James Longstreet and the American Civil War

The American Civil War is often called the first “modern war.” Sandwiched between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, it spawned a host of “firsts” and is considered a precursor to the larger and more deadly 20th century wars. Confederate Gen. James Longstreet made overlooked but profound modern contributions to the art of war. Retired Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen explains what Longstreet did and how he did it in James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War.
Initially, commanders on both sides extensively utilized Napoleonic tactics that were obsolete because of the advent of the rifled musket and better artillery. Some professional army officers worked to improve tactics, operations, and strategies. On the Confederate side, a careful comparison of Longstreet’s body of work in the field to modern military doctrine reveals several large-scale innovations.
Longstreet understood early that the tactical defense was generally dominant over the offense, which was something few grasped in 1862. Longstreet’s thinking demonstrated a clear evolution that began on the field at First Manassas in July 1861, developed through the bloody fighting of 1862, and culminated in the brilliant defensive victory at Fredericksburg that December. The lethality with which his riflemen and artillery mowed down repeated Union assaults hinted at what was to come in World War I. Longstreet’s ability to launch and control powerful offensives was on display at Second Manassas in August 1862. His assault plan at Chickamauga in Georgia the following September was similar, if not the forerunner to, World War II tactical-level German armored tactics. Other areas show progressive applications with artillery, staff work, force projection, and operational-level thinking.
Longstreet was not the sole agent of modern change away from the Napoleonic method, but his contributions were significant and executed on a large scale. They demonstrated that he was a modern thinker unparalleled in the Confederate Army.
Unfortunately, many Civil War students have a one-sided view of Longstreet, whose legacy fell victim to bitter postwar Southern politics when “Old Pete” supported Reconstruction bills, accepted postings with the Grant Administration, and criticized Robert E. Lee. Many modern writers continue to skew the general’s legacy.
This book draws heavily upon 20th century U.S. Army doctrine, field training, staff planning, command, and combat experience and is the first serious treatment of Longstreet’s generalship vis-a-vis modern warfare. Not everyone will agree with Knudsen’s conclusions, but it will now be impossible to write about the general without referencing this important study.
LTC Knudsen is an Illinois native. His career spans twenty-five years of active duty Army service and includes seven resident career artillery, command, and staff Army schools and colleges. He has many years of tactical experience in the integration of fire support into maneuver plans and fire control computation for cannon units. He spent nine years in Germany training tactics offensive armored warfare, as well as peace-keeping and counter-insurgency training. A combat veteran of Desert Storm, he performed extensive artillery fire planning and execution in support of the U.S. breakthrough of the Iraqi line and penetration into Iraq. He has also served in the Iraq Campaign. His years of staff work at the Corps, Army, and Pentagon levels give him a strong understanding of army operations from the lowest to highest levels.
Copies of the book can be purchased here:
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[@vincetaylor9378]

Longstreet, Jackson, and Lee were all excellent general's along with a list of others but as a black man I'm really glad they failed

[@michaelhoffman5348]

Excellent presentation on how James Longstreet was so far ahead of his time! Thank you!

[@vito336]

I have the book. It is an incredible read. There is an “Aha!” Moment on nearly every page. I recommend it highly.

[@carywest9256]

Say, vito336 ere you from Texas? Reason l ask, there's a highway loop around Conroe thats designated Tx.Loop336. Just wondering!

[@debpratt52]

Good evening to all from Upstate New York!

[@allencollins6031]

Same

[@ziggle314]

I just put the book on my Christmas list! Excellent presentation -- so much good stuff there that I watched it twice. The discussions of Fredericksburg and Chickamauga were real eye-openers. Thank you for providing such insightful presentations.

[@rexhauser8660]

His tomb with a very large monument towers over much of a large historical cemetery in Gainesville GA

[@stevestringer7351]

Well, I have read a little about Gen. Longstreet. I have listened to lectures and seen documentaries. I think that General Longstreet l, like so many other confederate leaders down to the rank and file to a good amount of the southern citizenry came to regret the bloodshed that the ear caused. Of course, at first everyone was doing their duty, defending their homeland etc. But as the weeks, months and years passed I just believe that they weighed the cost. From what I have grown to understand about Gen. Longstreet is that he was a realist. He knew that "the cause" was at best a long shot.... I believe he had definite ideas about how the war should be fought and was not easily fooled into following blindly. Then, after the loss of his wife and children, I believe he really went into a drastic personality change. I believe he became more and more cynical andess inclined to entertain propaganda. He knew that the south had limited resources in every area.... especially manpower which with every battle grew less andess abundant due to the lack or recruiting opportunities. So, Gettysburg happened.... Longstreet has received much criticism from many of his contemporaries. Some of it earned and some of it is ridiculous. According to the great CSA artiliarist E.P. Alexander, he did not necessarily care much for Gen. Longstreet going as far as to say that "if Longstreet said it, it is likely an untruth." I believe that General Longstreet was a great commander, talented on and preferred to be on the defensive position. I believe that he wanted an independent command free from orders that he considered counterproductive. At Gettysburg he may have actually even "drug his feet" on purpose so as to let Gen. Lee fail on his own and be in position to take command if Lee resigned or was relieved. However, on the other hand, Gen. Longstreet had a keen eye and as stated before was a complete realist..... he could see whT the AOP brought to battle. He quickly saw that the AoP was a much different army than Chancellorsville and before and was led by a hard fighting and determined Pennsylvanian named Meade that coincidentally had at a least a little to do with the loss at Gettysburg. Longstreet saw what he believed was the weakness of the most impregnable defensive position which was "the way on the right" flanking maneuver. Lee did not agree and may have been pressured by lower ranking generals about honor, pride and holding a position that tactically meant nothing to the CSA. Also, General Lee was coming off of what we now know was a major heart attack. So, General Lee may not necessarily have been quite fit enough to actually command an army at that time much less an invasion of any territory against st a numerically superior enemy. Who knows, Gen. Longstreet may have just been pouting because Jefferson Davis didn't "put him in" during Lee's recovery time. Also, we will never know what would have happened had Gen. Longstreet been in charge other than there probably would not have been a "Gettysburg" and if there had been we would most likely have known what would have happened had they taken the "way to the right". Sorry for such a long post. Please forgive my ramblings.

[@paulbonewicz3283]

The quote that you attributed to E.P. Alexander was actually said by Hunter Holmes McGuire who was Stonewall Jackson's former physician.

[@1954dst]

That is great can't wait to hear this hope it comes on soon long streets always been one of my favorite Rebels

[@salanzaldi4551]

"We should have freed the slaves and then fired on Ft. Sumter." James Longstreet

[@jangiel3103]

I recognize the RDP. I was in in the 80's. Plot the target with a pin, use the RDP for range and deflection, determine that the firing data is safe, send instructions to guns. We had self-propelled 8 in.

[@mwdjr3158]

Fantastic! Thanks for your service.

[@pastorrobbgoodman5084]

I am really looking forward to watching this. I love reading about Longstreet!

[@marknewton6984]

He was still slow.

[@michaeldouglas1243]

Hello from south central pa

[@mikedesil23]

Old Pete [>

[@joycefranklin8981]

For some reason I was unable to hear the dialogue without straining. It was just too much of a struggle.

[@haroldk3913]

It is clear to me reviwing this, the laptop I used was not strong in capturing my voice. I wish I used another I have, which probably would have made this more clear.

[@johnfenwick7641]

Ole gloomy Pete. Longstreet was one of the best generals in American military history and he was right at Gettysburg when he told Lee on the second day of the battle the roads south are still open we can slip out and head to Baltimore cut off Washington from the north but Lee had decided that the Army was there and there is where he would fight but he made the mistake of not holding the high ground anywhere on the battlefield so close

[@manilajohn0182]

Actually, that option was no longer viable. Yes, Lee 'could' have maneuvered around the Union left at the tactical level by a shifting of forces on the field, this could have easily been matched by a like movement on the part of the AotP. Additionally, the local road net didn't support the movement of the AoNVs baggage train and favored the ability of the AotP to keep on the inside track of the AoNV. Moreover, the entire point of such a movement- namely, to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV- had already been nullified by the meeting engagement of 1 July. In gaining that minor success, Lee had assumed a tactical offensive which he had never wanted. From 2 July onward until the end of the campaign, he was saddle with it. It was therefore highly unlikely that the AotP would attacj the AoNV- particularly as Meade had only recently assumed command of the AotP. The final nail in the coffin for all this was that Lee was out of time. The situation at Vicksburg (relieving pressure on the Confederates there was the strategic objective of the campaign) was critical, and Lee's army was foraging- so that the army could not remain in any one place for more than 3- 5 days. Lee had either to attack or abandon the campaign in failure.

[@SpartansAndHeroes]

Great video!

[@ozarklife9996]

Need a better mic.

[@marknewton6984]

Lee was not intetested in cities.

[@ThatOneKidd45th]

Cant wait to see what this is all about!

[@garyraines7511]

Pete Longstreet gave Bob Lee good counsel the third day of Gettysburg, but he ignored it.....He suggested abandoning the field and marching for Washington---"""NO 13000 men could take the Yank's defensive position,""" and he proved to be right....Lee is double damned for not listening. If Jackson had lived and given the same advice, Lee would have marched for DC. gl

[@doug.a.2665]

.."contributions to the art of war"!? ...makes it sound like a good thing ..not a good mindset

[@joedoakes8307]

Can this Book be found in Public libraries ?

[@haroldk3913]

Please ask your library to order it!