Discussing metaethics & pragmatist quietism with Andrew Sepielli

[@patrickwrites]

29:45 on the point where people say some philosopher said this and not that, then you show a direct quote where philosopher says that. In my experience this happened so often with Wittgenstein it's bewildering. There are a lot of people who give their opinion on Philosophical Investigations without reading the preface - quoting that preface might account for half of the hundreds of times I've pulled out quotes. Orwell is another common one, and then there's some who refuse to believe stuff like Lewis really did believe possible worlds exist, or Dennet really didn't believe in dreams. I think you were very tactful about definitions here. I'm learning a lot from the way you express your disagreements (or points of difference).

[@oOneszaOo]

when he mentions the moral insignificance of the difference between action and inaction being a reason for consequentialism, it's interesting how he's omitting the consequence of taking this difference to be morally insignificant: when action and inaction become equally morally significant, then the distinction between intention and contingency becomes insignificant. to take the trolley problem, if by not pulling the lever i am morally responsible/blameworthy for letting something bad happen (my inaction is blameworthy), i am now morally blameworthy simply because !against my will! i happen to be physically present and capable of pulling the lever, whereas if i had been lucky enough to be one of the millions of people sitting at home uninvolved (by no choice of their own), my inaction (like their inaction) would not be morally blameworthy. in other words, even though i had no intention and was not involved in putting any people on train tracks and even though i would have chosen to be at home uninvolved and for everyone to survive, purely due to happenstance + the fact of somebody else's immoral actions, i become blameworthy. this sort of guilt by contingency is what happens when the difference between intention to cause harm (like the person who put the people on the train tracks) and contingent circumstance (like my being physically present, being capable, having the relevant knowledge, etc) becomes insignificant. that's why to me deontology, even though i consider it to be insufficient by itself as a normative position, is absolutely morally necessary.

[@ashnur]

follow up when? I want to hear the two of you get into the details :D

[@codawithteeth]

1:04:05 ME TOO, ANDREW!! that’s what we love about Lance

[@popsbjd]

I just put the Kane B interview with Andrew on my watch later Playlist and you come out with a video from him. Going back to back on them today. Should be fun!

[@moonsweater]

One of your most interesting conversations so far, I think!

[@andystewart9701]

Enjoyed this conversation!

[@Patchowisky]

would be cool to see you talking with Destiny about quietism or with Alex O'connor about anti-realism

[@lanceindependent]

I agree.

[@dionysianapollomarx]

Awesome. Been waiting for this. I’ve seen interviews of Dr. Sepielli. Seems persuasive. Not really into quietism though. Might have to order his book.

[@cloudoftime]

While I am not in favor of sharing normative language with realists (with respect to using it at all), as I am not convinced of the benefit of utility over the confusion of equivocation, I love your example about folk physics.

[@JonahandMiraSepielli]

That’s my daddy