Battleship vs Carrier: What we forget

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Since we touch upon it here, I recently made a video on the B-17 and it's 'anti-shipping' history: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mJmseKh7aphjndU

[@Downloadguy1995]

I can recommend this video already watched it:) Besides i also like the video you Bernhard and Drachinifel made on the Afrikakorps. Been a subscriber to all you guys channels for a long time now. Oh and yes that is an austrian dragoon as my profile pic in anime style.

[@warhead_beast7661]

Could you maybe make a vid about German naval Bombers like the FW 200s and their tactics and succeses?

[@CheshireTomcat68]

@@warhead_beast7661 Yes, but comparing the Liberator and the Condor in this role would be interesting too.

[@warhead_beast7661]

@@CheshireTomcat68 yeah or the Marine Versions The PBY's and PBJ's of the B 24s

[@IronWarhorsesFun]

battleships: actually were a good idea at the time!

[@GregsAirplanesandAutomobiles]

Great video. I would like to add that during WW2 three carriers were sunk by Battleships/Cruisers, the USS Gambler Bay, HMS Glorious, and IJN Chiyoda which was crippled by aircraft but sunk by Cruiser fire. The number of battleships sunk at SEA by carrier aircraft are lower than most people think. HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse were NOT sunk by carrier aircraft, but by much more powerful land based units. Most battleships sunk by carrier aircraft were sunk while in a harbor. The Japanese Battleship Hiei was mortally wounded at sea by surface ships aircraft and was scuttled. Of course Musashi and Yamato were sunk at sea by carrier aircraft, but those were cases of multiple carriers against a single battleship. In short, even during the war, it wasn't a total slam dunk for the carriers, they didn't sink battleships at sea all that often, and sometimes the battleship sunk the carrier. Of course the big difference is when the ships are in the harbor. In those conditions carriers sank battleships quite a lot, and not vice versa.

[@willardlong2899]

Too add to this, the AAA armaments of the Prince of Wales and Repulse where fairly anemic. By late 43/early 44, Battleships, especially American ones where so heavily armed with AA, that they where very hard targets for air strikes. When they did take hits from aircraft, the damage was, more often than not, superficial. Yamato and Musashi took massed air attacks from multiple carriers over the course of hours to sink. Contrast that against carriers which where lost in one wave of air attacks, with the fatal damage being done generally in a time span of minutes.

[@Crosshair84]

@@willardlong2899 On top of that, didn't the US Gearing class DD have 80% of the AA throw weight, and much better AA fire control, of the Yamato?

[@sheboyganshovel5920]

Air strikes sank battleships in harbor because aircraft could reach them. Examples are abundant. Are you aware of any carriers being sunk in harbor by a cruiser or battleship? Subs might have managed it. Also, while the Gambier Bay was sunk by cruisers, this was in an action that saw two American destroyers and one destroyer escort and three Japanese heavy cruisers sunk. She was also an escort carrier.

[@andrewtaylor940]

Crosshair84 The Japanese AA control was horrible through to the end of the war. Which is sad, as it was arguably the best of the Axis powers. At least their naval AA. German land based AA was very effective. But that was largely due to over saturation of heavy guns. Known and well mapped out fields of Fire, and known and limited angles of approach. In the early war British shipboard AA was if anything slightly inferior to the Brits. Only the Americans were moderately good at AA when they entered the war. And then mainly only in the ships and facilities with the newest Directors. The Japanese started receiving a mildly rude warning at Pearl Harbor late in the Raid as the various AA sites and suites finally started coming online in response to the unprovoked peacetime surprise attack. What rarely gets mentioned is just how badly the Japanese pilots worlds were rocked by the surprisingly effective AA fire both from Midway island itself, and later by TF17 during the Battle of Midway. They had never encountered anything like it, and it is largely why the attack leader called for a needed second strike on Midway. Thus initiating Nagumo’s dilemma. It’s worth noting that for all the US Planes shot down during the Battle of Midway, only one is known to he felled by Japanese AA fire (whereas the rather more effective American AA fire shot down at least 6 of their own planes at various points.) All the rest were shot down by Zeros. That’s how bad Japanese Naval AA Fire was at that point. Contrast that with the late war, whereby the Battleship Yamato, refit with AA guns bolted to every possible surface managed to shoot down 10 planes... of the 400 attacking. An order of magnitude improvement! Yet still completely useless.

[@longnamenocansayy]

i think we'll see fewer aircraft carriers and tanks in the future. what i can easily imagine is a bunch of little ships loaded with drones, or manned planes loaded with drones. and of course space platforms, which make anything as big as an aircraft carrier obselete. do i have my head up my butt? i don't think so. we already see right now, lasers on board ships. and though a lot of people don't want to admit it, the world trade center was turned into dust. what force did it and where did it originate from? that's already ancient history, and we've done nothing but advance technology since then.

[@TheDancingHyena]

This would be a good video to do with Drachinifel. Would like to see more collaborations with all three of you guys.

[@RyTrapp0]

Then Ian can tell us what individual arms the crewmembers were carrying, the unique features about those specific models, and Othais can tell us about the evolution of those firearms and what led to their development.

[@firecrow7973]

@@RyTrapp0 YES!

[@firecrow7973]

@@RyTrapp0 and mark novak can repair one for us

[@MBBurchette]

Great video! Even IF the strategic capabilities of carriers (not to mention the capabilities realized by the U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force in 1944-45) were understood in the 1930’s, would their employment in the European Theater have even been remotely practicable? Certainly a fleet of German carriers in the Atlantic would have been a game changer, but the resources it would have required to build such a fleet were probably beyond what Germany was ever capable of. And if they did, just getting it into the Atlantic and out of range of land-based aircraft would have difficult. And once it was there, how would it have been refueled? Where would it have docked to repair? It seems to me that the Aircraft Carrier was such a decisive weapon in the Pacific War precisely because the geography of the South/Central Pacific favored its’ strengths and minimized it’s weaknesses.

[@LionofCaliban]

I want to argue on the minimised its weaknesses. Being used incorrectly, unprotected to insufficiently protected still happened. US subs sank the third Yamato sister, at that stage a carrier conversion as one example. Not to mention the greater logistics issues of running multiple carriers, the fact is you didn't have the floating carrier competing with an island or sufficently big land mass. Mostly. Carriers had the endurance to bring the aircraft, meaning when you had the opportunity to strike, you could really bring numbers to it. Wasn't it in excess of 300 aircraft sent against the Yamato? It's well and good having fleets running about across the ocean, it's another thing to be able to bring the aircraft as well and have the aircraft combat capable. Multiple strikes combat capable.

[@MBBurchette]

There Be Game - The Pacific certainly was a logistical nightmare. But I think that problem applied just as much (if not more) to supplying and reinforcing ground forces as it did to deploying oilers and coordinating support vessels with a carrier fleet. As for the Pacific minimizing carrier’s weaknesses, think about what the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of carriers were. The biggest in my opinion was simply being detected. Regardless of whether it was by reconnaissance aircraft, or submarine/surface pickets, the offensive power of carriers largely depended on their ability to avoid detection long enough to close with the target, launch an air strike and get away BEFORE being attacked by land-based aircraft, or being engaged by surface ships. All were, for obvious reasons, much easier to do in the Pacific. It wasn’t until 1944 that this changed, and by then the Japanese were simply outgunned. The U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38/58) sailed with 12-18 carriers and while it was still vulnerable to submarines and land-based aircraft, it concentrated enough aircraft to overwhelm anything the Japanese could still throw at it.

[@davieturner339]

M. Brian Burchette : Carriers wouldn’t help the German Navy, the historical issue with control of the Air Force, if that was overcome and they developed good carrier aircraft you rightly note the geographic issue of getting into the Atlantic while being faced by a far superior force in the Royal Navy. The Pacific theatre was unique in that the Japanese and Americans could build and repair their ships in relative peace. The British often sent ships to the US for refit as it was a safe area. Germany lacked safe ports and easy access to the combat area. German carriers would have a hard time getting out, and if damaged a hard time getting repairs, which is what happened to the service fleet anyway. Even if they had 4 in 39, which would have been a amazing feat, the chances of them surviving and getting into the Atlantic would have been really low. Look how the Royal Navy countered the submarine, if Germany had better subs sooner, that would have had more results than carriers, but the longer time went in naval terms, the weaker Germany would always become.

[@tenarmurk]

The Germans had oil tankers in the Atlantic in the early war a raiding force of some single light carriers would be similarly or even more effective as the deutschland class raiders

[@LionofCaliban]

@@MBBurchette Detection is detection. Both the Atlantic and Pacific provide enough cover for the forces to move. Hiding ships on an ocean in a period where you don't have satellites tracking ships, is actually pretty easy. Finding ships on an ocean is actually, really hard. Plus, detection is as much a weakness of any and all surface ships as it is the carrier. The carrier makes detection a far more over the horizon thing than most had at the time. So the vulnerability of the carrier is the vulnerability of all ships. To this day. Carriers don't just bring detection to the table, they also bring a way to dramatically stamp your will, influence on an area. That only another carrier can really stop. The Pacific was the environment to not only to learn how to do this, but presented enough space that the no-fun-zone a carrier innately produces. The horizon was no longer an absolute limit of engagement. It was a guideline.

[@enscroggs]

All good points, Bernie and Bismarck, a well-done presentation. I wish to add something from USN history. The first of the big carriers in the US fleet (big as in attack carriers) were and Saratoga and Lexington (CV-1 and CV-2, respectively). Both of these ships were laid down as battlecruisers to be armed with eight 408mm naval rifles basically identical to the guns of the Colorado-class battleships. Thanks to international arms limitations treaties these ships were completed as aircraft carriers, i.e. vessels whose potency as warships were largely discounted by naval experts of the post WWI era when airplanes were comparatively slow and fragile, and consequently ignored by treaty negotiators. The USN Bureau of Construction and Repair believed that these ships would be worthless as men-o-war at night or in poor flying weather, therefore they were completed with eight 203mm rifles in four twin turrets, giving them the firepower of heavy cruisers. However, better aircraft designed specifically for carrier operation and improved shipboard aircraft handling techniques made British, American, and Japanese carriers much more capable of nighttime and adverse weather operations, such that by 1940 both ships were slated to have their cruiser guns removed and replaced with 127mm AA guns. For some reason, IJN Kaga and IJN Akagi, contemporaries of the Lexington-class and both converted from capital ships to carriers by the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, retained their worse-than-useless 200mm secondaries to the day they died.

[@dnillik]

IMO the main reason carriers were ‘under appreciated ‘ interwar were the aircraft they carried. Effective carrier aircraft were only introduced in the late 1930’s. Another development was the introductory of effective anti aircraft fire control by the Americans during the same time period. This allowed them to have a reasonable expectation of survival when attacked. Until then both US and Japanese tactics separated the carriers so it was harder to loose more than one. No other navy managed to accomplish this. BTW the Japanese navy’s emphasis on light aircraft was to give them a longer range so they could strike the enemy carriers and thus protect their own.

[@longnamenocansayy]

you have to think about american radar too. the japanese knew we had it. off subject but a valuable side issue is that we also knew their code.

[@justinpyke1756]

HEY, I'M THE BATTLESHIP APOLOGIST HERE. THEY CAN'T DO THAT. SHOOT THEM....OOORRRRR... SOMETHING. (This is a deep reference, and if you get it you should be ashamed of yourself.) In all seriousness, great video! I had no idea this was in the works, so it was a nice surprise!

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

hehe, it almost didn't happen, I actually had a list of like of 5 potential videos or something for Freiburg, this was the only one we had time for besides the Archive report and a minor unpublished one.

[@mensch1066]

I'm ashamed to say that I got the Attack of the Clones reference. My life has been misspent . . .

[@JHorsti]

Patience, Viceroy, patience. She will die. It's ok to be a prequel memer.

[@tenarmurk]

Prequel gang

[@spinetanium3296]

There's a lot of important lessons in those films. Unfortunately our memories get hijacked by Jar-Jar Binks.

[@jrobson100]

"I don't consider Germany a ship." (Citation needed)

[@aaronseet2738]

Until it was fast sinking in 1945.

[@michaelhenman4887]

"These guys have never hit anything" *Doesn't evade.* *Gets hit* *Surprised Pikachu face*

[@thomaszhang3101]

I mean he should be surprised. Those bombs land by random chance so evading does not help and getting hit is like winning a lottery.

[@barkerm9]

The importance of the proximity fuse in naval WW II antiaircraft success is greatly under appreciated.

[@andrewtaylor940]

I think the change wasn’t simply one of Battleship v Carrier. As we saw early on in the war, the change was really the shift from powerful self contained single units operating independently, to tightly coordinated operating groups of task specific ships acting as a single functional unit. What we now know of as the Carrier Task Force. We talk a lot about the carriers making the Battleships obsolete. But it was more advances in Radar and Radio communications. These placed less importance on single large independent units. And this was most clearly seen in the battle against the Kriegsmarine. It was largely Britain’s tight coordinated operations vs the lone largely unescorted German Capital ships. The Carriers are essentially just a way to increase the strike and sighting range of such a coordinated fleet. I could be wrong, but weren’t the Courageous vs Sharnhorst and the Escort Carriers at Samar really the only times Carriers came within range and attack by surface ship artillery?

[@p0xus]

Should have brought on Drachfinel (idk spelling). Then you would have a land expert, an air expert, and a naval expert.

[@whatsoperadoc7050]

mxt mxt Drachinifel.

[@Tepid24]

@mxt mxt Watch his video on how to build a navy and reconsider your statement.

[@Tepid24]

@mxt mxt I'm not sure what your issue with him is. From his content it is obvious that he has a thorough understanding of all intricacies of naval combat from the tactical to the grand strategic level.

[@Tepid24]

@mxt mxt The amount of research he does is extraordinary and he has a clear understanding of the historical usage and intention behind design decisions and mission profiles of all major vessels of WW2. I'm not sure what you mean with him "not being in military strategy". He isn't an acting officer if that's what you meant, but neither are MilitaryHistoryVisualized or MilitaryAviationHistory for that matter. I'm not trying to be a fanboy here, but when it comes to knowledge and understanding of the matter he is definitely their equal.

[@Tepid24]

@mxt mxt Be honest: How many videos of his have you actually seen?

[@IzmirWayne]

To strengthen your argument: 1st Context: If one takes into account the assessment of you quote at 1:03 it becomes clear that you need to built several carriers if you go for them. For fleet-powers like Britian this is basically no real problem. For countries like Germany, which have limited shipbuilding capacities it basically means to go all in for a few years on carriers and built no battleships, since Germany had limited capacities to built ships of the size of an carrier or battleship. Furthermore the German Navy for a long time actually prepared for a war in the Baltic Sea or at least had to consider this possibility. In the Baltic the weaknesses of a carrier become even more pronounced and the strengths are even less important. 2nd Built strategy and economic effects: The construnction times you mention at the end of the video were achieved at the end of the massive ship-building program of the USA. So not only did the production facilities have several years of experience in producing those ships but they also had all benefits of economy of scale. So the mentioned numbers are biased by the effect of massive war production, an effect you can not have during peace time and even during war time I personally think that it is less pronounced for capital ships (this is the translation of "Großkampfschiffe") than for destroyers. To give a proper perspective one should rather quote production time for interwar destroyers. Btw: The US shipbuilding programe during WW2 is actually something quite interesting, because it is, as far as I can judge, unprecedented in history. The sheer numbers of ships produced makes me wonder how this was achieved. At first sight one might say that it falsifies the concept that naval strategy is built strategy, since they put our more ships than Japan had before the war and produced during the war. However, to built the shipbuilding capacities is part of naval strategy and therefore it actually emphasizes its validity. It merely ads another dimension beyond the ships that are afloat or in reserve.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

Videos referenced by timestamp: 00:08 - Carriers not the obvious Choice: kzbin.info/www/bejne/lWLMdmhpaLdqrLM 00:30 - WW2 Chip Class Guide 101: kzbin.info/www/bejne/iZitfK2oea-YpNk 02:16 - Operation Weserübung - Norway & Denmark 1940: kzbin.info/www/bejne/nXmtoqd_aKatobM 02:42 - Operating Conditions in the Pacific: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mWKygIirn5iKitE 02:53 - The Taranto Raid: kzbin.info/www/bejne/i3_ckIecgpKimpI 03:47 - Pearl Harbor: kzbin.info/www/bejne/pYW9nopppt9mgNU 03:50 - Battle of Midway: kzbin.info/www/bejne/pZqlmXqeh7SDa9E 04:58 - Armoured Carriers: kzbin.info/www/bejne/lZWrlXp-hZ2beck 07:24 - Bismarck vs. Swordfish - why no Swordfish shot down?: kzbin.info/www/bejne/hoWyZH2XnLtrnac 10:46 - Japanese Bomber Tactics: kzbin.info/www/bejne/g33Jk4x-hbyraNE 13:17 - In Defense of the Worst WW2 Fighter - the Defiant: kzbin.info/www/bejne/oYa6omevot9rj9k 14:33 - Italy Industry & Armed Forces: kzbin.info/www/bejne/f6LSgJ5ro794gdk Special thanks to Drachinifel helping out with data on production time of destroyers. Drach's Channel: kzbin.info/door/4mftUX7apmV1vsVXZh7RTw Military Aviation History's Channel: kzbin.info

[@brianreddeman951]

Also should be pointed out carriers require specialized aircraft and navies knew that aircraft, trained pilots, logistics ends up being more complex than a tried and true battleship. Only countries who needed mobile airstrips really put an effort into including aircraft carriers.

[@zayedalblooshi3517]

man I love it when KZbinrs work together on these subjects, it allows for every person to focus on their expertise, great video, hope to see more collabs in the future

[@joechang8696]

The battleship-aircraft discussion is often made without mentioning the progression of engine horsepower, and the us naval act of 1940. On engines, aircraft would not have meaningful strike power until engines reached about 900HP, noting the swordfish was 600 something. This was reached in the mid-1930s, which was about time the US started building more carriers. As to when the role of the aircraft carrier was understood, look to the naval act of 1940. In this, 18 carriers were authorized, 2 Iowa’s, 5 Montana, 6 Alaska, of which only the 2 Alaska were complete. Note the 4 Iowa’s completed were previously authorized. Oh yeah, by 1940, engines of 2000hp were in test, with aircraft reaching service in 43

[@kenneth9874]

A bit late but the prototype corsair with the PW R2800 flew may 29th 1940

[@HistoryGameV]

It reminds me of the mitrailleuse, the kind-of salvo machinegun the French used during the German-French War of 1870-71. This thing could have been absolutely devastating especially as the German infantry had inferior guns and often had to charge the French lines taking serious casualties. But the French used the mitrailleuses in a light counter battery role which completely wasted the potential of the weapon, especially against the excellent Prussian artillery. Of course the Japanese utilized their carriers and planes far better and had a far better idea of how to use them in the first place.

[@JanoTuotanto]

Before field telephones were available, all field artillery was for direct firing infantry support. So naturally any crew-served infantry support weapon was artillery.

[@samarkand1585]

The name you're looking for is the Reffye Gun

[@kellybreen5526]

I think you made a lot of valid points. Most "bad" or "wrong" decisions are made with the best of intentions. Factor in that decisions have to be made, often quickly, and with far from perfect information. Sometimes decisions are made based on intelligence that is fragmented or conflicting.

[@hymanocohann2698]

The more you know, the less you're sure

[@RonJohn63]

Did carriers need to wait for airplane technology (speed, capacity, range, durability) to mature?

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

well, it is a mixture of a lot of factors: recon patterns, radar, aircraft technology, carrier doctrine, etc.

[@LionofCaliban]

Short answer, to a degree and a fairly large degree. However it's not just the aircraft and the aircraft alone. The knowledge to use that, the technology to produce the aircraft, the schools to teach the pilots, the pilots to have experience to feedback into the schools and the doctrine of use to teach those pilots. Certainly aircraft advancements of the 30's helped the aircraft as a weapon, but it's one part of many different factors that in totality lead to the aircraft and aircraft carrier being so effective.

[@emilrydstrm3944]

Take a look at the Lexington class aircraft carrier. The planes it operated in the 20s and 30s were very different from the ones operated during WW2.

[@racinnut77]

Until the all metal monoplanes appeared, carrier planes could very slowly carry a small load a short distance. They were not very potent weapons. Aircraft technology eventually caught up to the ships.

[@SouthParkCows88]

Yes

[@dumptrump3788]

Consider a carrier force battling heavy seas, running into an enemy battleship force & unable to launch its aircraft due to the bad weather. But you don't win wars hoping for the right kind of weather.

[@SeismicHammer]

American ship designers decided to ensure all their ships could properly exhibit their 2nd Amendment rights.

[@michaelreifenstein2114]

they had to carry armed bears?

[@SeismicHammer]

@Michael Reifenstein No, that’s Poland

[@alephkasai9384]

They had to carry nuclear missiles?

[@SeismicHammer]

@Aleph Kasai that’s later in the timeline

[@KuraIthys]

The 2nd amendment is always amusing. XD Though the joy of living in England is the absurdities. You basically can't own a gun there (even olympic shooters have to go across to Europe to train) But... You can own a tank. (and even legally drive it on public roads) or a jet fighter, or a whole bunch of pretty serious military hardware... Of course, this is misleading because you can't own the weaponry that goes with it; That fighter jet you own has to have it's guns stripped and be unarmed. The tank has to not only be carrying no ammunition and have it's gun incapable of firing, if you want to be allowed to drive it on a road you also have to have the turret rotation disabled. So... Yeah, excuse me while I go park my tank. XD

[@iannordin5250]

I remember reading somewhere that the actual effectiveness of carriers during ww2 has been vastly over stated by historians. Most carriers had to rely on swarming to reliably hurt even under gunned japanese ships. They had a range advantage, but rhat advantage came with heavy costs. It wasn't until after ww2 when fire control systems and guided munitions and fast aircraft were able to mitigate those cost that carriers made the other types of ships truly obsolete

[@eliahaj2233]

Very insightful,I would like to ask,after ww2 with sam system still in development while aircraft became much faster,did cruisers and destroyers become very vulnerable to aircraft then?

[@nicholasconder4703]

I have made this comment elsewhere, but people tend to forget that carriers really did not come into its own until around 1939-1940. The reason for this was the lack of aircraft capable of carrying ordinance that could actually cause major damage to battleships. You can see this from the initial deployment dates for these aircraft to their respective fleets" 1936: Fairey Swordfish (RN) 1937: Douglas Devastator (USN); Vought Vindicator (USN) 1938: Blackburn Skua (RN) 1939: Nakajima B5N "Kate" (IJN) 1940: Aichi D3A "Val" (IJN); Douglas Dauntless (USN) So, given this timeline, it is easy to see why even carrier-equipped navies didn't realize the full potential of the carrier. They just didn't have that much time to evaluate the effectiveness of their new weapons, and develop the doctrine and tactics to utilize them to their fullest potential.

[@austinpundit6321]

Bernhard and Bismark together?????? What did we do to deserve this! What a great day!

[@fulcrum2951]

So the battleship and carrier argument are more complicated than the internet claims

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

more like "than nearly everyone else claims".

[@marxel4444]

i think its easy to see that aircraft are capable to strike ships without them having the ability to retaliate. since you can build planes faster then you can build a battelship. if you could have long range fighters (with were rare in the early war / mid war) with long range dive and naval bombers you could strike fleets without the need of carriers. since the distances in the pazific are so large that you cant just fly your planes to the bases at midway,wake or the phillipines without problems you need to transport them. also in the pazific you mostly fought away from your own aircover as said in the video. so your forced to either bring your own planes or dont bring planes at all. i would dare to say that carriers would be useless in the med since you have airbases close enough to the med that you can just use land based bombers to attack enemy shipping and build battelships since you dont need to bring your own air cover. the same would be with fleet battles in the north sea or close to briten. you could just use your land based planes to strike and escort. for the british they would need carriers to get for example planes into malta to relieve the island or to fight the german submarines in the atlantic,mostly the mid atlantic gap where no land based aircraft can attack them. so you again need to bring your own planes. to say it was so easy to see that carriers would beat battelships and such in 1939 is like saying "oh yeah,it was so clear to see that apple / windows / every other company get become big and succesfull will become big and seccesfull so everybody was just to stupid to invest in it."

[@sillygoose210_6]

Early over-the-horizon warfare.

[@TBOooder]

I love you guys, part of the best ww2 history buffs that exist on youtube and in entertainment media in general. Keep it up :)

[@enscroggs]

Another point to consider in a discussion about pre-World War Two attitudes regarding opinions of the relative worth of air carriers versus conventional capital ships is the original role of the carrier. Between 1910 and 1918 the Imperial German Navy operated at least nine airships. Though some of them conducted bombing raids their primary purpose was reconnaissance. Being the weaker navy it was vitally important that the commanders of High Seas Fleet had good information about the location and strength of the Royal Navy's Home Fleet, otherwise, the Germany Navy would rust away bottled up in its harbors, unsure of the situation just a dozen miles away. However, in ideal conditions, an airship flying at 10,000 feet could scan up to 43,000 square miles of sea in a matter of minutes, giving the German fleet a powerful and possibly decisive advantage. Warships of the period typically had main gun turrets able to elevate to about 20º and secondary gun guns mounted in sponsons to fight off enemy torpedo boats; consequently, they lacked artillery able to shoot at high-flying aircraft. Furthermore, experience countering zeppelins operating over land showed disappointing results using AA guns. Without some kind of effective defense, the Royal Navy would be forced to tolerate German airships flying over its squadrons reporting their positions and strengths in detail to the Kaiserliche Marine. The obvious solution was fighter aircraft, but the North Sea was not a place where floatplanes or flying boats could operate reliably, What was needed was a ship that airplanes could launch from and land on while underway at sea, in other words, an aircraft carrier. Fortunately, the British had a very fast but lightly armored battlecruiser under construction that could be converted to into such a ship, HMS Furious. However, Furious never shot down an airship and as a consequence, the idea of naval reconnaissance by airship survived the Great War intact, particularly in the United States Navy. In 1929 the USN commissioned the Goodyear-Zeppelin Corporation to build two giant airships, USS Akron and USS Macon, which carried biplane scout fighters able to be launched and recovered in flight. At the same time, the US Navy had three aircraft carriers in service. The USS Langley, a converted collier, was too slow to be of much use except for training, but the others were converted battlecruisers and sufficiently large and fast to be frontline warships in WWII. These ships operated planes classified as scout bombers, aircraft intended primarily for fleet reconnaissance. However, engines of the time were too weak to allow rapid climbs and a scout bomber would use a considerable amount of its fuel just climbing to 10,000 feet. Airship advocates pointed to the fact that the Macon could launch its planes already at high altitude, thus giving them a greater practical range. The debate was settled by the loss of both "flying aircraft carriers" to crashes caused by bad weather.

[@Vespuchian]

Casual reminder that it wasn't until nearly the mid-point of the Second World War that most carrier-based aircraft were any good. The Japanese were exceptional for having naval aircraft that could directly compete with army aircraft at the start of the war. It rather devalues aircraft carriers in naval strategic thinking if it's considered doubtful the embarked aircraft can do much more than provide air cover to proven weapons platforms like battleships under anything less than ideal conditions.

[@johnshepherd8687]

That is sonewhat of myth. The Zero was flown by experienced pilots. It was never a great airplane. It was designed with biplane tactics in mind which gave it superior maneuverability in the horizontal plane at the cost of poor survivability. Claire Chanault sent reports on Japanese fighters and their tactics back to the States from China but these reports were largely ignored. Using tactics that exploited the strengths of the P-39, P-40 and the F4F and the weaknesses of the Oscar and Zero negated the Japanese aircraft dogfighting ability. You simply didn't dogfight. Even late war Allied fighters would lose to a Zero in a turning fight.

[@Vespuchian]

@@johnshepherd8687 Agreed, but my point still stands: the Zero was roughly competitive with the Ki-43 while I would not say the same about the Buffalo or Wildcat compared to the Warhawk or Lightning.

[@johnshepherd8687]

Certainly not the Buffalo but the Thatch Weave pretty much neutralized the Zero's advantage. And the P-38 totally out classed the Japanese fighters. It was faster in level flight than Zero was in a dive. Or did you mean the P-39?

[@Vespuchian]

@John Shepherd No, I meant the Lightning. I’m comparing aircraft from the same nation, not against the aircraft they saw combat against. I’m certainly not speaking of tactics used or the pilots in those aircraft. My whole point was that the qualitative difference between the aircraft used by the Japanese Navy and Japanese Army was much less than the difference between aircraft used by the armies and navies of other nations. That was rather unique because naval aircraft tended to have notably lower performance compared to their land-based equivalents until around the midpoint of the war.

[@cnlbenmc]

It would be interesting if you guys would discuss the potential of Modern 21st Century technology applied to the Battleship concept. Like using nuclear reactors to allow for a fast ship with limited deck interference and able to power Large Railguns. Be able to accommodate huge numbers of VLS silos for anti-air, land, ship, even anti-sub missiles. Extremely powerful sensor arrays (aided by large available space and nuclear power). Potentially considerable active and passive defense systems (lots of space for Point Defense Arrays, even lasers) with composite armor possibly being used to allow it to absorb tons of damage if you're willing to spend the money on it.

[@LionofCaliban]

Actually it would be pretty boring and tactically about the only place something like that works is very littoral. My apologies, coastal. The artillery ship, the big gun battleship truly has passed. It will never come back in a wet navy sense. Unless the world suddenly losses all GPS and advanced computerised navigation. Plus, if you're giving up space for turrets and still packing on VLS, just in case, you're first asset of use are going to be what you put in the VLS. That's well and truly over the horizon and well out of range of any hypothetical railgun. And if I'm being really nitpicky, diesel boats are getting really really good at being really really quiet. To the point where I'd argue no anti-submarine screen would be effective enough to risk the use of the new battleship.

[@cnlbenmc]

+@@LionofCaliban+ Its naturally intended to be part of a wider fleet. Because it's nuclear powered it has more than enough deck space for VLS silos without cumbersome smokestacks cluttering up the deck and can even use a layout for the silos that can function like blowout panels on some MBTs; spaced far enough apart where one silo cluster detonating doesn't set off all the others tearing the ship in half and still have huge numbers of missiles. It would effectively be marrying the concept of the arsenal ship to the Battleship; being able to carry literally Hundreds of missiles of various types whilst being heavily armed and armored with the added bonus of being fast. Imagine a single ship throwing 200 or so ASM's like the LRASM at an enemy fleet or similar number of Tomahawk cruise missiles at land targets or coordinate with other AIEGIS vessels to track targets with its powerful radar plus lob several hundred Standard Missiles (like the SM-6) at swarms of planes or missiles. If given enough gun elevation; the Railguns would be able to intercept air targets and potentially even hypersonic missiles or ballistic missile warheads to protect the rest of the fleet, in addition to shore bombardment or shredding any surface vessel insane enough to get close enough. Subs are always a menace to surface vessels; which is why so much time and effort is spent on ASW screens. Having rather vicious Nuclear powered attack subs who's sole goal is to hunt down and destroy and submarine threats to the fleet is a rather nice thing to have. Plus there are Destroyers who are meant to cover ASW in their wheelhouse plus various airborne assets from the Carrier and other vessels (potentially the Battleship contributing as well) along with a potential working together to make life for a would be marauding sub a living hell if not outright send them there.

[@LionofCaliban]

​@@cnlbenmc So if it's travelling in a fleet and it's only meant to be part of a fleet, where it doesn't seem to notably add to fleet capability, why build it in the first place? Other ships are more than capable of mounting rail guns. Laser CIWS systems are possible, so to are the RAM/Rolling Airframe Missile, so that's good for a high speed incoming missile. If the only thing the ship brings is guns, that are limited to a ballistic curve, can't deviate around specific, invalid targets and still are limited to a round a range of 100 to 200 kilometres..... It simply doesn't add value. It does not have a purpose that can't already be achieved or is already possible. Not only possible, but more precise and freely steerable. If it's so dangerous against surface ships, I'm going to use small surface boats, I'm going to use every single sneaky underhanded trick I know. I know of them, Shadow zones are only the start. Ohio SSGN loaded up with in the area of 150 Tomahawks and she's a very quiet girl. The bigger the target the better the sinking. There's a reason the battleship, dreadnaught have been struck from the registry.

[@geesehoward700]

I could watch these collaborations all day long

[@danielstickney2400]

Here's some points to consider: Here's a quote that demonstrates that the relative costs of aircraft versus ships (and I mean all economic costs, time, labor, money, materials) was considered very early in the discussion: "[T]he torpedoplane, under favorable conditions, would make the $20,000 airplane a worthy match for a $20,000,000 battle cruiser. " - Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, 1917. Note that I emphasize Admiral Fiske's caveat "under favorable conditions". He was describing a potential threat, not advocating a switch to aircraft. Also note that this is exactly what happened to Bismark. Yes, the weather was horrible, but that was more detrimental to the battleship than the biplane by making aiming difficult. The "favorable conditions" were a lack of air cover or escort ships with effective AA batteries. One could argue that the US Navy was the only Navy in 1939 with a realistic understanding of aircraft defense as the US was the only navy in which all modern combatant ships had effective dual purpose main or secondary batteries with fully tachymetric fire control so all ships could contribute to an AA umbrella over the fleet. No other navy had this. The Japanese had some destroyers with (sort of) dual purpose guns but lacked the fire control. Prince of Wales and Repulse had four escorting destroyers but RN destroyers had no useful AA capability beyond limited self defense, and to be honest the RN's "High Angle Control System" was half-baked and ill conceived. They eventually addressed the half-baked but were stuck with ill-conceived for the duration of the war. However, the US Navy also persisted in prewar modes of thinking late into the war, witness the two Alaska class large cruisers and the last two uncompleted Iowa class battleships. Design work on the Montana class super battleships persisted right up through 1944 long after it was apparent to most that they wouldn't be practical or necessary, though to be fair by the end the design work continued largely to prove that impracticality. People tend to forget that design studies exist to determine what won't work as much as what will. It's one thing to say armored ships are obsolete, it's another to have hard data backing that up. Finally, US Carriers may appear to dominate now but that could change in less than a hour with one Peal Harbor-like event and those are really hard to fit into decades-long strategic and procurement plans, though if it does happen lots of people will jump up and say "they should have known!"

[@00calvinlee00]

Great Video Gentlemen. I may point out that the book on Carrier War was still being written between 1940-1942. As an example, the Kido Butai was a very unique idea in the world. Long range strike capabilities, capable if not adequate carrier aircraft taugh the world that Japan could strike anywhere with a large force of bombers fighters and torpedo bombers. Pearl Harbor, Darwin, Dutch Harbor etc. The FAA and USN would not equal the level of flight operations until mid-1943. The videos of MHV and Bismark point this out quite often. The absence of Carriers in the Atlantic can simply be due the lack of understanding. To be sure, many folks remember CVEs for transport role but many forget their role as the center of ASW Hunter Killer Groups. The Germans simply never got into the game with Carriers and had no Carrier Advocates. Imagine how hard ASW would be PBYs or B-24s blundering onto carrier based Bf109s. The FW200s suffered losses early in the war to FAA Marlets. Successful Carrier Operations were going on, normally with the IJN leading the way yet the Royal Navy had issues employing their carriers correctly which often led to losses be it in either theater. Couple poor understanding and application with largely obselete Carrier Types such as the Sea Skua, Swordfish etc and you are viewed as less of a force. The Kudo Butai was a constant threat once the multitude of missions and capabilities were understood and respected but this understanding only really began to receive attention after 1941. The FAA and USN Carrier Operations such as Taranto, the hunt for the Bismark and even Operation Torch were normally the exception to the rule. The full understanding of the Air Craft Carrier was still not realized in the USN and FAA until 1940 and 1941. To be sure, two Pacific Fleet carriers were employed as transport carriers on the eve of Pearl Harbor. But unlike the FAA,USN and IJN, I cannot name on Commander in the Wermacht who was an advocate of Naval Air Power. The other Navies had commanders, pilots and operations people who wrote on the manual on carrier operations, but even they at times made mistakes. There were very few people outside this group who knew how to employment correctly let alone how to advocate for the funding, building and use of them.

[@rscott2247]

The thing I think which is the most important object to consider is logistical feasablity vs. cost produce effective war machines vs. losses between these two types of warships. The USN had the capacity to commission light and escort carriers in the later stages of the Pacific theatre with Japan. Some were only 11,000 tons. At Taranto had the Italian airforce maintained a sufficient recconassiance, the Supermarina would hopefully been better prepared to deal with HMS carrier fleet there, not to mention that Malta was still marginally controlled by the British. But the Italians also didn't have much discipline when it came to radio silence ethier.

[@MakeMeThinkAgain]

There's a similarity between the status of the carrier and the status of the tank. What the Germans learned first and everyone else eventually, was that tanks needed infantry and artillery support. Carriers needed, and still need, the support of other ships. Something the US Navy got right was building battleships that were fast enough to support the carriers. The IJN had to fall back on their old Kongo class ships. Also, aircraft (especially engines) were developing as quickly in the late '30s and early '40s as tanks developed during the war in Europe. From year to year the picture could change completely. If the war in the Pacific had come 5 years earlier the capability of naval aviation would have been far less.

[@thomaszhang3101]

9:29 “...I don’t consider Germany a ship...” * *Bismarck flashback* *

[@dcmccann11]

WWII Germany had 4 battleships (13 capital ships), and most of them decorate the bottom of the sea by 1945.

[@Idahoguy10157]

In WW2 there were many surface actions involving Heavy Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and Battleships. However by the end of WW2 the only Battleships left were American and British. The competition of big gun ship versus big gun ship was all over.

[@ImRezaF]

Yeah sure buddy, just forget French and Soviet.

[@Winthropede]

And Italian

[@tlinstalltl]

We continued to use battleships in the following wars, even gulf war 1-uss Missouri.

[@binaway]

Big ships require a lot of escorts. As the 3rd Reich was only 6 years Germany didn't have the time to build a modern Navy. The inter war British carrier force was hampered by a disinterested RAF which controlled all of Britain's military aircraft until the Navy retook full control in mid-1939 which was to late to develop decent dedicated carrier air-frames. Only access to USN designs eventually allowed the Fleet Air Arm to evolved into a decent force.

[@zieten9983]

Great conversation, especially valuable the strong emphasis which was layed on not judging from hindsight. As one of the greatest military historians of all time, Hans Delbrück, once said: Reading about certain military decisions, one is tempted to bang one's head against the wall and cry out: "How was this possible?" But if you go into the details, you will find out that most of those people had good reasons for their (objectively wrong) decisions. As to the evaluation of aircraft carriers, the book Bernd cited from gives exactly the official view of the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, as can be found in a memorandum from 25.10.1938 with the title "Seekriegsführung grgen England" (Naval Warfare against England). This is one of the most important documents of German naval history. Though only a memorandum (by Hellmuth Heye, 1. Admiral Staff Officer in the operational department, during the war commander of "Admiral Hipper"), by order of the Supreme Commander of the Kriegsmarine, all departments of the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine had to align all their decisions and measures in accordance to this memorandum. It was the basis for the Z-Plan. The memorandum states that -carriers are an especially vulnerable part of the fleet and always will be; -longer deployment of carriers in coastal areas, where they can be reached by land-based planes, is usually out of the question; -carriers , if not able to escape the enemy by their speed, will always be depend on protection by other fighting ships; -increasing their combat characteristics against overwater forces will not bring any benefits, given their own vulnerability; -this vulnerability forces us to build a larger number of small carriers so that we do not lose all or most of our aircraft as a result of the destruction of one ship; -the advantage of having a great number of planes on one big carrier is cancelled out by the longer time it takes to get all planes into the air.

[@kev_sen]

The power of naval and land based aircraft, plus them working together was a new and deadly concept unique to WW2. Also the importance of codebreaking and deception can't be understated. The Italian Navy had no clue their every move was already known to the British Admiralty in the Mediterranean due to ULTRA codebreakers. The Royal Navy realized quickly during their campaign in Greece that they could not operate in areas contested by the Luftwaffe without substantial air cover from ground based aircraft without taking substantial losses. The dominating impact air-power had on naval warfare was well known to everyone at this point. Where Carriers didn't dominate the sea-lanes, it was landbased aircraft that did, from vital reconnaissance to overwhelming vessels with non-stop attacks. The Germans weren't out of the loop to the trend that airpower was needed to dominate the Sea lanes, with the Luftwaffe fielding maritime coastal command groups specialized in attacking enemy naval and shipping assets, these air groups are one of the main reasons it was widely considered suicidal to the Allied High Command to consider an invasion on mainland Europe without first wearing down the German Aircraft industry for years, after the Royal Navy had already lost 40 destroyers and 7 Cruisers to Luftwaffe maritime operations.

[@nick21614]

Aircraft performance exponentially increased during the latter half of the 1930s and early 1940s which changed things a lot, as well.

[@NaqrSeranvis]

Whether a decision is good or bad, is often determined by factors that haven't been predicted even by the one who made a good one.

[@darrenvanderwilt1258]

Most countries considered the Battleship as the main asset in force projection, mainly because it was a proven platform. Alternatively, aircraft carriers weren't considered some form of "Red Headed Stepchild" either. The U.S., before entry into WWII, already had an order for thirteen of the new Essex class, with an additional nineteen just after Pearl Harbor. The USN's extensive use of carriers and other smaller assets, for the most part, was spurred on by necessity, since they survived the attack at Pearl Harbor. USN commanders adapted to the new paradigm. The USN still brought new battleships on line, as well as repairing those from Pearl Harbor (of note: a country that has the capacity to raise sunken ships. refurbish them, and bring them to battle, shouldn't be trifled with). Of course nobody could predict the future. If they could, ships like Bismarck, Yamato, and Musashi would've likely not been built, since they ended up as a large use of resources literally flushed down the drain.

[@Halinspark]

"Billy Mitchell showed what would happen." Didn't his experiment show that under ideal conditions, an aircraft can do enough damage to sink a battleship, assuming the crew is asleep for 4 days? I remember reading that the actual result wasn't super impressive and didn't really prove his point.

[@ryuukeisscifiproductions1818]

Yeah pretty much, Billy Mitchell didn't do himself any favors when it came to making a good argument,, plus he kept focusing on straight high level bombing, which in practice was flat out useless against moving surface ships, unless your using a much more modern guided bomb. Hitting moving surface ships or submarines with bombs required either dive bombing or skip bombing techniques, neither of which could be one with 1920's or even early 1930's aircraft very well.

[@alanpennie8013]

@@ryuukeisscifiproductions1818 He was vindicated a generation later when The Tirpitz was destroyed by enormous bombs which could penetrate its deck armour. But at the time he was talking nonsense.

[@ryuukeisscifiproductions1818]

@@alanpennie8013 Still, the tallboys only worked against Tirpitz because she was sitting still. Had tirpitz been at Sea and moving, those tallboys would have never hit. And billy mitchells entire argument was that high level bombing would be effective against moving targets, and that straight level bombers could be used as an effective means of coastal defense, which it never was, at least until JDAM's where invented.

[@alanpennie8013]

@@ryuukeisscifiproductions1818 Fair point.

[@FrankJFischer]

It's good to hear these comments, and be reminded that these were serious decisions made by well trained people.

[@LucioFercho]

That the KM did not know what to do about carriers is understandable, they had no clue on why they were building battleships anyway... "In his most telling comment, Fuchs observed that "A V cannot find any document that spells out the intended uses of Battleships Gneisenau through 'F' and 'G' as well as the planned 10,000-ton cruiser."

[@drewdederer8965]

Biggest problem from the Euro_Centric point, and this really includes the Royal Navy. Is that the number of carriers was small and their strike load even smaller. Put mathematically, each additional carrier in a task force increased local strength exponentially not arithmetically. British Carriers Were Launching 12-16 plane strikes into 1942, partially because they didn't have many strike planes (the Skua was not the equal of the Val, let alone SBD). and partially because there wasn't enough deck space to fit more (Friedman has the numbers on this, the aft part of the flight deck was rounded down for aerodynamics and couldn't park a strike). Too, without crash barriers, the number you could launch was limited because landing took too long (each plane had to be struck below). AND they didn't have effective CAP fighters till 42'. By comparison the Japanese regularly launched 20-30 plane strikes (with another following if needed) and the US could put out 40-50 per carrier. The Japanese led the way in grouping CVs (See Pearl Harbor or better the Indian Ocean Raid). The USN soon followed suit. 2 CVs was enough to Approach Rabual (with land based CAP over the carriers). Later as the fleet grew, they could approach and strike Truk, and Formosa and finally the home islands. Short answer, One carrier is handy. 3 or more can be overwhelming. Again Germany and Italy didn't even get 1 into the water, and the Royal Navy rarely operated together in the early was (and lacked the plane power to make it work at that time anyway)

[@ajshell2]

If you showed me this video, two months ago, it would have blown my mind, as I didn't realize that Bismarck and you were different people at the time.

[@thearisen7301]

Drac has talked a bit about what the Japanese did for up-gunning. Basically they stuffed as many of their 20mm as they could onto their ships. Their 20mm wasn't very good but it's still a gun, etc

[@jerry2357]

The Arisen Weren’t the Japanese light AA guns 25 mm, rather than 20 mm?

[@javieralmeida2571]

Admiral Carls proposed pre war raiding forces centered on a carrier and BC plus destroyers, an interesting fact. Initially the KM, early 30s, wanted to build several carriers, however I don't know why the interest gradually faded. The LW managed to sink two KM destroyers with horizontal bombers... at night...

[@stuartwald2395]

Goering worked very hard to take over the Kriegsmarine's air arm in the mid-30s, and this led (according to Van Der Poorten) to a decline the effectiveness of German naval aviation, as the aircraft no longer worked for naval priorities and objectives.

[@maade9642]

Do you have more informations or a source about this plan you could tell me? I'm fascinated.

[@nicholasconder4703]

One of Germany's problems with using aircraft carriers was their limited access to the ocean (causing resupply issues) and "cramped" fighting environment. The difference between the war in the Atlantic versus the Pacific was maneuvering room. One could easily move into range of your target, then leave after the strike in the Pacific. In the Atlantic, the distances were smaller, leaving little room for hit and run tactics. This is part of the reason why British carrier losses were fairly high in the first half of the war (the other being lack of sufficient escorts).

[@kaptniglo4125]

That joke of bismarck 1:40 made me spill my cola but it was sadly unnoticed

[@TomTom-rh5gk]

You care about the truth that is why I respect you.

[@Tepid24]

Would it be fair to argue that it largely comes down to the geographical environment? I've argued that the main advantages that carriers had in the Pacific over battleships (greater range, greater destructive potential, better information-gathering) were lessened simply by the nature of the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean. Their range could not be abused to the extreme because the theater was simply smaller and filled with a lot more land compared to the Pacific. Their destructive potential was more limited because storing aircraft on deck was hard due to the usually rougher sea and hangar capacity was also smaller to account for the additional armor that was necessary to protect from land-based aircraft. And their much greater recon ability wasn't as essential because there was a much denser information network in european waters due to land-based radar and a higher patrol density. It is very interesting to see the difference between battleship losses in European waters and in the Pacific. In the Pacific most battleships were lost through air raids and torpedo attacks. In Europe meanwhile, most battleships were sunk either by attacks from ground-based aircraft (eg. Tirpitz, Roma) or battleship-on-battleship engagements (eg. Hood, Bismarck, Scharnhorst).

[@Tepid24]

On a side-tangent: In Europe it was practically just the British who actually used carriers en masse and this should be remembered, but wouldn't it be fair to say that the Kriegsmarine didn't need carriers for their intended goal of supply raiding? Similarly to the thoughts that went into the usage of surface raiders in tandem with submarines and the inclusion of guns on submarines, gun-based ships can operate far longer and are less vulnerable when raiding in enemy territory than carriers.

[@monstrok]

Great discussion! Really enjoyed it.

[@austinpundit6321]

What do you guys think of Admiral KIng, the US admiral who refused to implement a convoy strategy for supply ships leaving for Britain at the start of the war? This idiocy led to what U-boat skippers called "the happy time". I think he made another mistake as well, which I forget now, but it seems to me that he cost a lot of lives.

[@atfyoutubedivision955]

In kings defense, the US couldn't implement convoys because they didn't have the ships nessicary.

[@Castor586]

Someone has to mention the Liberty Ships. So someone mentioned the Liberty Ships. They were constructed with record speed, and their performance reflected it.

[@davidenko2468]

love this discussion gentlemen very interesting thankyou

[@barryjones8842]

The carrier is not the main thing. The airgroup is. in the late 1930s and early 1940s the capability of the airgroup SIGNIFICANTLY changed for the better with the aircraft becoming much more capable and lethal.

[@leonardoavelinoduarteleona8203]

Great video.

[@SergeantAradir]

"...if you send out the Yamato without aircover" *Bismarcks helplessly shrugs at such incompetence* xD

[@ignacejespers8201]

The ship or the person?

[@Akm72]

@@ignacejespers8201 yes.

[@Custerd1]

Current US carriers are supposed to have a 50-year lifespan. That’s a lot of planning!!

[@KuraIthys]

Yeah, though it's nothing special in the civilian world; Since I'm poor I generally drive second-hand cars. The one we own right now is about 16 years old, and on average we drive things that are in a 15-20 year age range, but in many cases those vehicles are usable quite a bit longer without much issue. Commercial vehicles have even longer lifespans. The official design life of the average train is 30 years, though using one for 40 to 50 years isn't particularly unreasonable, depending on it's construction. (certain materials are more problematic over the long term than others.) Civilian aircraft typically have a design life of 25 years or so, but again many get used longer; Typically shifting from use as passenger aircraft to freight aircraft as they age. 30-40 years isn't uncommon, though with aircraft, stress fractures are a concern, and you have to carefully monitor old ones for safety, which makes it uneconomic after a while. Ships... Well The famous QE2 - which is technically still in use as a floating hotel, was launched in 1967 and taken out of service in 2008, which is just over 40 years. This isn't all that dramatic for a cruise ship, nor for things like oil tankers or cargo ships. To use a different example of a civilian ship, the passenger ferry 'koningin beatrix' which was originally used on services from England to the Netherlands was built in 1986. It was renamed in 2002 and sold to a different company, then sold again in 2014 to a different company and renamed a third time, and is still in use. So far that means the ship has been in continuous operation for 33 years, with no sign of being decommissioned any time soon. How about we go back to trains though. The British Intercity 125 was introduced in 1979, and there are still working examples, in spite of the fact that this train was meant to have a 30 year service life. That makes some of them potentially 40 years old. However, in this case they were built over several years, and it's likely the newest ones still being use. Of course, in most of these cases major refurbishments happened regardless. But still. Meanwhile, if you go across to Australia you run into a locally produced derivative of the IC125, the XPT. It has different construction, different interior, different gearing, much improved air conditioning, and advanced dust filtration, amongst other things. This makes it slower than it's british counterpart, but far more robust, and better able to deal with harsh weather and poorly maintained railway lines. Be that as it may the more interesting aspect of them is that there's only about a dozen of them, and all were built about the same time (1981-82), and, more crucially, every single one that was built is still in service, meaning they're all at least 37 years old now, and there doesn't seem to be any sign of them being replaced any time soon. Military hardware has the disadvantage that everyone is constantly trying to play a game of one-up-manship with them, so they may end up obsolete even though they still function reasonably well in their own right. Civilian hardware can also fall victim to technological progression, especially in terms of fuel efficiency (aircraft are frequently retired early because the fuel and maintenance costs of old aircraft start to outweigh the cost benefit of keeping them running) But many vehicle types where realistic technical progression is limited, such as ships, are kept in operation basically until the thing wears out. Stuff like trains, cars and buses are also typically kept in operation until it's impractical to keep repairing them. Even if what once was regarded as a high speed express train is now relegated to running 'slow' all stations services... Plan ahead if you want to build anything substantial, basically. XD

[@anhvunguyen3995]

I didn't expect that there were someone named "Bismarck" and i was SHOCK!!!

[@barryjones8842]

The B-17 was not intended to be a an anti shipping aircraft - the Air Corps used the anti shipping argument as a selling point to Congress but it was never INTENDED to be anything but a strategic bomber.

[@samoldfield5220]

Thankyou for making this case. The idea that the carrier obsoleted the battleship in 1941 is as pervasive as it is wrong and is still causing poor procurement decisions today. The battle of the Coral Sea showed that carriers are vulnerable. The battle of Okinawa showed that battleships are neccessary. And the battle of Leyte Gulf showed that battleships are effective. Pointing to operation Tengo as proof the battleship could not stand against the carrier is nonsense. The Yamato had undergone it's second refit, but it was still armed with the same type 96 25mm machine gun with its completely useless 15 round box magazine. No amount of training or Japanese suicidal determination was going to turn that into an effective weapon. There are two reasons the carrier won out in 1945, the first and no longer important was the distances the USN needed to cover across the pacific. The US would always be operating away from it's own shores and couldn't rely on land based airpower. Only it could, can, and indeed does. The second thing the pushed the carrier out in front of the battleship was cost, carriers are tonne for tonne much cheaper and can be upgraded in an afternoon by replacing the air wings. But today you can look at the Zumwalt to see just how stupid the belief that "the carrier obsoleted the battleship" is. At 14,000 tonnes it's nearly as heavy as HMS Dreadnought (18,000), but it's armed like a light cruiser, doesn't have any armor, is slow, and has a deep draught. Too weak to fight, too slow to run as Jackie Fisher would say and all of this for a price tag of $7.5 billion dollars a piece. What they needed was a battleship, what they tried to build was a destroyer that could do a battleship's job, what they got was a very expensive lesson in not believing their own propaganda. I don't think they learned it though.

[@boydgrandy5769]

The Zumwalt class of littoral combat platform is a well recognized failure. What is the point of a vessel that has poor seakeeping qualities and has no weapon to fulfill its primary mission? You can't use the Zumies as an argument against Naval Air.

[@samoldfield5220]

@@boydgrandy5769 The argument is against the statement "the aircraft carrier made the battleship obsolete", and the Zumwalt is a product of that statement. It's a myth that has no actual basis in reality and has led to poor decisions because nobody calls it out.

[@JohnRodriguesPhotographer]

I think carriers and battleships at least the way the United States use them complemented each other during World War II. The United States using circular formations for air defense compared to Japan's everyone for themselves approach demonstrated how they complemented each other in defense. If you look at the film shot during Japanese air attacks the close maneuvering of American carriers, Destroyers, Cruisers, battleships demonstrates extraordinary confidence and seamanship of those in command. It was like a choreographed dance on a small stage. If the United States did not have carriers the battleships would not have been able to carry out their role of pounding the island defenses of the Japanese. At the same time without the enormous and the aircraft batteries on the battleships American carriers would have had trouble surviving in the Kamikaze filled Skies. As it is even with the number of batteries hammering away at Japanese kamikazes some critical hits were still made hardships of all classes. A fleet does not consist of a single class of ships. It is a team of ships of different capabilities working seamlessly to accomplish a mission. You take today, a carrier battle group not only is a carrier destroyers and cruisers, but there's also attack submarines operating in conjunction. Keep in mind submarines or single sensor platform, sonar. Tactics change as Innovations in technology occur. But a blue water Navy always has to operate as a team of ships not a single ship not.

[@PMMagro]

How long does it take to build a battleship? Before Taranto it was not so easy to know what a carrier strike (that gets through and can cause havoc) could do. As a Battleship is a few years to make do you scrap all started or planned ships then in autumn 1940? Not likely...

[@BladeTheWatcher]

Hmm. My 2 cent goes to development speed. While battleships haven't changed much after the Dreadnought (with the notable exception of adding radars), the planes, and their armament went through fast evolution. Planes got much faster, range got several times longer, bombs got heavier, torpedoes got a bit more reliable (with notable blunders). They were no longer annoying spy planes armed with pistols or hand-held bombs, but very dangerous weapons where one direct hit could doom the heaviest battleship. Yeah, once you're in range, you can blow a carrier to pieces. But it will find you faster, and can attack you from distances gunnery can only dream about.

[@thomasmusso1147]

A Fleet Carrier could perhaps be likened to a Boxer, fast on his feet, with an ultra long reach, an explosive punch and a glass jaw. Needs room to move (and run if required), fight at a distance and to stay away from the ropes. The Northern Atlantic was a large lake .. the Mediterranean a pond. Perhaps.

[@pibe88iTa]

"I'm looking at you, Italy" :((( feel guilty now

[@ronanmcdonald6386]

I think that the Graf Spee would be a terrible thing to build. Think about it, it would become a large target and a lot of ships would go after it. The UK has many more carriers and ships so it would be a disaster.

[@Abby_Normal_1969]

Enjoy both your vids. I do have a question, though. I am running off information from quite some time ago, do perhaps this info is outdated. My question is that there must have been envisioned some value to the CV. I have read that Germany, France, and Italy were pursuing CV designs before the war and that construction of the Graff Zeppelin, Joufre, and the Italian CV whose name eluded me were all started before the war. I read as well that Germany imported some Japanese designs. So, if these things are factual, why European powers invest in CV development and what was their invissioned role?

[@Dennis-vh8tz]

Battleships did have a potentially important role in WWII. Fast batttleships protected carriers against attack by enemy battleships. Early in the war radar still left alot to be desired and it would have been possible for a battleship to sneak up on and ambush a carrier. Also, especially early in the war, the ability of carrier aircraft to stop battleships with good AA weapons and their own supporting aircraft (either ground or carrier was based) was dubious. So having a few battleships escorting a carrier group to protect against enemy battleships was sensible. Slow batttleships escorted merchant convoys, especially the big ones carrying arms to the USSR. These went a long toward discouraging enemy surface vessels from raiding those convoys. So the battleships played a role and in keeping the Allied logistics machine working smoothly. By the end of WWII Allied naval dominance was so complete that so long as they had sufficient carriers it probably didn't matter didn't matter much one way or another that they chose to build cruisers instead of battleships. It wasn't really until the end of WWII and into the post war period that improvements in aircraft and radar made battleships obviously obsolete.

[@bkjeong4302]

I keep seeing this idea of battleships being able to ambush carriers, but given the distances involved it's doubtful that was actually going to happen barring human stupidity a la Glorious.

[@Dennis-vh8tz]

@@bkjeong4302 It's cheaper to build a few battleships, in case the enemy does (by plan or accident) the impossible, than it is to loose your carrier fleet just before a critical battle.

[@bkjeong4302]

@@Dennis-vh8tz not if the scenario is so unlikely and avoidable and there are more pressing concerns.

[@danielstickney2400]

@@bkjeong4302 The point you both seem to be missing is all battleships built in WWII were a result of prewar procurement decisions made years before, so it wasn't a matter of building battleships on the odd chance they might protect carriers, it was a matter of "what is the best use for these battleships we've already got". No one built battleships to escort carriers, they just used the battleships they already had, and everyone stopped building them as soon as the battleships under construction or on order were completed. There were also situations like night combat and arctic seas where carriers were still ineffective even as late as 1945.

[@bkjeong4302]

@@danielstickney2400 But for many (like the Iowas) there was still time to cancel them, but they weren't, even though the evidence they were obsolete was already there by the time they hit water. The argument "it was too late because they had already been built" doesn't hold up as much as you think.

[@JohnRodriguesPhotographer]

The B-17, in the anti-shipping role, was never used with the tactics envisioned for the aircraft. Too few aircraft, bombing independently and not in formation, created the historical record.

[@LionofCaliban]

First thought, history and hindsight are right bastards in these types of discussions. It's so easy to jump to the conclusions, because history says they did this, so therefore their logic must be right. Yeah...... I don't think so. If you look at the information they had at the time, there's something to be said for actually limiting your sources. It's hard to predict the future, full stop, end of statement. Looking at the information you had, on the air war of WW1 and the engagements, Jutland, it's actually hard to argue against the artillery battleship. The big gun, did damage and despite the explosive losses sustained at Jutland, did seemingly support a path of bigger guns, better aimed. Gunnery and detection, RADAR in effect, were the paths forward to make the most of the platform available. If you wanted to try and predict what a battle would like from a WW1 perspective, I'd suggest we look at the engagement in the Surigao Strait. We have big guns, aimed at big ships, with the use of RADAR, early computers which dramatically increased accuracy. To the degree you could have a battle entirely at night and it simply didn't matter. It was math, the speed, angle of motion, wind speed and direction, computed together with the known values of the ship and its turrets, turned to numbers to feed back to the guns. Elevation and lead being those exact numbers. I'd even go further to say it was the first real naval battle of the information age. Computers, early computers driven by mechanical gears, the use of RADAR and the stealth, relatively speaking of the US PT boats. Throw in the signals management, electronic warfare spectrum as well, it ticks all of my boxes. On the U-boat side, I think there was also a pretty good argument to made for submarine development, but it seems to have really been how to get around the naval treaties. Not seen as a part of a proper navy. This part I actually need to do some more research on. I really have only a passing knowledge of the work that was going on. Second thought, even with you guys saying you think ahead, well, you think a LONG time ahead for ships. Things are in the order of five to ten years worth of planning, building, testing, fitting out, training and outfitting. Not to mention occasional refits. That's a very long term thing and keeping a ship afloat is a complex process. What makes the rise of the US Navy in the Pacific on some level so extraordinary is that despite being kicked hard, Pearl Harbour, they still had the depth of potential, operation, to fight a very successful naval campaign. The only reason they had this is that the started the process to gain it in the late 20's to early 30's. They had the five, eight years minimum to put in to develop this. A ship is only steel joined together if it doesn't have a crew to man it. I would also suggest, a command system that allowed the confirmation of Midway Island as the target to go ahead. They had a very reactive force and that force didn't let the fact they only had carriers get in the way. They used it pretty damn well. More importantly, I'd suggest, they knew the risks of carrier warfare and mitigated them far more than the IJN did. Specifically damage control and aviation fuel management. Third point, islands make awesome unsinkable aircraft carriers. Europe is a big aircraft carrier. Greenland is an awesome aircraft carrier. The question is more how far apart those land masses are. In the Atlantic it was less a factor than it was in the Pacific. At least from the Allied perspective. As well as being a coastal Europe no go zone. It's a matter of perspective. Fourth point, the US Navy were still learning a lot and they kept learning. That's something to remember as well. They were busy trying things out and in the case of the US shared that knowledge all the way back to the training schools. They adapted, reacted and ensured that people had the knowledge needed to fight in the war that was happening now. Even if the Bureau of Ordnance is a notable exception to that comment. Something that certainly didn't seem to be that wide spread in WW2. At least two of the Axis powers seemed expect the war to turn into the war they wanted as if by magic.

[@WhySolSirius]

It probably didn't hurt that by the end of WWII, the US had something along the lines of 24 Essex-class fleet carriers. That's a lot of aircraft. Especially if you add the various escort carries to those numbers. And in terms of battleships, there were less, and many less modern ones comparatively speaking, to the Essex-class carriers. A Navy comprised of fleets of Iowas numbering as many as the Essex, with better AA suites, and cruiser escorts full of AA support may have turned that around.

[@alancranford3398]

When it comes to carrier versus battleship combat, it's the airplanes! In aircraft carrier versus battleship combat--as demonstrated during the Battle off Samar--the big gun and heavy armor beat small gun and "armor--what armor?" Part of the Battle off Samar was a cloud of several hundred aircraft armed with munitions inappropriate for fighting heavy surface warships.

[@michelledoyle748]

So funny reading the subtitles my grandma is from Germany and you both spell the same lol

[@mikereger1186]

Good discussion. It needed beer though.

[@Tuning3434]

Ah, the Classy lad. Better than that fancy SCRUB MHV! 😋.. Bernard will understand

[@brucenorman8904]

The Americans found skip bombing with B25s very effective for sinking ships in the Pacific. See the Battle of the Bismarck sea.

[@Leon_der_Luftige]

20:16 RIP IJN Mutzuki

[@johnshepherd8687]

Carriers did not really become the dominant naval weapon until late 1943. Yes, you can point to Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse but the carrier battles of 1942 simply depleted both IJN and USN carrier forces. The Solomons Island campaign was the major Pacific campaign of 1942 into 1943 and the Naval War was dominated by surface combatants. It was only after the serial production of Essex Class carriers got underway that carrier based airpower came into its own.

[@josephmagana6235]

The Solomon Islands campaign was dominated by airpower, both carrier and land based, not surface combatants. The only battleships ever committed were the ones fast enough to have a chance at avoiding enemy airstrikes and they were committed at extreme risk to suppress or defend the Guadalcanal airfield, not to fight it out with the enemy battle line.

[@johnshepherd8687]

@@josephmagana6235 The Solomons Campaign was dominated by land based air during the day. Carrier based air was a marginal contributor. The large number of surface engagements refutes your claim.

[@DebatingWombat]

“[...] das artilleriegetragende Großkampschiff.” Would probably be something like “[...] the artillery capital ship.” Or “the capital ship armed with artillery.” Anyway, I think the translation of “Großkampschiff” to “capital ship” is probably the closest one in terms of conveying the core meaning of the sentence.

[@fXBorgmeister]

"I jumped in a bit fast"..."it's what we Germans do". Lads, stop it, I need to breath! lol

[@worldtraveler930]

And this statement was said to a Austrian. 😏

[@jayteegamble]

The word "Scharnhorst" sounds amazing when a German speaker says it!

[@rogaineablar5608]

Technical suggestion: keep your microphone on the inside of your collar. There is a noticeable difference in volume and clarity when you face down towards the table as opposed to facing towards the camera, because the mic is on the out/downside of your collar.

[@patrickradcliffe3837]

I suggest you research the US Navy fleet problems conducted back in the thirty's. They foreshadowed the supremacy of carriers over battleships.

[@Romanov117]

Are we not forgetting that the real threat to Battleships were Submarines and Dive bombing/Torpedo Aircraft? While the Aircraft Carrier might not be heavily as armed as a Battleship and needed protection from other Ships like Destroyers and Light Cruisers, they're pretty mobile and the most formidable weapon of the CV's were their multi-purpose Aircrafts that provides air cover, it gives more range and situational awareness. Aircraft Carriers became more important in WW2 than Battleships because it provides early warnings systems to other ships.

[@s1d2f3]

I always thought you were one and the same person XD

[@austinpundit6321]

They are. One of those people is a computer generated image.

[@marksummers463]

Military History Not Visualized: I have a friend whose uncle was killed on the Yamato. She has an interesting story.

[@CTN-dj7fr]

Everything in this comment is my theories and opinions. Many of the people who argue that battleships became obsolescent after the introduction of carriers are quite closed-minded. They often use the examples of the Bismarck and the Yamato, which were sunk by carriers, however both of these instances were struck by the ships' very poor handling and a myriad of terrible misfortunes. (the paragraph from here is just a wall of text and rambling you probably don't need to read) Sending the Bismarck alone into the ocean full of the Royal Navy was probably akin to sticking your finger in a river full of piranhas, and of course we know about the unfortunate rudder hit and the failure of the shells to detonate and all that stuff. The Yamato's case was a full blown retarded idea, and a huge waste of a very valuable ship. Then there are a number of misfortunes that happened once Ten-Go was commenced - the Yamato and the other ships with her had no air cover, they were spotted early and were tracked very accurately right up to the point of the attack. Then when the attack happened a number of other things went wrong. The main anti-aircraft gun design on the Yamato was garbage in a number of ways, the firing of the main guns didn't do anything to the planes because of the useless shells used, instead harming their own ships' gun directors, making the ships' anti-aircraft defense much less effective. Multiple carriers teamed up to launch a total of 386 planes against Yamato, which could not be survived. The first wave included fighters which strafed many of the unprotected anti-aircraft guns, thus crippling her ability to defend herself for the rest of the battle. The US had also learned from sinking the Musashi with aircraft and put that knowledge to use in sinking Yamato. Meanwhile many of the people who argue that battleships didn't become obsolete only say so because they don't want to accept the former opinion, because battleships are cool, and often their only argument against battleships' obsolescence is that they are useful for shore bombardments - because you would go through the time, cost and difficulty of procuring a battleship just for shore bombardments, right? (sarcasm) My theory is that battleships did not become obsolete. In the sense of dreadnoughts chewing each other to pieces in lines, then they were, as with carriers and aircraft there were now alternatives, and you could afford to pick your fights more often. Rather, they simply changed roles, perhaps even for the better from the battleships' point of view. If your fleet has no carriers, then your fleet is limited in use, and your battleships are probably going to get eaten alive without air cover. If your fleet has no battleships, then your fleet has no backbone, your whole fleet is now vulnerable to both artillery ships and aircraft. With a combination of battleships and carriers, wether working next to each other or in their own separate ways, they accompany each other excellently. Battleships keep the carriers from falling under the guns of other artillery ships, and are an anti-aircraft strongpoint. Alone, battleships will get rekt; even for the toughest ones you can scrounge up the aircraft to be able to bomb it until it sinks, like Yamato and Musashi, but in a fleet they are difficult to focus and sink - much like it's difficult to destroy some tanks with all that infantry around it, it's at the least difficult to sink a battleship with its fleet around it, likewise it's difficult to sink another part of the fleet while under the warm feathers of the battleship (it's worth mentioning that with the air superiority the USA had in the Pacific, they never lost a battleship, yet they were vital to their success). And yes, they can do shore bombardments the best out of the rest of the fleet... actually, they can work in concert with the carriers, the carriers can provide the planes for the troops on the ground and the battleships provide the bombarding.

[@Matamoros212]

One thing which wonders me is that Germany had no dedicated Anti Naval squadrons/planes. With the improving plane technology wouldn't have it be reasonable, to build a strong land based anti shipping force like the Japanese did?

[@dumptrump3788]

The reason is that Hitler had a strategic vision that did not encompass naval power. By expanding Germany into France, The Low Countries & especially Eastwards Germany would become self sufficient in food, fuel & raw materials. His miscalculation was to believe that Britain would either not fight or would quickly seek a cease fire, hence no need for strong naval forces which also applied to the lack of strategic air power. In the end Germany couldn't do either, German industry & manpower simply wasn't enough to do everything it needed to do.

[@Schaneification]

All these the carriers were sunk before radar , good Sonar . The B17 was built as a long range bomber and scout plane . The B24 was used against German Subs as a scout plane Ant Sub and carrier task forces with Ant Sub escort came later , Sure counties fighting mostly land battles close to their home county do not need carriers. You do know by the end of the War American had over 200 carriers of all types .

[@generalbismark7163]

This argument is largely dependent (at the time) depending on what front you were on. In Europe everyone is fairly close and land based aircraft could reach all over, reducing the things that count for a carrier. Shore bombardment and anti shipping were more important things for a navy to build there. On the other hand in the pacific where if you didn't have carriers you would practically never have aircraft and knowing where ships was more of a problem the advantages of a carrier are highlighted. A battleship was reliant on radar for ship vs ship if it weren't for planes. A battleship was great for preventing other ships from getting to the carrier.

[@timothyoneill7268]

you named 3 British carriers sunk by subs, how many subs were sunk by aircraft carriers?

[@HistoryGameV]

A lot, though only very few by fleet carriers, the vast majority by escort carriers that either escorted convoys or operated in hunter-killer groups.

[@saschawagner5167]

repulse and POW had a few more problems like no tracers and40mm pom poms ammo not taking the climate to kindly