35th Annual Admiral Nimitz Symposium - 2022: Jonathan Parshall Keynote Speaker

www.pacificwarmuseum.org
"1942: Crux of War"
1942 was truly the hinge point of all of WWII, in that during this one year, both the Axis and Allies had the ability to create the long-term conditions for ultimate victory. It represented the point of maximum danger for the Allied alliance. Jonathan Parshall describes the totality of the war situation in the first half of the year from both the Allied and Axis perspectives, so as to create a broader context for understanding the issues in the Pacific.
Speaker bio:
Jonathan Parshall is an independent WWII scholar. He is co-author of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, which is widely acclaimed as the definitive account of that crucial battle. He is also co-author of the shortly forthcoming In the Dark: Naval Combat at Night, 1904-1944. Parshall has been widely published in the Naval War College Review, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History magazine, WWII magazine, Wartime (the journal of the Australian War Memorial), and others. He established “The Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage” (www.combinedfleet.com) at the dawn of the internet in 1995 and has been its curator since. Parshall has also been a long-time lecturer for the U.S. Naval War College, and a frequent speaker at the National WWII Museum, the National Museum of the Pacific War, the Pearl Harbor Aviation Museum, the Pritzker Military Museum and Library, and others. He has appeared on the Discovery Channel, History Channel, Smithsonian, the BBC, and most recently on NetFlix’s “Road to Victory” series. He was a technical advisor to the remake of the movie “Midway,” as well as other TV shows. His research for the past twelve years has focused on a forthcoming new history of the year 1942.
Special Thanks to Symposium Donors and Sponsors:
Humanities for Texas
Fischer and Weiser
Hilmy Cellars
and several private donors.
Book: Shattered Sword
store.pacificwarmuseum.org/pr...
This is a recording from the 35th Annual Admiral Nimitz Symposium: 2022.
For more information about symposiums, webinars, and our mission please visit us online:
www.pacificwarmuseum.org/
NMPW Copyright 2022

[@jamestamu83]

The first 30-minutes of his presentation is the finest summation of WW2 that I've ever heard! And I've been reading about WW2 for over 40-years. Wow!! This should be shown to all high school students. He truly brings history alive!

[@halking3497]

That is about the best WWII presentation I ever heard. Considering that I watch several every week, that's saying something.

[@billw2126]

exactly my thoughts mate. Have been obsessed with the Pacific war for the past few months. Wish i could find a realistic mil sim for it.

[@alanburke1893]

@@billw2126 check out 'War on the Sea PAC' videos on YT.

[@petersuson7958]

I agree

[@Conn30Mtenor]

@@billw2126 War in The Pacific, Admiral's Edition. It's a rivet counter, a logistics nerd's wet dream.

[@bbmtge]

Parshall is special.

[@paulrugg1629]

John is among the most relatable historians, and possessed of a broad range of subject,. A credit to his profession, and a golden opportunity for those who partake of his gifts.

[@TheBrokenFarmer]

This talk was fantastic

[@joesmith323]

When we talk about American re-armament we should remember that it started back around June 1940 - year and a half before Pearl Harbor. As examples: The first flight of the P-51 was in October 1940; the USA ordered three Essex class carriers in July 1940 and eight more in September 1940.

[@willl7780]

100%

[@dancolley4208]

Wow!!! Other than a rather small group of historians, who in the entire theater of world opinion had any idea how narrow and slippery the knife's edge truly was? Certainly not me, and I once considered myself to be reasonably well read. One clear concept surfaces: it matters whose writing one reads. Many times, there is no real choice in the selection and it appears that might be the case here. Thank God for those who who failed to drink the Kool Aid. We cannot forget that we are reading history, not current events. There does, however, resonate an idea that those who fail to understand our history are dooms us to repeat its failures and I'm beginning to see more of that as the clock ticks off its inexorable march toward the future. An AMAZING revelation to me, Jon. Thank you.

[@christopherclayton8577]

Mr Parshall Is really, really good value. Thank you.

[@egonzinc]

John combines his amazing knowledge of the subject with a clear and concise delivery. Fantastic presentation!

[@TheBrokenFarmer]

And a fantastic vocabulary

[@jamesthompson8133]

Excellent job Jon!!! Always look forward to hearing you speak! You are the man!

[@tracygallaway36]

This is masterful. Johnathan Parshall shines light into often ignored areas of this global war. He explains in such insightful manner how events in any one place and time will affect those in another front and time. Just brilliant! Thanks!

[@TheDauntless63]

“Shattered Sword” is a masterpiece.

[@user-oo8xp2rf1k]

Exactly . Yes.

[@JoshuaC923]

I would like to say thank you for posting such lectures online for us to listen and learn from

[@curtgomes]

My wife and I just visited the Nimitz WWII museum in Fredericksburg Texas. A beautiful town with so much to see and do. I highly recommend this as a stop for anyone traveling near the area.

[@fohelmli]

My wife and I visited the Nimitz museum in 1991 and were very impressed by the Japanese garden on the museum grounds. The admiral was very involved with humanitarian aid to the Japanese people after the war.

[@curtgomes]

@@fohelmli Yes, Admiral Nimitz enjoyed his gardening. After the war, while living in California, he had a garden he tended to and enjoyed. He was a man of many virtues and talents. A truly great leader... We have The Nimitz Freeway (hwy17) here in Northern California.

[@davidvonkettering204]

I read Nimitz' Gray Book a couple of years ago, and if you love the history of the Pacific War, you will be well-rewarded for undertaking the task of consuming these eight volumes. The feeling of real-time involvement is so pristine that, upon reading in the reports Admiral Nimitz' plane had crashed at Alameda Air Base I actually felt a wave of despair and trepidation in that instant. Mr. Parshall's presentations on this combat theater are as captivating as the experience I found from the Nimitz records. Thanks to the US Navy and Marines, who really were the victors in this crucial part of the war. Happy New Year! Love, David

[@Italian_Military_Archives]

Really outstanding! One does not easily find an analysis that interconnects all these theatres and their maritime supply lines

[@joshwhite3339]

Really looking forward to Jonathan Parshall's "1942" book

[@spikespa5208]

Parshall: will read or listen to whatever he has to say.

[@fr.joeobrien3678]

Absolutely!

[@bobl2086]

Superb! Brillant! Looking forward your next book.

[@Old_Foxy_Grandpa]

In the movie "Battle of the Bulge," a German colonel picks up a chocolate cake and shows it to his officers. "If the Americans can ship a chocolate cake to Europe gentlemen, the war is lost." This is not an actual quote. Fast forward to the 1990s when I was talking to a friend who was in France a couple of days after D Day. He was a US Army officer. He remarked to me that when he arrived on the beachhead, all he could see for miles and miles were supplies. Mr.Parshall is right, the logistics won the war. When I was a kid in Oakland CA, there were shipyards in Oakland, Richmond, San Francisco turning out Victory ships as fast as they could to take supplies to the allies. Indeed, supplies won the war.

[@jimsilvey5432]

That was an absolutely incredible presentation.

[@daryldellone3140]

Outstanding!

[@Doodloper]

Excellent lecture by the legendary Jonathan ""Field Marshall" Parshall

[@danielgiusti6649]

I have found my new favorite WWII historian!

[@vicmclaglen1631]

As a lesson for today; this is what an aggressor can at least initially achieve through years of observation and preparation. We are almost certain to face such a thing again. The aggressor always has the advantage at the outset.

[@paduapeted49]

A truly insightful overview of the vital importance of the global development and prosecution of the war from 1942 onwards, for all the main Allied powers. The war in 1942 was a very close run thing, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, in Europe and in Asia. The existential naval supply lines to and from Britain to the USSR, to North Africa and Asia as a whole, including the Pacific war, were undeniably interdependent. A British collapse or surrender following the fall of France was likely to have unleashed the full might of Germany on the USSR, with German air and naval forces essentially intact. 1940 saw the destruction of a sizeable part of German air forces over Britain. This staved off the defeat of Britain but was not as yet a decisive turning point in the prosecution of the European war. The massive military production of the US from 1942 onwards had to be supplied to Britain and the USSR across the Atlantic - or round Africa. Britain too supplied the USSR with thousands of tanks and of aircraft as well as munitions, as its own military production of these factors increased to a wartime peak which in itself surpassed that of Germany. At the same time much Soviet production (including the grain, coal and steel of the Ukraine etc.) was lost, destroyed or hastily removed further East. Much of this production was the result of rapid industrialisation - and at times highly disruptive agricultural collectivisation - in the 1930s. By 1942, the remaining Soviet populations were indeed close to starvation and - in the main areas of warfare - exposed to the elements as well as military destruction. Beyond US/UK supplies of tanks and aircraft through 1942, US supplies of military vehicles, trucks, jeeps, etc., essentially motorised the Red Army for later battles. The air war over Germany drew thousands of German (dual purpose) AA/AT guns and flak weapons back to Germany for air defence, which would otherwise have been used for tank busting in the East. It was indeed all interconnected. The collapse of Soviet food supply in 1942 may well have resulted in economic and military collapse. This is by far the best overall analysis and marshalling of solid fact and information on World War 2 I've seen yet. Much respect to you Sir - and I have to say I was in awe at numerous points. Even after watching for the second time.

[@gregwilliams386]

I remember my father took the family to the Officer's Mess at either Alameda NAS or Treasure Island. We met Admiral Nimitz who was holding court at the entrance.

[@DiviAugusti]

Wow what year was that?

[@wilshirewarrior2783]

When you mention Treasuer Island you have dated yourself. Good view of Alcatraz I had at night there on fire watch.

[@kevinmoore7975]

I’ve watched this lecture 3 times now and still marvel at its clarity and scope. Parshall has a talent for distilling the important essence from his subject and making his audience feel what it was really like. This particular lecture should be required viewing in each and every high school history class.

[@Digmen1]

As a proud British person I was always uosets at the way we let down Poland, surrendered in Tobruk and Singapore.

[@TheDe1deonly]

Great job highlighting the various factors that impacted the conduct of the war during a perilous period. Thank you!

[@JohnnyBoy-tw9mh]

Brilliant lecture! You just want to hear more.

[@gordonbutler5142]

What an amazing lecture.

[@ElliottNest39]

Excellent presentation. Thank you.

[@asterixdogmatix1073]

Always a pleasure hearing Jonathan.

[@vicmclaglen1631]

The Red Army was enormously supported by the West via the supply convoys. Tanks, trucks, and all else. Not spoken of now, almost as if it never happened.

[@kemarisite]

The list I heard included these as the top 4: 1. 100 octane aviation gasoline 2. Waterproof telephone wire 3. Trucks 4. Radios In addition, a humongous amount of material, things like lumber and aircraft aluminum, went across the Pacific to Vladivostok courtesy of the ironclad non-aggression pact between Japan and the USSR.

[@dennisweidner288]

@vicmclaglen1631 Absolutely correct. But Lend lease is only part of the story. The war in the West forced the Germans to divert much of their INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT from the Ostheer.

[@executivedirector7467]

Pretty much any competent historian does speak of it and always did. That said, in the critical period from June 1941 till the beginning of 1943, essentially until just after the Stalingrad campaign, hardly any western air reached the USSR. It was a lot of promises and a few ships. After Stalingrad, western production levels were getting to the point that truly massive quantities of equipment and materials could be supplied. The red army of 1944 was very different from the red army of 1942. So, while there's simply no question that lend lease was extremely important, it's also true that the USSR held off the Germans and survived the most difficult period of the war almost without it.

[@frankfelker5374]

Great presentation. Thanks.

[@robbie_]

Very interesting talk. Thanks for sharing.

[@treyriver5676]

Parchal is always enjoyable

[@chrisbullock3504]

I could listen to John speak forever, literally. He has time and again proven that he is such a great linguist while still conveying such great information.

[@gagamba9198]

Tragic that the average age of the audience appears to be 65. Nothing against elders. It's the young people who ought to hear this.

[@GSteel-rh9iu]

Its when the middle-aged and young forget what it was like in previous wars that new war looms large.

[@kemarisite]

Drachinifel, who gave a lecture here about development of a KZbin channel, is in his mid-30s.

[@davidtaliaferro]

That's the way of the world; time marches on; the young will have their own wars to consider.

[@misterbaker9728]

I’m 46 stoner from Cleveland. Most people are busy and can’t go to a lot of these. But there is a huge amount of younger viewers. That’s the whole point of you tube… I roll joints and watch after work. Never have the time or money to go to this. Be cool

[@tonydevos]

​@@davidtaliaferro wise comment. Bravo

[@hughmcginley8929]

Superb presentation. Eye opening. I feel egos on the Allied side also aligned better than the Axis. The Germans and Japanese also vastly underestimated the USA. Thank you.

[@dennisweidner288]

@hughmcginley8929 Yes they focused on the military force America had and misjudged what it could create.

[@Fulcrum205]

When the Abwehr showed their industrial intelligence estimates to the German high command Goering refused to believe them. It turns out those estimates had understated American industrial capacity by a rather large amount.

[@lennyhendricks4628]

If you followed the US Railroad industry during WWII, the War Production Board and its influence is utterly fascinating. In the twenties, the success of diesel-electric locomotives for switching applications is proven. By the mid to late thirties, diesel-electric passenger locomotives have also become a success story as well, first with the then new light weight passenger cars and later with conventional heavyweight passenger cars. But it's not until 1939 that GM's subsidiary Electro Motive Corporation (EMC) (which would become the Electro Motive Division (EMD) on January 1, 1941) that we saw the introduction of successful road freight diesel-electric locomotives with EMC's four unit FT. FT's were what the railroads wanted, but by the time the War Production Board is up and running they realize they need EMD's prime movers (the diesel power plant in a diesel-electric loco) as well as in some cases the electric transmission (generators coupled to the prime mover plus electric motors to power the wheels) for things like submarines and landing craft. And the RR's (with a few exceptions such as RR's such as the Santa Fe which operate largely in a desert environment) are forced to buy new large modern steam locomotives for road freight service rather than the EMD FT's they would prefer. So most of the last great steam locomotives are produced not because the RR's wanted steam but because the War Production Board forced them to turn to steam. The War Production Board also forbade new experimental designs and in many cases, RR's would have to borrow other roads' blueprints because they were not allowed to develop new designs.

[@lancethompson6839]

This is masterful.

[@joshuabecker6799]

He's amazing at the big picture, great speech. I've met the guy with the Studebaker question cause he mentioned buffalo. Small world.😂

[@gerry4b]

Another well argued treatise on the primacy of Allied shipping. That once again leaves me scratching my head that no mention is ever made of the Irish belligerent neutrality… and the lives it cost, and the nearly catastrophic effect manufactured Irish hatreds had in the Allied war effort.

[@jerrewilliams5555]

The Manhattan project would be good to show the insustrial/home-front point of view.

[@richardschaffer5588]

Great talk! The events of ‘39-42 seem prophetic as to the the present situation in Ukraine. The democracies were the disunited in the face of the Nazi/Japanese threat until the knife was at our throats. Only then did the squabblers unite & dedicate their nation’s entire resources to defeating the threat.

[@tomhoefling]

Brilliant.

[@richardbale3278]

The German retreat from Russia is a study in how to conduct a retreat.

[@Fulcrum205]

There is an old saw that Germans are great at the tactical and operational level but absolute clowns at strategy

[@GH-oi2jf]

“The Lion’s Share” is actually 100%. I hate it when it is used merely to mean “largest share.”

[@bertrandlechat4330]

Yes. The lion's share is the whole thing. Ask any lioness.

[@RobertPaskulovich-fz1th]

Parshall is knowledgeable.

[@TheKCaryer]

Imperial Japan did not take advantage of offered German military hardware and technology. A huge short fall of the IJN was lack of mid-range AA. The IJN basically had 25mm auto cannons and 5 inch guns. Nothing in the middle. The Japanese suffered dearly for this lack of sufficient fleet AA defense. Before war's outbreak, could Japan have bought rights from Sweden for the superb 40mm Bofors? Even utilizing the German 37mm AA gun would have been a huge improvement. Yes, the Japanese early on captured 40mm guns, but it was too late for their industry to provide what the IJN needed. Can we be critical of the lack of foresight of Japan's leaders on this matter?

[@peterfraser3005]

Very interesting presentation by a very interesting historian. I had the pleasure of e mail correspondence with him in the early days of his web site in 1995 or 96 asking him about the origins of his interest in the IJN.

[@buzzardflight1]

Awesome presentation. Brilliant. Personally I doubt the British would have managed to polish off the Axis in North Africa on their own in 1942, even without the Pacific war breaking out. With Crusader, which failed to sweep the theater clear of the Axis and set the basis for attacking Italy, they had shot their bolt for a while. No Pacific war would have meant no US at war also over the Western hemisphere - and without Torch, which would have been unfeasible without US participation, it's hard to imagine the British pushing all the way to Tripoli and Tunis from Egypt against an Axis army group not threatened from the rear

[@terrysmith6791]

you clearly believe in the Hollywood form of history

[@dennisweidner288]

@buzzardflight1 But they did. The British at Alamein dealt the Afrika Coros a blow from which it could not recover. And the Germans and Italians had a rear that the British were beginning to control--the Mediterranea Sea. This made it impossible to adequately supply their forces in North Africa,

[@executivedirector7467]

The British could have finished up the north african campaign in the spring of 1941 if they had simply focused on that task, which was very achievable, instead of grabbing much of the force they had in africa and sending off on a completely useless mission in Greece. Had they left Greece alone the african campaign would have ended in spring 1941. There would never have been an africa corps and the west would not have wasted two years fighting there.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@executivedirector7467 I think you are correct about Greece, although part of the problem I that the Greeks did not adhere to their part of the arrangement. But I would take issue with the idea that the 2 years were wasted. After Britain survived (1940) and the Soviets held (1941), World War II became a grueling war of attrition. And North Africa was a part of that attrition. 1. The British finally learned how to fight the Germans in an area where they had many advantages. 2. North Africa after the fall of France was the only place where the Western Allies fought the Germans on the ground for 2 years. It was a small fraction of the Osdtkrieg, but at least it was something. 3. North Africa diverted resources from the Ostkrieg, again small, but not inconsequential. North Africa required a lot of oil which the Germans were especially short of. 4. Hitler ordered that U-boats be redirected from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean at a time when the outcome of the Battle of Britain was still in question. 5. Hitlerr had to maintain substantial Luftwaffe forces in Romania to protect Ploesti 6. North Aftrca was where the American Army learned how to fight the Germans. A bit quicker on the uptake than the British and in an area where they could not be badly hurt. 7. In the end, the Axis lost nearly 0.4 million men in Tunisia alone. Again a fraction of the Ostkrieg, but not inconsequential. Another factor to consider is that the NAZIs were not the only aggressor. Remember that the NAZIs and Soviets were allies for nearly 2 years (1939-41). After the NAZIs were defeated, the Soviets would have to be dealt with, meaning the Americans and British had to have effective militaries. The same militaries that help defeat the NAZIs were the same militaries that prevented Stalin from moving further West. And it is in North Africa that they became effective.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 Didn't matter what the Greeks did - they were going to lose. British intervention merely made it happen faster because it invited German intervention. Another Churchill mistake. But in the spring of 1941 the British had defeated the Italians utterly, and just needed to continue their successful exploitation of that victory. A few more months of essentially driving unopposed through the remaining Italian-held areas and it would have been over. So: the British exchanged something readily acheiveable (complete victory in North Africa) for something that had nearly zero chance of success (victory in Greece).

[@EK-gr9gd]

In April 1942, the IJA and IJN had been totally overstretched already. There weren't enough supplies reinforcements or maintenance capability to keep a force like the KIDO BUTAI in operation infinitely.

[@ChristianReinholdt]

Great presentation. Although I keep getting distracted by how Jon pronounces Admiral Dönitz almost like admiral ‘Doughnuts’

[@edsteadham4085]

There's always one in the comments section. Someone gives a superb lecture full of facts eloquence insight etc.....and there is that guy who points out onr misstated factoid or verbal slip that is of zero importance. But you got your two cents in

[@ChristianReinholdt]

@@edsteadham4085 There's always one in the comments section. Someone acknowledges the overall great quality of a lecture and provides some possibilities for improvement, etc..... and there is that guy who points out the seeming inessentiality of this feedback. But you got your two cents in

[@CyberSarge44]

I had always thought that if Germany hadn't attack Russia we would a tough time recapturing Europe.

[@worldwartwoanalyzed7896]

It's difficult to know what Parshall is saying here: he criticizes Eastern Front determinism yet also says the war "would have gone to hell in a handbasket" had the Soviet economy collapsed (and the USSR, presumably, been thereafter defeated). As someone who believes the West would have been unwilling (not necessarily, but probably, unable) to conquer Germany absent the Red Army, John's rebuttal seems equivocal and ambiguous. The simple question arises: How do the Allies invade Europe against the entire German army, when a small fraction of that army gave them immense difficulty historically? The answer comes from FDR, who stated in 1942, "The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians."

[@manilajohn0182]

I'm not inclined to disagree. Parshall and Tully were less than accurate on a number of items in their book on the battle of Midway. That said, I am curious; where did FDR state that: "The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians"? While a solid case can be made for the accuracy of that statement, I've never before read that FDR actually said that. If you would be kind enough to provide a source for that, I'd greatly appreciate it. Many thanks in advance...

[@dennisweidner288]

@worldwartwoanalyzed7896 While it is true that the Western Allies would have had a difficult time defeating the Germans without the Soviets, the Soviets would have had a difficult time defeating the Germans without the Western Allies. Lend Lease and the War n the West which diverted industrial output from the Ostheer were very important. In addition, the Western Allies cut the Germans off from importing the oil they needed.

[@Fulcrum205]

Germany would have lost even if they had defeated the Russians. The Allies would have simply used their subs to close the Baltic sea lanes (German ASW was a joke) and then B-29s and Lancasters from England and North Africa burn German cities until the A-bomb is ready. Then the German high command and Adolf get turned into various carbon isotopes.

[@sekauffmanpa3]

Brilliant! I have a question that is similar to the "government types" question. Specifically, how were the New Deal reforms of the American economy helpful to building the military expansions (including industrial efforts) of the early war years? In other words, dis the New Deal help or hinder the efforts of war mobilization?

[@brianw612]

What is it about the British preoccupation with any 14 day period?

[@RobertPaskulovich-fz1th]

1942 - where can I buy this book!

[@stevphenrose7820]

Very interesting and well presented, a thought is that the aggressors have the initiative going into the war that the allies did not have. The axis could plan how to attack and where. The allies could only respond initially. No wonder that the axis had so great an advantage at the start of the conflict

[@dennisweidner288]

@stevphenrose7820Correct. Another factor is that the Allies did not want to fight the War or spend money on the military before the War while the Axis did want to fight the War and had massive spending programs before the War.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 The allied nations all started spending a lot on their military and on industrial development pre-war. yes, the axis had a lead; they started first. But the USSR had the largest mechanized force in the world well before the war started, and had pioneered things like large-scale airborne forces. They had some excellent aircraft and modern doctrine. Maybe they peaked a little early (1936-37 or so) and then suffered from the purge. But, again....they had some great stuff coming on line before the German invasion. Likewise Britain began rearming in the mid 1930s. The systems that won the Battle of Britain were all put in place before the war - sometimes years before. France began serious rearmament in 1936. By 1940 it had three armored divisions and several more mechanized divisions. It had a large (and as it would turn out, completely ineffective) air force and navy. The US lagged the most but, with our gigantic economy, we could afford to make some serious mistakes and still avoid disaster.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@executivedirector7467 A bit of a misunderstanding here. By Allies, I mean the Western Allies. The Soviets were more co-belligerent (rather like Finland and the Germans) that an Allied power. Remember that they were a NAZI ally for nearly 2 years of the War. And yes what you say about them is accurate--they were spending massively. What you say about the Western Allies is misleading. You are correct that Britain and France did begin to rearm in the mid-30s, but just that--BEGIN. The extent of the rearming was not a major effort. German military spending was a much larger share of GDP, even after Munich. As for America, we did not begin to get serious until the fall of France, but even then American spending was a relatively small part of our GDP.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 The USSR had been seeking a defensive alliance against Germany with Britain and France for several years in the 1930s, and were rebuffed. Then Munich happened. THEN the USSR signed the nonagression pact with the nazis. If you want to call the USSR an ally of nazi germany, what do we call France and Britain when they agreed to let the Germans take a big chunk of Czechoslovakia, to which they were bound by a defense treaty, without consulting the Czechs? I understood what you meant; I don't usually use the term 'allies' to include the USSR, but in this case I did not want to leave them out. As far as pre war spending, Chamberlain, for all his uselessness on other things, did preside over the creation of the whole RAF integrated air defense system, the first of its kind anywhere in the world. He presided over the Hurricane and Spitfire programs and had both aircraft in service by 1939. Britain also created the Singapore fortress. France spent lavishly on their armored divisions, (3,000 tanks in service in 1940 - more than Germany), the maginot fortifications, and a massive naval buildup including the construction of several heavily fortified ports. Even the USA, which was in terrible shape militarily in the 1930s, started up a naval construction program, and expanded the Army from the tiny 190,000 men in 1939 to over a million by 1941. Was it enough? No, we know that now. And while I agree with you that the allies didn't *want* to fight a war, they *were* preparing, and thank goodness they did.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@executivedirector7467 1." The USSR had been seeking a defensive alliance against Germany with Britain and France for several years in the 1930s, and were rebuffed." -- For good reason. Look at what happened to the countries where the Red Army moved in. We seem to have the tithe same opinion of Chamberlain, but what is commonly ignored, besides the air component which you mention is that 1) the Soviets were as much danger as the Germans and 2) when Britain finally had to fight, the whole country was with them. The British public which was near pacifism a few years earlier, firmly believed that Chamberlain had done all he could to avoid another war, tragically too much. This was also one of Roosevelt's major accomplishments. 2. " Then Munich happened. THEN the USSR signed the nonagression pact with the nazis. If you want to call the USSR an ally of nazi germany, what do we call France and Britain when they agreed to let the Germans take a big chunk of Czechoslovakia, to which they were bound by a defense treaty, without consulting the Czechs? -- France had a treaty with the Czechs, but Britain did not. The distinction I make between co-belligerents and allies is a commonality of values such as democracy, the rule of law, civil liberties, etc. And military aggression and murder on a huge scale. 3. I understood what you meant; I don't usually use the term 'allies' to include the USSR, but in this case, I did not want to leave them out. As far as pre war spending." A fair point and as you say they were building a huge military with modern arms. 4. , "Chamberlain, for all his uselessness on other things, did preside over the creation of the whole RAF integrated air defense system, the first of its kind anywhere in the world. He presided over the Hurricane and Spitfire programs and had both aircraft in service by 1939. Britain also created the Singapore fortress. France spent lavishly on their armored divisions, (3,000 tanks in service in 1940 - more than Germany), the maginot fortifications, and a massive naval buildup including the construction of several heavily fortified ports." All true, but even in 1939, it was not as much as the NAZI as a percentage of GDP. Probably also 1940, but here I am not sure. I will also point out that Spitfire squadrons were not operational until 1940. 5. " Even the USA, which was in terrible shape militarily in the 1930s, started up a naval construction program, and expanded the Army from the tiny 190,000 men in 1939 to over a million by 1941." Actually, with exception of the Navy, American military spending was minimal. And even naval spending was minimal in GDP terms. There were no real increases and a draft until the fall of France. 6. "Was it enough? No, we know that now. And while I agree with you that the allies didn't want to fight a war, they were preparing, and thank goodness they did." I am not sure they were preparing. There were increases in spending which is true, but those increases were not what was required to fight another war.

[@tarjei99]

The Eastern Font was the grinder that wore down the Germans. It allowed the Allies to land in Italy and later in Normandy.

[@dennisweidner288]

@tarjei99 Absolutely correct. German MANPOWER was primarily committed to the Ostkrieg , but it is the War in the West that diverted more than half of the German INDUSTRIAL output, leaving the Ostheer poorly supplied and supported..

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 Only in the last year of the war. From June 1941 till June 1944 the Germans were free to concentrate almost all their combat power in the USSR. If you look at their actual deployments, that was pretty much what they did. They stupidly kept more strength than they should have in places like Norway and France, not doing much of anything. But.....still quite small in comparison to the soviet-german front.

[@misterbaker9728]

So the trucks from lend lease didn’t help? They were losing dudes from 13 to 1 to 6 to 1… Germans were fighting on 4 fronts while ussr just had to go west.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@misterbaker9728 Of course the trucks and other Lend Lease aid helped, but it did not begin arriving in real numbers until 1943. Even more important than Lend Lease is as you suggest, the Waar in The West which diverted German industrial output from supplying the Ostheer.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@misterbaker9728 That's ludicrous. The USSR "just" had to go west? On a front facing 200-250 german divisions? As Dennis Weidner has said, the trucks were very helpful indeed but there were virtually none shipped before mid-1943. And armies need an awful lot of gear besides trucks.

[@greathornedowl3644]

🤔Deep Thoughts: 1) Jonathan Parshall is a great lecturer. 2) The Allies winning WW2 was like a blind squirrel finding a nut in the forest, poor planning, poor equipment, and poor leadership. 3) With All the talk about the U.S. economy did they really keep track of such things back then?

[@vincentlavallee2779]

Absolutely great 'speech'! And I agree with you totally about the War being a true world war, and that the Eastern front in Europe was in no way key and most importance of the entire war. I believe and contend that if the Nazi's had even conquered the USSR, that the war would have perhaps been a bit longer, but that they would not have been able to hold onto the USSR very long, perhaps a year or a little more. This would have drained German resources even more. In addition to this, the battles in North Africa, originally all British, and later in 1942 with the Americans, had a HUGE impact on the Wehrmacht, and thus on the battle with the USSR. It drained more and more resources from Germany, which eventually cumulated at the Battle of Kursk, mid 1943. About 400-500 Germans tanks were transferred from Kursk to Italy, as a result of the landings in Sicily, and later in mainland Italy, which the Germans expected. This had a direct impacted the battle at Kursk itself. And as you mentioned, had the Japanese stirred up trouble with the USSR on Russia's eastern front, then the Nazi's would have definitely been more successful late 1941, and early 1942. You even pointed out specifics where the cerain battles raging in the Pacific, and Indian Ocean briefly, impacted the war in Europe and the Mediterranean. There are lots more such cases, such as the US building the B-29 which was used only in the Pacific because it HAD to. What would have happened to Germany if the main fleet of US bombers in Europe were B-29's by mid 1942 that carried 3-4 times the payload of the B-17s? Another such case is why was the Luftwaffe not able to hold back the Russians on the Eastern front? Because most of their airforce was used to defend the homeland, to combat the bombers and attached fighters. So, there are so many events and interrelations that impacted other parts of the war, and to even suggest that the Russian campaign was the whole war, or even the main part of the war is just reflective that people who have this view really do not understand the complexity and inter relationships world wide. Nor do they understand the huge manufacturing produced by the US that nearly in every category out produced the rest of the world put together (allies and Axis), except in tanks and submarines, that really brought the allies to victory. There is a KZbin video series called 'War Factories' that enlightens us on just how significant this was. I have many Excel spreadsheets that will back up (with references for all the data) these production numbers, which includes all the materiale sent to Russia in 1942, and beyond. One last comment about your speech, which was truly great. You apparently learned well from your father. Stalin had spent the previous 10 years purging the Red army (killing off the officer corp), so when Hitler invaded in 1941, the Russian army was in a shambles. Stalin was forced to reorganize it, and more than once because he had decimated it previously. But to say that they learned great tactics, I have to seriously disagree with. The Russian principle throughout the war was to just send in the fodder, and eventually the Germans will be beaten. They were called the 'steam rollers' for a reason. As just an example, in the taking of Berlin for just the one month of April, 1945, the Russian had 100,000 soldiers killed. I do not consider this good tactics or learning how to fight. In comparison, the US lost 100,000 in the entire 3 2/3 years in the Pacific!

[@executivedirector7467]

The Kursk campaign was not impacted by anything the western allies did in Italy. That was Hitler's political excuse, not reality. There was no diversion of hundreds of tanks to Italy causing the Kursk offensive to fail. The Kursk campaign had been planned by both sides for many months, and the soviet counteroffensive began only a couple days after Operation HUSKY began. The Germans sent ONE panzer division (SS Totenkopf) to italy (not Sicily - so they were hundreds of miles from any fighting) without their heavy equipment, which was all left behind for other units to use. They picked up new gear on their way to Italy, where they stayed for a few months fighting no one and then returned to the USSR.

[@executivedirector7467]

I can't understand how you can dismiss the gigantic fighting in the USSR and then make the claim that the fighting in the west, which was frankly trivial in comparison before 1944, had a "HUGE impact" on the Germans.

[@executivedirector7467]

"What would have happened to Germany if the main fleet of US bombers in Europe were B-29's by mid 1942 that carried 3-4 times the payload of the B-17s? " The US could barely field a B29 force by late 1944, trying as hard as we could. Nothing on earth was going to produce operational B29 units in 1942.

[@executivedirector7467]

You might want to learn a bit about the red army instead of simply repeating myths and stereotypes. Stalin did not purge the red army for ten years. It was maybe two years. While most historians will conclude that was a crippling blow, there are a few who argue it wasn't, since some dead wood needed to be cleared anyway. I think if you look at the state of the red army in 1936, when it was a worldwide leader in mechanized forces and airborne forces, compared to 1941, when it could barely function, it's pretty obvious that the purge was a devastating set of events but that's just my observation. However....while it is true that in June 1941 the red army was in a shambles, in the midst of a major reorganization and on a peacetime footing, it's also true that they *did* learn in the hard school of war, so that the red army of 1943 was far more effective than the red army of 1941. I think its fair to say that their small unit training, leadership and tactics never got as good as the Germans, but it got a LOT better than the red army of 1941. At the higher, operational and strategic levels, they got a lot better and exceeded the Germans by 1945. The Soviet August 1945 campaign in Manchuria, for example, is as impressive as the German campaign in Poland in 1939 - more so in some ways. Soviet losses in the latter periods of the war were much lighter than in the early war period, even though they were still insanely high by western standards. Recall that 80% of German losses were inflicted by the red army. Both sides were fighting hard on that front, on a massive scale, for a long time. That's part of why losses were so huge. Part of it was also the soviet regime's disregard for human life, but, let's not fall for the old stereotypes that the red army simply threw men into meatgrinders. They did a lot of that in 1941, but they learned and got a lot better.

[@vincentlavallee2779]

@@executivedirector7467 Thank you for taking the time to respond to my post. I have to respond to your series of responses. Most of it sounded to me to be a bias of what happened in Europe, and the overall war effort, and over emphasizing Russia's role and impact on the war. Germany did send a large amount of tanks from Kursk to Italy as the Allies attack Sicily, and then mainland Italy, realizing that they were somewhat exposed with the Allies coming up through Italy. This did have an impact on the Battle of Kursk, although it may not have resulted in a different outcome since the Soviets had the German plans in hand we;; before the battle even started, and had time to prepare. Secondly, the B-29s DID start bombing in 1944 from the Marianas, and it was not successful for a few months, due to two main issues that did not exist in the European theater at all. The first was the huge distance required, which was almost double that in the European theater. The second was that the B-29's hit the jet stream since they flew so high (30,000 ft), and the jet stream was not known at all before the B-29s encountered it. This alone caused further serious engine problems, which already had technical issues. In some cases, the land speed the B-29s encountered was near zero as a result of the high air speed of the jet stream. And on another issue, the Russian did not respect human lives, and used them throughout the entire war without much concern. Some of this was was just incompetence, as Jon mentions, and some was just a tyrant's attitude - Stalin who had no issue to decimate the Soviet army personnel. But I contend that it was their overall mentality, which we see today all over again, although today their justification is not because of their national existence that is in question, but it is their ongoing war attitude. To see 100,000 soldiers killed in one month is totally despicable, simply because they were very mad, and that Stalin didn't care. Had we been given the task to take Berlin, we would have bombed it in a serious fashion for many days, perhaps for weeks, before moving in. And again, if the B-29s were used, it would have been all the more damage and destruction, and in less time as well. But my main point is that if your numbers are correct in the Russian killing 80% of the Wehrmacht, this does NOT justify their use of soldiers as fodder. Also, you also seem to think that I said that the Russians did not seriously suffer, which was indeed the case big time, for both their civilians and their military. I contend that they used their military quite like fodder, and were not too concerned about that. Their entire goal was to defeat the invading Germans, at any cost, no matter what it took. This is a VERY different attitude from the US, back then, and as well as today. As an example in the Pacific war, we consider today, and probably by many in the know back during the war as well, that both Peleliu and Iwo Jima were not necessary at all, which is really saying and thinking that our loses looked somewhat like fodder! We are deliberating over about less than 15,000 men vs. the 100,000 in one month on the Russian front vs. the 3 2/3/ years in the Pacific for the US. I agree whole heartedly with Jon's statement that the Russian war did not determine the war. As I stated before, I think that the outcome of WW II would be the same even if Germany had defeated Russia, especially at the Battle of Kursk. Russia had a whole Eastern section, and had moved their entire war machine out west, which would have been an issue to the Germans as long as Germany was entrenched in Western Russia. Peleliu was a campaign as a result of MacArthur's ego, and was clearly not needed at all. But MacArthur did not really care. His goal was to complete his commitment, that he would return, and save his name and achieve glory in history. Nimitz OKed this campaign as well, one of his few real military mistakes he made in the war. as I have said before in another comment. On the other hand, MacArthur had little or nothing to do with the invasion of Iwo Jima. For a while, the need for Iwo Jima was to not only assist with crippled B-29s bomber returning from Japan, but more so to send P-51s off to Japan to cover the bombers, and reduce their losses like what had happened in Europe. But by the time of the Iwo Jima invasion, General Lemay had switched the bomber raids from high altitude day-time bombing to low altitude night time bombing, due to the two reasons I mentioned above. Thus, the second reason for capturing Iwo Jima was gone. So, it is fairly easy to make a good case that the Iwo Jima campaign (the only US battle in WW II that we had more causalities than the enemy) was a major needless one, with great loss as well.

[@DannyBoy777777]

1941 was the end of the perilous period for the Allies. The Wehrmacht was beginning a period of de-motorisation and the Japanese had failed to aink any carriers at Pearl, which the minimum they needed to accomplish.

[@edwardmeade]

Ernie King's coal-raking is richly deserved. When the U.S. entered the war started the Canadian Navy offered hard-won expertise and scarce manpower and ships to assist the U.S. Navy to set up convoys along the East Coast. They knew what the U-boats could do; they had fought the Germans in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In one of the deadliest episodes of hubris in the history of warfare, King decided he had nothing to learn from the Canadians. Thousands of merchant mariners paid for his ego with their lives. Things didn't improve until the multinational 10th Fleet was forced on him and King turned his attention to the Pacific. This is not just a historical discussion. The current Navy leadership also has a blind spot when it comes to sealift.

[@dennisweidner288]

@edwardmeade Canada performed brilliantly in World War II. Their role in the Battle of the Atlantic was particularly impressive, but they did not have to fight the Pacific War. America did that for them. King's position was that poorly escorted convoys were worse the no escorts at all. The responsibility for the Drumbeal disaster was the Isolationists who fought tooth and nail against adequate appropriations before the War.

[@executivedirector7467]

I will just mention that people talk about convoys as if they were the obvious correct answer. But using convoys carries huge costs also. There's the fact that ships that are loaded and ready to sail have to wait in port until other ships are also ready - delaying the ones that are ready. The ships then all have to move at the speed of the slowest ship. More delay for the faster-movers. Finally, upon arrival, port facilities are not used efficiently, because all the ships get there at once, causing delays in unloading. If you were running a port you'd want a steady stream of ships on as even a flow as possible, not days when you are empty and other days when you have 40 ships arriving at once. This is not to argue that convoys should *not* have been used, because it's evident that the balance of factors probably weighs in its favor. But it's not this cost-free solution that only an idiot would oppose.

[@Fulcrum205]

The US didn't have the escorts. They were building. Look at the commissioning dates for US DEs and CVEs. They were under construction before Pearl Harbor. Much of the bottleneck was radar and hydrophones. You can make tanks or rifles in civilian factories for things machine parts or locomotives. Electronics not so much.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@Fulcrum205 Many of the escorts that America had were sent to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor. The movie 'Greyhound' is misleading. Almost all of the North Atlantic escorts were British or Canadian (1942-43).

[@Fulcrum205]

@Dennis Weidner sending US destroyers to the Pacific was the right move in 1942. The IJN was loose with few forces to oppose them. A massive sealift that needed escorts was underway to move forces to Australia. Many of the old WW1 destroyers were converted to attack transports in 40-41. The IJN, not the Kriegsmarine, was the real danger. King was right in sending most of the destroyers to the Pacific.

[@davidbotto7312]

Parshall and Citino are awesome!

[@dennisweidner288]

Jon Parshal constantly amazes me with his stunningly insightful presentations. His presentation on Eastern Front determinism was particularly thought-provoking. Now while I personally believe that the Ostkrieg was the decisive campaign of the War, the Red Army victory was in part determined by more that the Red Army's valiant fight. !. Jon mentions the importance of Nationalist China in occupying Japanese forces. He might have also mentioned the United States also distracting the Japanese with a range of diplomatic and economic actions even before Pearl Harbor. This may sound ineffectual, but the American oil embargo was a crippling step. 2. Jon also mentions Lend Lease which the Russians today now insist was of minor importance. In fact, it was very important. 3. Jon, however, does not mention the War in the West. Now while it is absolutely true that the War in the West was of minor importance in terms of MANPOWER, it forced the Germans to divert more than half of their INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT from the Ostkrieg. This left the Ostheer poorly supplied and supported and was an important factor in the Red Army's victory.

[@executivedirector7467]

But the ground fighting in the west didn't begin on any large scale until June 1944, by which time the Germans already faced a completely hopeless strategic position. Hard fighting took place but everyone knew how it was going to end.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@executivedirector7467 The Western Desert, Tunisia,, Sicily, and Italy, you are correct were not on the same scale as the Ostkrieg. They were not inconsequential, but much smaller. You are correct, but you are looking primarily at the GROUND WAR and MANPOWER. Here you are right. But manpower is not the only factor in combat power. If it was the Chinese would have won the War. World War II was an INDUSTRIAL war. And while the German manpower went EAST, the German industrial output, however, primarily went west. About 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry on foot with horse-drawn carts. That did not take much industry. The War in the West was primarily an AIR and NAVALwar, that took much greater industrial inputs. This means that with the massive diversion of industrial output, the Ostheer was poorly supported and supplied. This was a significant factor in the Red Army's victory. The War may have turned out very differently if so much of German industrial output had not been diverted from the Ostheer. I have worked up some of the numbers of the extent of this diversion if you are interested.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 Please don't assume that I am being so simplistic as to merely count manpower. You're right that no one could beat the Chinese if that is all that mattered. Everything gets much more nuanced the deeper you dive into it. But no matter how nuanced we get, the fact remains that the German-Soviet front (I will continue to refuse to use a german word to label it) was by far the most important front in the european war.

[@dennisweidner288]

You are welcome to use whatever terminology you want. I would probably use the term decisive, but important is fine. So we agree about the importance of the Ostkrieg. And I see you agree about the vital importance of industry. Thus you have to admit that where German industrial output was of major importance in the outcome of the War. And while German manpower mostly went East, German industrial output mostly went West. This was the vital importance in the outcome of the War. As a result, the Ostheer was poorly supported and supplied, moving on foot and with horse-drawn carts. This was basically similar to Napoleon's Army (1812). I absolutely agree that the heart of the Wehrmacht was torn out in the Ostkrieg. This was WHERE German manpower was destroyed. But WHERE and WHO were responsible are two different matters. An important part of the Red Army's victory (notice I say part) was how poorly supplied the Ostheer was. Not only did more than half of the NAZI industrial output go West, but it was the Western Allies that denied the Germans the oil that they so desperately needed. In contrast, it was the Soviets that supplied the NAZIs with the oil they needed to defeat France and nearly defeat Britain in the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic (1939-41). And there was also Lend Lease which is too often given more importance that the War in the West. Listen, I do not seek to deny the enormity of the Red Arm's accomplishment. It was huge. I do seek to deny what Parshal describes as 'Eastern-Front Dererminism'. The defeat of Germany was a JOINT victory. I do not know how it could have been done without the Soviets. But my point is that I do not know how the Soviets could have done it without the Western Allies. The War in the West was no sideshow, it was vital to the defeat of the NAZIs just as the Soviet resistance was vital. My real issue is with Russian thought today that the Soviet Union defeated the NAZIs singled handily and the War in the West was a mere sideshow. (I got the impression that you subscribed to that idea. If I recall you said that the War in the West was not important until D-Day. And the only way you could possibly say that is if you were using combat manpower exclusively as your metric.) Incidentally, it was Stalin who came up with the manpower bit himself. He famously said that Britain contributed time, the Americans money, and the Soviet Union blood.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 " If I recall you said that the War in the West was not important until D-Day" Nope, I didn't say that. I will say the war in the west, on the ground, was almost nonexistent before d day. In the air, sure, it was incredibly important during the boB and then again once the bombing campaign was significant enough. And the fact that the germans had to commit so much of their air force to the west deprived them of one element of their combined arms team in the USSR. All of that is true and still.....the war was decided much more by the USSR's efforts than anything else, and you have to plead pretty hard to move that needle westwards. Some of the highest ranking german officers wrote in dec 1941 that they had just lost the war because they had failed to defeat the USSR in a short campaign - and they knew they could not win a long war. On the highest strategic level I think that is correct. I will say again that the allies did little to deprive the germans of oil, since they wee short of it pre-war anyway and were getting their supply from Romania.

[@thebosscatman7]

Nice presentation I'm sorry about the other comment I've always been a smart ass

[@avenaoat]

The North African Axis military Italian and German could not use horses in the airforce, in the armies and at the fleet! They had to use the big percentage from the few oil and syntetic oil. The oil shortage in the Eastern Front was crucial and Mediterrain theater took from the Eastern front a lot!

[@henrivanbemmel]

When Mr. Parshall discusses the state US hometown morale in 1942, it reads to me like the fans of a sports team whose swing wildly and irresponsibly on every game. By all accounts, the national US psyche was to be isolationist right up to 8am on 07 Dec 41. To think that somehow all of this lack of global responsibility could be offset in a mere few months is just stupid. To anyone, the fortunes of the US in WW2 were clearly set on its ability to mobilize not only its army, but the awesome industrial plant it possessed and could grow all without the reasonable threat of enemy attack. So, sure as the sun rises in the east, there were going to be some lean months and years, but as Churchill knew short outright stupidity, the Allies were going yo win the war. Brooke on the other hand had been at this for nearly 2 years a he knew his country was not big enough to win thus on its own. The bloated British Empire had been so largely because until now other nations in those far flung regions did not have the means to effect an effective military challenge to colonial rule. Once this changed the Empire was not sustainable even if the aristocrats in their arrogance never accepted it.

[@davidtaliaferro]

Once the US entered the war, an Allied victory was assured; the only variable was when; without a Normandy Invasion the Allies would have still won but it would have been 3 to 5 years later than it was; the manufacturing capacity of the United States was just too much for the Axis to overcome; that given , use of the Atomic bomb on Germany may have come into play; one could even surmise that Hitler's failure to invade England was the turning point since it gave the US a toehold into the Continent and divided Hitler's forces from the Eastern Front. Isn't 20-20 hindsight wonderful?

[@richardbale3278]

Now let's talk about 1943.

[@chrishooge3442]

I suspect that even if the Germans had taken Stalingrad....it would continue to serve the same purpose. Germans would be pinned in defense. Soviets would be able to pin them and threaten them to the West.

[@leebiggs1685]

During the war, Hitler paid I.G. Farben 6x the market price of oil for a very limited quantity, about 5% of the national need. Additional newly drilled wells in the Romanian fields would have cost less and provided Germany with additional oil at perhaps 2x market price. Almost any prodcing field increases production in the short run with more wells, though not much more over the field's lifetime. The cost of Germany's attempt to capture and benefit from the Russian fields was huge in arms and men, a poor choice.

[@mitchellhawkes22]

Alanbrooke was just about the greatest general of the Allied West. He wrote of his troubles and triumphs in his invaluable diary. The great Alanbrooke had to put up DAILY with the mercurial British leader Churchill. Churchill was often upset with his Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but in his turn, Alanbrooke would not back down from his emotional boss when the two were at odds about military options. Alanbrooke often kept Churchill from losing his mind with bad strategy.

[@executivedirector7467]

Brooke was amazing - talented and dedicated. It's unfortunate that he never got the recognition he deserved. I wouldn't rate him as 'the best' but definitely among the best. Anyone tasked with keeping Churchill behaving deserved the kudos of a grateful nation.

[@johnfleet235]

@@executivedirector7467 Brooke was good with Churchill, but he should have reigned in Monty.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@johnfleet235 How do you mean? Reigned in his difficult personality? Or reigned him in in some other way?

[@spudwesth]

Half of the 8,000 Valentines produced went to Russia. 500,000 US trucks went to Stalin , according to Diana West.

[@executivedirector7467]

Close. The USSR received 2394 Valentine tanks. They liked them; it was their favorite British tank. You can read all the primary sources on US lend lease shipments, which are publicly available. By 1945 about one-third of the total truck inventory of the red army was US-built. But virtually all of them arrived in 1943 or later.

[@asmodeus0454]

1942 was a black year for the Allies, no two ways about it.

[@MegaBloggs1]

yeah-I reckon if the Japanese had taken Ceylon and Madagascar it would have provoked a response from the RN that would have probably crippled the RN in early 1942 and stopped the oil flowing out of the Persian gulf and crippled the supplies to the 8th army.The soviet economy almost collapsed in late 1942

[@BaronVonHobgoblin]

I love how Parshall doesn't hesitate to call out his fellow historians lurking Marxist ideas.

[@nigellawson8610]

If the Axis had been able to link up in the Middle East and Indian Ocean, although the eventual outcome of the Second World War would have been the same, the war would have lasted a lot longer. The reason why the Allies would have eventually won has to do with the fact that, even during the dark days of 1942, they were able to massively outproduce the Axis in every major category of weapon. When it comes down to it, the side that can outproduce the other eventually wins because wars in the industrial are won on the factory floor not on the battlefield. This fact is especially relevant as far as the Second World War is concerned. When it came down to it, despite the initial success of the Axis, once the war devolved into an attritional struggle, the superior economies of the Allies guaranteed their ultimate victory. In the end the Axis would be drowned by a blizzard of Allied production.

[@JohnSmith-pm3ew]

If somehow Rommel drove to Egypt (by capturing Tobruk, no other way), and somehow Stalingrad was captured on the march by devastating the Soviets, and somehow the Japanese broke into India, well.... shit would be very bad indeed. But the logistical train of these Axis operations were absolutely at their breaking point. So it's not likely they could have held for long. Especially Japan, that supply line was thousands of kilometers long and often by sea. So perhaps the war would have been extended by a couple months. Or longer, if it would have various knock on effects. Losing Stalingrad wouldn't have meant the Germans could supply their troops in the Caucusus much better, but it would have made operation Uranus harder. Part of what made it so successful is that the Germans who already had few reserves had to plug TWO flanks that were wide open. Impossible task, which forced an almost continuous retreat back to Ukraine

[@billk8817]

A great presentation. Not many maps show French Frigate Shoals- a significant (tiny) island in the battle of Midway. How like Parshall to put it on the map. A simple destroyer escort kept Yamamoto in the dark on the location of the US aircraft carriers just before Midway. Of course I disagree with him on Doolittle’s raid (without naming it he called it a “stunt.”) In this he takes Nimitz’s side. I disagree. Doolittle’s raid prostrated Japanese admirals and generals before the Emperor, such was their shame. It was a mini Pearl Harbor. His co-authored book Shattered Sword stated that in all of 1942 only 50 Japanese carrier planes were built. At first glance this makes sense since the IJN lost one carrier at Coral Sea and four at Midway. But I say that 1942 airplane production was diverted to the army so another Doolittle couldn’t happen which is why the Japanese kept so many planes home-bound. The impact of Doolittle’s raid was far reaching regardless of Nimitz’s or Parshall’s opinion. I have no proof of this theorem. But I also adhere to his thoughts that the war WASN’T WON before the US entered it. And those who espouse such blarney risk the wrath of Parshall in presentations such as this.

[@exharkhun5605]

Jon Parshall is such a great historian and such a great guy. He's going against "Eastern Front Determinism" here and I think he's right, but I think the "Eastern Front Determinism" point of view is only a counter to the US-centric point of view espoused in US media. For years the rest of the world has had to grind it's teeth as US media made it seem the US won the war against Japan at Midway and defeated the nasty Germans at the great American battle in Normandy, oh.. and something something Bulge or something, wherever the country of Bulge may be. It's nice to see this "US determinism" on the defensive, because it's just as wrong as the other point of view. In the end the truth is probably a lot more in line with what mr. Parshall is saying. It was a large interconnected war and what happened anywhere affected what happened everywhere.

[@dennisweidner288]

Educated people do not get their history from Hollywood. Western historians never dismissed the OStkrieg, even though Siviet authorities closed their archives making it difficult to study the Istkrieg, Abd Siviet historians are the lines that pursued Eastern Frint Determinism. And their medial dismissed the War in the West as a sideshow. Isuugestv you look at the number of Sivuet films about the war in the West.

[@executivedirector7467]

I think that's a very fair point. We all often over-correct. I guess it also depends on how deep an understanding one wants to have about the war. To the casual observer, it's not that far off to say the US defeated Japan and the USSR defeated Germany. If you only have one minute to understand all of WW2 then that's nto that far off. As you go deeper everything gets much more nuanced. The simple explanations are rarely the right ones.

[@darrellcriswell9919]

Red shirts! Are they Commies?

[@willoutlaw4971]

Dark days for European colonial "empires" indeed..

[@GSteel-rh9iu]

In 1943-44 three to four million people in Eastern India died of starvation; food aid from US, Canada, Australia refused or diverted by Churchill. Churchill's secret war: the British empire and the ravaging of India during World War II Mukerjee, Madhusree 2010

[@dennisweidner288]

@GSteel-rh9iu The Bengal Famine was a great tragedy. I'm not sure Churchill ignored it but certainly should have given more attention to it. But the matter is not as simple as you suggest. Shipping was a huge issue with the Allies. Congress had launched the Quit India Campaign. It is rather unfair to try to cripple the British administration and then complain it was not working well. Also, the monsoon was particularly destructive, impacting transportation in Bengal.

[@executivedirector7467]

@@dennisweidner288 Churchill wanted to ignore it; it's very well known that he hated Indians and was perfectly happy to see them starve. Although the Congress Party was the major organization seeking Indian independence, it's insane to say that because that movement existed, the British should have allowed three million people to starve who could have been saved. In fact it's an awfully good way to create support for an independence movement.

[@mva6044]

Alan Brooke accent at 23:00 😆American academics should stick with american-english. And technically Alane Brooke was right, they (the British) did loose the war, or at the very least it was a phyrric victory, they lost the empire.

[@mva6044]

Along the same lines, to professor Parshall -- in Q/A session, it's S-tavka, not sztavka. There is no "shh" sound.

[@wiktornyckowski]

38:02 Actually, the emphasis on Eastern Front ("Eastern Front determinism") comes from USSR-sourced propaganda (both during and after WWII), not scrutinized for a long time. Numbers dictate a very different story - to be quite precise, not a Pacific one but rather related to Allied (Western) bombing campaign from 1942 onwards, especially 1944 and early 1945. It wasn't Soviet invincible armies that conquered III Reich. Famous Eastern Front was but a stampede of a drunken horde of thieves, rapists and killers trampling over a corpse of German army which at this point was starving for fuel, ammo and quite literally, food. And German army was in such a desolate state because Western Allies bombed III Reich flat into the ground, quite literally. So, while the Pacific has been an important theatre of war, it was Eastern Front which has received far too much appreciation so far.

[@knicklas48]

Hungary is Hungary and Bulgaria is also Hungary?? 2:55 Proofing is your friend.

[@rexfrommn3316]

I am going to take strong exception to Jonathan Parshall's characterization of the Eastern front of WW2 as less than critical. This point is historically utter rubbish. Yes, all the other fronts were interrelated. Lend Lease aid helped the Soviet Union but it is difficult to say it was alone decisive. All the events of the global war on all the fronts had some impact upon all the others. However, the real turning point of WW2 was at the Battle of Moscow on December 6th, 1941 when Marshall Zhukov launched a massive counteroffensive against German Army Group Center. The Soviet Armies under Marshall Zhukov drove the German Armies back over a hundred miles. The German Wehrmacht lost vast quantities of small arms, tanks, warplanes, transport planes, vehicles and horse teams. German winter technology was inferior to the Russians causing enormous losses. Manpower losses for the Germans by January, 1942 were around 1.2 MILLION casualties. The war in the East changed much more to a war of attrition than a war on maneuver from this point forward. The results of the battle of Moscow are beyond dispute. It is important to note that the German Army was only able to attack with ONE ARMY GROUP for Operation Blue in 1942. It is also important to note that the campaign for Stalingrad required large numbers of Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armies that Hitler had to beg, burrow and steal from his Axis partners. Soviet resistance hardened dramatically in the Donbas region. German infantry losses became extremely high in the Donbas in the late summer of 1942. This constant attritional fighting wore Von Paulis's 6th Army down even before it got to Stalingrad. More German infantry divisions got sucked into the Stalingrad meatgrinder leaving less well equipped Axis armies on the flanks leaving the whole area exposed. Soviet disasters around Kharkov were correct with Marshall Timoshenko's military reforms. The Soviet Army utilized much smaler infantry rifle brigades of around 3,400 men and smaller rifle divisions of about 8,000 to 9,000 men. Artillery was more centralized under artillery divisions and artillery corps for better planning and firepower coordination along breakthrough fronts. More and better tanks, warplanes and artillery guns were produced in ever larger quantities from the factories in the Urals. The Soviet Army that counterattacked in November, 1942 was a much better trained, better equipped and better led army than in the past. The equipment losses at Stalingrad during the retreat to the Kharkov area and back to the Kuban area were enormous with tens of thousands of trucks, warplanes, guns, transport planes and warplanes the Wehrmacht could ill afford to replace. Another German Army at Voronezh was severely mauled and the 2nd Hungarian Army was annihilated. Essentially, after the Stalingrad campaign WW2 was going to end in Nazi defeat in Europe. The Western Allies only fought about one fourth of Wehrmacht forces from 1944 after the D-Day campaign. Around 80 percent of European casaulties in WW2 were on the Eastern Front. The Soviets tore the guts out of the Nazi Germans. It is important to note that the Soviet economy never came close to collapsing during WW2. Stalin's industrial managers stockpiled much of the strategic minerals ahead of the war. Also, while rations were hardly robust for Soviet workers, most had enough to eat to keep working. Othewise, Soviet production levels would have dropped. Much land in Central Asia was broken up by women farmers putting more acreage into production. We should also mention the fact that the Soviet Union fought Japanese aggression starting back in 1937 with substantial aid to Nationalist China with weapons, warplanes and volunteer pilots. Heavy border fighting against Japan occurred in 1939 with the Japanese getting a bloody nose at the battle Khalkin Gol under General Zhukov's combined arms counterattack. The Soviet Union also supported Republican Spain causing large numbers of casualties to Nationalist, Italian fighters. These Soviet aid campaigns to Nationalist China and Republican Spain were substantial keeping both of these governments in the fight for prolonged periods. Soviet officials also brought home ideas for medium tanks like the T-34 tank and the heavy KV tank that were in production in 1941. The Pacific War was important to the United States, Australia and other Commonwealth countries and especially important for China. Yet the decisive front in the WW2 was the Eastern front with the huge titanic struggle between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Operation Bagration was larger than both the Normandy invasion and the Battle of the Bulge. The Soviet resistance to Nazi Germany was so ferocious because every Soviet citizen knew after 1941 that no mercy would be expected from Wehrmacht soldiers. Stories of German atrocities against Soviet villages and cities were well publicized. The hatred of the Nazi invader was complete for the average Russian soldier. Soviet soldiers got steady messages reminding them to kill a German soldier each day or more if possible. Neither side took prisoners very often either. Wilhelm Keitel was asked when the tide was turned against Germany. His answer was one word, "Moscow."

[@MetroplexAerials]

You used the word pre-ordained. I would beg to differ that it is all ordained... we just can't see it.

[@michaelmontgomery5141]

Stalin acted stupidly at first

[@petestorz172]

Re Eastern Front Determinism, over-simplification hinders understanding.

[@johnrudy9404]

The Germans almost did it, with a very poor logistics train/trail, meddling by AH and against an enemy in his own backyard. They were good soldiers. Had the Nazis NOT been a group of genocidal maniacs, fosted German nationalism for all people and acted in concert with other countries, quite possibly, the soviets would have been crushed.

[@willl7780]

its amazing that we did so well in ww2 without diversity equity and inclusion...

[@xandervk2371]

Black veterans might disagree.

[@Conn30Mtenor]

John, I love your books and lectures BUT I want you to stop with your attempts at a British accent. It's really unnecessary. It's also embarrasing.

[@johngerardhealy]

Jonathan Parshall provides scant and weak evidence for his contrarian view that the Battles of Moscow & Stalingrad were not the decisive turning points of WW2. From then on Nazi Germany was in retreat in Europe. Remember, the allies agreed that Germany had to be defeated first; it was their priority. If you're going to have an exceedingly contrarian view ... then make a compelling argument.

[@just_one_opinion]

just goes to show you what a real ENEMY engladers are and were.

[@willboudreau1187]

I regret I have only 5 thumbs up to give to this video (channeling the democrats who vote early and vote frequently!!).

[@Happy11807]

American response to the Japanese Americans is ALWAYS CRITICIZED,with little regard to the peril and uncertainty at this time in history! We we’re getting our ASSES BEAT EVER WHERE,AND THE SITUATION WAS DEFINITELY IN DOUBT,ESPECIALLY ON THE WEST COAST!

[@manilajohn0182]

You exaggerate for effect. We weren't "...getting our asses beat". We were locked in a struggle in which the outcome was uncertain- and that is not even remotely the same as your claim.

[@Happy11807]

Evidently you paid no attention to what was going on in 1942! Mismanagement,down right incompetent leadership,the U Boat slaughter,Australia and Great Britain on a shoestring! The issue was definitely in DOUBT!

[@manilajohn0182]

@@Happy11807 The only things in doubt were how long it would take and how much it would cost to defeat the Axis powers. Churchill himself referenced this when, after he heard that Pearl Harbor had been attacked, he stated that he went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful, adding that: "Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder". The Allied powers held six conferences during 1942. They addressed the grand strategy of defeating Germany first, the postwar creation of the United Nations, intent to punish those guilty of war crimes, and where to invade in Europe first. These were not the actions of powers on the verge of defeat, or even on the road to defeat. They were in fact the actions of leaders who understood that, barring a succession of grand strategic misfortunes, the Allied preponderance of manpower, industrial capacity, and raw materials would prove decisive in ensuring an eventual Allied victory. During 1942, not one of the Axis victories was grand strategic in nature. By that I mean that not one of them was capable of altering- even slightly- the overall course of the war. The U- Boat offensive never came close to sinking the "...1,000,000 tons per month for a year..." which Doenitz himself reckoned as necessary to force Britain out of the war- and that tonnage requirement more than doubled when the U.S. entered the war. While Allied efforts to maintain a line of supply and communication to Australia were conducted with scant resources, Tojo himself regarded an invasion of Australia as impractical- primarily because the Japanese lacked both the shipping and the divisions to carry out an invasion of that continent. For their part, the Imperial Navy lacked both the logistical support and the warships to cut Allied communications with Australia. The Japanese were strapped just holding on to what they had in 1942- and things just went downhill for them from there.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@manilajohn0182 Pearl Harbor was a huge shock. At the time the decision was made, people on the West Coast were seriously afraid of a Japanese invasion. And Fith Columists were also a matter of concern. What was done was a gross violation of the internee's rights, but it is easy to say that now, possessing the perspective of hindsight. It's always easy to say what should have been done looking back.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@dennisweidner288 My friend, I never said anything about the Japanese - American issue.