Midway: After the Battle

www.pacificwarmuseum.org
Enjoy this very interesting webinar about the Battle of Midway from the National Museum of the Pacific War. The museum's Director of Archives and Library, Chris McDougal shows us hidden artifacts from the museum's archive and shares the incredible stories behind them. Special guest, Craig Symonds, gives us a deeper understanding about the decisions that were made before, during and after the battle and answers some great questions from our web audience.
Guest Biography:
Craig L. Symonds is professor of history emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, where he taught for thirty years and served as History Department Chair. From 2017 to 2020 he was the Ernest J. King Distinguished Professor of Maritime History at the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, RI. He is a four-time recipient of the Federal Government’s Superior Civilian Service Medal, and in 2014 he received the Dudley W. Knox Award for Lifetime Achievement from the Naval Historical Foundation. He is a Director Emeritus of the Admiral Nimitz Foundation.
Symonds is the author of seventeen books, including Lincoln and His Admirals, which won the 2009 Lincoln Prize, and Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles that Shaped American History (2005) which won the Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt Prize for Naval History. His books on World War II include The Battle of Midway (2011), Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings (2014), and World War II at Sea: A Global History (2018).His newest book is Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (2022) which was released this spring.
Craig Symonds book links (copy and paste)
The Battle of Midway
store.pacificwarmuseum.org/pr...
Nimitz at War
store.pacificwarmuseum.org/pr...
This is a recording from the National Museum of the Pacific War.
For more information about our webinars and our mission please visit us online:
www.pacificwarmuseum.org/

[@imagremlin875]

Museums are so very important to keep history alive. Thank you for this presentation

[@ronaldcole7415]

In 1981-1982 I was stationed on Midway Island (USN). The albatross were still called gooney birds and likely still are. During my year there, the island museum was still open. Around Christmas time the skeleton of a Japanese airman was discovered that somehow got burried during or after the battle. His remains were placed in the museum for safe keeping. I'm not sure what has happened to them since. Eastern Island where the original airstrips were was mostly abandoned by 1981 and Sand Island became the primary airstrip and base for the Navy. The placed sparkeled both as a jewel in the Pacific and as one of the most historical places in the US concerning a critical military engagement. Way out to the North on Sand Islet once stood a large water tower that was converted into a research station. None of us ever found out what was really being researched out there. Satelite photos that I've looked at seem to show the tower is no longer there. Along with many, many structures that are gone.

[@johnalombardi2951]

Time to get the clear and precise content to all of our citizens, especially our children!

[@Anthony-jo7up]

Dr. Symonds is always great, thanks!

[@ejdotw1]

Superb presentation, and excellent examination by Craig Symonds - thank you so much!

[@kevinscoggin3286]

I had the privilege of recently visiting your museum. Great display and laid out very nicely. Never would have thought of finding such a great collection in Fredericksburg, TX until I learned of the Nimitz connection. Keep up the great work.

[@carlfischer6145]

I wish more of this history could be taught to young American students in high school. They learn nothing about WW II.

[@jliller]

I had two years of American history in 7th & 8th grade (Discovery to Civil War & Reconstruction to Present) and one year (non-block scheduling), 11th grade covering all of American history, and two college semesters on American history split similarly to middle school. Out of those five classes, not a one of them was able to keep up with the lesson plan and all of them had to rush through things at the end of the semester/year. The result was a lack of coverage of the American Civil War and World War II, with post-WW2 being almost completely skipped. There's simply too much American history to cover in the time allotted. Personally, I think the system across the entire country should be... 9th Grade: Civics & American Government (full year, not half-year like I got) 10th Grade: American History - PreContact Native Peoples to 1815 11th Grade: American History - 1815 to 1908 12th Grade: American History - 1908 to about 20 years prior to present (current/recent events/issues would be covered by American Government class or are too recent for the purposes of a history class; history needs sources that become available over time plus the perspective that comes with time)

[@snake57]

They learn very little useful information. Except gender confusion

[@henrivanbemmel]

While I taught I'm Ontario, I also felt there needed to be far more history from WW2 onward. This is the history, good and bad, that has made the world in which we live. The course needs to be taught at an age where students can be asked to write essays or debate this or that approach to a given situation. For some reason history and English so often seem designed to bore students comatose. I think we can do better! Great teachers should be able to make the situation come alive. I'm no fan of discovery learning, again a great presentation can put the children at a given place in time. Kids old and young just love stories. We will get better learning by attraction rather than force. A school should not be the Marine Corps ... in my view at least.

[@shotforshot5983]

You would be appalled by what Japanese youths are taught about WWII...

[@henrivanbemmel]

@@shotforshot5983 Probably, but not surprised.

[@uncleron9481]

Thank you so much for this great piece of work. Professor Symonds is an especially compelling and knowledgeable expert and I was mesmerized by his wonderful comments. He is one professor whose class I would eagerly look forward to. Thanks again. Multiple thumbs up!

[@model-man7802]

Dad was on the Yorktown CV5 at Midway.

[@markreetz1001]

Thank you for his service. I'd prefer to thank him directly, but I have feeling that wouldn't be possible.

[@lawrencemyers3623]

A pretty impressive collection. Also read Prof. Symonds book on the battle a few years ago and found it informative and very readable. Top notch history.

[@bobkonradi1027]

At the 9:15 mark, the B-26 bombers were discussed. The 4 bombers were outfitted with torpedoes, which of course malfunctioned , as did almost all of the other torpedoes in use that day. I've often wondered what would have happened if they'd been armed with conventional bombs, because just about every report of their actions say that they were able to buzz over the Japanese carriers lengthwise after their torpedo runs. If they could have been over the carriers with gravity bombs, they could have wiped out their flight decks and then the carriers would have been sitting ducks for the navy bombers coming in later. The Navy had the misfortune of having some of their torpedoes work during the Coral Sea battle, giving the Navy a false sense of security about them at Midway. Hindsight is 20/20.

[@edwardmauch2918]

Dick Best is one of two pilots in history to score bomb hits on 2 different carriers! Go Navy!

[@frankpienkosky5688]

should have mentioned the other guy!....

[@IamDoogy]

Thank you for producing and posting this video. Very well done. Such brave men. We should all honor their courage and sacrifice.

[@onlythewise1]

really wow so smart

[@ArmoredNeko]

God I hope other museums does things 50% as good as yours, so much history.

[@kendracrispin5327]

Your channel just gained a new subscriber. My granddad fought in the Pacific Theater in the Navy and made a career as an NCO. Although he evidently never spoke about his WW2 days save for one story about witnessing a volcano eruption from a plane, I hope he would be grateful that you are preserving history so it is always remembered. BTW, I recognized the other two panelists in that photo of the Japanese fighter pilot: Dusty Kleiss, the other American SBD pilot who hit two carriers that day, and Jonathon Parshall, a historian. Oh, to have been there for that panel.

[@LesterMoore]

I saw a used book, first person, by Ensign Gay and upon receipt was joyed to see Mr. Gay's autograph inside the book. Such an honor to have the signature of this grand American hero in my collection. RIP Ensign Gay. May your bravery and story never be forgotten and honored.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

bit of a flawed scene in the film...where the jap carriers appear motionless while Gay looks on...

[@jrsands]

Thank you! There’s so much great information in this presentation. I certainly will be planning a visit to Fredericksburg TX to visit your great institution.

[@peterscaglione1345]

This was a very informative and interesting session. Thank you!

[@brucewelty7684]

i COULD NOT GET PAST THE ANNOYING WHINE SOUND, dang caps lock

[@cjwilliams8350]

Outstanding presentation. Thank you!!!!!!

[@NationalMuseumofthePacificWar]

Glad you enjoyed it!

[@calvingifford9442]

Wonderful video!

[@richardseverin1603]

great presentation. Informative and very interesting. Thanks.

[@NationalMuseumofthePacificWar]

Glad it was helpful!

[@wkeckeisen]

Excellent presentation! Well done with the facts.

[@chollythecrazycorgihesinsa6505]

Great video! Very informative

[@1961Tuber]

The Post Nautilus attack on the 4 carrier formation, caused the depth charging...AND the Japanese Destroyer left behind to keep depth charging TO USE FLANK SPEED TO TRY TO CATCH UP.... McCluskey noticed the wake of the destroyer and could see it was moving at flank speed...in a straight line...in the line of approach the Japanese Carrier Force would take to get to Midway...AND McCluskey smartly decided to head in the direction the destroyer was moving in....finding the 4 carriers and destroying 2 of them. The Attack by the Nautilus clearly could be called "An Assist"...since it caused the Dive Bombers to find the Carriers.

[@lukang72]

Really good and dramatic presentation

[@trexxg1436]

Thank you I enjoyed your presentation about the battle of Midway and enjoyed your guest speaker Craig Symonds. I liked and subscribed. I didn't know the museum was at Fredericksburg, Texas I am looking forward to visiting because I don't live that far away.

[@julioaranton5223]

Excellent Presentation!

[@Guitarguy273]

There were six other crews of Torpedo Eight who also participated in the attack on the Japanese fleet at Midway flying from Midway Island itself. Among those six crews there were only two survivors: Ensign Bert Earnest and his gunner Harry Ferrier. Source: A Dawn Like Thunder -- The True Story of Torpedo Squadron Eight by Robert J. Mrazek. George "Tex" Gay would speak at Historical forums commemorating the American Victory at the Battle of Midway billed as "The Sole Survivor." On one occasion both Earnest and Ferrier were also invited and when asked why they were there, Bert replied "We're the other sole survivors." LOL! (See Mrazek, pages 431 -432.)

[@jamesgibbs6970]

McClusky said he saw a box formation of 4 carriers and not a diamond with a near and far carrier while Best said he saw a diamond. McClusky asserted there was no near and far carrier and it was not due to his not knowing the doctrine. If they were were approaching at different angle, both men could be absolutely correct in their statements with one seeing a box formation and the other seeing a diamond formation. Since Naval officers live by a code of not lying, I think they were approaching at different angles.

[@jaytowne8016]

Imagine if the B26 s had been trained to skip bomb instead of torpedo. Since we know now that the torpedo used would detonate anyway if you did get a hit. The bombs in skip bombing would penetrate the hull and deck up high by the hangar deck. Not down low due to the armor belt. But we know now a hangar deck detonation would be likely a kill shot due to the way the IJN fueled and armed planes, there would likely be ordinance left over on the hangar deck even if the aircraft were not present.

[@jamesbrady2278]

I liked the new version of Midway. However, I can never understand why they omitted the F6 Wildcats no combat air patrol and also Admiral Jack Fletcher. It seems that unless they utilize all of the planes I find the movie was incomplete however the CG modern technology that they were able to re-create the most amazing battle scenes and all of the ships and also I remembered hearing a comment about when the pilots were up at 15,000 feet and it’s 40 below zero and they start diving and they hit the tropical air. It’s amazing everything for a dub, but they were still able to accomplish their missions. as the movie honored both American sailors and Japanese sailers and the amazing story about Private McDougall with that translation card that he had to help the Japanese prisoners. It’s a shame the Americans didn’t receive the same consideration, but that’s history and that’s war. that’s why when you say it was a good movie. No war movie is a good movie with the horror and the devastation that occurs in war of which my father was in the Navy during World War II so in closing, I want to thank you for this Great display of personal artifacts because when it comes down to it, it’s about people and not being a veteran in any way. I never served in the military, but what I’ve learned over the years talking to people that were in war it’s about the man and woman right next to you and they just want to do their job and get home. God bless everybody and stay well and be safe.😊

[@frankpienkosky5688]

the older version of Midway did a good job explaining the vital role the PBY's played in this fight...something that was completely omitted in the recent film...which also did a poor lob of recreating the Pearl Harbor attack...[Zeroes do not sink battleships!]...that was done much better in Tora, Tora, Tora...also should have mentioned how the Japanese strike force that struck the Yorktown..[twice!]....was able to find her by following her planes back to the carrier....or that it was a jap sub that finally did her in after heroic attempts to save her....

[@frankpienkosky5688]

remember seeing some footage of Japanese survivors being shot in the water...it was somewhat shocking and only aired once for obvious reasons...I guess this was a no quarter asked..no quarter given kind of fight....

[@joewalker2152]

@@frankpienkosky5688 That footage of Japanese survivors from a ship that was just sunk by a sub and then shot by the crew of the sub is on KZbin. It's also been used on many documentaries.

[@RANDALLBRIGGS]

Parshall and Tully, in "Shattered Sword," have clarified the role of Torpedo 8. Actually, some time passed from the time Torpedo 8 attacked until VS-6 and VB-6 arrived over Kaga and Akagi. It was not the case--as is often asserted--that the Zeroes were shooting Waldron's TBDs down as Gallaher and Best led their flights down toward the Japanese carriers. Actually, the Zeroes were getting rearmed and refueled.

[@richardmalcolm1457]

Yeah - really surprising to see Symonds repeating this misunderstanding. He's even discussed this publicly with Parshall!

[@Whitpusmc]

I was disappointed to hear this mistake again.

[@manilajohn0182]

Read Parshall and Tully with extreme caution. Only Akagi was engaged in CAP operations when the dive bomber attack began. Fuchida reported Zeros beginning to launch (although he erred in believing that they were part of a full strike), and Dick Best reported that she had just begun to launch 6-7 Zeros (there were likely only 6- in two fighter sections) as he dove on her. The senior surviving officer of Kaga (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) stated that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangar, six fighters in the air, and the rest of her compliment (approximately 20 aircraft) on her flight deck. Kaga's last landing time prior to the dive bomber attack- 1005- made the lifting of 20 aircraft to her flight deck possible, although few were likely spotted. The senior surviving officer of Soryu- Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara- stated that Soryu's strike against the U.S. carriers was on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. Soryu's last landing time- 0950- gave her more than enough time to spot her strike of 3 Zeros and 18 Vals. The 20- minute time interval between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike at 1050 shows clearly that Hiryu's strike (3 Zeros and 18 Vals) was on her flight deck when the other carriers were attacked. Twenty minutes was nowhere near enough time to spot these 21 aircraft and augment them by an additional 3 Zeros- and this doesn't include the Japanese requirement to warm up the engines prior to launch and brief the aircrews. It's worth pointing out that both of the senior surviving officers above were mentioned repeatedly in Shattered Sword- but their postwar statements were not. It's also worth mentioning that Senshi Sosho- what they call the official Japanese history and their primary source- is not an official history at all. Just sayin...

[@richardmalcolm1457]

@@manilajohn0182 There is more that could be said about these testimonies about what was happening on the other (non-Akagi) carriers at that moment. But Randall's point was a much narrower one: That Symonds specifically repeated the old claim that VT-8's achievement was in keeping the Kido Butai's CAP fighters down at low altitude to open the way to the dive bomber squadrons of Yorktown (VB-3) and Enterprise (VB-6 and VS-6) to stage their decisive attacks at 10:22am. But VT-8 staged its attack at 9:20am, which was a full hour before the dive bomber attacks of the 'fatal five minutes' fame. And the chronology just doesn't work for that claim.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@richardmalcolm1457 Yes, I understand, and I agree. VT-8 drew the Japanese combat air patrol down to sea level but did not keep them there. What kept them there were further U.S. attacks, poor Japanese aerial discipline on the part of their fighter pilots, and a lack of adequate control of fighter cover for the 1CSF. One of their pilots- Harada Kaname- later addressed this when he said that: "Before Midway, I thought that a fighter pilot's duty was to attack; at Midway, I learned the value of patrols". When the dive bombers attacked, the Japanese had approximately 43 fighters in the air. One section of two or three aircraft was at high altitude; all of the rest were at lower altitudes. I was only pointing out that Shattered Sword is a mixed bag. While it contains a great deal of information on Japanese carrier operations, the authors' analysis leaves very much to be desired. Cheers...

[@alancranford3398]

Speaking about torpedo bombers--the Devastators were out of production already and the TBF was being shipped out. One group of six TBFs were sent into battle and all six only flew one mission. Four B-26 bombers used as torpedo planes were also one-shot wonders. Though obsolete, there were Devastator survivors that flew again.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

so how did the Devastators do at Coral Sea?

[@joewalker2152]

The TBF was rolled out to the press and public on the afternoon of December 7th 1941. I find this quite ironic really.

[@alancranford3398]

Damaged a carrier and sank the Japanese light carrier Shōhō and four other warships in conjunction with Dauntless dive bombers. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea The push towards Australia stopped, and because of the Doolittle Raid the push to take Midway and parts of Alaska was on. The Devastators were obsolete but managed to do their part up to Midway--when most of the Devastators were destroyed in battle. But you asked about Coral Sea--and the Devastators did their part despite defective torpedoes.

[@paaat001]

One thing that bears mentioning is that Dick Best had contamination in his oxygen system that damaged his lungs to the point that was his last flying assignment. He was medically retired after the battle of Midway. Another thing worth mentioning was that the 4 TBF Avengers were also part of Torpedo 8 but were not on the carrier yet so they attacked from Midway. Three of four of those were also lost in the attack so technically one airplane out of the entire torpedo squadron (split between shipboard and land based) survived to return. It was deemed a total loss at Midway so all planes of Torpedo 8 were lost in the battle.

[@alancranford3398]

Four US torpedo planes took part in the Battle of Midway. The most successful was the PBY flying boat--no losses, one torpedo strike. Next, the Devastators were the most successful. Then there were the Avengers--their initial combat record was 75% didn't return and the one that did was written off--worse than the Devastators even though the Avenger was a better torpedo bomber that gave fine performance during and after WW2. Finally, B-26 bombers were used as torpedo planes and half were shot down, the rest were too badly shot up to fly again. The PBY was the most successful torpedo bomber that day, achieving one hit and suffering no losses, and that may have been sheer luck. The Devastators performed better and had a higher percentage of survivors than the B26 and TBF but still, "no luck." Not that the torpedo attacks were futile, no way. One scout-bomber mission was carrying smoke tanks and laying smoke screens to allow the torpedo bombers to get into attack range without being shot down. That mission was regarded as hard on Dauntless dive bombers and crew because enemy anti-aircraft fire was expected to shoot down the SBDs. The best carrier combat air patrols of the first six months of the Pacific War were the experienced fighter pilots of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Hampered by shortage of radios and by inadequate communications, no radar, very limited numbers of fighters covering their naval task forces, the mission load-out for CAP over the fleet (minimal for rapid reaction) and other problems that the three big aircraft carrier navies shared, Imperial Japan was the best at the game in early 1942. The torpedo bombers drew down the CAP and dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown set three Japanese aircraft carriers on fire in five minutes flat. While the torpedo attacks and other piecemeal American annoyances took place, the Japanese carriers were unable to launch strikes. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_B-26_Marauder Three 38th BG B-26Bs[21] were detached to Midway Island in the buildup to the Battle of Midway, and two of them, along with two B-26s detached from the 22nd BG, carried out torpedo attacks against the Japanese Fleet on 4 June 1942. Two were shot down and the other two were so badly damaged that they were written off after the mission. Their torpedoes failed to hit any Japanese ships, although they did shoot down one Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter and killed two seamen aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi with machine-gun fire.[18][22] The crew of one B-26, Susie Q, after dropping their torpedo were pursued by fighters; seeking an escape route, they flew directly along the length of the Akagi, braving anti-aircraft fire - although the pursuing Japanese fighters had to hold fire temporarily, to avoid hitting the flagship. Another, after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, didn't pull out of its run, and instead headed directly for Akagi's bridge.

[@ralphascariot105]

Wow Thank you for the real history of this important moment of world war II. Thank you ALL our SERVICEMAN and WOMEN of devotion for the USA. Rest in Peace !!!!

[@RTD3]

Need to always mention where the museum is, a brief history of it and why it's there.

[@paulbergen6574]

My grandfather worked in San Diego at Consolidated making PBYs. His dramatized??? story starts with the blow at Pearl Harbor and an emergency order for patrol planes. Overcoming all the heroic workers filled the order, and on their own time completed an extra plane. After the Battle of Midway the Navy sent a commendation to the Plant that claimed the plane not ordered was the one which spotted the fleet. My own investigation seems to indicate that these claims are unlikely to be true. However, you may have more information than I and able to confirm some aspect of the account. It might all have just been a ploy to boost production, or an expedient to divert enemy attention from the impact of their codes being compromised. Still, if this miracle plane could be found, I'd be interested in where it actually went and what it really accomplished.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

....all the "Strawberrys"...yes, their role was vital....got a really nice one on display at the museum in Dayton...along with every other plane you can think of......

[@petestorz172]

Hornet's and Enterprise's TBDs made their attacks about an hour before Enterprise's (and Yorktown's) SBDs attacked. OTOH, it was Yorktown's TBDs that attacked some 10 minutes before the SBDs and thereby occupied CAP fighters' and ship's lookouts' attention. OTOH, Hornet's and Enterprise's TBDs occupied the CAP's attention, kept the IJN carriers' flight decks occupied with rearming and refueling CAP fighters, and forced the carriers to maneuver, which hindered rearming the Kates in the hangars (sudden tight maneuvers and moving/shackling 2000 pound torpedoes are not a safe mix). The height difference between the CAP and SBDs gets frequent mention, but was the horizontal distance between the fighters attacking Yorktown's TBDs and Enterprise's SBDs also a factor? Another question I wonder about is whether CAP fighters' voice radios were still so poor that they could not be vectored away from the TBDs onto the SBDs - IOW poor or no communication compounding horizontal and vertical distance.

[@Whitpusmc]

The Japanese aircraft radios had multiple issues including poor shielding and atmospheric issues. Many times they were removed to save weight as they functioned so poorly.

[@Canopus44]

that's a great point. After Enterprise's and Hornet's torpedo bomber attack there was plenty of time for the CAP to get back up to altitude before the dive bombers arrived but that point seems to be left out in almost all narratives i've seen/read.

[@Whitpusmc]

@@Canopus44 I think the definitive thing that the spread out attacks did was it prevented the Japanese from launching their counter attack until it was too late / the SBDs destroyed three carriers. Regardless of success in attacking the Americans, not having their hangar bays filled with fueled and armed aircraft, might have a loud damage control to save one or more of the carriers that were hit.

[@Canopus44]

@@Whitpusmc Very true. The book "Shattered Sword" really did a good job in explaining that in great detail. That must have been really frustrating for the Japanese to deal with such a spread out attacks by the US. As you said, every US air attack did its part in the final success of the battle.

[@jameswentzkershawn001]

I have been studian this battle since I was eleven. When the movie came out.

[@mgt2010fla]

Are there any copies of the one volume Morrison "Two Ocean War" available to the public?

[@frankpienkosky5688]

....try Thrift Books....I just bought a copy....lots of good Navy stuff there...

[@joelmccoy9969]

From June 7th, 1942 to the first week of August 7th there is little sexy Naval activity. The New Zealanders had a Steavadore strike in the runup to the Guadalcanal invasion that I would really like to hear about. It affected the loading of the freighters that affected the off-loading logistics of the Marine's sustenance. Will to fight and logistics decide wars; Where is this story? The whole decision to invade and `Island Hop´ was part of the War Plan Orange but there is a chain of events between the Coral Sea Battle and the Guadalcanal Landing that has little to do with the Naval Fiasco that turned out so well which was the `Battle of Midway.´ The beginner sailor Fiasco rolled on in Iron Bottom Sound. Without the lopsided lucky Victory at Midway, the Guadalcanal invasion would have been delayed at best and even bloodier for the ground pounders on the Island. The flight to nowhere was a good indicator of where this was going despite technological superiority.

[@teashea1]

well done

[@petestorz172]

Lesser though its role was, Tambor's presence set in motion a response by the cruiser force he spotted that caused the Mogami-Mikuma collision and the consequent sinking of Mikuma and serious damage to Modami. The IJN had a similar scouting line, but it arrived after TF16 and 17 had passed by. I-168, which sunk Yorktown, had been tasked with scouting Midway Atoll.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

so where did those planes come from that sank that cruiser?

[@petestorz172]

@@frankpienkosky5688, I was referring to Tambor's role in Mikuma getting sunk. I did not refer to the Enterprise (IIRC) planes' greater (did you notice my use of the word "Lesser"?)role because, 1.) submarine actions were being discussed; 2.) I assumed readers would be familiar enough the sinking of Mikuma that mentioning Enterprise's planes would have been superfluous and needlessly verbose.

[@earlcollinsworth]

One thing I think had an effect on the Battle was the Thach Weave which helped the fighters to survive the fight.

[@joelbell9082]

You never mention anything about Commander Henderson who drove on an aircraft carrier and was awarded the medal of Honor and Henderson field and Guadalcanal was named after him

[@rabbitramen]

Nor did they mention Marine Captain Richard Fleming who was killed when his Vought Vindicator crashed into the Mikuma. The gasoline from his tanks exploded then caught fire and the flames were sucked into one of the engine room vents. These flames killed the Japanese crew in there and caused damage which contributed to the Mikuma's destruction.

[@mgt2010fla]

The Japanese claimed to have sunk the USS Enterprise SIX times! You got to wonder what the home folks thought of that?

[@Andi845]

Thank you great program!!!

[@johnskillman2035]

Regarding the question on were any of the Japanese destroyers with the Strike Group at Midway also present during Operation Ten-Go, the one-way attack by the Yamato in April 1945. The answer is yes: the destroyers Isokaze and Hamakaze were present and were both sunk on April 7th 1945. There were no other ships with these names during the war. Ref. Samuel Elliot Morrison History of United States Naval operations in WWII.

[@longrider42]

I had a Uncle on my Dads side of the family, who was in the Navy at the time of Midway, on a Cruiser, but he ended up being a radio operator on Midway, because one of the radio operators had gotten sick. It is rumored that he said when asked, how was the battle? "Very Loud" The radio shack was buried deep enough to be safe. Midway was the turning point.

[@earlcollinsworth]

I must remind you of the fact that Fletcher was operated on the principal of calculated risk which means that if the numbers weren't right he was to withdraw from the fight, which he did!

[@wmoy8507]

First time I heard explanation of why both squadron attacked the first carrier.

[@mineown1861]

Was the aerial torpedo they used plagued by the same problems as the mark 14 used on submarines at that time ?

[@frankpienkosky5688]

....from what I heard...yes...lots of stories about torpedoes running wild....

[@tjswan4628]

Isn't the Lexington in Corpus Christi TX?

[@noneatall9060]

That's a different Lexington, CV16.

[@jaywinters2483]

Hope they’re getting expert advice on how to preserve the leather jacket & helmet.

[@stevenesparza2003]

What did Yamamoto tell the emperor after the loss at Midway?

[@frankpienkosky5688]

....So Solly?...actually they did their best to keep the whole thing under wraps as much as possible...even going so far as to put out false versions of what happened....

[@petestorz172]

Re the night following the daytime carrier battle, the battleships and cruisers of Kido Butai were steaming toward TF16 and 17, and were closer than Yamamoto and his force. IMO, Spruance's choice was very correct, as the battleships and cruisers of Kido Butai outgunned TF16 or TF17.

[@stearman456]

It's very likely that had Halsey been in command of TF16 he would not have withdrawn afterwards as Spruance wisely did and the overall outcome could have been badly different. They may have collided head-on with the Japanese surface fleet in the middle of the night and the carriers would have been effectively defenseless. Spruance was a humble but brilliant warrior.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

@@stearman456 yet they never reached the Yorktown....which was helpless...

[@stearman456]

@@frankpienkosky5688 That's true, and it would be interesting to know just how close they got to her before they gave up, but the other two, making 25 knots or so, would have been a hundred miles away in just four hours. It could have gone sideways very badly. Spruance was correct.

[@dixiemae5042]

80th 👊🏻💪🏻

[@dennisweidner288]

Dr. Symonds is a wonderful lecturer and historian. He is wrong, however, about the runways. The Japanese did not bomb the Midway runways.

[@scottbruce4989]

The Japanese carrier flight decks were not full of planes also. Great lecture though.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@scottbruce4989 Three of them were. Kaga had approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck (per her senior surviving officer) although few were likely spotted, Soryu had her entire strike of 21 aircraft on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch (per her senior surviving officer), and Hiryu had her entire strike of 21 aircraft on her flight deck (her last landing time was 0920, and the interval between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the launch of her retaliatory strike at 1050 was nowhere near enough time to spot 24 aircraft- much less warm up their engines.

[@richardmalcolm1457]

@@manilajohn0182 I'm open to the argument that while Fuchida's account of what was happening on Akagi is difficult to sustain, that other carriers in the KB may have been somewhat closer to being ready to mount the strike than Shattered Sword generally suggests. The difficulty, of course, is in trying to weigh the accuracy of later recollections of surviving officers. (And how to reconcile these with those of, say, Leslie and Holmberg, who saw no planes (Leslie) or just one plane (Holmberg) on Soryu's deck at the moment of the attack? Normally, I would tend to value the IJN officers' accounts more, since the TBD pilots were mostly focused on trying to mount their attack, rathert than trying to make a detailed assessment of the state of the decks of their targets; but then Leslie's account was drawn up on June 4, which at least gives it more immediacy. In either case, we are left with difficulty in evaluating fallible human memories, often consulted well after the event.) One sentence that struck me from Shattered Sword is Parshall/Tully's observation on p. 230: Hiryu "would not mount her own counterstrike until 10:50. This, in turn, means that she was no closer to being ready to go at 10:20 than anybody else was." There's a bit of a logical leap there, since the time of the strike launch may not fully speak to the exact status of the prep of the involved squadrons, and of course the focus in these discussions is usually on Hiryu, since she was of course the only carrier that was actually able to mount the strike. That said, the half hour lag time is at least suggestive, to me, that Hiryu's state at 10:20 was *probably* closer to that argued by Parshall and Tully than that implied by Fuchida.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@richardmalcolm1457 Leslie was wounded and forced to ditch. Whether from his wounds or from treatment for them, it's entirely possible that Leslie simply made an error in the draft of his official report. It should be asked why Leslie- a 40 year- old squadron commander in June of 1942- would even consider falsifying an after- action report for no other reason than to fluff it up with "lurid tales" of exploding or burning aircraft. Read below what Holmberg told author Peter C. Smith in June of 1977 to discover why so many pilots failed to see aircraft on deck, and why the majority of those who scored hits did: "In the vertical phase, from 12,000 feet down to bomb release, I was concentrating on adjusting the aircraft's heading to keep the crosshairs of my telescope bomb sight on a red ball painted on the forward part of the flight deck on the target ship. I concentrated on two things at this juncture; one was to watch the altimeter for 1,500 feet coming up, the other was to push the electric bomb release button, and at the same time, pull the manual bomb release lanyard at 1,500 feet altitude. I did this to make doubly sure my bomb was released! Next, I concentrated on pulling out of my dive so that I would be just skimming the water when I regained the horizontal flight when my gunner (my rear seat man) shouted joyously over the intercom that my bomb had struck the target and that I should look back to see. I did so with satisfaction- but just for a moment, for then I concerned myself with evading ship's gunfire that manifested itself by shell splashes in my vicinity". Although the authors of Shattered Sword stated that Japanese accounts should take precedence over those of U.S. pilots, it's actually Japanese accounts which should be called into question. Many of those questioned regarding aircraft on the flight deck (as older men decades after the event) were ambiguous in their response, using phrases such as "I never saw..." or "As far as I'm aware..." Additionally, most of them had other duties to perform at the time and precious few referenced either the time at which they saw the flight deck or their vantage point. In contrast, the USSBS questioned senior surviving officers (just after war's end) whose primary duty involved knowing the status of the ship's air group. Lastly, there's the Japanese desire to save face of the Imperial Navy's officer corps. The CAP were led by officers who allowed their own fighter cover to leave the 1CSF wide open to a dive bomber attack. In the Japanese version of events, no attack aircraft on the flight deck generalizes the battle; the Japanese took the initiative by attacking Midway, but the Americans seized the initiative by launching a series of attacks which eventually overwhelmed the Japanese. In fact, the Japanese have already done this sort of thing- saving face- in "Senshi Sosho". In their volume on Midway, the Japanese place a great deal of responsibility for the defeat onto the shoulders of Petty Officer 1st Class Yoji Amari for his failure to describe ship types in his initial report. This is despite the fact that he actually sighted the Americans. Meanwhile, the pilot of Chikuma's no. 1 aircraft flew right over the Americans without sighting them and then broke off his mission due to bad weather. The pilot of Chikuma's aircraft was Lt. Chuma, a graduate of the Imperial Navy Academy at Eta Jima- and his failure was covered up in Senshi Sosho. The authors never demonstrated that Fuchida was lying. In fact, Fuchida had serious memory issues. His memoirs contained numerous errors concerning trivial personal matters which were of no historical consequence at all. That said, he was correct in the (unusual) number of aircraft which attacked Akagi and the number of hits which the Japanese recorded on the ship. He was also accurate in stating that Zeros were just beginning to launch when Akagi was attacked. Best confirmed this by noting 6- 7 Zeros beginning to launch- one of which passed through his bombsight as he passed 3,500 feet. A solid case can be made that Fuchida simply conflated the launch of Akagi's CAP fighters with the strike which he knew was being prepared. Lastly, regarding Hiryu- it's unlikely that the Japanese were spotting aircraft aboard Hiryu while the other 1CSF carriers were being bombed- particularly since Hiryu's deck crew had ample time to do that sooner. The last landing time of aircraft aboard Hiryu was approximately 0920. The last landing time aboard is key to determining when a strike could have begun to have been spotted, because both photographic evidence and a filmed interview show that the Japanese could and often did launch CAP fighters from abreast of a carrier's island- leaving the rear flight deck clear for spotting. Spotting a deckload strike of 21 aircraft took about half an hour, while another 15 minutes or so was required to warm up the engines. The roughly twenty minute interval between approximately 1030 and the 1050 launch is about the amount of time that the Japanese would have needed to bring an additional three Zeros to the flight deck to add to the strike and warm up the engines of the force while the aircrews were briefed. Cheers...

[@richardmalcolm1457]

@@manilajohn0182 "Lastly, there's the Japanese desire to save face of the Imperial Navy's officer corps." Yes, indeed - but that's the argument that Parshall and Tully (and not just them) are offering in characterizing Fuchida's account! Because that account (and maybe, just maybe, Ohara's in regards to Soryu's flight deck operations, too) rather baldly serves a narrative that the Kido Butai was just minutes away from launching its own strike on Fletcher, but were doomed by mere bad luck, rather than their own string of bad decisions (and indeed some brilliant strokes and great skills on the part of the USN). Those bad decisions go far beyond mistakes with the fighter CAP that morning, and they go all the way up to Isoruku Yamamoto. Was Fuchida lying? The problem with his account goes far beyond mischaracterizing that CAP launch on Akagi. And it was not Jon Parshall, after all, who dismissed his account as a "pack of transparent lies,' but a Japanese historian! But whether he was intentionally lying, or merely had "serious memory issues," the consensus that exists in Pacific War historiography now, on the part of both western and Japanese historians, is that he is deeply unreliable as source even for actions he was present at. And in the end, that may be all that really matters.

[@scubaman6]

A fleet without air cover as Yamamoto would have known would not have continued East, secondly, all of the Japanese carriers in that Midway attack were sunk. The other Japanese carriers were in the Southwest Pacific on other duties.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

.....or attacking the Aleutians?....

[@donaldtireman]

Among others, the Zuikaku and Shokaku were either undergoing repairs or awaiting replacement aircrews after the Coral Sea battle.

[@michaelhband]

👍👍👍❤❤❤

[@3dickeys]

Anyone notice how black and shiny the airstrip is right now?

[@fredmaxwell9619]

The MK14 Torpedo used by American Submarines were mostly fixed (finally operational) by the fall of 1943. Submarine Commanders identify and reported the torpedoes as faulty and failed miserly all through 1942 and 1943 but were ignored by the Bureau of Ordnance and said if there were any fault it was the submarine Captains and crews. It makes me wonder how many US submarines were lost because of faulty torpedoes. More then one US submarine was sunk by a faulty torpedo making a circular run and hitting the submarine that fired it.

[@525Lines]

Glad to see there's some Japanese representation.

[@NationalMuseumofthePacificWar]

Yes, it is important to tell stories from every side.

[@alancranford3398]

The Japanese threw away their fourth lost carrier by sending out a last and rather feeble strike that hit the Yorktown for the second time. If the Japanese had danced out of range to link up with the rest of the fleet, they could have tried Midway again later that week. Perhaps Yorktown would have survived the battle, or perhaps Yorktown would have met up with the Japanese submarine that actually did manage to torpedo the Yorktown. Spruance got in his licks and pulled out of range. No need to throw depleted air groups with exhausted fuel, oxygen, lubricating oil, bombs and torpedoes (and possibly caliber .50 machine gun ammo). Yorktown's task force had depleted AAA ammo. Would the Japanese Navy went ahead with an amphibious assault on Midway and try again to draw the US fleet into battle?

[@frankpienkosky5688]

...."feeble"?....they hit her hard with two separate attacks....the last one leaving her dead in the water...and battleships without air cover are sitting ducks...just ask the Brits....the Japanese had a superb fleet, but it was a finite resource...they could never replace their losses they way we could....and they knew it....

[@alancranford3398]

@@frankpienkosky5688 The surviving American air groups were out of torpedo planes (and if my information is correct, there were only enough torpedoes for two full strikes--there were torpedoes but nothing to carry them). The dive bombers had conducted two strikes that day and lost pilots due to navigation errors, fuel exhaustion, and of course to enemy action. Of course, the Japanese had just lost four carriers and there was just one small carrier with the Yamato--and after underestimating the Americans, after "sinking" the Yorktown in three times in three air attacks (the first was Coral Sea), it appears that the Japanese Navy lost faith and decided that they had enough losses for one day. The Americans fled because they had reached the point of diminishing returns--and couldn't afford more losses. The Japanese fled because Midway wasn't knocked out and because there were an unknown number of American carriers with an unknown air strength in an unknown location supported by an unknown number of battleships and cruisers. Fog of War is an equal opportunity agency. The Americans had better situational awareness--besides, if Midway fell, Japan could either expend resources garrisoning it (and being cut off by American submarines and long-range strikes from Oahu-based heavy bombers) or could abandon the place.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

@@alancranford3398 they probably could have taken it...but they also probably couldn't have kept it....remember that wasn't the real objective....

[@alancranford3398]

@@frankpienkosky5688 The trouble with diversions is that they turn into the main effort. The Aleutians were a diversion, Midway was bait--so many pieces! The main event was supposed to be a climatic battle to sink the American Navy. War Plan Orange (the obsolete war plan) didn't call for an immediate decisive battle--what I've been able to find out indirectly. The US Navy under War Plan Orange would have needed a year to get enough stuff together and relieve the Philippines. War Plan Rainbow was in effect during 1941, several months prior to Pearl Harbor and the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Rainbow called for a holding action in the Pacific while devoting most resources to defeating Germany and Italy and those European Axis nations. Japanese plans for Midway were to repeat the "success" of Pearl Harbor by sinking enough of the US fleet to keep America from interfering with Imperial Japan's conquests--and make taking the war to the Japanese home islands too expensive in American lives. www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-rainbow.htm

[@TaskForce-nr7sd]

@@alancranford3398 I agree. Yamamoto knew his intelligence had completely failed him in this ambush. And he had very little air power left to counter whatever surprises the USN might have lurking. If his Main Body had the two Aleutians carriers and carrier Zuikaku (even with a reduced air group), he might have continued the battle. No doubt frustrated with himself for not bringing every available carrier to the decisive point of contact.

[@tennis20100]

Why didn't the Hornet do anything in the battle?

[@johnnybanks5321]

They were sent out on the wrong heading and missed the Japanese fleet. Except for Torpedo 8.

[@pakers2128]

Admiral Spruance made the observation in his afteraction report on the consequence of Hornet squanders its resources. Hornet had a chance of redeem self in the attack of the last Jap carrier, got there after the carrier was destroyed because they did not launch on time. Nimitz took revenge on the Captain by side lining him for at least a year. that is why it is called the Miracle of Midway; basically TWO American carriers defeated FOUR Jap carriers.

[@kudukilla]

Torpedo 8 was from the Hornet. The rest of their planes went on “the flight to nowhere”.

[@FairwayJack]

good vid ... btw, melee is pronounced may lay

[@elijahhodges4405]

Dick Best is still one of my heroes.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

....so..did he burn out his lungs or not?...

[@elijahhodges4405]

@@frankpienkosky5688 I think the movie took a little artistic license. But it was something that could happen. Pilots who were in a hurry often had problems with the oxygen.

[@russellpowell6634]

VFO drift on their receivers was a documented occurrance in this battle. You cannot gear the ither pilots if your recrive frequency has drifted away from the intended frequency.

[@coolcat5714]

All these great men who did great things …Nimitz is up there with Patton and Eisenhower…

[@johngaither9263]

FYI, While Fredericksburg, Texas is not at the end of the Earth, the end of the Earth is visible from Fredericksburg.

[@andrewklahold2880]

How comes none of our battle ship were not brought in to this battle

[@johnnybanks5321]

Too slow. This was a carrier battle with planes not guns.

[@andrewklahold2880]

@@johnnybanks5321I understand that even though they were slow they could have moved in for in direct fire once they were located, but what I discovered, though is that the Iowa class was not in play yet them was the ones that I was thinking of, still I think they could have snuck the Pennsylvania I there for some in direct fire. As for the the torpidoes the subs had the same problem as I recall

[@frankpienkosky5688]

there weren't any available...most sitting in the muck at Pearl Harbor....

[@jeep146]

I disagree with Symonds answer that destruction of Midway would not of made a difference. If the first wave had destroyed it's targets a second attack would not have been needed. This was the reason the switch from torpedoes to bombs happened. If the aircraft had remained armed with torpedoes they could of launched before the first wave had landed. The one bomb dropped may not have been a fatal blow.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

all Nagumo had to do was turn away from the American fleet during recovery...then turn about and attack...but that was not the way of the warrior...even though his planes had greater range than ours...or he could have split his force which is what the people on the Hornet expected....

[@oldranger649]

Midway Island WAS an air craft carrier, do not diminish its strategic value.

[@dennismason3740]

How could any non-psychotic human being ever allow the Mk-14? How many Allied sailors died due to the problem torpedo? Thousands?

[@rogerpattube]

It’s pronounced AT-toll (like Prof Symonds says it).

[@dirkaminimo4836]

If the only purpose of the midway was to bait the US carriers, why did the have a huge landing force, and was continuing the air assault on the island?no I think extending the defense of Japan by taking midway was just as important as the carrier destruction

[@jaytowne8016]

Wouldn't detonate

[@frankpienkosky5688]

...and ran too deep...sub commanders would sometimes have to dodge their own fish....

[@lonnyfuller7830]

It doesnt fit the current naritive.

[@eastockerable]

Atoll not A-toll. Insufferable dull!

[@danielgregg2530]

This guy's constant mispronunciation of the common word "atoll" is making my head hurt . . .

[@ryanhamilton9709]

I love ww2 history but there's No way I can listen to this woman's voice! Plus shes wrong on her facts!

[@kellyfindley1485]

Isn't the original videos of the attack on pearl harbor on one of the sunken carriers at Midway?

[@markreetz1001]

"History doesn't happen in a vacuum." The Nautilus missing with its torpedo run, the attacks from Midway not hitting a thing, and the early carrier torpedo attacks may seem a waste of men and material. However, it is these very acts put the men and planes in position to get the results that came. The submarine kept the Japanese destroyer around long enough for McCloskey to spot it heading back to the fleet. All Army planes from Midway kept the carriers busy evading attacks not allowing the carriers to launch an attack. All the planes that went down with the first 3 carrier hits were thanks to Midway. Those planes would have been long gone from the carriers when the dive bombers arrived. And the ill-fated torpedo attack kept the fighters at sea level when the dive bombers arrived up high. Almost every mission that day played a role in the Kido Butai losing 4 carriers.🛩⚓🛳