Even in physics things aren't framed that way. There are fixed facts of parts and systems that repeat but that is only because they repeat. Then you use those fixed facts with deduction to find the particular facts about a particular object or system. With objective morality you'd have to do the same. The moral fixed facts would be metaethics level. Then applied "ethics" would be where you get the particular moral facts about the agents and system of a particular moral scenario.

Applied.to Garfield's hamburger example. The strange sounding conclusion is not really the culprit. Rather, it is the *assumption* that two contradictory propositions are true simultaneously. Once you make that assumption, then you have excluded nothing, including statements about burgers and what not

No we aren't. Why do you think so?

@Oskar1000: They just seem to dismiss that kind of idea with "really?..." It's like, well, yeah, really, maybe, lol. I guess people like him just don't seem to take seriously the problem of trying to figure out what would be a meaningful life, and how we even find meaning in the first place on a fundamental level. For example, it might be easy to think that the meaning of life is to just go on roller coaster rides your entire life and if you can't afford it then just do what you can to afford it... but of course, one could reasonably ask, "what makes a roller coaster ride feel meaningful?" You may need to come to build a metaphysical theory to understand that, as for example, we might get a sense of how we compare the ride to other (probably mostly less stimulating) things we experience, and so if all of life were roller coaster rides, maybe we would have never found them fun, making the roller coaster ride as a source of meaning hard to exist in isolation from other things and the metaphysical relations (or something/some things similar/analogous to those) the roller coaster ride has with them. You don't build a metaphysical theory with "really?..." (You just express your vague, broad intuition about it, ranging from general ideas to emotional feelings about it.) You could just ignore the question that the theory tries to answer, but philosophy aims to provide answers to that question... whether one is personally interested in it says nothing about the fact of the matter and shouldn't be taken as an answer to the question of such. Sure, there are silly things about free will theories... but there are silly things about non-free will theories too... in metaphysics, for example, usually you end up committing to at least something that's quite unintuitive, like that there are no chairs or something, and then have to somehow find a harmony between it and other things we believe and our ways of perceiving reality. Really, the idea of silliness is both subjective and very vague. It's not useless but it's not especially useful and often needs a few substantive things in tandem with it to make a particularly insightful point, and even then, it's not doing the majority of the heavy lifting. If one responds with a metaphysical theory or some useful adjustments to an existing one, that would be a more scientific and compelling objection, because if you're merely advising to just drop a theory entirely, then there is no replacement that is implied other than "any theory other than the one I am bashing," which doesn't narrow it down a whole lot, and going from a useful theory to either that, or nothing, is not really progress; if you could alter it to make a more useful theory out of it, then it would do more (and more useful) explanatory work than the previous theory and hence be an improvement, but barring that, that work is not being done. You have shown an imperfection with the theory, but in merely so doing, you have not yet provided a better alternative to it.