Historian Reacts - Cadorna Snatches Defeat From The Jaws of Victory I THE GREAT WAR Week 108

[@RyanPetersonReacts]

Links: Discord: discord.gg/r2WeevN3Ua Twitch: www.twitch.tv/ryanpeteslive Gaming Channel: kzbin.info/door/q93DC9Jrmz_tQY9jakgouA Main Channel: kzbin.info/door/A0d4wih_ecEWiLjy0Ws4Tg

[@samrevlej9331]

This week goes from August 12th to 18th, 1916.

[@freudsigmund72]

Cadorna manages to lose a victory to the Austrians.... truly an achievement

[@KimFareseed]

11:38 Agreed.

[@untruelie2640]

Btw, the accurate name of the highest german military rank was "Generalfeldmarschall" ("General Field Marshal"). It sounds a bit pompous compared to similar ranks like the french "Maréchal" or the british Field Marshal, but it comes from a long tradition of both the prussian army and the army of the Holy Roman Empire. The HRE even had a "Reichsgeneralfeldmarschall", which was the highest military leader appointed by the Emperor, even though it was mostly an honorary title for particularly important and accomplished generals (from the higher nobility of course). The naval equivalent of the General Field Marshal in the german navy was the "Großadmiral", also spelled "Grossadmiral" (lit. "Big/Great Admiral", fig. "Grand Admiral"). Karl Dönitz, the commander of the german submarines in WW2 and the last successor of Hitler as the german head of state was a Großadmiral.

[@robertelliott-bach7101]

I do understand the mockery and critical judgement of Great War-period general officers is a continued bit for this channel, however, if I may, I would like to offer a counter-opinion, and claim on why the the critical judgement on these period generals is perhaps a little, dare I say, undeserved. And I would account this to one or two fundamental factors, relates in fact, to to experience with warfare itself. The last great European conflict on the European continent itself, with model, contemporary European armies, was the Franco-Prussian War, a conflict of linear warfare, of line-structured formations of single-shot repeated rifles, with quasi-Napoleonic artillery pieces, and still with that antiquated sense of "gentlemanly conduct" in warfare. And critically I would argue, it was comprised of classical formation battles. All conflicts including the European nations preceding the First World War were colonial conflicts, against indigenous African natives possessing little to no contemporary firearms, and certainly having not the knowledge of a model European army. They were a completely different opponent, oftentimes necessitating little proper operational strategy beyond the implementation of superior military technology. All military academies before the First World War had taught quasi-Napoleonic or quasi-early Victorian military tactics, of antiquated formational battles with smoothbore musketry and later single-shot repeating rifles. And indeed, the first couple months were similar to this dynamic formational battles, which was why these great strategic maneuvers were so effective early on, the armies ostensibly, more prepared then they would be. And then, that ended in the winter of 1914, and transformed into something so completely different, linear attritional trench warfare. This model of conflict requires a completely different form of warfare, the first operational battles and strategies, instead of great formational battles of yore. And this fundamentally different form of warfare had to be overcome by elderly gentleman officers who throughout their numerous decades of service, had been accustomed to formational, quasi-linear warfare. If you were a general, especially a general chief-of-staff, whose career and in this situation, the fate of the nation, relies upon your tactical brilliance on the field, and then after only four months of conflict which you had, for decades prepared for, which the military academies instructed you in, which you had become so accustomed to it was child’s play to conduct, and now you are instructed to instead now, command armies orders of magnitude beyond what you were accustomed to, assailing fortified, defensive positions atop unfavourable battlefield conditions, with the enemy equivalent in capability and material strength as you. Oftentimes the strategy and solution to this seemingly insurmountable problem was just to do what was done before, a linear warfare-esque frontal assault, even as machine guns, modern artillery and occasionally aeroplanes would deliver much more resistance than in previous conflicts, the solution was always the same, just reinforce with more men and try again. You can’t really flank unlike in formational battles, because the trench lines extend with little to no apertures along the complete frontline. There is no dynamic formational maneuver. The most you can do is oblique order, concentrated men on one section of the frontline to overwhelm and breakthrough, which is what many did. Most of the time, the greatest solution was by employing the greatest technological, material or manpower advantage. Now, you may ask yourself, “Well, they must surely, if they were proper generals, to adapt to the situation.”, and indeed that is a justifiable criticism to deliver. Yet, human behavior is difficult, especially when it is an entrenched behavior, as warfare had practically not changed since the dawn of organized warfare in ancient times. Every conflict since then had more or less been by classical formations, from the Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War, to the Battles of Thermopylae and Marathon, from the largest, bloodiest medieval battle, the Battle of Grunwald, to the Battle of Gettysburg. No army had ever clashed in such a manner before, with such revolutionary mechanical technology, such as armoured trains, mechanized artillery, eventually armoured vehicles, bolt-action rifles to aeroplanes. It was a fundamentally different engagement, and you as a practioner of war, have to now wade your way through this murky new environment where not classical formation battles, yet grand, even million-strong operational battles are centre-stage, with mechanized weaponry, dirigible airships, aeroplanes, armoured vehicles, cryptology, and the abandonment of any semblance of “gentlemanly conduct” in warfare, instead with deception, infiltration and partisanship. Now perhaps the zenith of this collection off general officers' strategic triumph was in 1918 (by which Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf and Luigi Cadorna was dismissed from their military position by the way), as the German and Allied general staff began implementing combined arms warfare, employing their aeroplanes, reformed infantry structures and armoured vehicles to the greatest of their capabilities and effectiveness, only after three or so years of progressively learning modern warfare. And this is where the celebrated German Spring Offensive, or 'Kaiserschlacht' and Hundred Days Offensive occurred, practically to some degree proto-operational combined arms warfare of the Second World war. Ultimately, however slowly, they did adapt and learn. And I do think, a mark of a at least quasi-competent tactician, is adapting and overcoming their tactical situation. Am I being overtly generous? Probably, yes. And individuals such as Luigi Cadorna are objectively inept, foolish commanders. Yet, I still believe in the merit of perspectives, and given the individual situations of these general officers, I do believe we can deliver a little credence to these men of such mockery. Sources - www.historyhit.com/were-world-war-one-soldiers-really-lions-led-by-donkeys/ www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/british-incompetence-in-world-war-one-has-been-overestimated-it-s-politicians-not-the-military-who-deserve-censure-9039985.html Less Ironclad Sources - www.quora.com/Why-were-WW1-Generals-so-inept www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/13urdn/were_wwi_generals_incredibly_incompetent_or_just/

[@melkor3496]

Well written comment as a response. I’m very impressed. I very much agree but in the start and throughout the war there was a great many old generals that were incompetent and then there was the ones that just struggled to adapt.

[@robertelliott-bach7101]

@@melkor3496 Indeed I do agree with your point, and perhaps that is a demonstration of a little too-much generosity towards these historical figures. Yet I do consider it especially important to highlight these factors, as without proper and suitable context, it gives a absolutely false impression of absolute idiocy within the General Staff. Whilst yes, many humans may make fundamentally idiotic decisions, yet this myth that every non-commissioned officer above the equivalent rank of major was strategically idiotic (not inept corresponding to their situation, just tactically idiotic), portrayed to mockery in popular period pieces such as "Blackadder goes Forth", and oftentimes portrayed in other World War I media from the perspective of the individual infantryman, which is true from their perspective, yet delivers a false perception without the general's perspective beyond "Oh look, they are pompous strategic idiots living in high society whilst the poor, moral soldiers are dying for them". Like everything in history, that is true too some degree, yet it has definitely been overexaggerated in popular media. Furthermore, even the most strategically-inept and foolish individuals have some wartime capability. Marshal of Italy Luigi Cadorna was a masterful innovator in military logistics (probably why the Italian Army did not collapse after so many military blunders), and he still achieved victories at Asiago and Gorizia/Sixth Battle of the Isonzo, which occurred two months ago and last week respectively. Furthermore, this perception of him as a valorous defender of Italia was probably maintained by charismatic and zealous propaganda, which he was probably also a pioneer in. It was only after the Battle of Caporetto between October 24th and November 19th, 1917 that the Italian High Command were completely through with him. They sacked both him, his subordinate general Luigi Capello, and practically all general officers responsible. And the officers which succeeded him would command Italy's armies to victory, employing the combined arms warfare that was adopted by the Allied powers. When critiquing someone, I always find it especially important to understand the perspective of the individual which your critique is direct at. A good exemplar of my point is Hello Games Studios, a astoundingly talented and capable video game design team which became perhaps the most detested company in the video game community because of their inexperience and blunders in their marketing which, whilst to some degree understandable for a indie development team which have programmed only two games thus far, and that redeemed themselves by labouring at the game until it became a superlative video game. Sort of similar to the First World War generals to some degree. Flawed, unprepared and inept (in the context of the upcoming situation they were propelled into), which slowly "redeemed" themselves by learning and adapting, until achieving great victories in the end. Except for the German generals. Even with the Spring Offensive they were still detested. Source for Marshal Luigi Cadorna paragraph - www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luigi-cadorna_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ And Internet Historian's video regarding the legend of Hello Games and the redemption of No Man's Sky is probably the greatest source I can deliver for that.

[@iwatchDVDsonXbox360]

I feel like you overrated Ottomans. I feel like out of all Ottoman leaders only Mustafa Kemal is pretty successful.