Cold War 2.0 | FT Rethink

How bloc mentality is transforming business models and supply chains.
#supplychains #investing #geopolitics
See if you get the FT for free as a student (ft.com/schoolsa...) or start a £1 trial: subs.ft.com/sp....
► Check out our Community tab for more stories: / @financialtimes
► Listen to our podcasts: www.ft.com/pod...
► Follow us on Instagram: / financialtimes'

[@Questioneverything2050]

0:20 We were in a multipolar world? This is why I don’t take these “professionals” seriously

[@JA-pn4ji]

In reply, I would say that the US is debt and technology-led. The US borrows money cheaply from high-saving exporting countries (like Japan amongst many) using interest-rate policy measures. This money is recycled into technology investments and property, essentially keeping the asset-values in these sectors high, creating the many stock paper-billionaires pervasive in US tech. Asset holders in the US - those with property and stock investment, are constantly rewarded with higher returns than domestic or overseas bank savers. The capital gains obtained are either recycled back into property and stock investments for future capital gains keeping the speculative machine continuously running or deployed into the consumption of goods imported and paid for by the US's loose monetary policy (Money printing). The continuing growth in stock market indices is technology-dependent, meaning it relies on the constant hype of newly introduced technologies that are applied to products mass manufactured by exporting countries (mainly in Asia) and thus cheaply available to the consumption-focused US economy. It has even become habitual for US tech companies (Meta) to announce new products coinciding with their annual results to boost their stocks and distract attention away from their current profitability towards profitability at some future date. Technology sanctions hamper this long-running (since the widespread introduction of the internet in the 1990s) economic process, in a way similar to the impact of Cold War sanctions on the proliferation of communication and ancillary technologies. Many of the IP protocols of the internet, and the operating systems (Unix) were available in the 1970s, but did not gain commercial traction because they were restricted and considered military technologies until the Cold War ended in the 1990s. The inability to make technology widespread would be a natural consequence of today's technology sanctions. If only the US and its Western allies (consider the Luddite nature of its European allies coupled with their domestic job protective measures and the energy strain of AI data centres) have access to, for instance AI technologies, then the ability to incorporate such technologies into consumer goods would be both diminished and expensive to the consumer as well as not deriving adequate revenue and profits for tech firms to deepen their research engagement in such activities; meaning the debt-technology cycle described above, that currently drives the US economy would also be impacted. In short, if exporting countries are denied access to technology, then consumption-driven economies like the US would also be self-denying cheap widespread access to mass produced goods using these same technologies. And if goods exporting countries are subject to tariffs and protectionist walls, they are also likely to build walls to prevent capital flows that today benefit the US. Historically important is the fact that most countries had capital and exchange controls before the late 1980s, (UK 1979; France 1989; Spain 1991) suggesting such control phenomena are not unusual. In fact, most liberalisation of currencies occurred accompanying the start of the very same globalisation (in the 1990s.) that the US appears intent on destroying. Thus, even the notion of BRICS which entails the creation of a non-dollar financial/trading ecosystem that excludes the intermediary role of the US financial system would in implementation act as a barrier or wall to the export of capital from BRICS nations to the US (at a minimum Seigniorage savings) in the same manner that US goods tariffs act to prevent imports into the US from BRICS. It is the US that benefits most from this system, and its actions are no less than 'having its cake and eating it', at worst the US risks a backlash that adversely impacts the upward trajectory of its highly speculative debt-fuelled financial markets. There is also the risk that AI, the latest technological hype, would devastate service-based economies more than manufacturing-based ones. The displacement of the professional classes of workers (lawyers, accountants, bankers, stock traders, professional investors, analysts of various kinds ...), who are at the top of the trickle-down US income and asset earning hierarchy (with stock market-invested retirement funds and mortgages), would affect its consumption-based economic model. China for its part is building Yuan-based commodity markets across the entire commodity spectrum from agricultural to oil and on to primary metals. This is evidenced by recently built 'gargantuan' commodity storage facilities in China - the usual prerequisite for establishing a globally ranked commodity market. It foretells a future where China can buy commodities from BRIC nations using its currency with the price-determining leverage of possessing large domestic stockpiles of commodities. This adds to its already-established manufacturing prowess. Even in semiconductors, the announced goal of 28nm supply and equipment-based self-sufficiency by 2025 is adequate as a buffer against technology sanctions even in the most extreme of circumstances i.e. war or comprehensive technology sanctions. After all, a war would also impact Taiwan the main exporter of these goods. Over the next 5 years, the following trends are likely,: China achieves its aim of a localised semiconductor industry and the US succeeds in its aim of re-shoring or near-shoring technology industries. Of the two, I would say that China is the more advanced in achieving its goals. The various TSMC fabs being built in the West would not start producing at advanced nodes until the end of the decade. China would have built 60 fabs by then. This contrasts with the self-satisfied US thinking that it is self-sufficient in primary commodities. While to some extent true, the labor and environmental costs attached to domestic US mining and exploration render its production comparatively expensive to exploit. Any extreme event reaction prompted by geopolitics or 'Trumpian' US policy directives could create economic imbalances that outweigh previous economic disasters, on levels beyond the 1929 economic depression. The US should bear in mind the experience of the 'Trumpian' King Croesus whose consultation with the ancient Greek Delphic Oracle - very much in the vein of the current wishful thinking (about China) by the many prognosticating US-based think tanks, resulted in the reply: "If Croesus goes to war, he will destroy a great empire." Sadly, the great empire destroyed was his own.

[@patrickhorgan8389]

Pithy 😂

[@urbanstrencan]

Great video

[@mattyrjackson4261]

So AI is only for services? That's a bit short-sighted

[@KevinMooneygplus]

Pragmatic maybe

[@tandrichter]

Great ideas! Pity about the delivery…

[@simple-stack-by-ed]

So basically I dont want to benefit a lot from you because you would become powerful enough to never depend on me... Game theory...

[@new__user]

Now "showmethemoney"

[@khairulnaeim756]

I not same brain thinking as Yankee...🤖

[@vikramjitchadda5498]

World War We

[@김모치-z1h]

conclusion being?

[@mariacheebandidos7183]

is there any technology used in china today that is not American? using American technology, American invention, American innovation, American know-how, ... to make more stuff, cheaper, faster, ... doesn't mean you lead the US in that technology, it just makes you even more dependent on American technology, more dependent on America, no? people said similar things (wrt the US) about the ussr, japan, and india will probably be next after china. looking back, these countries were no where close to competing with the US and neither is china today nor india tomorrow. just because a country manufactures more solar panels, cell phones, ev, ... doesn't make them a leader in the field, if the idea didn't not originate from that country, especially if they didn't make any significant change or improvement to it. almost every technology used around the world today is American. until that changes, there wouldn't be any true competitor or rival, just followers and dependents. maybe focusing more on who invented thing A (because they are more likely going to invent the next thing) paints a better picture than who is manufacturing more thing A