Episode 17, Debate review: Graham Oppy on Oppy vs Craig

[@kamilgregor]

I am a simple man - I see a new episode, I click

[@New_Essay_6416]

Yup

[@chad969]

Hey Kamil what did you think of Carriers recent debate with Jonathan Sheffield?

[@radscorpion8]

thats right you are simple

[@FlencerMcflensington]

It's also hard to overstate how freaking excited I was when I checked my notification and it was a new video from you. I was walking downstairs and must've let out an audible and probably quite manly yelp... because my wife asked, "what's wrong?!" I was confused and I said oh no it was a happy yelp! Happy and manly yelp.

[@romanbesel4759]

Good Job as always! I like how the conversation went, you two dived straight into the "good stuff". Thanks for taking in my request on patreon, I understand Oppy's account now much more clearer.

[@JerryPenna]

Great to hear 2 amazing thinkers. Keep up the thoughtology!

[@RanchElder]

Hard to overstate my enjoyment of discussions like this, particularly with you two. Thanks!

[@DarwinsGreatestHits]

Nice talk. I think an episode with Oppy about his branching view of possible worlds would be fun. Very few naturalists think the laws of nature are necessary, but they haven't seen Oppy's reasons.

[@throughaglassanalytically1679]

@Darwin's Greatest Hits Who are Naturalists who don't think the laws of nature are necessary? Could you link to some literature as well? I feel only Quentin Smith has really addressed this question coherently.

[@ejward1974]

What was most impressive about this discussion, aside from the brilliance of both minds, was the pure lack of ego demonstrated. Thank you for this example of intellectual humility.

[@ObsidianTeen]

There's always ego, even if it's veiled by a *display* of humility. Trying not to be egotistical is another game one's ego plays.

[@littlefurrow2437]

Dishonesty is hard to see as brilliant. Clever, educated etc, yes but religious apologists lack basic honesty. WLC pretends he hasn't been corrected a thousand times on his sophisticated strawmen. Sorry, can't call that brilliant.

[@eronfas101]

18:55. Symmetry breaking. I believe that's the term Graham was looking for. Great conversation!

[@jmike2039]

Oscar Peterson trio intro. Such a W Alex.

[@Uberrima.Fides.]

I haven't looked into how timestamps are created on YT videos, but it would be great to have them on videos of this length, like if I want to jump back to the beginning of where they start discussing Pruss's writing on the subject.

[@resurrectionnerd]

“On the relevance of the [BGV] theorem for the kalam cosmological argument, Craig says: “The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem proves that classical space-time, under a single, very general condition, cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. Now either there was something on the other side of that boundary or not. If not, then that boundary just is the beginning of the universe. If there was something on the other side, then it will be a region described by the yet to be discovered theory of quantum gravity. In that case, Vilenkin says, it will be the beginning of the universe. Either way, the universe began to exist.” What Craig does not seem to realise, however, is that his own metaphysical commitments preclude him from using the fact that ‘timelike geodesics are past-incomplete’ (which is what the theorem proves) to infer ‘the universe had an absolute beginning a finite time in the past’ (which is what he wants to show). These two statements are not equivalent: the first refers to a spacetime interval, and the second refers to a period of duration of metaphysical time. In order for Craig’s desired conclusion to follow, he would need to assume that the spacetime intervals described in the theorem are in fact the same thing as the metaphysical time he talks about in his philosophical writing. At the very least, he must argue that the finitude of the one implies the finitude of the other, though if the two descriptions of time do not refer to the same thing it is unclear why this should be the case. This position that there is a close connection between physical and metaphysical time, however, stands in stark tension with Craig’s remarks about the philosophy of time in his other published works. Craig has repeatedly and emphatically emphasised the importance of distinguishing the concept of time in physics (especially relativity theory) from the conception of time he appeals to in his philosophical arguments. Thus, he emphasises the difference between “physical time and space (clock and rod measurements) and metaphysical time and space (ontological time and space independent of physical measures thereof)”. In particular, he argues that one should: “Distinguish metaphysical time from physical or clock time and maintain that while the former is (tensed) in nature, the latter is a bare abstraction therefrom, useful for scientific purposes and quite possibly (tenseless) in character, the element of becoming having been abstracted out.” Craig is very sceptical about the relevance of findings about physical time to philosophy, stating that “(special relativity) is a theory about physical time and space and says nothing about the nature of metaphysical time and space”, and “we must not forget that relativity theory concerns physical time only, not metaphysical time.” This seems to present Craig with a major problem - if relativity theory describes physical time only and says ‘nothing’ about metaphysical time, then how can Craig infer that past metaphysical time is finite from a result about the finitude of past physical time? Indeed, Craig explicitly acknowledges the fact that a beginning in one type of time does not imply a beginning in the other: “If we draw a distinction between metaphysical time and physical time as Newton did, it is quite evident that a beginning of the latter does not imply a beginning of the former. God in metaphysical time could be quite active prior to creation (perhaps creating angelic realms) and could bring physical space and time into being after having existed without their being co-existent with Him.” In discussing the various notions of time used in different fields of physical inquiry (thermodynamics, special relativity, general relativity, etc), Craig notes the many differences in properties these notions have from each other and from time as used in natural language, and as a result concludes: “It is difficult to resist the conclusion that all of these operationally defined ‘times’ are not really time at all, but just various measures of time suitable for their respective fields of inquiry.” In regard to the spacetime manifold that is the subject of special and general relativity, Craig says: “Minkowski's four-dimensional, mathematical space serves as a convenient calculational and diagrammatical aid... but says absolutely nothing about ontology... the four-dimensional continuum should therefore be regarded as a useful tool, and not as a physical 'reality'... Minkowski's spacetime is at best a representation of physical time and space as described by the equations of (special relativity) and cannot pretend to imply a four-dimensional ontology.” All of this then raises the question as to what metaphysical significance Craig can place on the Borde-Vilenkin-Guth theorem. It seems impossible for Craig to appeal to the Borde-Vilenkin-Guth theorem as establishing anything of significance about the origin of the universe or the finitude of time if he believes physical time is distinct from metaphysical time, and the operationalised ‘times’ used in physics are not really time at all. At the very most, all the theorem shows is that one measure of physical time used in one particular theory, which Craig thinks should be interpreted instrumentally anyway, must have a beginning. To infer from this that the universe therefore must actually have an absolute beginning is simply impossible given Craig’s views about time. Craig’s inconsistent attitude about the philosophical implications of physical theories has been noted by Mauro Dorato, who in a review of Craig’s book Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity states that: “(Craig) seems to oscillate between two contrasting philosophical positions. According to the first, ‘relativity physics… is not necessarily saying anything that is relevant for the metaphysician’, a claim that tends to be advanced whenever evidence coming from physics is against his metaphysical views. The second position is that physics ‘confirms’ certain metaphysical and theological views over others, a claim that is put forth whenever evidence for the existence of a privileged frame (coming for instance from cosmic time or quantum non-locality) seems more reassuring. If this impression is well-founded, Craig’s book is essentially guided by an apologetic attempt and opportunistically uses physics and metaphysics for his purpose.” The problem goes beyond the issue of interpretation of physical time and its role in scientific theories, because the way time is treated in the Borde-Vilenkin-Guth theorem is totally at odds with Craig’s views about the nature of time. In the paper, time is treated as a continuous variable that can be integrated over. This makes no sense at all under Craig’s presentism, since he does not believe time has the structure of real numbers, nor does he believe that different moments of time co-exist in a way that it would make sense to sum (integrate) over them. Craig believes that time consists of a series of non-metrical intervals of ‘present’, one constantly replacing the other as the objective temporal progression of time passes on, as per the tensed notion of objective becoming. Given this understanding, it is simply absurd to integrate over a timelike geodesic to produce a result for the maximum possible length of a proper time interval. Such a result is metaphysically meaningless given that time is not continuous and consists of non-metrical present moments. Such a result might have instrumental value, but given Craig’s commitments it is ontologically totally confused and uninterpretable. Thus, given Craig’s own arguments, the Borde-Vilenkin-Guth theorem is absolutely worthless in establishing the absolute ontological beginning of the universe.” Excerpt From: Fodor, James. “Unreasonable Faith: How William Lane Craig Overstates the Case for Christianity.”

[@vincentiormetti3048]

@S Gloobal Vilenkin and Craig have a different understanding of universe.

[@Koran90123]

Hi Sandra Banks

[@mattsmith1440]

@S Gloobal You keep repeating the same mantra without ever quoting from the paper itself. You are wrong, and anyone who cares to check can see you are wrong. I understand apologetics usually relies on a denial of reality, but you should bear in mind it only really works on those who already agree with you.

[@anglozombie2485]

Didn't Craig already response to most of the excerpts from James book?

[@richardgamrat1944]

@@anglozombie2485Did he? Where I can read/hear it?

[@Jockito]

This was great. I was itching to hear Oppy elaborate on some of the points he made during the debate and it was annoying that it got cut off short with the Q & A at the time. This video scratched that itch.

[@relvar3158]

Hey Alex. Very off topic, but. Do you know if those are board games behind Graham? I think I can see Terra Mystica but not sure…

[@Bhuyakasha]

There's this quote by Richard Feynman I always think about when fine tuning gets brought up: “You know, the most amazing thing happened to me tonight... I saw a car with the license plate ARW 357. Can you imagine? Of all the millions of license plates in the state, what was the chance that I would see that particular one tonight? Amazing!”

[@rogbec01]

Am I missing something? No evidence of multiverse and still , for the naturalist, have to come up with the original causal agent?

[@chadmarx7718]

​@@rogbec01 there is evidence that suggests a multiverse. Saying it's a wrong hypothesis is a different matter.

[@TK19]

Just started the video, so sorry, no constructive comment other than to nod in approval of Graham's board games. Can't make out most but that Terra Mystica box is unmistakable ;)

[@turdferguson3400]

I enjoyed this very much. Imagine how much more I could have enjoyed it if I saw the rest of Graham's face.

[@bigtombowski]

He does have a very pretty face

[@pauljohnson6406]

Hi Alex, at approximately 13:40 in the video, you misunderstand Craig's interpretation of "aesthetic impulse" or "aesthetic reasons" as including solving practical problem. Craig says it includes solving mathematical puzzles, not practical, as in empirical, or scientific, problems. Craig clarifies further that he would reject the term "aesthetic' in favor of a priori. Therefore, what Craig means is that it is uncanny that mathematical objects developed for purely a priori reasons, or in a purely a priori context, if you will, should be so applicable to the physical sciences.

[@NN-wc7dl]

My two KZbin favorites in the same video! That's the definition of a good day. (I don't mean they are KZbinrs for heaven's sake - like THAT lot - only that you can find them there occasionally.) :-)

[@chad969]

Oppy just blew my mind at 25:38. I never thought about it like that

[@rogbec01]

1:17 great honest discussion about “partial explanation”. But I still don’t understand how a naturalist can appeal to multiverses or primary cause being “natural “ as primary cause created natural laws , so by definition is super-natural

[@tymmiara5967]

Great discussion, I was waiting exactly for something like this in order to understand Oppy's view better. Oppy is essentially trying to bring the discussion to a draw, by showing that whatever objection on this issue is raised against naturalism, it also can be raised against theism. And the crucial point is that both theistic and naturalistic explanations contain a "happy coincidence" (or a "lottery"). However, it seems that in this discussion you have not considered that there are different kinds of lotteries. Suppose on theism the applicability of mathematics is a happy coincidence of getting heads in a coin flip and on naturalism (in the contingent scenario), the applicability of mathematics is a happy coincidence of getting six in a roll of a dice. In that case, the applicability of mathematics provides evidence for theism rather than for contingent-naturalism, even though both are "brute contingencies".

[@jolssoni2499]

For that you'd need a well-defined probability space which would be just as plugged out of thin air as in the case of any other probabilistic piece of natural theology. EDIT: And if both theories explain the data equally well it's not a draw but rather naturalism wins because it has a bigger prior as a matter of logical fact.

[@alexlarsen6413]

Not really, because these different "lotteries" in your example are either arbitrary (why would you assume God only has x number of options which is smaller), or you can go all the way back to the initial state on naturalism and get the exact same "lottery" regardless.

[@rogbec01]

1:19:37 “ I’ve given up trying to help the theists here”?? Perhaps I am not following the argument and happy to be corrected, but am I right in saying the best that naturalism has to offer is natural forces? So even if you decide to go down the multiverse path to find some explanation of why there is something and not nothing , don’t you have to get to an initial cause? Which is not material, so what do naturalists have to say about an initial cause that creates the material? The best you can do is acknowledge that there must have been a non natural / material cause else you are just ab elephant holding up the world with mo explanation of what is holding up the elephant!!??? Please explain how you get around this?it’s one of the reasons why I’m not a naturalist

[@Spinozasghost]

The naturalist is just going to say that, to the extent that such an explanation is necessary/possible, the theist has no more reasonable grounds to insert God as the explanation.

[@mauteman]

I could watch this all day.

[@alexlarsen6413]

I don't understand how you could ever finish your countdown to past infinity when infinity is not a number. Seems to me like you'd never finish counting.

[@jolssoni2499]

The comparison with the fine-tuning argument is a good one to keep in mind. It seems like there's a similar kind of opportunity here for the theist to play 'heads I win, tails you lose': if the universe is "orderly" enough such that mathematical-linguistic-conceptual constructs can (more or less) successfully describe what is going on then God must be one hell of a designer, and if the universe around us is pure chaos but we exist nonetheless then that must be because of God's providence. Obviously both E and ~E can't be probability-raising evidence for theism so the (honest) theist will have to place their bets, but since the evidence in both the case of fine-tuning and applicability of mathematics is old they can just claim that theism "predicts" whatever happens to be the case and the naturalist can't win, by stipulation.

[@dogsdomain8458]

I think this is correct. I personally dont unserstand the fine tuning argument. A lot of things that occur are improbable. It doesnt mean god made it happen. But we dont know if the universe could have been another way, or perhaps all possible permutations of universes necessarily exist, and we just find ourselves in the one where life as we know it will necessarily come about.

[@Software.Engineer]

I guess ~E is implying somehow that it is possible for humans to exist in a disorderly universe. So the question really is if the universe is disorderly or not.

[@jolssoni2499]

@@Software.Engineer It is possible for humans to exist in a disorderly universe by divine fiat. God can do what he wants, and that's exactly the problem when it comes to theism explaining anything.

[@Software.Engineer]

@@jolssoni2499 Wait, so is it possible for humans to exist in a disorderly universe because God can make it so? Maybe it is not possible and actually this God can't make anything without order being part of it, maybe creation requires process and process requires order. Like saying our existence is from order being a necesity? Like maybe existence is reliant upon order and without it, the human brain from unorderedness can't be relied upon to make judgments about existence? Like if Logic is made by the mind.. and the mind is from unordered processes, nothing can orderly follow anything logically from our minds? Just some thoughts I guess.

[@harrygreen9804]

I feel like you guys just miss a silver bullet here, you've accepted that mathematics is true of the world and we need to explain why it is the case that it's so ordered and perfect for the human mind to grasp. An answer which would give a good account as to why there's such a good 'fit' is simply the kind of Copernican revolution Kant theorised, where our intuitions of space and time are what give the unity of consciousness and experience to the world as we perceive it and science as the study of the body of our experience can make use of those apodeictic intuitions. If the mathematics is something we bring to the world as cognising agents then it really requires no extraordinary explanation as to why it fits so well, it fits by necessity if cognition via our intuitions is a contingency for an object of our experience. I mean you can go further with causation, nomic laws in the universe, it can all be accounted for by the structure of our cognition projected onto the world which seems to require no major explanation at all if we are comparing worldviews as to how well they give an account or given a worldview how likely is it we expect this outcome.

[@qqqmyes4509]

Wouldn't mathematical formulas still reflect/"approximate" the laws of nature without humans crafting the scientific theories? I thought WLC's argument was not centered on our human ability to understand the mathematical formulas that fit the data and seem to represent laws of nature, but rather that independent of the discoveries of science, the fundamental laws of nature have a peculiar nature in their ability to be mathematically modeled. (Of course, without science, we wouldn't know that the laws could be stated in mathematical terms, but it still would be a fact of the matter.)

[@dylansevitt]

hey Alex I like your idea, but there seems to be a problem with your partial explanation analogy... it seems that we know that X happened which could lead to a rather than b, but we're not using X as an explanation without knowing X happened... in your case your saying z is the reason why a rather than b, but z seems incoherent to the person your talking with...(z is the limitless past). lpartial explanations couldn't be used to prove the the partial explanation existence...

[@rogbec01]

Hi Guys, I am not a philosopher, and it may be just what you guys do, loved the discussion, but I found some of your rebuttals of fine tuning a bit frustrating, probably because I don’t understand where you are going. I am assuming your goal is to find truth no matter where reasoning takes you. I didn’t understand why you kept talking about hypothetical worlds with mathematics . I don’t see how that adds to the argument at all. That’s more an epistemological question about how we come to know and use mathematics. I believe the theist position is ontological . That this world is made with laws of mathematics that are so precise we can send a man to the moon and back. Regarding levels of precision, just asks physisist the extraordinary precision required. . Can naturalism come up with the fine tuning that we see? It seems to me that natural laws can’t do that, given the evidence of the Big Bang whatever was before the bb was causal, powerful. Personal , non physical and eternal. Nothing existed prior and from nothing comes nothing! Multiverse? Sounds like you are introducing the elephant holding up the earth. You still have to explain the original cause of multiverses, again supernatural is the best option, because if it is outside time, space , then it by definition would have to super natural. Throwing in multiverse is just a furfy, same as saying little green men, does not address the first cause.

[@anglozombie2485]

It seems Oppy does agree with Alex's view on the Kalam. I still think it's one of the more interesting arguments, but I think it isn't the strongest cosmological argument. The one that you see Pruss/Feser/Rasmussen run is better overall. I think Feser has a point when he talks about Kalam in saying that Natural Theology Must Be Grounded in the Philosophy of Nature, Not in Natural Science. That is a mistake Craig is making by defending that kind of cosmological argument.

[@sasilik]

If there is a god and if it gave us everything and we can have reason and logic because of it I still don't understand why there is need to account for it or be thankful to it. It was a creator in that case and it is no more. Or if it is then for practical everyday purposes there is zero evidence that it has any effect on everyday life.

[@appearances9250]

Malpas was simply obviously tap dancing

[@Joe-bx4wn]

Mr Brute Contingency

[@VACatholic]

The brute contingency that theists present is one that can be interacted with and known through personal experience. God is a personal being that allows for a relationship. This relationship allows for personal experiences that prove to the individual that God exists. The brute contingency that atheists present is one that is just a fact that they assert with no further explanation. It's just something they say and then claim that they have the same explanatory power as theism. This is just not true. This is where Oppy's argument that theists and atheists have brute facts that are "equally unlikely" is false.

[@VACatholic]

@DUArte Because brute facts I can confirm through experience are more likely true than brute facts I assert without reason? I really don't understand your objection at all.

[@charlescarter2072]

Spot on! Well said

[@johnfleming5470]

Don't Know, therefore a god musta done it and and his name is Jesus, QED!

[@jesserochon3103]

It's not IDK therefor... Rather, it's IDK but God is the most plausible explanation based on our limited knowledge.

[@johnfleming5470]

@@jesserochon3103 Really? show the evidence that it's the most plausible explanation

[@charlescarter2072]

@@johnfleming5470why do you need evidence? Aren’t reasons enough?

[@TBOTSS]

Craig kicked their asses. This is Oppy's and Alex's trauma/recovery session. Sad.

[@YingGuoRen]

Lol did you watch a different debate? Craig was deeply uncomfortable and just restated the same things over and over again, totally ignoring Oppy's arguments.

[@TBOTSS]

@@YingGuoRenCraig had to explain time after time the basics of the philosophy of mathematics to Oppy. Craig has published in this area - Oppy has not and in the exchange this was apparent.

[@YingGuoRen]

@@TBOTSS Dude it's philosophy, not physics lmao. This stuff isn't complicated. Also, Oppy has a background in both mathematics and philosophy, whereas Craig is just interested in cherry picking what he can to buttress his idiotic arguments. You see him do the same thing with cosmology, which he also doesn't understand.

[@TBOTSS]

@@YingGuoRen So one of the leading philosophers of time, who has also published in peer reviewed journals on cosmology, general relativity and mathematics does not know what he is talking about. Ah, I understand - you are a child.

[@YingGuoRen]

@@TBOTSSIt's easy to be a leading philosopher of time when there are only four of them.

[@TBOTSS]

Why do atheists, after being exposed by William Lane Craig, feel the need to go on a podcast with each after the debate/discussion? Alex is the worst, after his talk with Craig, he also teamed up with, the frequently vanquished, Wes Morrison to lament the intellectual weaknesses of Craig AFTER their complete failure to do so when in conversation with Craig. Sad.

[@barneyh4655]

they are looking to discuss more and grow more in there knowledge. I assume they would do it after any major debate

[@anglozombie2485]

I think it’s fine

[@kelvinloeb812]

Exposed by Craig? Too funny unless of course you count Craig making faces as winning points

[@TBOTSS]

@@kelvinloeb812 Oppy's and Alex's therapy session. Pathetic.