arguing isn’t “true philosophy” it’s about loving knowledge that’s what the word actually means

[@Againstfascist]

I've never seen Oppy so bothered by an argument. I'm tellin you. Feser has really rediscovered something important here.

[@jacobkats3670]

Are you talking about the last part with the act/potency stuff or the beginning part about arguments?

[@oliversanderson8665]

@@jacobkats3670 The last part probably.

[@Againstfascist]

@@oliversanderson8665 Good guess.

[@Againstfascist]

@@jacobkats3670 They had to establish ground rules to think about the idea itself. If you're going to play football, you want to get the rules down first.

[@affinity1746]

I think quite clearly Ed Feser won the debate. At around 1:40:00 mark, the debate had shifted towards the principle of causality, namely the Aristotelian principle of Act and Potency distinction. The phrase "the potential to remain unchanged" isn’t a thing. Change is the actualization of a potential according to Dr. Feser's argument. So, quite naturally, there doesn't need to be anything to actualize the potential to remain unchanged because to remain unchanged is, quite obviously, not change. Academic philosophical articles have even been published on this debate, essentially demonstrating that Oppy’s critique doesn’t work. I think Feser is onto something. And considering Graham Oppy is widely considered to be the best and leading atheist philosopher worldview, I think Feser has caught a very big fish.

[@ramodemmahom8905]

Do you mean that academic papers have been published on this debate between Feser and Oppy? If so, can you link to those papers?

[@affinity1746]

@@ramodemmahom8905 yes, you could check this out for starters onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/heyj.13604

[@ahmedesam5024]

@@affinity1746 its for money :(

[@anteodedi8937]

Nah, Feser is not a fisherman.

[@raducoman6423]

Can you please provide links to those articles you mentioned?

[@armandvista]

These discussions between Feser and Oppy are great content, some of the best on this channel imo! More!

[@lenar.1691]

Thank you so much for these videos. Thank you for giving us the chance to see these two discussing. ❤

[@PaulQuantumWales]

This is the sort of discussion that will make this channel stand out from the usual slough of backslappers and outgroup floggers. Bravo.

[@jholts6912]

Can we pls do another Oppy and Feser discussion? They r the best

[@danharte6645]

I totally agree. These guys are still in the heavy lifting stage and it'll take another conversation or two to get to the bones. It's worth it as it's a pleasure and a privilege to observe

[@SheikhMuhnughts]

@@TheWorldTeacher But they did

[@CedanyTheAlaskan]

@@TheWorldTeacher With what? Btw, this is Purdy Persuasive

[@danharte6645]

Any serious intellectual observer needs to understand and appreciate the groundwork required to establish precise terms meanings and understandings before anything can progress These philosophical arguments and debates are complex and require a great deal of clarification. This discussion of atheism vs theism is opperating at a new and seriously advanced level in comparison to anything tackled by Dawkins Dennett Harris of Kraus It was an absolute pleasure listening to these two intellects and I'll be listening to this discussion again and again over the next few days and weeks

[@tryhardf844]

I agree.We have outgrown that era.

[@gabepearson6104]

@@TheWorldTeacher ???

[@koffeeblack5717]

Yes... yes... but I feel this specific conversation erred in the opposite extreme, viz. you do not need to spend over an hour to establish the point that claims are more fundamental than arguments for rational dialectic. Arguments are a heuristic for determining the most basic explicatable statements possible shared by the disputants involved- sure... fine. No need to take over an hour to make this point.

[@artemisgruis1528]

Completely agree with you that they need to set the premises and the terms and universe of discourse by which they will discuss their contending theses. I can tell that you truly are a scholar my friend.

[@hallboy5]

Honestly this conversation got to be pretty over my head, but I love hearing these two dialogue. They are both incredibly smart and respectful towards each other. Great debate, Cameron! Keep these coming.

[@vincentfrimpong4665]

They where both cordial and civil but graham was finding it hard to follow feser's argument

[@kamilgregor]

Yup, all three of them have books in the background, everything is in perfect order here :)

[@kamilgregor]

@buymebluepills Well, they are probably Christian books for the most part, so... yeah :P

[@New_Essay_6416]

Haha

[@isabel4981]

Ed has a effing library. I have so many questions. Does he have a hoarding issue? Is he even at his own home? What sorting system does he use? Can he even get to the books in the far right shelf? I need answers.

[@kamilgregor]

@@isabel4981 It's a green screen

[@myopenmind527]

Only one has read all those books.

[@nathanalex6880]

Well done CC. Very thought provoking and important insights that often only come up from great minds. Ed Feser’s point about distinguishing between the person who holds an antagonistic view need not be characterized by his/her view is noteworthy and should be adopted during these discussions in our daily lives.

[@plantingasbulldog2009]

People are making a bunch of jokes about how they spend so much time arguing about arguments, but this was the most transformative part for me. It was very fruitful, unique, and thought provoking, and I find it useful. My views about arguing and arguments changed as a result of this.

[@SpartanLawyer]

Watching this 2 years later, and this was a massive score to get both of them in a discussion together!

[@killer3000ad]

THis is some really good content and a real step above other discussions/debates where the belligerents would use strawmans, ad hominems, circular logic and other fallacies. The two are very respectful of each other and do not belittle or insult.

[@escuddy3244]

Cameron, you did a great job of keeping the discussion on topic and asking clarifying questions. Fantastic moderating.

[@kelvinvillegas5310]

I think that the comment was sarcastic

[@escuddy3244]

I can confirm that my comment is sincere.

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

@@escuddy3244 Oppy clearly did NOT want to discuss the same things that Feser did.

[@vinegar10able]

Arguments about arguments, meta-arguments, this is really good. Reminds me of studying John Etchemendy's work on logical consequence at uni.

[@SheikhMuhnughts]

Loved reading the live chat lol. "Just get to arguments about God." Lol, just chill bro, just enjoy this great conversation

[@dynamic9016]

Very interesting discussion and I really appreciate it.

[@CedanyTheAlaskan]

Now, almost two years later, we need a part three

[@danielcartwright8868]

It seems to me that one argument will rarely change a person's mind but will give them something to think about and, over time and deliberation, a person may change their position. The claim that argument can't contribute to changing one's mind seems absurd to me.

[@Againstfascist]

Of course that is true.

[@bensonmathewsabraham5943]

A man is convinced he is dead. His wife and kids are exasperated. They keep telling him he's not dead. But he continues to insist he's dead. They try telling him, "Look, you're not dead; you're walking and talking and breathing; how can you be dead?" But he continues to insist he is dead. The family finally takes him to a doctor. The doctor pulls out some medical books to demonstrate to him that dead men do not bleed. After a while, he admits that dead men do not bleed. The doctor then takes the man's hand and a needle and pokes the end of his finger. The man starts bleeding. He looks at his finger and says, "What do you know? Dead men do bleed!!

[@Againstfascist]

@@bensonmathewsabraham5943 If your first principle is "I am right", then there isnt much more you can do. Luckily, or maybe hopefully, that isn't the case for most people.

[@ThiagoCT9]

Againstfascist I’m afraid it is the case for most people... Either way, I think you’re right.

[@nikolaskoutroulakis571]

I don’t think you understood what he was saying about arguments. To start with, he didn’t say that, and gave examples of where he thought it could He was also talking about arguments in the technical sense of being sets of premises which logically entail a conclusion. There are “arguments” which in effect do what you say they do, but this sense of argument isn’t really what he means by argument.

[@danharte6645]

@Capturing christianity, a big congratulations to you for organizing and mediating such an exceptional conversation between 2 serious intellectual philosophers. You haven't just won my admiration, you've won a massive follower. This is high level stuff and very rarely seen these days

[@kylemyers971]

Oh man, it ended right when it started to get real good. I wish Feser fleshed out further his argument that a physical simple could not be the ontological bedrock of reality

[@esauponce9759]

Amazing discussion!

[@mikemcgill90]

Heavy weight battle to the bell well done Cameron .

[@GodTangent]

This conversation has a lot of potential but not a lot of change!

[@GhostLightPhilosophy]

1:49:41 Oppy brain power increasing to 110%

[@dejanromih7913]

hahahah

[@tihomirvrbanec9537]

Laughed fell of chair

[@nietzsche1991]

LOL

[@richardlopez6226]

I think a big error that Graham makes when he quotes Mackie’s book is that he generalizes religion. You can’t really put Buddhism and Catholicism with Satanism. They have drastically different beliefs.

[@markszlazak]

Very nice explanation of where arguments work and where they do not. Thanks.

[@danglingondivineladders3994]

thank you for sharing your learning with us

[@barry.anderberg]

The phrase "the potential to remain unchanged" doesn't seem like a thing. Change is the actualization of a potential according to Dr. Feser's argument. So, of course, there doesn't need to be anything to actualize the potential to remain unchanged because to remain unchanged is, quite obviously, not change. Edit: I now see that Dr. Feser says essentially this at @1:40:00

[@ralphgoreham3516]

"Only a fool never changes his/her mind". when new data/evidence materializes, In this case is there a creator /God, refusal to change to yes is simply denial generated by feeling, not logic/ intelligence. From a single cell to the vast universe the fact surely is intelligent design screams at our REASONING. I am one who changed

[@barry.anderberg]

@@ralphgoreham3516 Thanks, but I'm not sure what that has to do with my comment.

[@LogosTheos]

@@barry.anderberg Lol.

[@segurall1]

@Barry Anderberg I sort of read Feser comment on as follows. Something actual (red chair) that has the potential of not being actualized (staying red), is the actualización of that potential by something already actual (the red chair). So in essence it’s a restatement of Feser premise in a round about way. Now my question is I thought all thing that are actualized need a more essential actualización, where thee buck stops at God, but this seems to suggest it could be circular. Unless I’m miss understanding something about Feser comment about Graham’s analogy.

[@segurall1]

Graham’s analogy seemed dependent on temporality, where Feser is talking about essentiality. When discussing potentials being actualized.

[@koffeeblack5717]

Oppy's criteria for a "good" argument is really criteria for a perfect argument- a standard in terms of which we understand the function of formal reasoning. Feser's point was basically that there are many shades of grey that fall short of this perfect paradigm case while still succeeding as useful or good in the sense that they make our commitments explicit and advance the discussion further.

[@tammygibson1556]

As an atheist viewer of this channel, I must confess you have integrity to bring such a capable opponent to your show. To be honest, I think Feser is right that Oppy's claim and his are the same claim. The chair will not change unless something changes it is the same as saying an actual potential requires a mover. Oppy has some work to do there. I think Oppy's points about how arguments are used were well thought out and modest.

[@noircc]

Yes - I agree - Thinking of things where the potential is being actualized, can't be traced to an potential which is unchanged.

[@piotr.ziolo.]

I completely do not understand this philosophical approach of introducing actualizers. Do those philosophers even know what they mean by that? For instance the universe is a closed system which just evolves. And this evolution is governed by certain differential equations (or rather physical laws described by those equations). There is no need for an external actualizer. If you have a container with boiling water and you cut out any external source of heat, the water will mesh for some time and then settle down once the temperature fluctuations are smoothed out. You seem to understand what they are talking about. Could you point me to good materials which explain those notions? Or try to explain them yourself?

[@jakemackenzie795]

@@piotr.ziolo. It's about causal contingency. I think these philosophy PhDs know what they are talking about buddy.

[@piotr.ziolo.]

@@jakemackenzie795 I'm glad that you think that. But that does not address my questions in the slightest.

[@bassman_0074]

@@piotr.ziolo. in your understanding the external actualizer is the law itself, but these too are contingent so we again result in an infinite regress without an author for these laws. An alternative explanation of natural laws is that they are descriptors (not governors) of natural processes dependent on the inherent capacities of a substance such as the capacity to conduct electricity, shine or be affected by gravity. Fesser argued in his introduction to scholastic metaphysics that nothing comes from nothing. It has to come from something, hence act arises from potency and thus something comes from something. This is a middle ground taken by Aristotle between two extremes. 1) there is no actuality because things are always changing (yet change is a transformation from one thing into another, but if there is no actuality then there is no “thing” to change into. Hence for change to exist act must exist.) or 2) there is no potency because nothing ever changes. (Hence all creation is the same. There’s no difference between man and a rock.) Aristotle position is then “there are real distinctions between substances, and one substance can change into another.”

[@floriangeyer1886]

Props to the fantastic job done by the moderator.

[@jonathanbryden438]

You should see if you can bring together James Anderson and Graham Oppy.

[@piotr.ziolo.]

I love how Oppy explains even the most obvious concepts, like the one of a theory entailing all its logical consequences. But he's absolutely right many people might not realize that.

[@rud69420]

Well I think most people wouldn’t understand what he means by theory without that explanation. I’ve been into philosophy for a while and this was my first exposure to the term.

[@RawGameplay0]

Best Camera Award goes to: Cameron Worst Hair Award goes to: Graham Best Hair Award goes to: Cameron Worst Camera Award goes to: Edward Best Background Award goes to: Edward

[@adamedgar5765]

Im sorry but Graham very first statement is problematic for me. I see his view as a gross oversimplification of how world views are established and more importantly, changed when evidence is presented that convicts an individual that change is needed. He seems to completely discount the importance of why change is made and of conviction. My own father changed his world view from essentially a non Christian to Christian in his late 30's. He argued against Christianity from that perspective until he was convicted he was wrong. Now he argues in favor of Christianity. I struggle with the idea that Graham is right when it does not to me appear to reflect conviction and conversion to a different world view where one has vehemently defended an existing world view that is at odds with the new one.

[@danielosetromera2090]

Which camera did you use to film yourself? It looks increíble.

[@tillo1981]

Another example of how many, not all, atheist are brilliant dancers and inventors of going around questions or trying to reason away from a conversation of the existence of God. Only for the respect of Edward I watched the entirety of this video. I respect Oppy too!! Let me fix that. But, he was just rambling. Very good rambling.

[@HegelsOwl]

You're another example of Christians always getting the question wrong.

[@richardlopez6226]

This is the greatest debate between a theist and an atheist.

[@samuelsimpson6120]

You blow that whistle Oppy.

[@philotheos251]

I don’t know whether Graham has actually understood the principle of act and potency with respect to the actual existence of anything. Let’s not forget that the ‘Aristotelian proof’ is just a version of the argument from contingency. Premise 7 (which Graham denies) says this: “The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualisation of S’s potential for existence.” Feser was trying to explain this after the hour and a half mark. To use an example, let’s consider the water in the cup of coffee that Dr Feser used in his book. What Feser is saying is this: why does the water in the cup exist at any snapshot of time? The water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen molecules. Why are the hydrogen and oxygen molecules actualised as water at that specific point in time? The hydrogen and oxygen molecules certainly have the potential to constitute another compound (like hydrogen peroxide). So why are they actualised as water? The potential of the hydrogen and oxygen molecules to be actualised as water, is actualised by the specific configuration of the subatomic particles, which are in turn actualised by the specific configuration of even more fundamental particles, and so on. Notice how we have a hierarchical causal series involving the _ontological_ reduction of potency to act. This would therefore terminate at something that is pure actuality. Let’s modify our example. Suppose the water in the cup existed everlastingly. The water (or its constituents) might exist of ‘factual necessity,’ but that would be necessity by way of another thing (necessity per aliud) as opposed to God who is pure actuality and therefore exists necessarily through himself (necessity per se). It seems that however you play out the argument, you'll get to something that exists of absolute necessity and is unconditioned - which would be God. No appeals to metaphysical composition (form/matter, essence/existence, substance/accidents) need to be made in the argument from motion (I think).

[@FoxintheKnow86]

_Notice how we have a hierarchical causal series involving the ontological reduction of potency to act. This would therefore terminate at something that is pure actuality_ I deny that this would necessarily lead to something that is purely actual and extrinsic to the composite. There are at least two of options: 1. Objects are gunky, they never bottom out in some fundamental level 2. Objects bottom out in some simple non composite things. Now I know Feser brings arguments against (2) but they simply aren’t convincing. When he says that for two simple things to be different, they must be different in virtue of their parts and are thus not simple, I don’t think that follows. For instance, it seems possible to distinguish simples by virtue of their accidental properties. Accidental properties are external, and parthood is intrinsic, and so ad intra a simple can lack parthood but still be differentiated by virtue of such properties. Other properties, relational properties, or location speed, vibrational frequency etc are not ‘parts’ and if they differ then it serves to differentiate the simples they refer to without invoking parthood. It would also seem as if simplicity is prior to these properties anyway they are gained and lost without it affecting simplicity- so even if there were some sort of complexity or metaphysical multiplicity it is not of the sort that is parthood. And so no regress would arise. Option (1) is also viable. Philosophers proposing atomless gunk, in contrast to simples, hold that gunk is hierarchically structured. There’s infinite descent without any real worry- each level of composition is dependent upon prior levels, and so forth infinitum. Now it’s important to point out that such ontological dependence is not vicious in any obvious sense. Unlike say, a essentially ordered series that takes place in time, where the series is not actual at some time _t_ and is actual at _t1_ and we need a cause to account for the change as ‘no member of the series has the power in and of itself to be actual’ gunk is not so dependent, as it is not the case that it is composed over time from non gunk. Further composition would in a gunky world always involve some further assembly of new gunky objects from prior gunk. The worry in the temporal sense is that the series ‘never gets going’ and it clearly did at some time after _t_ but there’s nothing analogous here in gunk. Yet its still true that the dependency is transitive, all the way down. The actuality in the series was never ‘caused’ or injected at some level, rather it is had at each level in virtue of the prior parts. I don’t see a regress here being vicious. To suggest so because the actuality in the series must come from without unless the series wouldn’t be actual, would be question begging. Nor is there a need to account for a change where the series was not actual to when it was, that would necessitate an external cause. And so if our explanations like our ontology is gunky, nothing it seems is unaccounted for, and we avoid the need to invoke a purely actual simple external cause to the composition.

[@ccmnxc]

​@@FoxintheKnow86 Man, reality bottoming out in a bunch of simples, all with external accidental properties...it's starting to look like full-blown Leibnizian monadology here. But I digress. I don't see how an accidental property doesn't count as a metaphysical part, unless by accidental property you mean a cambridge property. If the accidental property is a property *of the thing,* then two things follow if that thing is a simple: 1. That simple can have only one property (as multiple would entail composition), and 2. That property could not change in any way (as ability to change requires act/potency composition). At this point you just end up in a Parmenidean freeze, since these simples have only one property and cannot change. Even if we insist the change lies in the relation, if neither member of the relation is actually changing, then there doesn't seem to be any change in the relation itself. Everything is static. Yet, as we know full well, change is a real feature of reality. Hence, an accidental property cannot be a property of the simple with that thing itself still remaining a simple. If, however, it is purely external (e.g. Socrates becomes shorter than Plato in virtue of Plato growing), then the only thing differentiating simples would be their relations with other simples. But a relation is not itself sufficient to distinguish relata if the relata are otherwise identical. At that point, it is just something relating to itself. Hence a pure externalist account fails as well. So it still seems like Feser's position against (2) stands. With respect to (1), temporality has pretty much nothing to do with it. Some gunky thing that has been existing from eternity unchanged and another one that has been the subject of change and temporal progression still suffer the same problem: instrumentality. Each level of the gunk is an instrumental cause, transmitting actuality from a lower level to a higher level. Yet, no level of the gunk has, of its own accord and own nature, existence and actuality. It's metaphysical bootstrapping and doesn't explain why we have only as much gunk as we do. There could be none, or there could be arbitrarily finite or infinite amounts of the stuff. A couple common illustrations are moving traincars or a light shining off a bunch of funhouse mirrors. One does not explain the movement of the cars or the light in the mirror by all of a sudden having an infinite number of traincars or funhouse mirror, each member of which is incapable in and of itself to produce the effect. In short, (1) violates the PSR, the merits of which I suppose we can discuss. But there we are.

[@FoxintheKnow86]

@@ccmnxc Thanks for the feedback, I've psoted twice here on the two issues at hand: _I don't see how an accidental property doesn't count as a metaphysical part, unless by accidental property you mean a cambridge property._ I think that is going to depend on your definition of parthood and property. I don’t think that accidental properties need to be thought of as parts, they may just be modal properties _about_ parts or simples for instance. Aristotle would have thought of quantity as an accidental property for instance, but I don’t think that quantity is a part- it is a sum of parts- a molecule being 8 atoms doesn’t mean that ‘having 8 atoms’ is a part in addition to the having of 8 atoms as parts. Regardless, if simples are still extended for instance, which seems possible without involving parthood, then that could be a property that is not a part that could vary from simple to simple. Or if a simple was akin to say a string, it might have the property of vibrating in such and such a way. That wouldn’t imply again, that these properties were parts, or that they had to be had in virtue of having parts, they’d be more like powers. Even so, it strikes me that simples could always have Cambridge properties, or purely extrinsic relational properties that would serve to differentiate them. Again, being located in time or space, or in a structure, or composing some further object, these are all ways of differentiating composites, and so they should be for simples. _If the accidental property is a property of the thing, then two things follow if that thing is a simple: 1. That simple can have only one property as multiple would entail composition), and 2. That property could not change in any way as ability to change requires act/potency composition_ Again, there can be multiple properties had extrinsically, relational/Cambridge properties are not parts. One can make a distinction quite intuitively between possession and parthood. Some x can possess y, or could have y as its part. The distinction can be made by the essential/accidental distinction or the extrinsic/intrinsic relation if you want. I don’t see a general rule that implies possessing a property implies parthood, any more than possessing say ten dollars in my hand implies that bill is a part of me or my hand. So again, possessing two or more properties does not entail composition being in space, or being to the left of something else, or being a part of an ear are not composites of the things that possess such properties yet they are multiple and they are also distinguishing properties that can be had by differing simples. In addition, it should be pointed out that properties like that, even if we are a realist about properties, don’t themselves seem like composites. They could be themselves simple (tropes, or instantiations of universals) and so they wouldn’t incur any obvious regress worries. _At this point you just end up in a Parmenidean freeze, since these simples have only one property and cannot change_ This is wrong as I see it. Again, take strings- they seem to lack composition, yet they could be forever vibrating at different frequencies, or maintaining patterns of vibration over time in virtue of relational properties. For all we know, some basic description of our world is like this. Or replace vibration with moving in space and time- an inherent power of simples- they bump up against each other, forming composites etc. One can account for permanence (as long as the simples persist in existence and behave this way they generate supervening activity) and change (the different patterns/relations that arise and fade, the new structures etc are what we experience). No need to deny change there. And no need to say that the simples that ground this need have parts. They may be complex in what can be said about their behaviour, causal history and relations etc, but that doesn’t imply parthood. At this point, one could argue that x is complex but x is not composed. You can omit the complexity of God and the composition to get some extra special sort of simplicity, but I don’t see any reason why complexity is coextensive with composition here. _Even if we insist the change lies in the relation, if neither member of the relation is actually changing, then there doesn't seem to be any change in the relation itself. Everything is static. Yet, as we know full well, change is a real feature of reality. Hence, an accidental property cannot be a property of the simple with that thing itself still remaining a simple._ I agree that there needs to be changes in relata to account for a change of a relation. However I don’t think that it's necessary to assume a static picture as default without begging the question. Simples can possess causal power (God does) and so it could be a historical fact that there has always been causal power of simples never at absolute rest or not being exercised. Whether that’s a causal power to say vibrate, or to move, there’s no reason to think simples would be static. If they are not and never have been static, then it’s not as if we have a reason to think that there was ever some static picture that then changed to possess some degree of dynamism. You might want to say that simples possess an active potency- such as the potency to vibrate at some frequency F at some time t. That though is a type of potency that collapses to act. Now there’s the issue of passive potency. Of course the Aristotleian might argue that a passive potency is a metaphysical complexity, but I would have a tough time thinking that potency was a part- a potency by itself isn’t anything. _If, however, it is purely external (e.g. Socrates becomes shorter than Plato in virtue of Plato growing), then the only thing differentiating simples would be their relations with other simples. But a relation is not itself sufficient to distinguish relata if the relata are otherwise identical_ Think of a simple A in space occupying some region _r_ and another simple B occupying some region _q_ it seems to me both are distinguished by that fact. But A being at or in _r_ is not a part of A. It will involve perhaps some distance between A and B in virtue of the distance between _r_ & _q_ and that is something we could measure and observe and experience. Or one could replace regions in space with points in time. Or with reference to structure- A is part of some composite C, but B is not. Again being a part of some further composite is not a part of the part that is composite. That’s because properties or relations like being part of the Eiffel Tower, or being ten miles north of, or being three years prior to- these are distinguishing properties possessed by things, but are not in themselves part of things. _At that point, it is just something relating to itself. Hence a pure externalist account fails as well. So it still seems like Feser's position against (2) stands_ At no point are we relating to the thing itself here, any more than we would for a composite- we are not making reference to parts at all to make it true that these things are the case. And so I still think, when it comes to accounting for differences among simples we do not need to appeal to parthood. When it comes to being actual in some sense, or exercising causal power or being affected by a causal power, one doesn’t seem to need to make reference to parthood in any obvious way.

[@ccmnxc]

​@@FoxintheKnow86 I appreciate the thorough reply. If it’s alright, to avoid quote clutter, I’m just going to number my responses according to each paragraph you’ve got here. (1): The notion of parts I am working with tends to be pretty robust, though not all-encompassing. So take something like quantity or powers. If something has quantity, then it is at least potentially divisible, which introduces a passive potency to the thing. Powers are a little more difficult since they are, pretty much by definition, active potencies (which even God has), but even here one could ask why a simple has this power or disposition rather than another. If for no reason, we have PSR issues. If for some reason, then there is something accounting for what makes it be one way as opposed to another, which indicates a passive potency. Either way, you have basic metaphysical composition, and that kind of parthood seems to be enough for Feser’s argument to get off the ground. So to take your examples, something with a particular dimensive quality is potentially divisible and a string has a power of vibrating in one way or another that still needs accounting for. (2): I’ll leave aside the point on Cambridge or relational properties for discussion below. In terms of the possession and parthood discussion, I think the fundamental issue we’re having is working under different senses of “part.” I, along with Feser, hold that any act/potency relation in a thing implies some basic metaphysical composition. So even if the thing I possess is not a part per se, my power to possess or not possess that thing is a part of me. Now, perhaps you take issue with the act/potency distinction, but then let’s turn our focus to that, since that would be the fundamental issue. In fact, I think this will play an important role in the rest of my responses, so I will keep those brief and refer them back to these first two responses, and we can take things up from there. (3): The strings or simples then have metaphysical parthood of the act/potency variety, since they could vibrate or move in one way or another, thus they are not truly simple. (4): This paragraph merits a more thorough response. Now, obviously, if my previous argument for a static universe (on this simples view) fails, then the point you are responding to is moot. But that aside, you speak of a historical fact of these things possessing causal powers and those powers being actualized, which seems to be outright brute fact-ism (with a whole bunch of brute facts to boot). Why these things are the way they are is an important question, but then we’d be back to discussing the PSR again. You also note the difference here in active and passive potency, to which I just refer you back to my statement (1). If the strings, simples, or anything else have a passive potency, then there is something making that thing to be what and how it is, which immediately leads to a more fundamental cause. So the passive potency itself is not so significant so much as what it implies when a thing has a passive potency. (5): While you are right that location is not a part and that it serves to distinguish two different things, each simple has the passive potency of being present at some other point in space, in which case, it lacks total metaphysical simplicity. (6): I think your last sentence pretty much sums up where we are at odds, both in terms of our position as well as our terminology usage. It is precisely in being affected by causal power (or being able to be affected in some way or other), that the Thomist is going to say we have parthood of a basic metaphysical kind. Perhaps that’s where we should focus our dispute.

[@FoxintheKnow86]

@@ccmnxc You are of course free to work with your own definition of parthood, as long as it’s not ad hoc, I think the only worry is talking past each other. As I said, I think we can distinguish between possession of a property and that property being a part of the object. Even so, some properties like extension, or location, or other Cambridge properties/relational properties like being part of are not themselves parts of objects- they may be things that can be said of an object, or used to differentiate an object from another. I think that much is established to get over Feser’s initial worry. And I think, intuitively, we do this all the time to differentiate things, without reference to parthood. I assume the real issue is whether or not an object can possess these properties or have them said of them without invoking parthood of some other kind. I say yes- you say no, because for you they omit a certain metaphysical complexity, which is what you mean by parthood. I don’t really see why I need to accede to that view though- it seems to me one can just talk of a simple thing lacking parts even if it has some further metaphysical complexity coming along with it, there’s nothing intuitively part commiting about saying x is 5 miles north of y for instance. But perhaps that could be shown in a way that’s convincing. The worry for Feser’s argument however, what gets it going, is that a composite is going to fall into a regress that only a true simple can escape (God). I think t that even if really troubled by these objections, we could just posit some basic metaphysical composite- say a simple non composed piece of matter and a single non composed property- a basic compound or unity that could be an instantiation of some necessary relation perhaps, indivisible in reality and a basic building block of further composition. Neither the parts of such a compound are really separable metaphysically- neither are composed as an event of fusion by a cause external, and so neither part of the compound invokes further regress worries, and the argument is blocked. Again there’s no need to insist on a cause for this basic composition, it could be a wholesale fundamental unity in nature, an interdependence that is fundamental, but even if such compounds were caused, such causes wouldn’t themselves need to be essentially ordered, and so the regress could persist but without a worry about viciousness (the cause could be the relation between them is symmetrical for instance). I think it's noteworthy that when talking about metaphysical composition at this point, we have moved far beyond the scope of initial consideration of parts that’s more akin to physical composition we observe that is the subject of the initial stage of the argument. That’s where the regress worry arises- but if one talks of metaphysical composition of matter and form say, then in some basic instance, neither matter and form are further composed so there’s no regress worry there, and it may be the world has some basic compound of simple non-composite form/matter. I think that it’s possible in some entities, if there is basic composition of simple metaphysical things (whatever they be) they bottom out in some entities that are not further composed. For Thomists, matter and form or essence existence, even if composing a thing, aren’t actually possibly decomposable or separable- and so one could say they weren’t necessarily composed as an act or event of composition, even if they are distinct, so I don’t think that such distinctions without separability are a million miles off here. If xy are distinct and inseparable, I think it’s intuitive to think that x and y were never composed by some cause putting together an x and a y. My understanding is of course, sometimes we do generate new matter form composites by adding together pre-existing matter form composites, but I am talking about some first basic compound of matter and form- I see no reason if they are not further composed, why they would have needed to be joined given those components (some basic form and say prime matter) couldn’t presumably exist without each other to be thus joined by a cause. If there’s no further cause here, there’s no causal regress. A quick note on parthood with regards to extended simples, it has been objected that anything that has extension possibly is divisible, or it can be said to have say, a left part and a right part. I don’t think that follows without begging the question, but there is some controversy outside of Thomism on this, but I’m not convinced that extended simples are obviously taken off the board by these sorts of objections (as far as my limited understanding goes). Just because something is possibly divisible, doesn’t mean it actually is. If objects are divisible into parts because they have parts that could possibly be separated, that is for things to actually be divided one must decompose them in some way, this would not be applicable to what is not composed. Thus such conceptual division does not imply actual division. Temporal extension for example, could in the Aristotelian sense be infinitely divisible, yet there are arguments against why that’s perhaps impossible. _I, along with Feser, hold that any act/potency relation in a thing implies some basic metaphysical composition. So even if the thing I possess is not a part per se, my power to possess or not possess that thing is a part of me_ Again, I think it’s very odd to think of potency as necessarily a part, given a whole can be said to have a potency, it’s not as if potency entails parthood. Now an active potency is something like a power that is actual on your view. I think a passive potency is like a disposition to be acted on. Both are grounded in actuality as I see it. A potency that is not actual, is nothing at all really. I don’t think you can have non actual parts, given what it is to be a part of some object is to actually compose it to some extent. So really if potency is distinct from act, then no part could be purely potential, given all parts are actual, otherwise they are merely potentially parts, and we don’t need to worry about those- the atoms in my left foot are potentially part of some great statue of Zeus, but they aren't actually parts. So I think we can avoid the sort of metaphysical composition at that deeper level, and merely end up talking about the actuality of wholes or parts being such that it could act on other things or could be acted on. This captures I think, the sense in which an object is potential, it could potentially be doing something, it could potentially be done unto by something else. These describe I think modal facts rather than describing parts. Now maybe there’s a worry about how we deal with ‘potency’ if it’s just another way something is actual without reference to a part that is a disposition and a part that is a power. But again, I don’t think that we need to think of powers as a part, as a power can be applicable to a sum of parts, a simple could just be coextensive with a power (like say powers are jsut the sort of things always moving unless another simple stops them or ensnares them in a relation that generates a composite) or possess a power that is not dependent upon parts but is derived from its entirety. Powers are irreducible things that don’t have parts, and wholes can have powers that aren’t located in their parts. A whole can have a power and a disposition its parts don’t have. So a simple I assume can have a power and a disposition without having parts that are some power or disposition. The sentence ‘x can be bounced by y’ doesn’t seem to entail that y has parts, or that x has parts. It strikes me that if y, whether it be simple or composed, is such that when x acts it will respond in some way (be potential) then we have an account by appealing to x and y and the powers/dispositions involved. Now you could argue that a simple couldn’t be a power and a disposition as this entails parthood. I think though, that would just be question begging at that point. Another consideration that strikes me- is that if powers are parts, or dispositions are parts then they are presumably primitive and irreducible to further parts, thus some parts are simple. Now maybe all simples are powers or dispositions. Reality at some basic level is just a vast mosaic of interacting powers/dispositions that then form composites. The idea that everything is a power in some state or other is not ridiculous, though I have not given much thought to that view since I’m not really convinced of power theory of causation.

[@mathewdumay4079]

I would love to see WLC and Graham Oppy! :)

[@vincentiormetti3048]

happening soon

[@mdbahrozbaburali]

Happened.

[@duranmartin7791]

Maybe an alternate example to the red chair that could clarify Oppy’s position would be: a meteor in space cruising at a constant velocity. It has the potential to be at a different position in time along its current trajectory, so long as no other force is exerted on it. Therefore, if nothing happens, the potential for it to change position and be further along the trajectory at t+1 is actualised. This shows that states can change and potential can be actualised even when there is no actual actualiser...

[@jrhemmerich]

This is helpful, as it moves the illustration out of a static example, which is helpful. However, is it not the case that the position and velocity that the meteor maintains is the actualization of a prior actualizer? It is just hidden in the temporal sequence. Namely, the last thing to hit the meteor (along with the concurrent forces of gravity around it (these forces are parallel to the concurrent structures which were actualizing the redness of the chair). It seems that the initial conditions of actualization, which are now incorporated by inertia, are being ignored by the narrowing of the temporal timeframe. It’s like a certain type of occationalism is being assumed-where each moment, the continued existence of something is treated as if it were the actualization of something without a cause. But such a view would destroy all causality altogether. Each slice of time would just be a moment connected to the one before it by habit, ala David Hume. I don’t think this is what Gram intended. It would have been nice, if Feser could have asked him if this consequence was intended.

[@noahclayborne5560]

Can you get a debate between Feser and Sean Caroll?

[@Nonnobisdomine77]

I'm at min 58 and dr. Graham seems to make the case for setting up what an argument is to bring everything to his standards instead of engaging the argument under his standards and beliefs to what a good argument should be. As to what conclusion comes out of the argument that is up to each individual who participated in the argument. We can share views and listen to each other that is charitable and positive.

[@paulkelly1162]

Capturing Christianity You produce some very great content, man! Can I ask though, why the time limits? Couldn't you make more money from longer videos (more advertisements!). Regardless, keep doing what you do!

[@Miatpi]

Part 3!

[@petarcosic2781]

Recommend "Counsel of Trent" channel,and Veritas Dipolog channel's playlist.st.Joseph and Mary pray for us!

[@ArcadianGenesis]

May the man with the better webcam resolution win. Oppy HD > Feser SD

[@trustinjesus1119]

A.G. a man of honor, a man of letters, a genius, a man to be reckoned with. The pleasure is all mine. It's people like you that keep it turned on.

[@diggingshovelle9669]

Oppy sounds confused and seems to misuse the notion of potential by bestowing on potential an ambiguity namely an actual potential rather than a potential. Is this putting the horse behind the cart?

[@iDealaeDi]

this was an intelligent two hour way to say "everything has a cause" "ehhh not so sure".

[@kylemyers971]

You really didn't follow anything, eh? Lol

[@Samsgarden]

The earlier discussion about arguments begotten from predisposed opinions is a salient one. Take this debate; two philosophers invested in their positions arguing against the other. What's stopping them from adopting the opposite world view? They could easily argue for the contraposition

[@mikemurray2432]

Towards the end upon the discussion of act and potency Graham is really circumambulating what Ed is saying, he doesn’t seem to understand the metaphysical principal of act and potency. But really awesome interview with these two guys!

[@dwaynetherickscanchez3160]

ed looks exactly like david wood

[@danharte6645]

I'm a huge fan of both of these guys 😀

[@lenar.1691]

You think? Well good that he isn't as hostile as Wood.

[@namikazeomar8001]

Looks same different brain

[@TheDaniyool]

@@lenar.1691 pk

[@noahclayborne5560]

Can you do Feser vs. Sean Caroll? "Does The Universe Require a Cause?"

[@logans.butler285]

@Actus Purus hmm ok but Fesser is a philosopher of science, isn't he?

[@gabepearson6104]

@Actus Purus Aron wall vs Sean carrol

[@giovannidaza4574]

@@gabepearson6104 yes !

[@tomgreene2282]

The chair has a potential to REMAIN red in the new situation. Did Graham pick the wrong example ...or the wrong man? Feser's body language from about 1.00 says it all! He catches Oppy on the ''knock down arguments''. Great debate. Feser:...uncaused cause...Oppy: uncaused effect. Faser never saw an uncaused cause...however Oppy never saw an ''uncauser 'of effect either.

[@MiladTabasy]

I think potentiality is the distance between absence of something and its presence (actuality). When we imagine a red chair remaining red in the next moment, we cannot say it had the potentiality to be red in the next moment unless we imagine absence of redness just before the next moment and then compare it with presence of redness in that next moment. So we assumed a chair on which there is the absence of redness and that chair is like an actualizer or God.

[@MiladTabasy]

The chair is the actualizer of red. Good idea

[@eu7kw678]

I think the entire debate rests on one not believing there is a first mover/cause (that is actualised and God) for all other potentialities, (regardless of whether they are simples, atoms, quantum mechanics) and not being satisfied with simply a limit, and, one believing that the limit is all there is to it. In other words, the belief in the existence of God lies in the belief in the existence of God; I say this because one’s belief in the limit of things, their potentialities, indeed even the phenomenon of potentiality, and thought, is a case as strong as one’s belief that all these limits simply point to a being that transcends and causes or at least is above and beyond these things and limits. And I believe that is beautiful in the grand scheme of things - that the most crucial question of life, the existence of God, the crux of all matter, lies exactly at this extremely tenuous yet curious and fragile state of question, which can only be answered by faith (either in limits and what limits science dictates, or, a transcendental being that is above and beyond these said limits).

[@CandidDate]

the person who is more naturally "happy," is more inclined to believe in a caring, loving God.

[@Oners82]

Nope, the person who is naturally more inclined to believe what makes them feel good rather than what is true, is more inclined to believe it.

[@CandidDate]

@@Oners82 why do they serve wine at Catholic mass? In vino, veritas.

[@Oners82]

@@CandidDate Because it is a weird cult that has cannibilistic rituals. These people believe that they are eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the person who sacrificed himself for them and don't think they are doing anything weird!

[@jholts6912]

Can we do a debate between Feser and Oppy on Thomism?

[@Againstfascist]

The idea that you can take on that whole task? Maybe in 500 debates. You first need to debate about Aristotillian metaphysics. Get that down first.

[@jholts6912]

@@Againstfascist okay that's very true

[@theotherway1639]

Is the red chair also red in the dark, or only in the presence of light? Also, is it still red if viewed by a person with color-blindness?

[@consciousphilosophy-ericva5564]

Great debate. This is totally unrelated, but I would like to know more about Feser's thoughts on Jesus. I never have really heard him talk about Jesus.

[@lenar.1691]

Did you search on his blog?

[@danielosetromera2090]

He's catholic, so you can imagine.

[@KenMerrell]

What is it with philosophers and chairs?

[@Israel2.3.2]

Like Aristotle's Organon and the sentence 'man is white' lol. I think philosophers are so focused on abstractions that generating non-standard examples would end up drawing attention away from the task at hand. Also, whenever I spend significant portions of my time reading philosophical texts my imagination becomes noticably weak. The mind's prism with its colored bands of orchestral overtones reduced to a single strand of white noise.

[@280zjammer]

God doesn’t need you to believe anything at all in order for God to exist. Trying to begin a relationship with God by question the existence of God is foolish. If a person really wants to know if God exists, attempting faith is just about the only way to know anything real. It’s only an argument because the question is wrong. Don’t ask “Does God exist?”. Ask “God, do you love me?” because if he doesn’t (he does though) then there would be no point in discussing the rest.

[@anteodedi8937]

🤣🤣🤣

[@anteodedi8937]

@@offense53 It is the silliest comment!

[@KT-dj4iy]

I ‘m trying but failing to understand exactly what point Graham is making when he says, _”beliefs and theories are almost entirely prior to arguments”._ On the one hand it sounds very similar to something many who have been through sales training will have heard, namely, _”people buy emotionally, and only then do they justify intellectually”_ And indeed the reason that is taught is because it is usually a waste of time to try to move a prospect to buy using argumentation, or at least argumentation alone. Rather, you need to find where their deeper emotions sit with respect to the purchase - find the pain, as some sales methods put it. Is that all Graham is saying; that in most cases, logic - specifically, a sound conclusion reached by valid inference from premisses asserted as true - will not move someone from a counter position? I hope there’s more to it than that because while I reckon that is absolutely the case for mere mortals - witness the current madness on the extremes of both political sides in thhe US in late 2020 and early 2021 - I’d hate to think that pro philosophers like Graham and Ed, each with a brain the size of a small planet, would be subject to the same limitations. I mean, for my part, I, non-philosopher, with brain the size of a small butterball turkey breast, _aspire_ to the kind of austere, Spock-like respect for logic that I imagine is everyday life for these dudes. Am I misguided?

[@anaxoloti820]

@1:34:51 We all know it's obvious that a red chair will remain red the next moment if something doesn't interfere with it (i.e. painting it blue, and I guess ignoring oxidative decay of the paint). But the fact of the matter in this silly example is that there IS something actual that's actualizing the potential of the chair to be red at the next moment. You could just say that the chemical properties of how paint adheres to the wood of the chair and how the photons that reflect from the paint into the retinas of your eyes which give it its perceived red color are the already-actualized things that are actualizing the chair's potential to be a red chair at t+1. How does Graham not see "the need" for this? There are literally observable things that are explaining why this red chair is a red chair in the next moment.

[@richardlopez6226]

That’s a good way of putting it.

[@danmoore3444]

I think the bigger problem is this: If change is the actualization of potential, and the chair has not changed, then there is no actualizer in need of explanation for the lack of change in the chair in Oppy's view.

[@CalebLove-ci8bv]

@@danmoore3444 I know this was three years ago, but I guess I'll ask my question any ways lol. Wouldn't it still be the case that the chair has changed? Like you said, change is the actualization of potential. So even though the chair is currently red, it is also potentially red in the future. So when that future red is actualized, change occurs, even if it stays the same color (red); or at least that's what make sense to me. From my understanding, the change isn't in, for instance, the color of the chair. If the chair were to change from, let's say red to blue, technically there is a change in different actuals, but that wouldn't be the same change used in the argument, as change is any potential, actualized. I would love to know your thoughts on this!

[@Joe-bx4wn]

An atheist using pure logic without tainted by ego

[@roxyliebensterb7633]

Oppy is on to something extremely interesting and important here. Once I heard a person say: "I don't do arguments". It was meant to be funny, I believe, but I suspect he was wiser than he himself intended to be.

[@patricpeters7911]

The main chunk was arguments about arguments and red chairs. Once you get to talking about bottom-level reality and “simples,” you get to the meat. I hope Feser interacts more with this in the future. The idea of “simple” particles was talked about in their last interaction too. After all, if you take the proofs seriously, all sides have to admit of a bottom level reality. The theist needs to show why something like basic matter or energy (or whatever) cannot be most fundamental.

[@neptasur]

There is a common misconception that the Aristotelian argument breaks down when we get to the smallest particle (whatever that may be) and then find that we can't go further. The Aristotelian is not speaking of composition of physical elements, but rather composition of metaphysical elements such as essence and existence. So even if we could find the smallest fundamental particle, this would do no damage to the Aristotelian argument because such a particle would still be a composition of essence and existence.

[@emanuelbenicio3501]

Because fundamental particles cannot be the material cause of space and time. The argument from reduction doesnt assume that DDS is absolutely insignificant, by the contrary, the reduction of an effect to its cause is the reduction of potentiality to actuality, and since fundamental particles cannot contain the actuality of all things within themselves (they are individuated pieces of matter which dont make up the entirety of space, and so they cannot be the actuality of everything.), they cannot be the cause of all things. That's the error of pre socratic naturalism

[@erinnhawaii]

To give the example of a red chair seems to be a defeating example because we know that it has been created by a mover, namely, a human being. Using the example of something that has already been knowably changed is the best we have. To say that it is not necessary to have a mover is a dead end. Why is it not necessary? What would then be an example of something in the universe that does not require a mover or a cause (since everything that begins to exist in the physical world does in fact have a cause)?

[@erinnhawaii]

I get where you’re coming from, but it’s not a random assertion of any flavor. It’s a response based on looking at the evidence cumulatively in attempt to make sense of why we are here and what caused our existence. I don’t see this as being a bad thing. Mentioning that the universe is expanding and that the cause is certainly not based upon nothing just bolsters the reason why we seek to find answers to things. This goes with seeking to understand anything, no matter the discipline. Imagine if we all were so skeptical that we dismissed the fact that we could ever know anything. We would never accomplish anything or come to any new understanding. I doubt this is a society where you would like to live in. To say that we cannot know anything would be self-defeating. We clearly do know things. I would think it more noble to seek than to not seek at all. It seems as if the rest of your comments are emotionally-based. I would encourage you to explore the historical evidence for the resurrection further (if you have not already done so), in addition to the issue of morality. On atheism, there is no morality. Arguing against someone as being bad/evil or even gods or a god/God as being bad/evil would be futile in this sense. Mandating morality when it doesn’t exist on atheism/naturalism cannot and does not work.

[@davidmckean8100]

When Oppy mentioned my sophomore year philosophy professor at 15:18 I was like 😮

[@rogerfarias4506]

Can you enable the auto-generated subtitles?

[@stuckmannen3876]

God bless ✝️

[@stuckmannen3876]

​@@TheWorldTeacher It's not an easy question... I would say its easier to answer what God is not... given our human perspective.

[@stuckmannen3876]

@@TheWorldTeacher It's kind of the same thing as light and shadow. Shadow is the absence of light.

[@stuckmannen3876]

​@@TheWorldTeacher pee?

[@thomaserickson568]

These guys should play more Star Wars: The Old Republic. It's really good and fun.

[@tonybanks1035]

too short. consider a longer format

[@trustinjesus1119]

Hiya! I've been studying the subject matter since 1973 when my Dad (The Admiral - Commander of the armies of Heaven) took me to see Raymond Moody's "Life after Life" : documentary movie. What do you want to know?

[@bubbillionaire2423]

Did Dr. Feser just explain Dr. Oppy's argument @ 1:32:24 ? There is a potential for the red chair not to change. This potential does not need an actualizer to actualize. I guess Dr. Feser would say that this is still no change. I think Dr. Feser's wording on this is very solid. Change is the actualization of potential. I do not see a way around it.

[@trustinjesus1119]

The laws of nature are constant, and they're universal, and they're the embodiment of actualized potential. You say "Change is," I don't think so, but Mr. Billionaire, I didn't follow a damn word either of these guys said. Not a single cogent thought, even when the moderator tried to dumb it down for me, nope, flew right over my head. At least your comment I understood! God is immutable, I know that. Nothing else is immutable. They keep talking about Aristotle and the scholastic philosophers and Saint Thomas of Aquinas and whatnot (the all important whatnot) but what they're saying and what I learned from them doesn't seem to be corresponding in my mind. I listen to this stuff, I concentrate my focus and it's like I wind getting these kind intellectual seizures.

[@saintmik6576]

@@trustinjesus1119 loloolololololol the argument doesn't need to be this complicated tbh . Nothing cannot create nothing that doesn't make any sense therefore someone actualized the nothingness ( potential) and made something.

[@trustinjesus1119]

@@saintmik6576 don't laugh at me, I'm on your side, can't you tell by my moniker and icon? if you don't believe me, look at my video. I'm making the case I Am that Someone. The best case anyone has ever made.

[@DaveJLin]

I am more confused than ever before 😆

[@PowerD2]

existential inertia is compatible with God´s existence, is not refuting anything by pointing it out, in the other hand, existential inertia can be used as given by god, so things can remain in existence

[@matthewmayuiers]

“Vs” shouldn’t apply here. This is just a discussion

[@legron121]

The chemical microstructure of a chair does not “actualise” its redness in the sense Feser needs for his argument to work (it’s not the “efficient cause”, but the “material cause”, to use Feser’s preferred Aristotelian categories).

[@grantbartley483]

The cosmological and moral arguments are (technically) good arguments for God: valid arguments with true premises.

[@RepublicConstitution]

Humans are primarily emotional creatures. The opening salvo is simply about the nature of disagreement.

[@christopherconey732]

At 1.07.30 Feser made a knockdown argument against the value of knockdown arguments and Oppy agreed with it :)

[@0thniel101]

A better question would be; is there any good arguments against God?

[@zayan6284]

So does Feser own all those books? That's thousands of dollars in pure bookage

[@Metalhead98793]

Well he probably has been buying those books for years now and he probably enjoys reading a lot.

[@bradspitt3896]

Some were gifts.

[@richardlopez6226]

I’m on my way of topping his book ownage.

[@spacedoohicky]

I knew a pastor with about three times as many books. He was mostly living very meagerly on a small pension at the time. He got the books from weekly purchases, and a lot of them were used before he got them. A person can accumulate a lot of books just by being a little patient looking for the right books, and the right deals while browsing. After he moved I helped set up his basement with shelves. It was a full basement, fairly large, and half of it looked like a library. He also had some rare, and very old books including what were probably antique bibles. So just going by the basement he would have looked rather rich, even though he was far from it.

[@hudsonensz2858]

@@richardlopez6226 it's likely he has way more books then what is in this one room

[@LtDeadeye]

I know the chair was just a thought experiment but isn’t it the case that there is actual change, however minute, always taking place?

[@namapalsu2364]

Yes, it is. Unlike William Lane Craig's "change" in his cosmological argument, the Aristotelian/Thomist "change' is a change that is always taking place right here right now.

[@MrDzoni955]

Yes, the chair's "potential to stay the same" is just the chair being actualized by something already actual. It just doesn't get to have the power to remain the same and in existence without getting circular.

[@overcamehim]

He who dies with the most books wins.

[@isaacanderson8231]

You dare challenge me?

[@michaelzane3823]

What if you die in a public library

[@saintmik6576]

@@michaelzane3823 ya goof!

[@tweetophon]

Skipping ahead to 1:20 or so onwards, Oppy lands on the same issue I had with Feser, as explained in our PDF: antiquitystudio.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PseudoAgesilausVer4.pdf Feser assumes a certain metaphysical model and fails to provide a satisfactory account and justification for it. The Divine Doctrine of Conservation - a Medieval innovation - is the metaphysical mistake that should be abandoned or otherwise explicitly explained and better defended by people like Feser. It's unfortunate that Feser throws around terms like "Aristotelian" while quietly assuming medieval innovations that totally re-colour the argument. Oppy and Feser will no doubt have a more productive discussion next time. I will tune in again.

[@Againstfascist]

Here you go, friend. He has already done what you are asking for. edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/new-acpq-article.html?m=1

[@pipelineaudio]

Did they ever get to the question in the title or was that just clickbait?

[@veritopian1823]

Actual & Potential are *opposites*. The chair is red. It doesn't have "the potential" to be red a t+1, it will necessarily be so unless changed. It has the potential to be blue at t+1. It doesn't have "the potential" to be red, it "actually is" red. He's transferring the fact that the future itself is potential, not actual, onto the chair. The chair's "potential" to be red at t+1 is really just the future's potential to exist.

[@mothernature1755]

So would this mean that existential inertia (something continuing to exist) would be a thing?

[@mothernature1755]

Or feser would have to say that it's not the chair that is contingent on God to keep existing but rather time is contingent on God and the chair being contingent on time. Or something along those lines.

[@severalstories3420]

I'm not sure I understand why a chair being red needs something new to break-into reality to keep it red. The reason I've put it that way is because I think doing so illuminates the problem that had them talking past one another for an hour. The potential for change is described by each of them in different ways. For Oppy, something being an actualizer is the in-breaking catalyst alien to what had been there before at T^0. He's baffled by this idea that you need some new thing to swing into action and make the thing that was red, red for another moment. For Feser, it isn't that--but I'm not sure what else he could possibly be referring to. Anyone have an explanation?

[@jrhemmerich]

The idea is that causality can exist in a constant static situation. Thus if a cat is sitting on a chair. The chair is actualizing the cats position even though the chair is the same from moment to moment. Oppy is discounting concurrent causality as an actualizer. That’s Feser’s point about the atomic structures that are causing the chair to be red by their persistence through time. If one wants to find a more obvious temporal actualizer for the chair being red, one can just look to the person who painted the chair. Oppy only gets rid of the need for an actual actualizer (the human who painted the chair) by artificially limiting the timeframe to two narrow slices of time. He is ignoring the fact that the chair’s features were caused and then persist through time until some additional actuality acts upon the chair’s persistent potentialities (such as the potential to be painted green by an actual brush, moved by an actual person, etc. until by going backwards temporally or inwards metaphysically, to the base of reality, one comes to the thing or mind which always exists, some part of which is fully actualized and needs nothing to bring it into existence).

[@Samsgarden]

Who painted the chair?

[@wishlist011]

… and what colour were they?

[@ThiagoCT9]

I don’t think that’s relevant, since they’re talking about a hierarchical structure rather than a temporal one.