Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Perception

[@obadiah60623]

Just one simple critique of the Aristotelean distinction between matter and form by Merleau Ponty uprooted and exposed what I had unwittingly accepted as the totality of perception. Merleau Ponty is like therapy for those of us in the western intellectual tradition who state truth claims without considering epistemic humility. Thank you.

[@alexhubanov1526]

This guy communicates information very effectively! Pleasure to listen to.

[@Charles-qf6vo]

Speaks in a very weird way. I was distracted and could not follow.

[@MikeWiest]

That notion of the “pregnancy of matter” with potential forms is already present in Giordano Bruno’s lovely book Cause, Principle, and Unity. Thank you this was very helpful.

[@joezagame5598]

That was a great explanation. Thank you.

[@gmgoenawansusatyo]

an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty.

[@mephesh]

Wow, now my new interest is perception, I like the idea that perception as a child and adult is different, such a new concept to look into

[@cultureandtheory5097]

Thank you so much for the video; your knowledge is greatly appreciated and has been incredibly helpful!

[@mu.makbarzadeh2831]

Thank you for sharing. I hope to have some discussing online video chat on your channel.

[@cpn1011]

can i ask you if there is the transcript??

[@ComradeDt]

I cant find these early essays anywhere

[@jimmyfaulkner1855]

Does Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of perception a form of direct realism (naive realism) or indirect realism (representationalism)?

[@brentjones2991]

What?

[@aliens4143]

I suppose the latter, in your terms, although there is at the same time not necessarily a distinction of "realism", as all things can be considered "real" at least in their particular mode of experience (not necessarily beyond). So there would be room for the semantics of "naive realism" anyway. Although, similar to Kant, there is also never an access to pure "realism", or as things are themselves. (Which would be one example of how the rift is exaggerated here or open to misunderstanding.) Plus he, as most philosophers, has an allergy to "representationalism", I think (as it already presupposes a direct realism etc). Hooray. To give a fully sharp answer, one would need to hone it with some reading, but I think you get the drift.

[@aliens4143]

Kant was a transcendental philosopher, not a phenomenologist. If one uses these categories (which makes sense), why not the correct ones. (There might be a misunderstanding that Merleau-Ponty might have claimed in passing some of Kant's insights had been arrived at by a phenomenological procedure, which is a way of advertising the validity of phenomenology in regard to older philosophers. However it would be more fitting to apply to Schopenhauer, who could be described as Kant's successor. He by the way advertised himself - but Kant also - similarly in regard to older philosophers.)

[@roygbiv176]

Very good presentation. I'm a bit skeptical of the whole move away from Kant in this period though.

[@artemisXsidecross]

Well done, thank you

[@rskyler1]

Kant the phenomenologist?

[@sleepingbadgers]

Yeah I had the same thought… I’m pretty sure early interpreters thought that he was phenomenalist idealist a la Berkeley but that has since been supervened by other interpretations of his philosophy I.e from Henry Allison among others.

[@davidfragoso6366]

maybe it was a lapsus, confusing him with Husserl, both germans

[@brentjones2991]

While Husserl is credited with coining the term 'phenomenology,' Kant's work laid significant groundwork for it. His 'Critique of Pure Reason' emphasized the conditions of possible experience, which is central to phenomenology's focus on how objects appear to us. Kant explored the limits and structures of perception, which Husserl later expanded. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty, a key figure in phenomenology, was deeply influenced by Kant, as he built on the idea of perception shaping reality. In this sense, Kant can be seen as a proto-phenomenologist

[@luiscarlosrodriguezsancho1436]

Science has evolved so much and intersecting with philosophy. Te matter of perception in Neuro is much different now that 100 years ago as the meaning of time and space. New thinkers will need to figure that out both versed in science and philosophy.

[@aliens4143]

I don't think Merleau Ponty took the gestalt-phenomena as the reason for his philosophy, but merely as an empirical argument. Edmund Husserl, for that matter, was basically the founder of the method of phenomenology and I think the term proper, and Merleau-Ponty also saw himself in his tradition. (Psychology, for that matter, is and always was - mostly - a travesty of science and academia. Otherwise the argument could be made, of course, probably on the minds of some viewers, "why not simply jump on psychology, because of these AWESOME gestalt phenomena a hundred years ago or so already?" However that is basic empiricism, for that matter, itself an absolute rarity in that field or otherwise a total oversimplification of complexities. Yes, they hardly can do right, but that's their fault, thinking any critical methods of science and academia, or ethics, exclusively don't apply to them, but that's not really the topic now. Also, and more simply, they are largely not compatible in method or purpose, in other words, they remain different fields anyway. Which has also been discussed aplenty in the wake of such topics in the early 20th century.) As for Kant, while there is an perspectival and conceptual shift, it is probably a mistake to think that his results would have to be taken literally as a description of active "intellectual operations". Which would probably hurt all kinds of formal criteria.

[@DjTahoun]

🌷😇🌷

[@kensho123456]

Maurice MP's book was Heideggerian NOT Kantian.

[@bebopbountyhead]

Aren't these just as arbitrary as Kant's transcendental categories? Assuming that one's perception is accurate regarding things like figure/background and depth begs the question of "how do you know that?" Here's the problem in a nutshell: you've got a set of things labeled "things I know." I come along and ask you "how do you know that you know these things?" You can't reference inside the set, as that would be viciously circular. You can't say "I just do," as that would be affirming arbitrariness as part of philosophical argumentation, which would affirm contradictions. You can't reference outside of the set, as you don't know those things.

[@fede2]

You seem to associate "arbitrary" with "unmediated".

[@bebopbountyhead]

@@fede2 I don't see exactly what you mean by that. "Unmediated" replacing "arbitrary" could lead to a number of interpretations. By "arbitrary" here, I mean that these things (Husserl's transcendental reductions/Kant's transcendental categories) are taken to be foundations of experience without justification.

[@fede2]

@@bebopbountyhead "...without justification". Eh?? The justification is that they are required in order for experience to be intelligible. They're both pretty clear on that...

[@noahlibra]

@@bebopbountyhead Their internal coherence to experience itself. Their relation to ontological primitives is another story though.

[@bebopbountyhead]

@@noahlibra Seeming coherence, genuine correspondence, and facticity aren't the same things. In order to distinguish between parts of experience for the sake of thinking or talking about them, one must delineate between them. To take these delineations as defining basic elements of experience is to put them beyond that which can be questioned. However, this leads to the question "how do you know that your delineations are true?" not being answerable. It's the same problem that all foundationalist systems of inquiry. Saying "I can't think of it differently" isn't a justification for knowledge of the truth of something. If, on the other hand, one decides to say that the delineations are contrived, then they're left with the same problem of not being able to confirm or deny any claims about their experience.

[@LeopardKing-im4bm]

It is not wise to dispense with the matter/form distinction. Neither am I arguing for naïve realism. Somethings which exist conceptually can be denied genuine material expression. That is not cause to abandon a useful axiom. The phenomenon of becoming can not be explained outside of dualism. That polarity does not need physical rootedness anymore than irrational numbers need to be physically handled to understand indebtedness. This idea of brute physicality is the wall against which philosophy breaks it's nose. A preposterous desire to have real world corollaries pushes modern thinkers to believe that ancients were hasty. This reminds me of the scavenger hunt for unified field theory. We need to knock on wood in a superstitious attempt to control immateriality instead of understanding it. That is why philosophy has come to a screeching halt with the aid of fools like Habermas. Truth is not found in appearance, so it makes no difference how we treat analogies. It is reason that accelerates insight, not the most accurate lay of the land.

[@brentjones2991]

It's not wise to obscure simple points with overcomplicated jargon. Dualism isn't the only way to explain becoming, and dismissing thinkers like Habermas without backing it up feels like avoiding real engagement. While I personally critique Habermas-especially from a Derridean perspective that questions the foundations of his communicative rationality-those critiques are grounded in detailed arguments, not just broad dismissal. Both Derrida and others challenge the kind of dualism you're defending, showing that meaning and truth are far more complex than a form/matter distinction.

[@LeopardKing-im4bm]

@@brentjones2991 Strict materialism is a dead horse. Don't throw a hissy fit when someone takes the whip out of your hand. Habermas and Derrida are both fools on different sides of the grave.