Hegel's Circular Epistemology

In this Seminar, we examine Hegel’s circular epistemology.
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Chapters
0:00 Intro
3:21 Overview
13:27 Criteriology vs. Epistemology
14:30 Circular Justification
19:31 The Phenomenology’s Original Titles
20:35 Mind-Internal vs. Mind-External Reality
29:02 Hegel’s Circular Epistemology
35:35 All Mind?
37:18 Rotating the Logic
38:30 Heidegger on Hegel
41:24 If Hegel Were a Hypnotist
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How to Cite this Video:
Scalambrino, Frank. (2023). Hegel's Circular Epistemology. [Video]. KZbin. kzbin.info@phil....

[@exlauslegale8534]

Congrats, every cent invested in your education was worth it!

[@philosophemes]

Thank you! I appreciate it! I hope these videos help! Let me know if there's a topic you all would like to see.

[@exlauslegale8534]

@@philosophemes How about the first chapter of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, Deleuze’s favorite topic, this position between idealism and materialism. Let’s revel in the general antihegelianism…

[@philosophemes]

@@exlauslegale8534Good call! I'm putting it in the queue.

[@cesardaia4912]

Thank you for upload this video. The name of the Dr is Rockmore?

[@philosophemes]

You're welcome! Yes, Dr. Tom Rockmore. He's the author of the book Hegel's Circular Epistemology from which I quote in the video. And, I highly recommend his book: Kant and Phenomenology! Are you interested primarily in Hegel, or Hegel for the sake of understanding someone/something else?

[@cesardaia4912]

@@philosophemes i'm interesed in Gadamer, cause of the hermeneutics.

[@philosophemes]

@@cesardaia4912 Excellent! I'm hoping to put some videos together on Heidegger's Being & Time, so hopefully we'll get to talk hermeneutics down the road!

[@cesardaia4912]

@@philosophemes thanks man, this channel is amazing.

[@ReflectiveJourney]

I am not an hegel expert but you can read hegel as an neoplatonist where the unity of thought and being is identiy-in-difference. Also, in SoL, he makes a distinction between formal identity and concerte identity and both identity and difference are recipocally dpendent on each other. I also dont think you can escape circularity in a monistic system. Reason is its own standard imo. Good video nonetheless

[@philosophemes]

Thank you for your comment. I definitely side with Kant over Hegel. I agree about the neoplatonist reading. I like how you put it: "Reason is its own standard." Do you think there is some-thing other than reason though?

[@ReflectiveJourney]

@@philosophemes not sure what is being asked. Reasoning is a cognitive faculty so of course there are other things and even other faculties. Although, I would distinguish speculative and understanding Reason. Ontologically, I am a hylomorphic conceptual realist. The conceptual determination is the historical and intersubjective following Hegel. Definitely not a kant expert but interested to know how you would respond to the categories of pure understanding being dogmatically assumed in kant.

[@philosophemes]

@@ReflectiveJourney Thank you for sparking these thoughts in me with your excellent comments. Sincerely. There are some folks who refuse to accept that there are things - as wrongheaded as that sounds. They seem to hold a position that the thing = their perception of it. So long as we accept that there are things that exist, then we can invoke the distinction in Kant between Sensibility and Understanding. Sensibility is limited by our species-specific conditions for the possibility of experiencing things. If we accept that, then we only need to clarify one more step. If we have trouble accepting it, we can consider how limited we are in our capacities to experience. For example, we don't see ultraviolet light, but it's there. We don't experience things like hummingbirds, but hummingbirds do experience things. So, there are a number of ways to show: not just that we are limited but that what we are getting from reality is limited in scope. The next move then is in regard to understanding. As long as we don't think - like Hegelians seem to think - that those limitations are nullified by our power of understanding, then it is not simply the case that "The Real is rational and the rational Real," rather rationality cannot reveal the totality of reality. As technology continues to improve, we can see that human rationality is limited. The reason I continue to highlight this aspect of the contrast between Kant and Hegel is because it functions as a "hinge point." So, we can use it to quickly sort through theories. I'll respond to your question about the understanding below.

[@philosophemes]

@ReflectiveJourney Excellent question RE: the categories of understanding! It took me such a long time to work out how Kant justifies the categories. I don't think that they are dogmatic. I'm putting together a series of philosophy of technology videos presently, and, then, I'll put together a video on this. I wouldn't have thought to do that without your prompting, so thank you, again. For now, I'd say: I think it's helpful to contextualize the question/problem in two ways - in regard to theories of predication/definition coming out of Aristotle and the problem of a priori knowledge of causation in Hume. If you place the Table of Judgments, the Table of Categories, and the Table of the Principles of the Pure Understanding from the Critique of Pure Reason beside one another, look at section 3 of each. The Table of Categories is also known as the “Transcendental Table of the Concepts of the Understanding.” Recall, according to Kant, “Concepts [Understanding] without intuitions [Sensibility] are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). So, judgments (of experience) function to give "sight" to intuition. Thus, the "Analogies of Experience" (section 3 of the Table of Principles) explains that the Concepts/Categories of the understanding identify how Judgment Relates the contents of Sensibility to one another. In terms of Aristotle, we could say Appearances are hylomorphic in that sensory content is subsumed under the forms of Intuition (Space & Time). Then, Appearances can be Understood as the material to be subsumed under the Concepts of the Understanding (thought of as forms of Judgment). When you say "hylomorphic conceptual realist" could you help me understand how you're using "conceptual" in that phrase? Does my response make sense?

[@user-sq3iz6qg5u]

It's a nice video, but you have missed the point in my opinion. The science of consciousness is criticised to have not left the boundaries of consciousness, which was not the point. Hegel, as well as Kant, wasn't naive realist nor did he want to scrutinize the difference as the difference, simply due to the conceptual truth that once we are talking about difference we have somehow brought it into our discourse and hence domesticated, in a way. Makes little sense to quite counter opinions on if Aristotle and Sexttus because Hegel was exactly pointing to their shortcomings in systematic way; why are their opinions more important here? You haven't really gone into detail nor have you built any resemblance of an argument. Hegel was talking about the foundation of the whole system that cannot be but itself, then, circularity is unavoidable. Also, you never mentioned coherence theories of truth. So I will repeat: a nice video, some interesting comparisons, but you didn't really give an effort to back up your point.

[@philosophemes]

Thank you for your comment; I apologize for any delay in responding. My goal was to show what the different positions (Kant & Hegel) look like in regard to mind-external reality. I think the video accomplished that. The problem with your comment about Aristotle, is that, though there are shortcomings with Aristotle, the truths of logic remain the same. @limricks5822 is exactly right. The reason I really wanted to put this together (as I mention in the video) is because this is a major stumbling block for those who follow Hegel. I'm not sure how you mean that I missed the point. I guess I'd ask, the point of what? Hegel's philosophy? I don't see this video as a criticism of the science of consciousness, I see this video as a criticism of the assumption that Hegel's science of consciousness represents mind-external reality. Hegel is very tricky, one of the major values of this video, imo, is that it shows you where the otherwise monstrously powerful philosopher Hegel is open to defeat. There is a much bigger ontological issue at work in the background than "coherence theories of truth." The issue actually goes all the way back to Plato. So, I opted to point to the bigger issue, which is: Hegel doesn't think difference in terms of difference; he thinks difference in terms of sameness. When we come to figure out what difference in terms of difference looks like/when we understand difference in terms of difference, then it's like walking into a well lit room. Hegel's system is wrong. His system is wrong because it has an illusory relation to mind-external reality (according to Kant), and it is wrong because it understands difference in terms of sameness, not difference (according to Deleuze). Hegel's reign has lasted too long (the Analytics need to accept that they should abandon Brandom and Hegel [and Zizek for that matter] and return to Kant!). Thank you again for your comment.

[@user-sq3iz6qg5u]

@@philosophemes well, it took a while to write it down, but here it is. thank you for an extended response. let me make my point more. you have presented your position and brought up some interesting thoughts, but, by my lights, in no way have you made your point or demonstrated that Hegel is wrong. Rather, you have missed his main points. I will proceed in path set by philosophers like Pirmin Stekeler, as well as T. Pinkard and R. Pippin. the position you are describing and endorsing is dangerously close to naive or metaphysical realism, which is, well, quite easy to defeat. As to logic: logical truths are eternal, but logical systems are axiomatic and any logical truth should be formulated within a system, so it is only system related. this is always based on a set of assumptions or presuppositions that _we_ accept and then unravel a logical system. there is no one and only logic, but multiple various incompatible systems of establishing syntactic relations between propositions that we are free to adopt and discard. they are tailored for different tasks etc. so validity of a proposition is determined by its place within a broader system of propositions within a system of logic with its intricate language rules and premises. in this respect, logic is always circular: we may formulate sentences and prove them only as far as we start from premises we already have; not all the sets of premises would equally work, but still it is far from being unified or unanimous. in a way it is circular, then, because the premises (axiomata) are shown correct (in a system) by inferences and truths they allow, and inferences and truths show that axiomata were correct. Philosophy of science has come to realise that our theories are ‘posits’, that in some ways connect us with the world. I will refer you to Quine and antirealists here. valid logical system is valid 'objectively', it does not depend on our mind, but the edifice of a system is always elaborated by us and this validity can be upheld in practice by a community of thinkers and speakers. so what logic are you talking about? traditional, classical, non-classical (non-binary, modal, epistemic, abductive etc?). one sentence may be true in one system and false in another. in sum, what your logic is and what you use it for partly depends on you, and in a certain way logic is circular. So this claim “Hegel's system, being circular, assumes its own coherence.” contains an incorrect assessment because it does not assume its own correctness, but establishes it in the unraveling of the whole system. Ad the note on Aristotle: he criticized vicious circle, a form of ostensible proof that has no real import because it is tautological - A is B and B is A. The problem with that is that you can justify anything like that. However, it only works with some local or restricted lines of reasoning and it does not apply to a whole philosophical system, only within a science the premises of which are already established by philosophy. Within itself a system must be coherent and in one certain way circular so that the end of the system must bring us to a full understanding of the premises we started with. it is not to be applied to local line of reasoning. Actually, in his circularity Hegel follows the figure of self-thinking thought that was introduced by Aristotle. Ad the note on Sextus: Drawing on Sextus Empiricus, you have to keep in mind that he criticized not only circularity, but also infinite regress and foundationalism. so other horns of his criticism strike a position you are coming to. We cannot escape a certain kind of circularity in philosophy. 2. The break from reality and identity. “That is what we call a floating sandbox, where Hegel can play all day, totally untethered from reality. Although he comes back to reality quite often to suggest truths which are true in his sandbox but which cannot be considered true in reality.” His system is wrong because it has an illusory relation to mind-external reality (according to Kant),” First of all, this was in fact started by Kant because he claimed that we cannot know anything apart from what reason had built herself. So any talk of external reality is paradoxical in Kant’s system. In this respect, Hegel followed the Kant’s steps and rectified some of his improprieties. Second, Hegel introduces the content of the world in the very opening chapters of Phenomenology - by demonstratives here and now. The content is already given to the conceptual thought, then he proceeds to refine and precisify the form of thinking of that content, the work on the concept. Third, by postulating mind-independent reality you simply miss Hegel’s idea and fall into the empiricist illusions. To avoid that, I would really recommend reading him in German. He did not claim that the world is construed by our individual minds, he was not a Locke, but he claims that reality is thusly constituted that the world is thinkable and open to our concepts, because it has conceptual form. Concepts are more than just our mental states or similar, objective concept is inherent structure of the world because it is determined. Then, this can be grasped by our subjective thinking. I would refer you to works of Stekeler, Pippin and Pinkard here. Once you postulate world in a realist way, you immediately will be faced with the problem to establish our connection to it and will fall prey to various kinds of scepticism. It is a pendulum like process from realism to constructivism in their various and changing forms, which is the internal process of the development and evolution of Geist. 3. Deleuze difference in terms of difference. By itself Unintelligible formula, you have not given any interpretation or example. But it’s ok. The problem with that is that the moment you start talking or thinking of the difference, you already domesticate it - make difference a part of your discourse, label it, introduce categories and thus tame it, in a way. So volens nolens it enters our language and thinking, what Hegel calls the recognition of ourselves in the other. (does it strike you that word Deleuze is pronounced almost as delusion? Deleuze was through and through within the Hegelian paradigm). So, overall, perhaps Hegel was wrong, but I do not see how you refuted him in the video. In my view, to repeat myself, you have missed Hegel’s point and are fighting a strawman. Thank you for you video and comments because it stimulates further Nachdenken.

[@philosophemes]

​@@user-sq3iz6qg5u Thank you for taking the time to put your thoughts together in a comment. I hope that philosophers of the future will see what we discussed here and benefit from it in some way. For the sake of time, I'll only address the points you make that seem foundational to your overall critique. In section 1: You state, "one sentence may be true in one system and false in another." That is true, but we are looking precisely for some-thing that stops the slide of (linguistic) relativity. Natural laws don't change, for example, gravity, depending on how we contextualize them. Our speech acts can't make objects fall upwards. I thought it might be helpful also to mention that when you say, "validity of a proposition," I think you mean "truth value," since (logically-speaking) validity is a property of arguments, not propositions. In section 2, you state: "started by Kant because he claimed that we cannot know anything apart from what reason had built herself." I realize that is a possible (and possibly a popular) reading of Kant's philosophy; however, that is an incorrect reading of Kant. Kant does not suggest that I can use my thoughts (without performing any actions) to produce a sandwich in front of me that I can eat. Also in section 2, you mention "the Given," but that is precisely what we are concerned with here. In other words, the Given is not simply given. Further, I encourage you to consider that there is a difference between an empirical position and a transcendental position. So, when you say, "by postulating mind-independent reality you simply miss Hegel’s idea and fall into the empiricist illusions," that conflates empirical and transcendental positions. In other words, the Kantian Copernican Revolution revolves around the hypothesis that "the mind doesn't conform to objects; objects conform to the mind." And, so, if objects are conforming to the mind, then necessarily there must be some "thing" other than the-object-as-it-conformed-to-the-mind, i.e. "re-presented" by the mind. So, the hypothetical function of the Kantian Copernican Revolution necessarily points to the "pre-conformed" reality that (because we're talking about conforming to the mind) must be "mind-external." Therefore, (and this was the point of the video's critique of Hegel, which I think you're missing), we don't need to "posit" mind-external reality. Moreover, if you think sandwiches only exist in minds, then you don't ever have to put another sandwich in your mouth. But, if you stop eating, then you'll eventually die. So, it seems there's a difference between the mind-external sandwich and the mind-internal sandwich. Lastly, in section 3, notice that you are applying the Hegelian move to Deleuze that Hegel applied to Kant. Difference in terms of difference is precisely not domesticated. The phrase "difference in terms of difference," points directly beyond language and thinking. That is the whole point of thinking difference in terms of difference, not in terms of sameness. It's actually not an unintelligible formula. It just takes awhile to learn to "see" with it as a regulative idea. I appreciate your clang association comment that "Deleuze" sounds like "delusion," but, were I to say that to you, wouldn't you simply bring up that that association only works in the system of "English"? So, to conclude, I don't think we are arguing against a "straw man" as you suggest. Nowadays, people seem to believe that language can magically turn reality into whatever you want it to be. But, that is an illusion. It is a "transcendental illusion" to use Kant's technical terminology, and the champion of the dialectics of that illusion is Hegel. Until we return to Kant and learn how to not get sucked into the Hegelian system, we will continue to debate how something should be labeled, rather than how something functions in relation to reality. Again, I appreciate you taking the time to comment and critique the video, I think the comments that emerged because of it may be beneficial to people who visit here in the future. Sincerely.