Hood's Division Should Have Just Marched Around Big Round Top!

[@FUNKRUBICON]

Good point Tim! Another factor that I feel people tend to forget is that most of Hood’s division had already marched 25 miles just to arrive on the battlefield on July 2nd. The fact that these soldiers accomplished what they did that day after that long of a march is amazing. Adding another two to three miles to flank the round tops May have completely exhausted these troops not withstanding the factors you bring up.

[@jaynoyd]

I had read the Alabamians under Hood broke camp at 3am with little or no breakfast, made the march with little water in the heat of July. They were worn out. They would be repulsed anywhere along the line where the Federals were waiting.

[@johnswanson4266]

The entire problem for Lee was blindness. He had no information on the forces in front of him due to a feud between Stuart and two of his subordinate officers who were trusted by Lee. The irregular cavalry units Stuart gave Lee weren't used because he never trusted them. The Union cavalry got there first, assessed the situation and then prepared the battlefield. Never go into a battle blind.

[@TheHistoryUnderground]

Tim Smith is pulling no punches. 😅👍🏻

[@jacobmasters438]

No doubt! I was fortunate enough to see him in person last month when I visited Gettysburg with my Dad and thanked Tim for the good job he does. Lol

[@billpike7392]

Love these Angry Tim Videos! Custer, Witness Trees, Hoods Division. Keep them comming Tim😄

[@aaronfleming9426]

3:42 Ah, so refreshing to hear someone tell it like it is! I liked and subscribed at that moment :D

[@michaelbruce6190]

Hood’s plan at Franklin was even worse

[@andrewc2491]

This one should have made ""Tim's Pet Peeves" video! I thoroughly enjoyed watching Tim get a little smart-alecky here, and agree with him 100%. This is kind of an intellectual version of an "embarrassment of riches"...we who have studied this battle for years and years (and enjoy a relative "wealth" of knowledge) easily can identify the lunacy of such a possible choice on the part of Hood. But those who are new to the education of the Battle of Gettysburg...well...of course you are graciously extended a bit of slack here, and I'm certain all are happy that you are becoming one of the enlightened!

[@tommcdonald1873]

You mentioned the Sixth Corps. People also need to realize even closer and rested at the time was Caldwell's division . They sent the 5th NH to the Taneytown Road for reconnaissance . When they realized Hood's Division was fighting the round tops and the Wheatfield they reassembled with the rest of Cross' Brigade and attacked the Texas Brigade and Bennings Georgians there.

[@jumpmaster82nd.]

Perfect Tim! War isn't waged as easily as moving chessboard pieces and your opponent doesn't watch you maneuver bedazzled into inaction by your brilliant plan. It was/is a stupid idea...

[@pagejackson1207]

I would just add that the Confederate attack on July 2nd was to be an echelon attack starting on the Confederate right and and extending to the Confederate left. There would be an interval of time between each brigade stepping off on the attack - perhaps 15 minutes as an average. The attack was already hours behind schedule and an additional hour delay in initiating the attack would likely have resulted in the Confederate left not getting engaged at all as sunset occurred at approximately 7:30 PM (there was no daylight savings time then) and civil war armies were loath to conduct night-time attacks at this portion of the war.

[@jumpmaster82nd.]

@@pagejackson1207 And that the hills and rock formation below were not objectives proper.

[@Samuel-o7j2f]

Wow, so nice to watch and listen to this video. Up until now I always bought into Hood's idea as a good one. Listening to Tim present other facts made me realize, as Tim stated, that it was a terrible idea. Thank you Tim. Hood marching into the 6th corps would not have been fun.

[@dennismatthews7060]

One could also argue that Hood DID in fact go around to the right, just not as far as he wanted to. General Lee conceived an oblique flanking attack coming up the Emmitsburg Road and hitting the Federals on Cemetery Hill (the tactical focus of all three days of the battle). Once the battle started, however, Hoods division went straight ahead, in effect moving to the right, and hitting the left flank of the Union army first at Devil's Den and then on Little Roundtop. If successful, they would have been behind the Union lines, which was the objective of the proposed move around Roundtop in the first place. This maneuver, it should be noted, was inevitable given the position of Sickles Third Corp, the nature of the ground and the initial engagement with Sharpshooters in front of Big Roundtop, while also staying within the parameters of Lee's original plan.

[@onesmoothstone5680]

AMEN! Preach the good word !!

[@baltimorelimolady]

the battle was lost the morning of the second day. if longstreet would of attacked in the morning or as late as noon, he probably could of taken the high ground meaning cemetery ridge. the union didn't have all of their corps yet in town. his prolonging the attacks until 4pm cost them victory at Gettysburg.

[@hatuletoh]

Maybe. This is the trouble--and the fun--of speculative history. The Confederate troop movement took as long as it in part because they were trying to work their way south without being observed, which they mostly managed to do at the cost of many hours of daylight. So let's imagine that Longstreet decides to say "to hell with it," doesn't worry about being seen by the Union look-outs, marches his corps directly to their jump-off points, and launches the attack earlier in the day. The Union generals would have had the time to adjust their own deployments--with the benefit of interior lines--to meet the now obvious incoming attack. They might have had less soldiers on the field when the attack hit, but those soliders would very likely have been in much better positions to receive it. No desperate message from G.K. Warren for troops to cover the left flank, no crazy mixing of commands as units are fed into the fight piecemeal, and (probably) no Brash Dan Sickles and the 3rd Corps advanced out a half mile ahead of the main Union line. Maybe the better preparation and organization wouldn't have been enough to have stopped a determined 1st Corps Confederate attack made with plenty of daylight to spare, but knowing that the success the Confederates had in the actual attack came partly from the unpreparedness of the Union defenders, if we take away that element of surprise it's almost impossible to speculate about the result.

[@blukeblue1235]

@@hatuletoh Good points! People seem to forget that the Yankees weren't stupid and just sitting around drinking coffee.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Longstreet didn't attack because there was no actionable intelligence or reasonable plan.

[@GhostofSicklesleg]

Wow, great point to that! Tim you changed my mind a little more.

[@McNair39thNC]

They barely had the men to do what they did they certainly wouldn’t of had enough to stretch around the round tops. If you still think it’s a good idea then you need to stop watching the movie Gettysburg and read some more books and listen to Tim.

[@randygrider9758]

I agree with your asessment. Lee’s line was already longer, and thinner than the unions, that was bent in a fish hook. Any part of the union line could be quickly reinforced , where as the confederates had to march miles, the union marched yards. At this point of the battle, Lee was out of choices, other than retreat, which he could not bear. After picketts charge he def had no choice. He lacked the men, and supplies, for anything but a quick end. I think his biggest failure was not doing as Longstreet suggested and manuevor early in the battle between Meade and Washington, and make Meade charge.

[@stonesinmyblood27]

Simple: Hood knew Lee’s plan wouldn’t succeed and his men would pay the consequences of Lee’s tactic

[@PathfinderHistory]

The book Killer Angels and the movie Gettysburg did much more good than harm. It fueled interest in Gettysburg and American history. But it causes people to over emphasize some things beyond what local historians think should be. Agree?

[@sweetsoulstudy472]

"We must move around to the right sir! And take them from the rear!" I always knew this sounded easier said than done.

[@danmc7815]

If you are assessing Lee and his move into Pennsylvania, it is a failure. Done. So, the next thing is to assess the options available to his army. What else could and should Lee have done? Lee is brilliant tactically, but strategically he does not have a winning plan. To assess his plan, one needs first to admit that the South probably can never make the Union incapable of fighting. So, Lee must say the Union of its will to fight. Two different things. At the end of WW2, Germany has lost its ability to fight. It has nothing with which to fight anymore. Japan surrendered and cut a deal while it still had some capacity to fight. It was losing and probably would have continued to lose. But, they reached an agreement, and Japan was not invaded. Look at the Punic Wars. Carthage has the ability to fight after the first two, but not the third. Lee has an idea that he must defeat the Army of the Potomac to make the Union sufficiently war weary, so the South can win. This seems to be to be the flawed idea, but maybe not. The maybe not is because soon the Union will have new Generals that will change things. Grant pins down Lee's army and forces it to choose: Fight or flee. George Washington lost battle after battle and kept his army in existence despite doing so. He loses the major cities, but he keeps fighting. Could Lee have kept fighting if he had not defended Richmond? Perhaps. To what end? Sherman attacked the ability of the South to fight with his marches. Total War, attack the ability of the Southerners to even feed themselves, nevertheless an army. So, maybe Lee had to have a victory that destroyed the Army of the Potomac. Gettysburg and Antietam were chances to get it, perhaps, but both failed. Why? Before we go off on Hood, maybe he was right, and maybe the wrong move was to attack the Army of the Potomac at all on these days. Maybe not just Hood, but Lee's entire army should have moved and picked a different place to fight or better, force the Army of Potomac to attack. Defense is almost always easier than offense. We will never know. After the battle, this is all war games and speculation. But, it can be fun and/or interesting.

[@Hambone-nx2io]

Dang brother... settle down!

[@b2l421]

So General Hood didn't realize the challenges he would face when he suggested moving around the right?

[@clarkbuckner4900]

Yep.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Even generals sometimes indulge in wishful thinking. And facing what Hood faced, it's hard to see why some wishful thinking was tempting.

[@Heystraw]

Tim tell us how you really feel lol

[@blukeblue1235]

Yes. Tim was a little vague here.😂

[@celticnorthman3615]

Set them straight Tim!! Good job!!

[@tinaphillips7239]

If Lee would have listened to his second in command, Longstreet, and redeploy after pushing the Union troops back on the first day, Hood’s unfortunate frontal assault wouldn’t have been necessary. They could have taken Culps and Cemetery Hills and commanded the battlefield while as Longstreet suggested in moving his entire Corps to get in between Meade’s army and Washington

[@bayknight20]

I think that Lee's actions on Culp's Hill was a waste.Should have used those forces on the south end of the line

[@tinaphillips7239]

@@bayknight20 I think it’s better to say Ewell’s inactions on Culps Hill we’re a waste. Lol

[@bayknight20]

I do not think they had a chance at Culps hill, it was suited for defense and the outcomes show it. It was a waste of effort.

[@bayknight20]

@@tinaphillips7239 Easy to say, but the Union troops were well fortified by the second day and were basiclly impregnable.

[@bills6963]

Not to mention that Hood proved to be a pretty lousy strategist when he took over for Joe Johnston’s army in 1864.

[@pizzafrenzyman]

Not just 6th Corps, but 5th Corps is still in back of the round tops at this time. Hood would have run into 2 Corps!!

[@burrellbikes4969]

Considering the Round Tops were unoccupied when Lee gave his orders to attack and it was General Warren seeing the soon to be desperate situation that changed the situation. But had Longstreet and Hood gotten their attack off sooner (as Lee had hoped) they very well could have gotten to the top first, which would have been the flanking attack already. And without all the extra waiting and waiting while Hood wandered off into an area with more Union reinforcements marching through. As well as Union Calvary scouting their own flank. The idea of swinging around simply wasn’t realistic.

[@marvwatkins7029]

Hood may have been brave and (recklessly) aggressive, but he was also something of an incompetent idiot when it came to military direction.

[@blukeblue1235]

😂

[@aaronfleming9426]

Yep. Maxed out at division command.

[@stewartmillen7708]

Answer to your question: McLaws and Anderson sidle down to extend the line. Moreover, Oates"Alabama regiment found Big Round Top unoccupied, and Oates claimed (likely justifiably) that he could have held Big Round Top against multiple his numbers, and that furthermore once cleared of trees artillery could be placed on the summit which would have driven Union forces off Little Round Top. That seems not 'crazy' or stupid

[@aaronfleming9426]

If McLaws and Anderson sidle down, they open a huge gap in the rebel line. And there's still the matter of time. It takes hours and hours to get to the summit of BRT, cut down the trees, haul up the cannon. And the whole time they're doing all that marching and manual labor in 90 degree heat they need to eat, and drink, and then there's the whole problem of that big old hole in their line created by all the sidling and what Meade might do to exploit the situation....so it is a crazy and stupid idea.

[@fload46d]

Very good. Another thought is that many of the Confederates had just arrived and were pretty beat.

[@jwhite146]

Hood wanted to go around the Round Tops but Lee had given orders to attack Devil's Dem and the Round Tops.

[@dennismatthews7060]

Just want to point out that Hood’s division had ALREADY moved around to the right! And how long did that take them? And how efficient was that march? And how good was their intelligence when they discovered an entire Union corp on their new front? It reminds me of Meade’s rebuke of Sickles when he said if Sickles keeps advancing to the West he could find even higher ground.

[@McNair39thNC]

Not the best comparison though. Meades point was that Emmitsburg rd was commanded by cemetery hill and it was not a good move and was against orders. While it threw a wrench in Lees plan, it was a terrible position and the 3rd Corps paid the price. And where did they end up, back on cemetery hill where Sickles was supposed to be the whole time.

[@ardalla535]

The war was lost at Sharpsburg. Even then it probably wouldn't have mattered . He still could not have taken Baltimore or Washington -- he had no siege equipment. Only chance he had was if Britain could have broken the Northern blockade. But only an overwhelming victory at Sharpsburg MIGHT have convinced the Brits.

[@aaronfleming9426]

You're right, although there was no way Lee was going to win any kind of victory at Antietam. He simply didn't have enough men. He barely had enough men to hang on by his fingernails as it was, let alone deliver any sort of counterattack. What lost the war at Antietam was that Lee fought the battle at all. If he had withdrawn after capturing Harpers Ferry he would have been able to claim a wildly successful raid - fed his army in Maryland for 2 weeks, captured a 12,000 man garrison (!), captured a huge pile of materiel. Instead he fought and lost and gave Lincoln the victory he so desperately needed.

[@Gitarzan66]

Right on Tim. I would love to hear you deal with stupid people in person.

[@Gitarzan66]

@@cfonde You look stupid by taking him completely serious.

[@Not_So_Weird_in_Austin]

Werent the orders were to attack rather than flank? Even without calvary to scout there was little to indicate if flanking would work. Better in hindsight unknown on the actual day. You could say Stewarts calvary failure to attack the rear was the same concept only Custers action prevented an actual attack in the rear on the 3rd day

[@bayknight20]

Was daylight savings time in effect on the battle date?

[@beej86]

No. DST was not a thing until the 20th Century. It first came in at the time of the First World War.

[@robertmichols4320]

00

[@bayknight20]

@@beej86 so the sun would be going down at around 7:50 at night, effecting the length of the battle

[@treyhaidet818]

Cool! Thanks Tim, you are the best!

[@philspaugy1756]

Go my man! Rock on!

[@daviddougan6961]

Not to be negative, but who is this military genius? Obviously, Hood's attack was doomed to fail, and he saw that clearly, and suggested the only alternative was to attack and seize Big Round Top or the surrounding area . All those Union troops along the front would have been flanked, and Confederates being on the highest ground in the area they would have presented a difficult obstacle for the 6th Corp and quite frankly, the Union troops were not going to attack anyone to their front. What happened was exactly what Hood expected, which then led to the other disaster the next day, Picket's charge. General Lee was the best general on the field but he failed in both decisions and he knew it. He offered to resign to Davis on July 4th which was declined.

[@AD-md5uk]

should have used a10's

[@justindavidson9157]

“You should have let me go to the right, you should have let me go to the righttttttt...”

[@KaedFuyou]

Hood had to fallow orders he could not change them Longstreet tryed to convince Lee to do so he would not budge

[@georgedoolittle9015]

I think people need to understand that Battles such a Gettysburg are famous precisely because no one really knew what they were doing or what was going on as opposed to so many other Battles of the US Civil War as they would become...though all hardly set piece in the least. In other words *"your Army"* has a mind of its own with the Battle of Gettysburg a textbook example of that.

[@mikesuggs1642]

If Stonewall Jackson had been present, he would not have procrastinated one bit about a move around the round tops. he would have simply done it and executed it to the letter. Of course, There would have been no need to engage around the round tops to start with because Jackson would have seized the High ground on the First day rendering everything that happened on Day 2 and 3 mute. Because Day 2 and 3 would have been the Federals retreating to get some distance between Jackson and themselves and attempting to cover Washington.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Unless he fell asleep. You never know when Jackson's going to fall asleep.

[@mattpiepenburg8769]

Agree Hood’s plan would have been a bust. Further agree that retrospect has 20/20 clarity. That said, I still feel that Longstreet’s overall argument on July 1 to redeploy and to take the entire army south between DC and Meade and force the union to attack an entrenched position ( a kind of “pre Cold Harbor”)of better choosing/ground would have been wiser once Ewell failed to take the high ground on day 1. Lee had his blood up, overestimated (and over scarificed) his men in an otherwise understandable ambition to win a decisive victory in the north to break Union moral and end the war before the reality of math broke the south. EP Alexander, whose calm opinions were often the soundest during and after the war, agreed as much. Of course day 2 and day 3 failed, and thus it’s easy in 2022 to critique decisions in 1863 with confidence and data not openly clear to Lee and others. That said, Gettysburg was clearly no Gaines Mill but rather more a Malvern Hill and Lee was wrong to force day 3. Furthermore, by the afternoon of day 2 it was clear to Longstreet and of course Hood that Johnston’s morning reconnoiter of the “open air” flank at little round top was an error and made the previous plan a doomed one, as both Hood and Longstreet knew. Better communication and clear pragmatism could have spared lives the CSA could not afford to lose. Lee was certainly no Burnside, but something about July 2 and July 3 suggests he was not at his best.

[@aaronfleming9426]

I agree in general, although Longstreet's strategic "plan" suffers from the same problem as Hood's tactical "plan", namely that Meade controlled the interior lines of communication and could have beat Lee to any point. Lee's only real option was to retreat to Virginia.

[@mikesuggs1642]

A quick movement around Big Round Top would have caught the Federal Army totally off Center. Hood would have had total access to their rear and could have either launched an enfilade assault against their line on Cemetary ridge or went directly for their reserve artillery and camps and supply trains in the rear. Either way Meade would have been in a terrible situation, if he pulled more forces to deal with Hood's incursion in his rear. Lee could have broken though his line at the weakened point in more than one location. Meade would have had to pull out and save what he could of his Army.

[@aaronfleming9426]

If you had watched the video you would know that "a quick movement around BRT" would have run smack dab into VI Corps, to say nothing of weakening Longstreet's corps and making it vulnerable to attack.

[@stephengregory8152]

It seems to me that bravado outweighed logic many times in this mess . . Find wood or stones and defend that , instead of marching in a line in the open . . Maries heights is a good example

[@larryoliversr.4141]

Would have been easier to match around the flank then assault the hill

[@lanemeyer9350]

He’s correct. Good would have ran right into the (fresh) 6th Corps and been all alone over there. He would have been decimated

[@lanemeyer9350]

HOOD*!! Forgive me

[@bigsarge2085]

👍

[@swampyankee]

Tim, you have to learn to express yourself. :-)

[@mikecooper8731]

Dont hold back. Tell us how you feel. ;)

[@deejayimm]

3:40 trigger warning...

[@paulmarino8810]

Lee was over confident plain and simple. Hubris is a weakness, thats why the union won at gettysburg. Plain and simple.

[@richardhoward3462]

Wow, get angry much? Chill out. Don't take it so personal. Get off my grass!!

[@kw19193]

One thing to disagree with something that never got past the discussion stage, quite another to get pissy about it and vent about it on screen. We will never know what might have happened had Hood gone around Big Round Top so why waste time prattling on? However, it is something that further obfuscates the real issue about Gettysburg that few - and certainly not southern apologists - want to discuss, and that's Lee's thoroughly slack and uninspired handling of this battle. Regardless, an historian should be dispassionate about events the better to lend his voice credence in not only this but all other events as well. Clearly this guy has a different opinion regarding that. Cheers!

[@McNair39thNC]

Angry Tim 🤣

[@Americanpie1800]

There are alot of good points with this battle but little round top was just another small part in the battle, who would win was desided on the first day the high ground is what desided on day 1