Рет қаралды 1,662
TRAVIS HEINZE DOCKET NO.: 95145-A
VERSUS 10TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NATCHITOCHES PARISH NATCHITOCHES PARISH, LOUISIANA
LIBRARY, ET AL.
WRITTEN REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr. Heinze’s claims have prescribed under former La.Civ.Code art. 3492 as well as newly enacted La.Civ.Code art. 3493.1.
Mr. Heinze asserts the subject alleged offense occurred April 18, 2022, the date of defendant’s ban notice forbidding him from the Natchitoches Parish Library. In accordance with former La.Civ.Code art. 3792, Mr. Heinze had until April 19, 2023, to file his petition. However, Mr. Heinze filed his petition on November 14, 2024, or 1 year, 6 months, and 27 days beyond the one-year prescriptive period of former La.Civ.Code art. 3492. Mr. Heinze is correct in his counter-argument that the one-year prescriptive period was extended to two years by the Louisiana Legislature in 2024 when it repealed Article 3492 and enacted La.Civ.Code art. 3493.1. However, that enacted legislation additionally declared that this newly doubled prescriptive period “shall be given prospective application only and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this Act ... This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2024.” Act No. 423, 2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2024) (redesignated as La.Civ.Code art. 3793.1.)
Here, Mr. Heinze’s cause of action occurred well-before July 1, 2024, to take advantage of the new 2-year prescriptive period. Therefore, Mr. Heinze’s cause of action remains under the one-year prescriptive period of former La.Civ.Code art. 3492, and, as discussed supra, he filed his petition 1 year, 6 months, and 27 days too late.
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Mr. Heinze’s reliance on the Continuing Tort Doctrine is misplaced.
Mr. Heinze alternatively argues the Continuing Tort Doctrine to toll or interrupt any purported prescription of his cause of action. Mr. Heinze is correct that the continuing tort doctrine is an exception to La.Civ.Code art. 3493.1 and former La.Civ.Code art. 3492 that applies when continuous tortious conduct causes continuing damages. Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326, p. 10 (La. 6/29/99), 737 So.2d 720, 728; Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532, 542 (La. 1992). For the continuing tort doctrine to apply, three requirements must be met-(1) a continuing duty owed to plaintiff, (2) a continuing breach of that duty by defendants, and (3) a continuing injury or damages arising day to day. Crump, supra.
In contrast, when the operating cause of injury is discontinuous and not “arising day to day,” even if the plaintiff continues to experience ill effects or injury from the original, wrongful act, the continuing tort doctrine is inapplicable; and “prescription runs from the date that knowledge of such damage was apparent or should have been apparent to the injured party.” Crump, 98-2326 at p. 7, 737 So.2d at 726; Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632, 09-2635, p. 21 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 1005; Scott v. Zaheri, 2014-0726, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/3/14), 157 So.3d 779, 787.
Here, the Natchitoches Parish Library’s April 18, 2022 ban is not a continuing injury arising day to day. The library issued one ban notice to Mr. Heinze after he was arrested in the library for the alleged offenses subject to his pending Natchitoches City Court criminal proceedings. That lone ban notice is the “operating cause” in this case; it has not been continuously reissued. Therefore, the Continuing Tort Doctrine affords Mr. Heinze no relief.
Mr. Heinze’s claims under Louisiana Open Meetings Law are likewise prescribed.
Claims under Louisiana Open Meetings Law carry a 60-day peremptive period.
La.R.S. 42:24; La.R.S. 42:28; Greemon v. City of Bossier City, 2010-2828 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1263, 1266. Therefore, Mr. Heinze’s suit “must be commenced within sixty days of the action” under La.R.S. 42:24, or “must be instituted within sixty days of the violation” under La.R.S. 42:28.
In the case sub judice, the peremptive period ended sixty days after April 18, 2022, or on Friday, June 17, 2022. His suit was filed on November 14, 2024, or 2 years, 4 months, and 29 days later. Consequently, his claims under the Louisiana Open Meetings Law are forever perempted for peremption, as opposed to prescription, cannot be interrupted or suspended. La.Civ.Code art. 3458, 346; Borel v. Young, 2007-0419 (La. 11/27/07), 989 So.2d 42, on reh'g (July 1, 2008); Lambert v. Toups, 99-72 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 745 So.2d 730; Glod v. Baker, 2004-1483 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/23/05), 899 So.2d 642, writ denied, 2005-1574 (La. 1/13/06), 920 So.2d 238.
Therefore, based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of Mr. Heinze’s claims against Natchitoches Parish Government have prescribed or perempted and must be dismissed.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers, in the City and Parish of Natchitoches, State of Louisiana, on this, the 22nd day of January, 2025.
HON. DESIREE DUHON DYESS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE - DIV A