Germany Army: Quality or Quantity? feat. Prof. Neitzel

In this video Professor Neitzel discusses the degradation of German Kampfkraft ("fighting power") during the Second World War. For this we also compare the different challenges the Wehrmacht and particularly the German Army faced on the Eastern and Western front.
Disclaimer: I received a pre-release ebook of Prof. Neitzel’s Book “ Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - eine Militärgeschichte ”.
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Neitzel, Sönke: Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - eine Militärgeschichte. Propyläen: Berlin, Germany, 2020.
#MeatGrinder,#TechGrinder,#DeutscheKrieger

[@ytguypro]

"The Wehrmacht was not prepared for a Marathon. It was a sprinter." sums it well.

[@fulcrum2951]

In a nutshell

[@briantarigan7685]

@@fulcrum2951 kurzgezact

[@chipperunder6887]

Spot on.

[@pointlesspublishing5351]

That is what you get when you take the "Blitzkrieg-Doctrine" in Hearts of Iron. High Org, but bad org recovery. :-P But then again: Going Sprinter is the only chance for Germany. Marathon againgst USSR? Even more suicide.

[@georgethakur]

@@briantarigan7685 Underrated comment

[@MBkufel]

Other channels: "Wikipedia is a good enough sourde" MHV: "So I invited yet another professor..."

[@monkeydank7842]

It’s up to all of us, to bring the professors knowledge into the Wikipedia.

[@clicheguevara9917]

@@monkeydank7842 100%

[@aksmex2576]

@@monkeydank7842 Damn right! I better be seeing a Wikipedia page on this video.

[@michaelwilliams854]

Wikijudea lies by omission. And lying.

[@monkeydank7842]

@@michaelwilliams854 Do you have a source for this claim?

[@vilegione4569]

Wow, the tech war was something I barely considered, really interesting!

[@melvinjansen2338]

The tech war?

[@pcrackenhead]

@@melvinjansen2338 He talks about it later on in the video - air and naval war is significantly more resource intensive than the ground war. So while the eastern front ground down their manpower, the western front ground down their resources. Something I hadn't fully considered either.

[@wmd202]

Also the allies had a lot more engineers, chemist and other highly specialized technical personal to draw on Things like radar,Sonar and other advances in technology of which germans fell behind in.

[@jasonharryphotog]

Look at axis plane losses 1941 and 1943 they spike when fighting uk/USA forces They lost them on one side when they needed them on the other

[@thethirdman225]

@@jasonharryphotog Interestingly, this tine the Germans were being shot down over their own territory. In contrast to the Battle of Britain and the Eastern Front, you would make it home if they survived.

[@MrSinaAzad]

I prefer these works over Military history visualized, you act more freely here!

[@stanislaskowalski7461]

The different formats are complementary.

[@BamBamBigelow..]

I've seen Professor Nietzel in countless documentaries. If topic includes the Wehrmacht, Sonke is your go-to guy.

[@The_Old_Gang]

Here, take my ö, for Sönke ;)

[@BamBamBigelow..]

@@The_Old_Gang My American keyboard doesn't include that button. If it did, I still would not use it.

[@The_Old_Gang]

@@BamBamBigelow.. I wrote this mainly as a joke

[@BamBamBigelow..]

English speakers don't care about umlauts

[@Normalguy1690]

@@BamBamBigelow.. ö

[@marsing69]

was actually very enlightening, i never really thought about the "tech" grind the western allies provided, and the insane casualty rates are usually glanced over in arguments amongst laymen it seems. thanks for the video!

[@andrewblake2254]

Just one example; there would have been hundreds more 88's on the Eastern front if they had not been needed in Germany for the bombing war. That would have stopped many Russian tanks and made combined infantry/tank attacks far more expensive.

[@mikkykyluc5804]

That book's proposed heavier weighing of the air war's influence is an interesting idea to be sure. If I may be a bit cheeky here though: it could also come from a place of wanting to "claim" the credit of being the ones to finally stop Germany's advance, which is usually begrudgingly ascribed to the Soviets.

[@blacksmith67]

I like the counterfactual historical examples.

[@JCRS2]

What?

[@blacksmith67]

@@JCRS2 8:57 What would have happened had the Wehrmacht attacked France in 1939, and 13:08 would Germany have stopped the Soviets had they spent much more on tank production and less on aircraft.

[@Ok-fj4mv]

I don't get it

[@Ok-fj4mv]

@@blacksmith67 they weren't on the same production game m8 greyhound

[@blacksmith67]

@@Ok-fj4mv if you go to the time stamps, these are more or less what the guest professor is asking as counterfactual questions. I like it when people ask open ended questions about what might have happened. Not a big fan of people who insist that they absolutely know the answer, these are exercises to inspire thinking, not end it.

[@naitikka]

I got my ” I am cät person” t-shirts... thanks quality material in videos and t-shirt!!!! BR from Finland.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

Awesome! Thank you!

[@MrRemicas]

Even if the German built more tanks and slown down the Red Army, they would still have run out of fuel. More quickly, actually.

[@MrRemicas]

@Josef D yeah, manpower issues too. Especially since Prof. Neitzel notes the panzer divisions were already in part draining competent men from the infantry: more tanks would have deepened the problem.

[@vilegione4569]

@UCMogVzxZdW8g6cyEO3XdebA well, while dashing for the caucasus they ran out of supplies multiple times and that caused them to halt often and slowed down the operations. Even reaching the oil fields would have overestended their lines while having serious men shortages. Not mentioning the fact that the oil fields are in the caucasus region and in mountanous terrain tanks are not really helpful. Even bringing more men would have probably caused a supply collapse, if you add to them tanks the supply lines would fail even sooner

[@mladenmatosevic4591]

Maikop oil field was destroyed so well before German occupation, it took few years after war to rastart production.

[@joshjo9026]

Thats the point, a plane needs more fuel, than a tank :D Also you have to consider the Infrastructure you need for Airwarfare

[@ungeimpfterrusslandtroll7155]

Who know's but that's completely superfically thought. If they could have built more tanks because there was no need for all these rescources in the west, they obviously would have also had more fuel, maybe still not enough overall but maybe enough to achieve other goals, goals that would have given them more fuel capacity.

[@88porpoise]

Interesting comments on the bombing campaign. Would love to hear more about that and the impact of resource allocation.

[@MrGS53]

This is such high quality content. Even when they were simply infographics. I’ve been watching since 2017. But now this is crazy, the locations, travel, professors, production quality. Damn

[@jasonharryphotog]

Manpower lost in the east A costly resource war in the west And British knowing your every move and telling the east in real time

[@scifidude184]

Especially since the head of the Abwehr was literally part of German resistance against the nazis thus giving information freely away.

[@tims8326]

I gave this a like, despite, and I want to emphasise this, that appallingly tied tie.

[@MChagall]

What's wrong with his knot?

[@georgethakur]

@@MChagall Timothy doesn't like big triangles.

[@peterk2455]

Thick tie - small knot; with a spread or cutaway collar use a smaller knot. The tie should be 1/3rd tie and 1/3rd f the width of the exposed collar on each side. Use a simple oriental knot, for long thin ties use a half windsor, or a full windsor.

[@georgethakur]

Peter doesn't like them either.

[@MChagall]

@@peterk2455 full windsor = double windsor no? That is what he is wearing in the video.

[@--Dani]

I have learned more about Napoleonic Wars through to World War II and Beyond by channels like yours than anything elsewhere, plus new books by Glantz, Kotkin, Gordon but most importantly you guys, and its about time we see some of them on your channel for less than a 20sec sound bite. Well done Bernard thank you

[@MrGouldilocks]

Excellent video! In the world at war documentary (If you haven't seen it, it's a must-watch) Albert Speer said that the air war was essentially a second front by 1941. Even if the air attacks had done no damage at all, the amount of resources, manpower, and fuel that Germany expended in defense of its air space constituted a second front.

[@jh8146]

I love all your videos. I think this is ,from an informational and educational perspective, one of the best. You really are branching out and getting better all the time. Keep up the Great Work!

[@heinrichvonbaden8824]

Please more of Prof. Neitzel it really adds to the quality of the videos

[@Boney1992]

Well, the choice of having a high quality elite and a great number of low quality divisions was forced. We should not forget that the Wehrmacht has been built in a short amount of time, starting from the limited forces of the Reichswehr. Even with the furious rate of rearmament that characterized 1933-1939, that put a huge strain on Germany's resources, it was not possible to completely rebuild the German Army.

[@TheGaymo]

The losses of the first world war had flow on effects that reduced available manpower in the second world war, both in experienced leadership and numbers of the replacement generation.

[@johnschuh8616]

Which is why the Army did not want to go in 1939.

[@rwcowell]

I really enjoyed Professor Neitzel explain some of the breakdowns of the German Wehrmacht and factors that lost them the war. He seems extremely knowledgeable in German military history. I would enjoy speaking to Professor Neitzel sometime or at least listening to his lectures. Excellent presentation. Cheers!

[@awf6554]

That was fascinating, thanks. A favourite book of mine on the subject is Overy's Why the Allies Won. The commitment of technical resources to air and sea power in the west was something he didn't cover.

[@kilroywashere8390]

Hervorragendes Video, auch durch die Präsenz von Prof. Neitzel. Habs dieses WS leider nicht zu War and conflict studies in Potsdam reingeschafft, aber nächstes Jahr krieg ich das hin! Weiter so Bernhard! So geht zeitgemäße Historiker-Arbeit!

[@saxonost7]

Using Overmann's casualty figures ( Menschenverluste der Wehrmacht an der Ostfront), I think it's possible to argue that the Wehrmacht must have already been close to losing its qualitative advantage well before the advance upon Stalingrad in the summer of 1942. Overmann's figures suggest that by the time the springboard operations towards the Caucasus and Stalingrad began in the spring of 1942, the Wehrmacht on the Ostfront had already suffered one and a quarter million casualties. By casualties, I refer to his own definition: that the wound required removal of the soldier from the battlefield. Clearly, some of these soldiers would have returned to the battlefield after a time, yet combine this with the failure to take Murmansk at the end of 1941, thus allowing enormous quantities of materiel to be imported at an astonishing rate for the remainder of the war, and the war in the east is already well and truly lost. The quality of the Wehrmacht soldiers remained high in comparison to other armies, but the losses were unsustainable and those of the Red army were supportable.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

you don't even need Overman's (just one "n" this his case) numbers for that, during war-time the Germans did assessments on the combat effectiveness of their divisions, Summer 1941 vs. Spring 1942: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mZLSqYGJg8iEkNU

[@--Dani]

I am so happy to see historians on your channel, they have figured out that the 20sec sound bite on "history" shows on bbc, history channel etc. are a fares. If they want to reach an audience that cares and wants to learn about history, instead of the flawed shows I see on "mainstream" channels they need to do more with guys like you Bernard. Outstanding work please keep it up.

[@mickethegoblin7167]

I will look into this book, looks interesting

[@LewisRenovation]

Always enjoy your videos. Some day can you answer a question I have about Austria in WW2. In general does Austria consider itself a belligerent part of Nazi Germany or a Nazi victim?

[@supertorte1410]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austria_victim_theory

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

some elements are discussed in my Anschluss video

[@bLaCkHeArD91]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized hmmm Anschluss :)

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

Entire nations rarely have monolithic opinions. I guess you can take the official.position, ut I dont see much historical value in that.

[@looinrims]

I’m from the future, there’s now a video

[@machinegunpreacher2469]

Been watching Prof. Neitzel on TV here in the US for years, clicked as soon as I saw the title. EDIT: Excellent analogy, "a sprinter." My baccalaureate senior research paper was on the topic of Axis and Allied logistics in the Second World War. Their problem was that they couldn't keep supply (literally) up with demand on the front and without adequate "catching up" time (noted extensively by Glantz in his "Stalingrad Trilogy [vol. 1 especially]); then those experienced troops lost simply could not be replaced. And to quote Halder "shortage of fuel and ammunition..." I know NOBODY cares, but in case you are accidentally interested, I'll paste an excerpt from my logistics research below. I plan on expanding it into my MA thesis if the idea is approved: Germany Perhaps more than any other western European nation, Germany was the most dependent upon horses for the majority of its military transport capacity. During the early stages of the First World War Germany alone mobilized some 715,000 horses and their Austrian allies employed 600,000. Horses would be called upon again just over twenty years later as the primary source of mass overland mobility for Axis supplies. During the Second World War, motorized vehicles would supplement, rather than replace horses in logistical operations. While preparing to invade the Soviet Union, German planners had to rely heavily on captured vehicles for both combat and transportation purposes. Prior to “Operation Barbarossa” (the German name for the planned invasion of the Soviet Union) many German commanders understood that their capacity to conquer large swathes of Russian territory would be limited by their slow-moving supply columns. Meanwhile the Soviets estimated that Riga (in north-central Latvia near the Baltic coast) and Kiev (southeast of Moscow) would be as far as the Wehrmacht could advance before coming to a full stop. SOURCES for the above paragraphs: . Siegfried Knappe, “Soldat.” (New York: Random House, 1992), 10, 40. . John Keegan, “The First World War,” (New York: Vintage Books, 2000, 73. . Williamson A. Murray, “The World in Conflict,” in The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker, (Cambridge: University Press, 2005) 333.

[@clementlg68]

It is indeed very interesting, it comes to my attention that by the end of ww2 german forces were equipped with what was available at the nearest locations in terms of factories producing weapons and accessories because of the real chaos and constant air harassment threatening German logistics.

[@jensstahlschmidt2183]

Part 3: Gen. George S. Patton wrote: "It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier." Where in Europe, young men of each nation's elite have, in war, traditionally gravitated towards the "teeth arms" -- rifle and armored regiments -- America's elite in the 20th century have shown other enthusiasms. America's brightest and best gravitated instinctively towards the specialist arms, managerial military functions or staff jobs. This is not to deny that some Ivy Leaguers fought with distinction at the sharp end in northwest Europe. But it is reasonable to suggest that in World War II, American infantry units suffered from a severe shortage of educated officer leadership. Interviewing war veterans, in marked contrast to Europeans who generally acknowledge respect for their officers, American private soldiers lavish regard upon good NCOs, but seldom reveal much for their unit commanders. Many American privates in northwest Europe cannot today recall the name of their battalion commander. I have seldom met any European veteran of whom this would be true. The notorious American infantry replacement system, by which men were arbitrarily posted to a numbered, non-territorial unit, and had no chance to build the loyalty possible in a British regiment, created deep unhappiness among many men, and contributed to the U.S. Army's alarming total of almost a million battle-fatigue cases in World War II. By the spring of 1944, the War Department perceived that a great mistake had been made in according such low manpower priority to infantry. Specialist branches and lines-of- communication units had been permitted to skim off an absurdly high proportion of the fittest and best- educated men. Of 1942 army volunteers, only 5 percent had chosen infantry or armor. It was found that 1944 infantrymen were an inch shorter than the army's average, a fair measure of general physique. Although infantry made up only 6 percent of the entire service -- an alarmingly low proportion -- they were suffering more than 80 percent of American casualties in Europe. Although 54.3 percent of the German army was composed of fighting soldiers, this figure fell to 38 percent in the U.S. Army. About 45 percent of the Wehrmacht was committed to combat divisions, against 21 percent for the U.S. Army. The Americans possessed a far higher proportion of officers to men: yet many more of those officers were employed in rear areas rather than with fighting formations. In the last year of the war, great efforts were made within the U.S. Army to improve the ratio of teeth to tail; to divert high-quality manpower towards the infantry; to improve the level of infantry training and leadership. In all these things, there was some measure of success. Yet the Americans, like the British, never matched the extraordinary professionalism of the German soldier, an historic legacy that long predated Nazism. It was probably fortunate for the future of Western civilization, but greatly increased Eisenhower's difficulties, that few Allied soldier saw themselves for a moment as other than civilians temporarily in uniform, while their German counterparts possessed an uncanny ability to transform themselves from butchers and bank clerks into natural tacticians. One of the more absurd propaganda cliches of the war was the image of the Nazi soldier as an inflexible squarehead. In reality, the German soldier almost invariably showed far greater flexibility on the battlefield than his Allied counterpart. "The Germans were willing to act -- always," said the British Major- General Brian Wyldbore-Smith. They seldom failed to seize an opportunity offered by Allied error. They were masters of rapid counterattack after losing ground. They would hold a position to the last, then disengage masterfully. Not every German soldier was a superman, not every formation of equal high quality. After the Battle of the Bulge, for all intents and purposes the Wehrmacht's last gasp in the west, the western Allies never again faced German units of the highest caliber. But throughout 1944, amid the monumental errors of Germany's high command, at regimental level the German soldier achieved miracles. There was a contrast between the attitude and behavior of most young Britons and Americans on the battlefield against those of their German counterparts, and this was not exclusively the product of the enemy's political fanaticism. John Hersey wrote vividly from a Marine unit on Guadalcanal: "When you looked into the eyes of those boys, you did not feel sorry for the Japs: you felt sorry for the boys. The uniforms, the bravado . . . were just camouflage . . . . They were just American boys. They did not want that valley or any part of its jungle. They were ex-grocery boys, ex-highway laborers, ex-bank clerks, ex-schoolboys, boys with a clean record, not killers." Yet in war, the army that proves most successful in making its raw recruits into killers possesses an immeasurable advantage. Montgomery wrote ruefully from the desert to Sir Alan Brooke in London, in identical vein with Hersey: "The trouble with our British boys is that they are not killers by nature." In May 1945, the Allies attained victory first through the huge efforts of the Russians who had inflicted three-quarters of the German army's casualties; and second through the deployment of overwhelming resources. It may be argued that, after 1945, in seeking to learn the lessons of the World War II, the American Army made the mistake of reversing the order of these factors. American commanders came home from Europe believing they had proved that overwhelming air and firepower could not merely be a critical supplement to, but an effective substitute for, dedicated infantry fighting. If so, this was an error of judgment that continues to cost America dear today. The shortcomings of American infantry in World War II were repeated in Korea, and in Vietnam. It is a great delusion to suppose that the Indochina war revealed unique, unprecedented problems in the U.S. Army. The American army created in World War II had suffered weaknesses and difficulties. These weaknesses, highlighted by media attention and by defeat, had existed since World War II but had never been discussed before. Many Western professional soldiers believed in 1944-45, and still believe today, that until the United States can come to terms with the problem of producing massed forces of effective combat infantry, the continued commitment of technology and cash will not suffice to make her defense effective.

[@thethirdman225]

How is this relevant?

[@peterdonlon2083]

@@thethirdman225 Bruh, just enjoy some Patton.

[@LordInter]

citation? 😊

[@brianbyrne3003]

Very interesting read. Thanks

[@rimshot2270]

Hershey was a jerk. Those "boys" were men when it counted. They did what they had to do to the best of their ability, and they won. No one could ask any more of them.

[@robertmarsh3588]

Thank you for posting. Would love to read this but I last studied German at college over 30 years ago. Perhaps time to kick start me learning again.

[@jimmccormick3957]

. .? . .? . , Zola.lz. a A A .

[@jimmccormick3957]

. . . A. A.

[@AndrewH2791]

Looking forward to an English translation of The Professors work.

[@outlaw8865]

Its amazing how the Werhmacht kept fighting so long and so effective . I mean the losses by the Red Army are Appalling!

[@davidtrindle6473]

War criminals are not heroes

[@FortniteBlaster2]

@@davidtrindle6473 When the other side is brutal and doesn't sign the Geneva conventions, and is known historically for it's brutality, you bet they'll be brutal back. It's not only natural, it's perfectly logical. War crimes are a product of war. Go search up American war crimes in Iraq, mass rapes and murders of children. It's unfortunate, but it happens. SS and Werhmacht were charged and court martialed like any other army.

[@paullakowski2509]

@@FortniteBlaster2 yeah i always think of "unleashing the dogs of war"...but a great deal of posters need to hide behind the morality of their side.

[@tavish4699]

@@davidtrindle6473 he i find it funny to hear that from what i presume is an englishmen......

[@Blox117]

@@davidtrindle6473 so basically all russians to the modern day

[@MrPresident__]

Will this book be available in English? Edit: Sorry saw you reply to David Vazquez. Hopefully there will be!

[@jellyorwhat3343]

Experience is obviously a huge factor and gave me many more ideas. Considering how crucial experienced troops are, it emphasizes to me, how important it is, to keep your troops alive not just from an ethical perspective but also from a military perspective as if you would literally not value human life as for example many totalitarian systems (eg. fascism and socialism) did. Thinking about this, makes it even more insane, to think about how hesitant Germany is about introducing armed drones. A tool as revolutionary for the warfare as tanks have been. German politicians argue about his for 8 years and decided they have still more need to discuss about this more. They really know how to degenerate this nation thoroughly on every level. With our current politicians we wouldn't even have adapted the steam engine.

[@holyfox94]

I wish, these interviews were longer. Very interesting.

[@joeblow9657]

Fascinating interview sir

[@peterfromthenetherlands3823]

The good content keeps on coming! Well done.

[@Philistine47]

Professor Neitzel raises an interesting point, and one I hadn't heard before, about Germany pouring more resources into aviation - especially air defense - than into tank production. But I wonder how _fungible_ those resources really were. For example: certainly night fighters were expensive, but I _suspect_ it's not as simple as "a night fighter cost X times as much as a tank, so instead of one night fighter you could have had X tanks." I suspect that some of the most expensive things that went into our hypothetical "X tanks' worth" night fighter - high-performance aero engines, radar, and of course a very small but very highly trained crew - would not have translated well (if at all) to armored vehicle production.

[@sheldoniusRex]

Are you sure? Imagine if instead of using super alloys in jet engines the German Army had spent those resources doubling the service interval of their tank engines by replacing the steel valves with nickel alloy. Doubling the service interval of your tanks in an Army whose only winning units were based around tanks is freaking huge!

[@Philistine47]

Who said anything about jet engines? I said "night fighters," which in 1943 means "definitely _not_ jets." So the "high performance aero engines" in question are (comparatively) large piston engines manufactured to (comparatively) tight tolerances. There aren't a lot of exotic metals or fancy alloys involved there; and while you could surely manufacture _somewhat_ more tank engines than aero engines for the same investment of steel, rubber, power, etc., it's almost certainly less than a 2:1 ratio. Even if I had been talking about jets, though, the German jet program is notorious for having to work around their _lack_ of exotic metals for fancy alloys. So you're talking about "redirecting" resources that very famously did not exist. As an example of the kinds of things I _was_ talking about: How does reducing production of fighters, or canceling further technical development of fighters, help the Germans roll more armor plate? That's something tanks need _a lot_ of, and aircraft need _none_ of (not of the quality and thickness required for an AFV) - even the raw materials needed are completely different!

[@stafer3]

@@Philistine47 Maybe they could still stick with planes, but move them to the east and have more air superiority situations. I think, at least in terms of gathering information, denying information, it would be useful for movement of troops. Planes at least don’t get stuck in mud so they can move. And having information that 100km to the south are no tank groups, so I could focus all units to attack north during battle might be that push that can decide battle. Same with avoiding large scale encirclement. But even with more planes, I would still avoid ideas like airlifting supplies to Stalingrad.

[@Philistine47]

@@stafer3 Maybe. There's a real question of just how many aircraft Germany could practically support on the Russian front. Their logistics were already strained to - arguably _past_ - the breaking point, and aircraft need a lot of supplies, especially fuel. And a side note: aircraft absolutely could and did get stuck in the mud, when operating from grass airstrips (which wasn't uncommon for fighter squadrons in general during WW2).

[@schnoodle3]

Germany certainly had to pour a huge amount into AAA art and ammo and those certainly took from the front

[@nikitachaykin6774]

These are good points, however it was mentioned that high casualties during Eastern Front campaigns decreased professionalism and quality of average German unit. But would combat experience that these units were getting would be a counter trend and will be making these units better? These soldiers, sergeants and officers did not had enough training hours, but they were getting a lot of very real combat experience. Just comparing it to the Red Army that had lost huge part of its professional stuff in the beginning of the war and had to replenish it with fastly trained drafties. It seems that real combat experience was increasing their quality. And Red Army in 1941 and Red Army in 1944-1945 are rather different in professionalism. Why same thing has not happened to Wehrmacht?

[@hazzmati]

Because the soviet union had a much bigger population. SU had the capacity to engage the German Forces while at the same time building up huge numbers of reserves. Soviets also weren't fighting on multiple fronts like Germany. Millions of German troops were occupied elsewhere that could have been used in the East. Like they said in the video, Germany did not have any time to rest and train up their reserves. Experience will make you better but trained troops have higher chances of survival which is why casualties started increasing heavily

[@МихаилЧерников-п2т]

@@hazzmati soviet union after invasion didnt enjoy that big of population advantage, compared to occupied Europe

[@theonlymadmac4771]

@@МихаилЧерников-п2т occupied Europe definitively had other interests than fighting for the germans. (Thank god!)

[@МихаилЧерников-п2т]

@@theonlymadmac4771 some of it had

[@mikekarns5286]

One dimension of the war that I think Prof Neitzel has overlooked is the psychological dimension. One of things I noticed was that the short sharp periods of the early war were followed by periods when those who died were laid to rest. The euphoria of the victory overshadowed lost comrades; however, the constant fear and stress was relieved. Upon the Russian campaign beginning, nearly all the old hands realized that this campaign was unlike anything they had undertaken before. Great encirclement battles could be sacrificed for and yet no end in sight came of them. As the advance continued the number of bold popular leaders began to decline simply through attrition. Yet in the autumn of 1941 psychologically the Wehrmacht was still a potent force. They still believed in their leadership and that victory was possible. Here the Moscow campaign became the final lunge well beyond their capability. But I contend that their morale and psychological state had declined but not taken a fatal turn for the worst. The period post Taifun is overlooked. Stalin ordered renewed offensives everywhere. This period was simply a frontline soldier’s frantic period of survival, consumed by staying alive, getting something to eat. Only on the quiet fronts did the melancholy set in. The Russian army being a poorly trained improperly lead military wasted itself against the remnants of the Wehrmacht. What remained within the Ost Heer was a small core of experienced small unit leaders, maybe corporals and a few lieutenants. Maybe former causalities returned to the unit. After the winter 1941 through spring 1942, wounded trickled back in to revitalize the moral. The Individual soldier would not have been privy to the true state of the Wehrmacht; however, they would have experienced the sense of loss of their friends. At this point they would have experienced the inward turn. By this I mean they began to shut themselves off from emotional attachment to replacements. Once again, the summer offensives and the fact that the Wehrmacht had not experienced any disastrous defeats still kept victory possible. What we overlook is the psychological attraction strategic objectives had. This is expressed by the fact that many soldiers undertook advances both into the caucuses and towards Stalingrad which once again were beyond proper logistical support. They did so under the false expectation that once these objectives were attained, the war would end. Unlike in the west no physical objective could define the end point. So they still believed they would win, however they were concerned deeply as to whether they would live to see the victory and piece. Stalingrad debacle shattered any delusion still remaining. Because the general Staff had become questioned also. Worse ultimate victory faded from their belief. I think that was the psychological culminating point. Failure of the relief effort at Stalingrad. Had a deep effect on the rest of the Ost Heer. It replaced the idea of one more try for victory to our focus is to survive the war.

[@juanzulu1318]

Not so sure about this. We dont see many desertion incidents in that phase of the war. We see a wehrmacht which is still able to perform excellent defensive and even offensive maneauvres. So even if we assume that there was a deillusion about the war, the combat ability didnt seem to have impacted the performance much.

[@mikekarns5286]

@@juanzulu1318 In the fight to get to Stalingrad look at the pictures closely. The Small unit commanders began to break the upper wreaths on their combat assault badges off. This was due to the melancholy which had set in. The advance on Stalingrad was not a chase. The Russians contrary to what most believe threw in massive counterattacks. These attacks contributed to the steady drain on manpower. More importantly it drained the German troops of their morale. As the divisions advanced on Stalingrad they sustained large losses in manpower. The officer rates of loss were high also. What is not developed in the story, is the fact that almost all the divisions advancing on Stalingrad lost 18-20% of their strength BEFORE they got to the city. 3-5% a day doesn't seem like a high loss rate but do the math if 3-5% losses a day every day. Add to that the losses from sickness and you really begin to understand the impact these losses had on the Germans. And another thing the Russians fouled the water supply points as they retreated. Which brought on sickness. German morale did not break down because the German troops had the impression that once they got to Stalingrad the war would be nearly over. Hitler was certain that given the losses inflicted on the Russian army through 1941 and during the 42 summer campaign that the Russian manpower was reaching the end. Instead STAVKA had 8 rising to 11 forming Armies. ( A Russian Army was equivalent to a german Corps). Plus the Russians rationalized tank production during this period. The Rationalzation was simply reducing tank types and concentrating all production on a limited number of models.American Lend lease equipment began to arrive. Look at the number of main battle tanks being provided to the Russians. While the 1941 total tank supplied by the west were nearly 3000 machines, which was considerably more gun armed tanks than the German's started the war with. It is not the quantity of lend lease but when they arrived that is more important. The real Zeitzev, called the cases of Spam and cases of handgrenades supplied to the Russian Troops in stalingrad "the second front". The most taxing thing on the german infantry was no matter how many divisions, Corps, Armies they destroyed more appeared. The Sixth German Army destroyed 6 Russian corp level units before it got to the city. There were many reasons morale began to decline.

[@juanzulu1318]

@@mikekarns5286 as i said there is not much evidence for a reduction in fighting moral. Actually, it is quite the opposite: it is astonishing that a huge drop in moral was missing which enabled them to kept fighting till the bitter end. We have evidence that the German troops which fought in the Battle of the Bulge were highly motivated. What I agree with is that the idea of a final victory faded away with the years in all but the most indoctrinated Germans. But they kept fighting, and their fighting moral drew its energy from comradry, their unit cohesion, the defence of their country and people, their understanding of duty, etc.

[@mikekarns5286]

@@juanzulu1318 Properly trained troops can fight hard even if there is low morale. What most do not understand is that only a fraction of the troops in any unit are the ones doing the actual fighting. Unlike movies killing isn't as easy as it is shown. The real reason for the German Armies combat effectiveness was that it was in the defensive in prepared positions. They routinely ranged their own artillery in on their own positions. This was so that if the enemy pushed them out a short sharp concentration which was very accurate would hit their old positions followed by an immediate counter attack. That is the contribution the western allies made to the war. Nearly all the effective mobile counter attack reserves were sent to Normandy from the Russian front. Morale weakened on the approach to the caucuses and Stalingrad, simply because of the immense size of the battle area. Their offensive morale held simply because they believed that reaching the objectives would get them close to the end of the war. Once stalingrad was lost morale was shaken badly. It was not until the muddy thaw period that morale in the german army began to increase.(1943). Replacements were the product of shorter training periods, coupled with the smaller number of combat experianced junior leaders began the wastage of real morale.Another factor was the horrendus losses the Russian army sustained. The Russians attacked everywhere with small numbers and noted where the weak spots were. Redeployed weakly in the non attack sectors and concentrated in the attack sectors. While the entire front may have been 1:1 odds the reconcentrated odds were between 3:1 and 7:1 in the attack sector. Most german units knew that if they held the first attack and the counterattack units appeared they could hold the line. German troops would hold their positions even if bypassed expecting a counter attacks to relieve them and restore the line. It is difficult to explain how watching your friends disappear and new faces appear has on a persons mind. only to watch the new faces disappear at even faster rates. Old hands use sarcasm and jokes, however fewer and fewer understand as time goes on.

[@juanzulu1318]

@@mikekarns5286 as I said, the various offensive operations like Battle of the Bulge or others contradict ur hypothesis.

[@zbigniewbiernacki3682]

"Air artillery" (Stukas) was essential in starving Polish units out of all kinds of supplies. Prepositioned ammunition caches were destroyed as were logistical convoys while they were on the move. Many Polish units surrendered after running out or ammunition.

[@bluefox9436]

Nice summary of the whole war on the eastern Front - this is one of the few videos on this plattform I really agree with to 100% - keep up the good work

[@giantfrigginnerd]

How did you do this video set up btw, it is set up like a video call but with good quality recording equipment at either end. Did the Prof. just have that stuff or did you send it out to them? Either way is really good to listen to whilst playing HOI4 :')

[@liagson]

He filmed this in the great war channel studio

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

we talked via skype, but recorded via local cameras and audio. As stated we were in the Great War Studio.

[@WindHaze10]

Common sense: You cannot sustain multiple wars in short succession. German high command: Ha ha blitzkrieg go brrrrrr!

[@jasonharryphotog]

They didn’t plan for a long war After britain the Luftwaffe assumed to be a five year break I’ve read So ordering and manufacturing and processes before Speer etc was not efficient They were tripping over their shoe laces in many respects

[@teaser6089]

@@jasonharryphotog Plus too high standards of quality resulted in the Americans and Soviets building 4-10 tanks for every Tiger or Panther. Germany died on their lack of industrial capacity and lack of trained soldiers, which was a result of underestimating the Soviet industrial might and manpower. The Germans thought the Soviets could only muster about 100 divisions at max, but within a year 300 divisions were operational. I can remember reading somewhere that the Germans had to replace the battle-hardened soldiers of the Western Front, the soldiers that were supposed to be defending the west wall with recruits to send more experienced soldiers to die in the eastern front.

[@jasonharryphotog]

@@teaser6089 The war based on race was always going to make for a dangerous and violent period in time, with civil wars and everything else in between going on in the fog of war. In any event, Germany's war council smashed itself to pieces, in any great fights the winner is the one who makes the least mistakes, once the side stated off on a certain trajectory however as time went on simply collapsed in on itself mortally wounded.

[@mangalores-x_x]

@@teaser6089 The German "high standards" were a result of producing on a peace footing. In peace time footing companies get more money for equipment and can sell more expensive, but less quantity of equipment. Pretty much all of Speer's magical increase of productivity was just German industries switching to a war footing, streamlining production and simplifying the weapon systems. All in all the plan was to win by end of 1941 and they failed to ask the question in what state germany would have to be if the war continues in 1942/43. Not to say that'd been enough because this multi front war was also not really what they wanted but stumbled into. Interesting alternative history question would be how well/badly Germany had faired if it had assumed a defensive posture against the Soviet Union and concentrate on defeating Britain in the Mediterranian and maintaining her resources. That said there was the impression from the Winter War which told everyone around the globe that just right at this moment the Soviet Army is a second tier army that can barely fight plucky Finland by sheer numbers. So waiting had the threat of the Soviet army getting their act together before joining the war later. Bottom line: Germany should have realized being in the middle of Europe means you should have at least some allies on your side or not start a war to begin with.

[@teaser6089]

@@mangalores-x_x Agreed, also the Soviets did get their act together, cause it wasn't the soldiers or the equipment at fault during the early stages of the Winter War, but the generals that were idiots.

[@jensstahlschmidt2183]

Part 2: Germany's titanic struggle with the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944, which killed more than 2 million German soldiers -- arguably, the best 2 million -- provided the western Allies with an extraordinary luxury for nations at war: time to train, to prepare, to plan to meet the enemy on the battlefield under conditions of their choosing, at a moment carefully selected by the warlords of America and Britain. From the battle of Normandy to the very end in Germany, the British army's performance was profoundly influenced by inability to withstand heavy casualties. Montgomery was repeatedly warned by his superiors in London about the scarcity of manpower. Within days of the landings in France, British battalions were being cannibalized to provide replacements. In 1945, whole divisions were broken up for the same reason. Since the war, far too much critical attention has been focused upon Allied generalship in northwest Europe, and far too little upon unit fighting performance. Allied senior leadership was, on the whole, not inferior to that of the Germans, hampered by the dead hand of Hitler. Montgomery may have been cautious -- not least for the reason mentioned above -- but he was certainly not incompetent. The sluggish performance of his British formations in Normandy and after was principally attributable to war-weariness and reluctance to accept further heavy loss when final victory was within sight. Yet for the Americans, manpower was not a problem. From beginning to end of the campaign, their willingness to accept casualties to gain an objective was acknowledged, respected and envied by their British allies. "On the whole, the Americans were willing to go at it more toughly than we were," declares Field-Marshal Lord Carver, in 1944-45 an armored brigade commander under Montgomery. How was it, then, that the U.S. Army found it enormously difficult, indeed often impossible, to defeat Germans encountered on anything like even terms? First, there was the extraordinary failure of the western Allies in 1944- 45 to provide their ground forces with adequate weapons. By that phase of the war, American and British technology had created a host of miracles: superb combat aircraft, antisubmarine warfare equipment, radar, the amphibious DUKW, the proximity fuse and the Jeep. Through Ultra, the greatest cipher- breaking operation of all time, the Allies possessed extraordinary knowledge of the German order of battle, deployments and often -- though not in the Battle of the Bulge -- German intentions. Yet amid all this, in northwest Europe the Allied leaders invited their ground troops to fight the Wehrmacht with equipment inferior in every category save artillery and transport. German machine-guns, mortars, machine-pistols, antitank weapons and armored personnel carriers were all superior to those of Britain and America. Above all, Germany possessed better tanks. The Sherman, which dominated the Allied campaign, was a superbly reliable piece of machinery. But it was fatally flawed by lack of an adequate gun to penetrate the Tiger and Panther; and by poor battlefield survivability in the face of German tank guns. These shortcomings were well understood in Washington and London before the 1944 campaign began. But the Chiefs of Staff expressed their confidence that Allied numerical superiority was so great that some qualitative inferiority was acceptable. This confidence was a fatal delusion. Again and again in northwest Europe, much inferior German forces equipped with a handful of Tigers, Panthers or 88mm guns were able to halt a major setpiece Allied attack in its tracks. For the American Army in northwest Europe, from beginning to end, the critical difficulties centered upon the performance of the combat infantry, the men at the very tip of the spear. It was upon these troops that the overwhelming burden of battle, and of casualties, fell. A report on the tactical lessons of the Normandy campaign by the U.S. First Army declared: "It is essential that infantry in training be imbued with a bold, aggressive attitude. Many units do not acquire this attitude until long after their entry into combat, and some never acquire it. On the other hand, units containing specially selected personnel such as Airborne and Rangers exhibited an aggressive spirit from the start. The average infantry soldier places too much reliance upon the supporting artillery to drive the enemy from positions opposing his advance . . . ." Gen. Mark Clark wrote from Italy in the summer of 1944: "Without question our training has not yet produced disciplined officers and disciplined men." By the winter of 1944 and the Battle of the Bulge, Gen. Omar Bradley's forces were performing far more effectively than during June and July in Normandy. Yet to the very end -- considering the mass of the army rather than only such justly celebrated divisions as the 1st, 4th, 9th and Airborne -- American infantry fieldcraft, tactical skill and above all leadership left much to be desired. One of the greatest American achievements of the war was the expansion of a tiny prewar peacetime force of 190,000 into an army of more than 8 million men. Yet an inevitable consequence of this transformation was a chronic shortage of high-quality, trained career leaders. In all America's wars, her allies have agreed that the able West Pointer has no superior. The problem, in World War II, was that there were nowhere near enough of these to lead an army of 8 million men. Likewise, the achievements of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions showed what the American soldier at his best can do. Much of the attention on the Market Garden battle (the Allied invasion of the Netherlands in September 1944) has focused upon the heroic sacrifice of the British 6th Airborne Division. Yet objective historians, and some British eyewitnesses, believe that the American divisions put up a more professional combat performance than the British; and that if Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had been granted the field command rather than the British Gen. Frederick A.M. Browning, the outcome of the battle might have been far happier for the Allies. Thus it would be absurd to suggest that America is not capable of producing elite foot soldiers. America's Navy and Air Forces have seldom -- and certainly not in World War II -- found difficulty in attracting officers of high quality. Yet to be a soldier in America has never been the honorable calling, outside a few thousand Army families. It has traditionally been the route by which young men of modest origins -- Eisenhower and Bradley not least among them -- may aspire to build a career.

[@SuperIv7]

The speaker contradicts himself: he correctly points to huge losses of manpower on the Eastern front. That includes tank and air crews. In 1944-45 the loss of experienced crews made availability of huge quantity of armor useless. In 1943-44 Germany actually switched its economy to military mode and *WAS* in fact able to produce enough tanks and planes, despite allied strategic bombing efforts. However they were quickly losing experienced soldiers. That's in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union improvements in the average quality of its fighting force. In 1945 Germany had plenty of brand new advanced tanks and planes and millions of fresh conscripts, but no fuel and, most importantly, nobody who could effectively use them, except for a few 'experten'.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

The soviet improbement in performance is directly relatwd to the rebuding of their officer corps after the great purge, not the availibility of veteran soldiers. They suffered mutch the same ratio of attrition as germany did.

[@SuperIv7]

@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 - an officer can only do so much.. commission is not some magic trick. Well trained veteran soldiers go a long way. General Zhukov had experience of the war with Japan in 1930-s and a top post in 1941, and yet the Red Army was losing in 1941, and invincible in 1945. By focusing on raising average training levels the Soviet Union managed to develop a force that was able to brush away new German hardware along with million of poorly prepared recruits, and easily beat few remaining 'experten' both in the air and on the ground.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@SuperIv7 The soviets were not 'unstoppable' until the second half of 44, it had much the same pace of advance it did in 42. The turnaround in 42 can be wholly attributed to the siberian troops moved west, their continued progress to the steadily refined battle doctrine, and reconstructed leadership, and their rapid advance after Bagration to the axis being reduced in size, and fighting a two front war. The avrage soldier of any major army was not significantly vetter or worse at any point of the war than any other. They all had comperable equipment and training. The reason soviet forces were collapsing in barbarossa was because entire divisions would retreat or surrender without fighting, or would fail to retreat and be sorrounded because their leadership could not act swiftly enough, for lack of initiative or experience. Where the red army did fight, the axis advance was greatly hampered, these were only small scale ebgagements in light of the whole front however.

[@Principator]

the post war bomb damage surveys indicated that strategic bombing wasn't nearly as effective as the Allies had hoped. Speer also asked in his biography what if the amount of resources invested in FLAK batteries, both 88mm and 128mm cannons, had instead been devoted to anti-tank warfare in the Ostfront? The chief benefit was it required Germany to divert limited men and resources to fighting allied bombers as Neitzel notes that the German aviation industry consumed 40% of their resources whereas tank production was only 6%. A Stug III cost 82,500 Reichsmarks. What did it cost to produce and operate over 7000 Bf100/ME410? What if Germany industry had produced more Stug III instead of Bf110 to address the lack of anti-tank capabilities in Germany infantry divisions?

[@eamon821]

I think others have pointed this out but in both world wars, the German's put an emphasis on a few high-quality formations while most formations were composed of low quality. Everyone else instead went for a large number of average formations which was more successful.

[@davidtrindle6473]

Makes sense

[@peterlustig6888]

How was it more successfull? Germany got overwhelmed by a majority of enemies.

[@andreborges73]

the Luftwaffe lost thousands of planes on the Britain campaign and didn't make ingland reach a point of collapse so not finishing England at that moment was major mistake Hitler did in stopping the invasions plans, I think down the line, Germany suffered a lot with not having planes of the field.

[@thinman8621]

The technology competition and related economics are very interesting. A longer presentation with more detail would be great. Thanks

[@jonpolfreixes8513]

Can't wait to read this book! Unfortunately my German isn't good enough, is there any chance of this book being translated into English?

[@krautreport202]

I high chance as those subjects sell pretty well. But it may take a while. I know of a few german publications that were translated for Cambridge University Press and that took roughly 5 years after the original german release.

[@PalleRasmussen]

But, and this is a serious question, not an attack on Neitzel, who has done excellent work in the past; is it not just a rehash of Citino's books? Bernard has read both, do you know Bernard?

[@krautreport202]

@@PalleRasmussen It is not about the "German way of war" as prussian approach of strategy and warfare of traditional officers and more about the self image and relationship of the army to the civilian society and the political system as a whole. Especially about the long shadow of WW2 and the Wehrmacht for the Modern Bundeswehr in ( an ever increasing) contrast to the attitude of civilian society.

[@noodled6145]

Probably would have to rely on something like Google Translate or paying a translator to do it properly for you.

[@PalleRasmussen]

@@krautreport202 danke sehr.

[@notkimjongun3752]

very cool dude this prof!

[@mcdermg]

Informative and insightful video as always

[@OkaNieba]

i really like this cooperation. Interesting Stuff :)

[@2002gaby]

I like how he talks about the German Army as "we/us" and not only the "the Wermacht".

[@stardustcomet7527]

its funny

[@machiavellianoverture1747]

@@stardustcomet7527 not funny ha ha, but funny

[@Epqntlg]

He just quoted someone

[@Darilon12]

Actually he doesn't. Except when quoting or when using indirect speech. As a historian it would be massively unprofessional.

[@entspannter]

Like for Neitzel. Guter Mann, durch und durch.

[@ronin47-ThorstenFrank]

Excellent analysis!

[@adoramus]

I am so thanful for the discussion in English. Greetings from Poland.

[@Alopex1]

Very good video as usual, and great that you got Prof. Neitzel! However, I would argue against the point made at 14:40: the personnell losses on the Western Front 1944-45 actually appear to have been significantly heavier than on the Eastern Front, proportionally speaking. In Normandy, full-strength German divisions were wiped out in a matter of days, and this trend of extremely heavy losses continued into 1945 (also due to the fact that many German soldiers were more likely to desert and surrender on the Western Front). Overall, I would argue that, proportionally, the Western Front was a much heavier drain on ressources AND personnell than the Eastern Front.

[@joethegeographer]

Excellent information, thanks for sharing. It seems like August 1943 was as a major turning point for the Wehrmacht.

[@edkaeuper5607]

As far as the air war that how the stug 4 came about the factory that made the stug 3 witch was made on panzer3 hull was bombed. So production was switches to the plant that made the panzer 4 hulls.so It defiantly had a impact.

[@rodrigoquiroga8590]

Excellent video and analysis !!

[@Feuerlaufer]

as always well presented and informative.

[@aliasalias8433]

Ich lese Neitzels Buch gerade. Hervorragend geschrieben, sehr informativ.

[@jake-tx7cu]

Werde es mir zu Weihnachten gönnen, freu ich mich schon drauf

[@niklasisda3298]

Absolut spannendes Buch über die verschiedenen deutschen Armeen seit 1870. Ohne ‚Krieger‘ geht es nicht - auch nicht in Afghanistan!

[@gerryw173ify]

I'm a bit skeptical of the Waffen-SS being considered elite troops? I've read some materials on them and it seems like they performed on average the same as Wehrmacht units and in some cases worse. TIK also touched on how politically loyal troops doesn't necessarily mean their combat effectiveness would be higher. Though I guess the SS units might have received better gear to allow them to perform better.

[@CBUCK1994]

I thought you had to be a more elite physically and intellectually to get into the ss

[@aitorrodriguez9070]

Another amazing video !!

[@bjornodin]

Considering the massive amounts of steel, plus logistics of sending tanks to the eastern front and training... I'm not sure if they could have scaled up to what was needed?

[@johnhenni7558]

This You Tube format is dedicated to support the Western Allies narrative, so Neitzel talk fits perfectly into the narrative. People with a layman's casual interest in WW2 seem quite satisfied with Neitzel's version.of a.very often retold tracing of the trajectory of Germany's military performance throughout the War. I don't hear any glaring errors or remarkable insights in Neitzel's accounts.

[@lancelot1953]

Hi John, if you review Military History Visualized videos, you will see that he points out the many "weaknesses" of the German military machine and the many errors of the German/Nazi leadership. There are plenty of YT sites that points out how bad, weak, overwhelmed, etc. the German military was - this site is not about that or about taking sides, it is about giving facts, regardless of narrative(s). Check TIK's website, he also offers top quality presentations. Ciao, L (US Naval War College)

[@dontforgethistory_official]

Nice talk. And it seems to be an interesting book!

[@Ensign_Cthulhu]

Next I would like to see Prof. Neitzel discuss the First World War and the Kaiserschlacht. Until then, I will hope for an English translation of the book.

[@CalebNorthNorman]

Neat! Thanks for the video

[@GuderII]

Basically never fight alone

[@etwas013]

Time to recuperate or simply getting more equipment. The latter was the crucial factor in minimising infantry casualties. The major focus on cooperation with assault cannons, a relatively rare piece of equipment in infantry divisions, is a proof of that. The validity of the primat of modern warfare, "he who lacks equipment, pays with blood", is much in order here.

[@rndompersn3426]

Really interesting. I think people underestimate how much of an impact the UK strategic bombing was on the war and how much resources the Axis had to spend on countering it. The Allies could afford the losses from the air but Germany really couldnt, especially with oil being so precious.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

The allies had such a massive resource advantage, that the, could afford to be inefficient and utilize poor strategy, yes. This does not make the poor strategy good.

[@rndompersn3426]

@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 When you look at how close Germany got to Moscow they needed to do anything they could to relieve the onslaught. Furthermore, what if Germans did revolt? A lot of suffering could have been stopped and the Allies may have been able to occupy most of Europe before the Soviets. The blame really goes on the German people.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@rndompersn3426 The blame goes on the convenient scapegoat, which tends ro be the loser. The fact is the allies would have been better served by sending more materiel, and potentially evsn expeditionary forces to the eastern front earlier. Much of the soviets early losses can be attributed to their nonexistant command structure, poor communication and poor logistics.

[@RonSommar]

The main issue of the Germans was their misunderstanding of economics. The disability to mass produce either tanks, ammunition, small arms, the growing lack of fuel and same hand the idiocy to invest in V weapons. It could only fail.

[@YKYYKYKYYYY]

Prof. Neitzel is missing key point on when he says that Germans could not counter-attack successfully in winter 43/44 as they did in Feb 43. Red Army has changed significantly since Feb/Mar 43 to winter 43/44 - it simply had more man power and firepower so there were no holes to be exploited by German counter-attack - the whole body of penetration was densely filled with troops, so Germans could not do much about it. In simple terms, by winter 43/44 they were too outnumbered both on quantity of Soviet manpower and firepower. Again simplifying, they could fight successfully against 2-3 times more enemy that had relatively weak firepower but could not do much against 4-5 times more of enemy that had strong firepower. That's why Wehrmacht was asking so much for more firepower - that was the only way to balance significant increase in Soviet manpower and material increase.

[@thomasmusso1147]

Enlightening .. thank you.

[@texas_germanic7073]

Logistics was another issue during the Russian campaign, Which I think you mentioned in another video

[@holyfox94]

Question: What if Rommel& Kluge would have opened the western front in 1944, as they planned to?

[@Treblaine]

It's all over by then, no fuel. So 90% of thier army is paralysed. Without air supremacy they're also almost blind. They were fighting mostly like a first world war army against enemies that were fully motorized AND outnumbered them. Breakout was impossible.

[@billd.iniowa2263]

I knew the strategic bombing of the Allies had a greater effect than some people give them credit for. But I hadn't thought of it in terms of costing Germany money to keep up with the Allied air forces.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

The strategic bombing had at peak a 12% reduction in vehicle production, and is generally considered to have costed the allies significantly more than it harmed the axis.

[@billd.iniowa2263]

@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 Well when dealing with numbers one has to put them into context. When you consider that Germany didnt start going into full war production mode until 1943, of coarse the numbers will go up. As more and more factories come on line, it at first seems that German production actually goes UP when the 8th Air Force is giving maximum effort in 1944. Thats where the numbers get misleading. Also note that alot of this production is done in small "cottage factories" employing only a dozen or so workers. The large factories having been targeted by Allied bombing. So you have a multitude of new small factories instead of a few large ones. Not necessarily the most efficient way to do things. -- This also may be used as validation for carpet bombing of cities, but thats a different topic.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@billd.iniowa2263 The 12% number specifically comes from chassis started but having to be discarded, or never finished due to the effects of bombing. It doesnt compare different time periods. Data on the overall efficiency of decentralised production can be obtained in comparison with other countries not under strategic bombing, and shows similarly low figures. Strategic bombing did have an effect, that over the war added up to thousands of vehicles less, but the effort expended on it ultimately is not justified by its results.

[@billd.iniowa2263]

@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 I have to respectfully disagree. What about chassis never even started due to no factory left to begin building them in the first place? And you are talking about vehicles. There's alot more to war production than just trucks and tanks.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@billd.iniowa2263 Corrwct, hovever behicles require complex supply chains, skilled labour and specialist machinery, and even these wernt severely impacted. And as I said to assertain the impact of the distributed production chain on productivity, one can compare with say, the Soviet Union, that used centralised factories, and sees that even with the bombing, the centralised method was not significantly more manpower or resource efficient. The only burdeb the distributed production scheme placed on germany was the one on homeland logistics, which within their heartland was not really a problem. And wouldnt be even decades later as the US failed to interdict the ho shi min trail with modern precision weaponry. It os a simple fact thag strazegic bombing is not efficient, causes heavy collateral damage, and its application was completely unjustifoed, and quiet likely cunterproductive in every occasion it has been attempted. I honestly see no good arguments for it, or even a reason to search for said argumsnts.

[@norbertblackrain2379]

Never voluntary start a two front war.

[@bjorntorlarsson]

Isn't it an advantage that the enemies are cut off from one another?

[@norbertblackrain2379]

@@bjorntorlarsson Which they weren't in case of World War 2. In really "inner lines had advantages on a tactical level but as a general strategic concept in an industrialized war it did not really work. All ready in the American civil the northern anaconda strategy defeated the inner lines of the south.

[@norbertblackrain2379]

@@bjorntorlarsson Tactical success off inner lines - Napoleon in the days before Waterloo where he used the inner lines to beat the not united armies of his enemies. But he lost the moments Prussians and Brits could unite. Strategic example from the same time. Napoleon fighting a 2 Front war in Spain and against Russia at the same time. It did not end well for him.

[@panosfasoul699]

@@norbertblackrain2379 I'd argue that in Russia Napoleon didn't loose because his forces where split so that isn't a great example.

[@norbertblackrain2379]

@@panosfasoul699 He had to maintain significant forces in Spain fighting Wellington and a very active insurgency. Add to this the need to protect a long shoreline. This is a situation very similar to Germany in world war 2.

[@nickdanger3802]

12.13 Germans in 43 44 spend just six per cent of their resources into tank production but more than 40 per cent of their resources into the air industry.

[@PalleRasmussen]

Citino and Stahel would probably put the breaking point as December'41, if not June '41. Balck certainly does in his memoirs. Citino and Stahel both points out that the Wehrmacht lost more men in the second half of '41 than they had reserves (one million Vs 875000), and Balck points to both the horrific losses amongst the trained soldiers and the losses of tanks that cannot be replaced fast enough.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

well, since you asked in your previous question about "rehash", you might want to read the Germany and the Second World War series, e.g., this video is based on it and it is quite old: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mZLSqYGJg8iEkNU

[@asg666btx]

I have heard one of his trusted generals advise AH to somewhat postpone the attack on Russia until such time the National Socialist German Army completes all the upgrades needed by the Military Organization...

[@Alte.Kameraden]

Glad this exist. I often tell people the German Army was a Shadow of itself by 1943. It relied so much on a hand full of Strong Divisions, and milked them dry. Their campaign in 1942 kind proves it, hearing stores of Divisions having to leave some of their elements behind (fuel shortages) during their push into the Caucasus and even then many of those divisions were under strength as the few months prior to end of Operation Barbarossa wasn't enough time to recover, while at the same time resource/fuel shortages forced the 1942 Summer Offensive whether they were ready or not. Once they were out of quality forces, on top of horrible equipment/resource shortages there was nothing they could really do to win the war. Then the Summer of 43 comes along and they didn't even have the resources to launch a limited offensive, let alone a grand one like years prior, with most of their strongest divisions also being Green Divisions like the a number of the Panzer Divisions used at Kursk. The number of German Divisions kept rising but that "core" of their strength was long gone.

[@Alte.Kameraden]

​@darkplace28 Well to be honest, it was an organizational and doctrine issue for the Western Allies in particular. They had the equipment, vehicles, and men. Numerically the combined French and British Airforces almost matched the German Luftwaffe plane for plane if you include all the Hurricanes and Spitfires available in 1940. Issue was how they were used, where they were deployed, and a serious lack of preparedness. France had it the worst being much of their equipment including tanks were from the 1920s or earlier and they had issues getting their counters to the Spitfire/BF109 into production delaying their deployment by a few years prior meaning France didn't have many planes that could match the German BF109 or British Hurricane/Spitfire fighters. But a lot of countries fought WWII with interwar and WWI equipment even most of the German infantry divisions at the time. If I recall all the way into 1943 the Germans were also still deploying biplanes in the Mediterranean and Eastern Theaters for specific roles, like the He51 being used as a light bomber in Poland, Russia and Italy despite being a 20s era fighter plane.

[@Alte.Kameraden]

@darkplace28 But the Germans also deployed anti tank rifles in 1940, almost everyone did. The Bren was no less obsolete than most LMGs if you were fortunate enough to even get a LMG. Compared to the MG34 just about all LMG/HMGs were obsolete almost regardless. So no country really even by wars end had something that was comparable to it, and the US Army wouldn't up until the 1960s even. So I wouldn't say the Bren was a handicap, but more of a "Good enough" category of a weapon similar to the American BAR, good enough for the job but not stellar.

[@PatriceBoivin]

Your guest was excellent !

[@tomkratman4415]

And when will the book be available in English?

[@somethingelse4878]

I never thought of different tech levels, just war So we have accountants running the costs and they would prefer the enemy killed with a stone not a v2

[@razorback2007]

of course if you lack of fuel and fight against everyone, it does not help.

[@HaVoC117X]

I cannot remember a single army of the second world war which was satisfied with their performance. Even in the American press the performance of the US soldiers and officers was even criticized in public during and even more after the war.

[@bigthoughts2644]

The country that determined if the German army beat Russia was japan. If japan had attacked Russia and not the US it is very possible that the Russians would have collapsed much the same way they did in the First World War. The US would most likely not enter the war as the US populous was heavily divided on their involvement in the war. Pearl Harbor was the deciding factor in world war 2. Nothing else is even close to as pivotal. Midway, Stalingrad, Ansio. All these battles change is the length of the war. Pearl Harbor decided the victors and the losers. Edit: the only other decision that may be as close as a deciding factor between victors and losers was the refraining of attacking the British at Dunkirk

[@jayg1438]

Read up on the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet Union and Japan fought a pretty intense series of battles along the Khalkhin Gol River around the Manchukuo/ Soviet border in 1939. It led to the defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army. Japan wanted no part of the USSR after that. That is where Zhukov started to earn his reputation as a capable commander.

[@Blackjack701AD]

Very good video. I really enjoy your content.

[@cleanerben9636]

It went from one extreme to the other

[@michaljanecek82]

is the book in english too?

[@jurisprudens]

Does not seem so

[@michaljanecek82]

@@jurisprudens :-( my german is terrrrrrible :-D

[@galgenvogel1871]

@@michaljanecek82 it is a new publication, let's hope there will be a English translation in the future. Maybe you could ask MHV on Patreon about it.

[@michaljanecek82]

@@galgenvogel1871 that's a good idea :-)

[@LukoHevia]

Give it a few months and it will probably be translated. Prof. Neitzel's previous books have been released in english, so there's no worrying about the "if", just the "when"

[@TheBigHambi]

I wonder whether the questions discussed here are discussed in more detailed in Neitzel‘s book. I would be very thankful if one who already could read it could answer this, as I would like to afford it in this case! Thanks in advance

[@williamschlenger1518]

So it had nothing do with fighting on at least four fronts& a dozen countries?

[@alexiscambridge8679]

No obviously not that would make too much sense

[@artificialintelligence8328]

'Countries' is meaningless as an argument. You have proper powerhouses like Luxembourg, Tannu Tuva and San Marino which actually do pose a problem, and the numerous small, undergunned, underequipped, and simply unprepared countries like the USA, UK, and USSR. (sarcasm in there, in case you haven't spotted it)

[@whiskeytangosierra6]

Interesting view. Bottom line, don't fight a two front war unless you have the resources of say, the USA, and then only against enemies who can't physically get to your borders. It has long been my personal belief that Germany lost WWII in 1941. I could not put it in to words this succinctly. Good video.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

It lost when the soviet union didnt collaps in the first months of barbarossa. It is enlightening to read intelligence reports on the red army from all parties involved. Everyone seemed to believe they could not hold out longer than 3 months.

[@looinrims]

You can fight a two front war, especially when one or both enemies are completely incapable of offensive actions, like Britain was

[@ThrowawayModeller]

Quality or Quantity? Wehrmacht - why not neither?

[@thamor4746]

Why not both, but only as high as can you make it would be the truth. They couldn't get the quality, but you still need quantity to fight that kind war...

[@danijelkasunic7572]

Just one word. Beautiful! 👌🏻

[@brandongreen5884]

From what I heard the "main" capability that the Wehrmacht possessed early in the war was not "technology". Even though many of the "technological" inventions such as the STG-44, Tiger tank, Messerschmidt-262, and the V-2 were "brilliant" there were simply not enough of them that could be placed into "service". But it was their "execution" of the "combined arms concept" (the world's first "attempt"). Like what was stated in the video they only prepared for a "sprint" and not a "marathon". Even though they did "execute" when on defense "brilliantly" as well. Of course, this is in addition to a MULTITUDE of other factors that "contributed" as covered in the video by the professor.

[@Etzelsschizo]

The Pz. VI Tiger I wasn't a good tank design, it was just built big to counter the KV-1 and T-34 at the Eastern Front as the 5 cm kw 38/39 of the Panzer III's proofed useless

[@janlippert4639]

Wow, ich bin begeistert! Sönke Neitzel ist der beste Kriegshistoriker, den wir in Deutschland haben. Abgesehen davon war das Video mal wieder sehr interessant. Tatsächlich kann man vieles des Gesagten sehr gut am Geschehenen ableiten. Auch diesmal wieder ein TOP Video. Vielleicht sollte man beim Feldzug gegen Frankreich auch einzel Personen wie Rommel berücksichtigen, ebenso die Zusammenarbeit der Luft und Landstreitkräfte. Sowie die Befehlsweitergabe per Funk ( im Gegensatz zu den Franzosen in fast jedem Fahrzeug vorhanden). Letztlich war aber wohl auch das Verständnis von neueren Taktiken tragend? Also nicht nur die Luftüberlegenheit?

[@olafkunert3714]

Die Situation zwischen 1939 und Sommer 1940 wird schon sehr gut 1995 in Friesers "Blitzkrielegende" diskutiert....

[@alexandershorse9021]

Great interview. The crucial mistakes Hitler made were invade the Soviet Union and then in the winter crisis of 41outside Moscow, declare war on the United States. The Wehrmacht simply could not defeat the combined resources of the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire as the good professor rightly explains. Is his book going to be available in English please?

[@marrvynswillames4975]

to be honest, unless they managed to get an new oil source, they would need ot invade ussr if they wanted to keep the offensive