Market Garden 80: A Bridge Too Far? (Part 5)

[@bensmith3242]

Just discovered this podcast, cannot wait to listen through this series, absolutely amazing

[@sonsofthesilentage994]

I want to write ... Of other gut wrenching military endeavours but you show me my lack of depth, of knowledge, of paying the level of respect fallen men deserve ... But, like you, I do the same every time I read accounts of Arnhem ... I uselessly will them on to some kind of crazy victory, even though it is absurd to do so ... I carry my British parachute wings with heart ... Thank you for honouring this incredible fight of the heroes of the 1st Airborne Division

[@thunderace4588]

Thank you Al and James.

[@timselbie3419]

This is brilliant

[@terrywoodham8419]

Brilliant bloody great 👍

[@elmersalonga6424]

Thanks so much for this series because of this it enforces My different view about 82nd Airborne was the one to "blame"... 1st Airborne was already falling apart from the get-go, Germans already reacting and squeezing so much pressure at Arnhem needless to say that a "Single Battalion/Col Frost" was the only one controlling or holding the Bridge. The reason why the "what if Nijmegen was taken earlier scenario" the Plan might have worked? For Me it is unfair for the 82 Airborne Every Bridge should be depended by a DIVISION not ONE BATTALION plain and simple! Airbornes Job was to "hand over" the Bridge to XXX Coprs/2nd Army not to be Rescued by them as in the case of Col Frost Battalion at Arnhem.

[@iancarr8682]

What would be the future value of the Allied occupied land, surviving bridges and branches of the Rover Rhine retained after MG?

[@OldWolflad]

How can they already be 33 hours late at Grave when 8am on the 19th is only 39 hours into 30 Corps start? Am I missing something? I just don't get the timings allegation at all. When they reached Nijmegen at 11am that day it was only 42-43 hours since they started. Furthermore, Browning's decision not to allow Gavin's suggested assault on 18th was surely wise given that they struggled to take the bridges even with 30 Corps tanks support on the 19th. Carrington was not the 2nd tank across Nijmegen Bridge, he remained on the southern side whilst the 4 tanks crossed. His tank was the 5th. The British took the bridge at 1830 hours, the 504th PIR reached it at 1915 hours. The Grenadier Guards alone lost 81 men at Nijmegen. Their infantry deserve some credit for winning the battle at the southern town end of the bridge alongside 505th PIR. I disagree about Horrocks, an excellent commander. Really unfair to criticise the 2.30pm 30 Corps start. That was simply the order of Brereton who prohibited any movement until the airborne troops were on the ground, as we all know that his timings of arrival were not what the British wanted. H-hour was 1300 hours on 17th September and Brereton ordered that ground forces did not move until an hour after h-hour.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Well said. XXX Corps actually put on the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. I personally think it would not have been a good idea for the ground advance to have started before the paratroop drops in case the Germans started mobilising forces down Hells Highway to rush to stop the ground attack..... and the paras could have been landing right on these mobilising German forces. Disaster.

[@elmersalonga6424]

Exactly! You just crushed the "36 hours delay was because of Nijmegen" story...

[@nickdanger3802]

at 21.10 of this video, lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 8.20 AM on day three on current maps Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem is 25 miles/40km on current maps, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water

[@Sarah-JaneR32]

The 'only twenty miles' thing, in being to the States I've realised that distances are considered differently, America being vast so twenty miles is not much but in England when I grew up in the 60's going 28 miles took a weeks planning :) yes i know it was different times but it's just something that came to mind when this was mentioned, enjoying it though

[@millofnethermill]

So, in advance of "The Crossing", you have Browning, Gavin, and Tucker planning how to take the bridge. At some point it was decided the best method was to take the bridge from both sides. Send the 3rd Bn via canvass boats during day light, 3pm start. Did anyone (Browning) say, you (Gavin) take the bridge during day light and we'll (XXX Corp) cross in the evening and rest our Men (XXX Corp) and refuel, then set off towards Arnhem in the morning (21st). I wonder if Browning ever said by the way we don't move our tanks at night before the 82nd got in the boats? What we have here gentlemen... is a failure to communicate. No wonder my Father (Lt. Thomas Pitt S-1 HQ 3rd Bn) and his fellow soldiers on the first wave were so pissed about stopping from advancing towards Arnhem after "The Crossing" till the next morning.... as the Brits "don't move tanks at night, never". Yet, the 82nd crosses the river in broad day light under intense enemy fire with the preconceived notion that they would go all the way to Arnhem that night.... but no, someone had other ideas.

[@jgo5300]

I wonder what might have happened if one of the American divisions had been given Arnhem to take with the Brits swapping their mission?

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Same outcome. The Americans failed at Son and Nijmegen.

[@nickdanger3802]

Germans attacking the Heights had 5 armored cars, 3 halftracks with quad 20mm AA guns and 24 medium mortars at 21.10 of this video, lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 8.20 AM on day three on current maps Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem is 25 miles/40km on current maps, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water

[@lyndoncmp5751]

If the 82nd had taken the Nijmegen bridge as they were supposed to do then XXX Corps would have been crossing the bridge around midday on the 19th, only 10 miles from Arnhem. XXX put on the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945.

[@scotttaylor7767]

Gavin was probably distracted by the pain in his back. But he wrote that he felt this operation would bring nothing but disaster for the airborne cause. I suspect his heart just wasn’t in it. And thought market garden was going to be a failure anyway. So I will do what I’m ordered to do. But I’m not going to stick my neck out if I can help it. And I’m going to try to get the 82nd through this battle with as few losses as I can.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Actually Gavin wrote "we knew the risks were great but we believed that the battle we were about to fight would bring the war to an end".

[@marcelrenes2435]

Greetings from The Netherlands. I've heard al your 5 podcasts. They were great by the way. My biggest question is: where were the RAF and the UUSAF? Hundreds of plains where used to land the Airborne Troops. What did the rest do? You both mentioned the panic when the Luftwaffe suddenly appearded. But what did the allied airforce do? Did they help or not?

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Brereton wanted the skies clear for his planned 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. He did not want tactical ground attack air support sharing the skies with the transport aircraft and gliders.

[@marcelrenes2435]

@@lyndoncmp5751 wow! Thank you for your info. I appreciate it. 👍

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@marcelrenes2435 No problem. You're welcome. As an example, Vandeleur (the Michael Caine character in the film A Bridge Too Far) requested ground attack air support take out the German anti tank gun position near Aalst on day 2 but was told no air support was available so they had to try and detour around it before the Germans withdrew.

[@PalleRasmussen]

I would disagree that the W-Allies would not fight with the same callousness and desperation as the Germans, if the situation was reversed. Consider the situation four years before and the troops Churchill was preparing for the defence against Seelöwe. "We shall fight them on the beaches..."

[@roberthutchins1507]

good job. kida depressing though.

[@scotttaylor7767]

I can’t help thinking it was a good thing that market garden failed. The allies would have been isolated up in north Germany. I can’t see Hitler and the Nazis collapsing in late 1944. At most the allies would have been in a better position to take Germany in 1945. Also I’m struck by how poorly the American and British generals get on. It’s like the hostility between Montgomery and Ike has filtered down to the lower ranks. Gavin goes his own way and ignores Browning. And that dooms the operation.

[@nickdanger3802]

"Gavin goes his own way and ignores Browning." when did that happen ? EDIT DUE TO MY REPLY TO FOLLOWING REPLY BEING DELETED at 21.10 of this video, lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 8.20 AM on day three on current maps Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem is 25 miles/40km on current maps, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water "sending his men off against German tanks that weren’t there" British AO, British intel. "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands." Pegasus Archive Browning page

[@scotttaylor7767]

@@nickdanger3802 By not taking Nijmegen bridge on day one of the operation and instead concentrating on the grossbeck heights. Browning as the airborne commander could and should have ordered Gavin to stick to the plan but he didn’t. He allowed Gavin to waste valuable time sending his men off against German tanks that weren’t there. By the 30 core gets to the bridge it’s too late.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@scotttaylor7767 at 21.10 of this video, lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 8.20 AM on day three on current maps Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem is 25 miles/40 km, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water "sending his men off against German tanks that weren’t there" British AO, British intel. "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands." Pegasus Archive Browning page

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Had Market Garden suceeded nothing further could have happened anyway, as British 2nd Army would have had to wait until US 1st Army got beyond Aachen and to the Rhine itself. British 2nd Army wouldn't have advanced on the Ruhr alone. As we know, US 1st Army didnt get much beyond Aachen for the rest of the year and got bogged down in the Hurtgen Forest. This was not foreseen to occur when Market Garden was being devised. Market Garden should have actually made things easier for the Americans at Aachen, with all those German armoured units being sent to the Netherlands, but the US 1st Army failed to capitalise on this.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@scotttaylor7767 Gavin himself TWICE ordered Lindquist of the 508th PIR to strike for the bridge ASAP. Lindquist didn't. Then the Germans strengthened in Nijmegen and Gavin decided to pull out on the 18th and wait for XXX Corps.

[@PalleRasmussen]

Commenting to say I like waking up to new episodes, and so KZbin knows you do good stuff, but also guys... I hate adds. And I hate them even more, when they are British, and I am not. If you are so impoverished that Patreon, etc is not enough; try things such as Ground News that at least are international, useful and has some integrity.