Montgomery vs Eisenhower on Operation Market Garden's True Purpose | History Debate

[@xarglethegreat]

I always had the impression that market garden was meant to achieve both, clearing the antwerp approach in the shorter term, and once the supply line was more secure serving as a spirngboard for the thrust to the Ruhr later

[@erikdrum6934]

Another reason why the V-1 and V-2 rocket launch sites were also in the sector of the British army. And the V-1 and V-2 were causing a panic in UK by killing the civilians in London.

[@manticore4952]

It's obvious Monty was talking about the long term objective. Capture the port, get resupplies/additional reinforcements and push behind the enemy.

[@mgt2010fla]

@@manticore4952 That's why Monty ignored the waterway to Antwerp until he lost Market-Garden and then sent the Canadian's to do the hard work! The German 15th Army had time to organize it's defense.

[@exharkhun5605]

Churchill, at that time, was pushing to meet the Red Army as far east as possible. As we've later learned if you want to push your army through Germany west-east (east-west) you can go through the Fulda gap and you can go over the North German Plain (for which eventually the English were responsible in NATO's Northern Army Group). The North German Plain or the Nothern Lowland starts in the Northwest quadrant of the Netherlands and it goes all the way to Poland. We dutch joke that if you're standing at the eastern end of the Afsluitdijk (the landbridge/dike you forgot the name of) that there's only a few cows between you and the Polish border.

[@johnd2058]

I really want to say something intelligent, NATO ally, but I can't get past what "Afsluitdijk" looks like in (American) English. Any funny ones the other way around?

[@nukclear2741]

@@johnd2058 think the pikes along the Mississippi river, but it is also a bridge

[@KnightofAges]

Doesn't matter what Churchill was "pushing". Eisenhower was ready to give Stalin all he wanted - the Western Allies DID, in fact, meet the Soviets further East than the borders of East Germany. They then retreated to hand over all that German land and people into Soviet hands - the US troops met the Soviets at Torgau; Leipzig was well behind the American lines; yet all those people were then given to Stalin's cruel hands. You can see the front here at the end of the war: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Line_of_contact#/media/File:Final_Operations_-_19_April-7_May_1945.jpg

[@johnd2058]

@@KnightofAges All that had been agreed to, and not an inch or a soul more. That map you posted shows Torgau as an insecurable salient, and Leipzig within artillery range of the front. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/210_mm_gun_M1939_(Br-17) | The Western advance past that occupation line occured in the context of terrain decidedly favorable to the offense, as good as it gets in Germany. This does not make for a stable border, historically. The only rational outcome of breaking the deal at this point would have been to fulfill the Valkyrie Conspirators' delusional fantasy that Hitler's death would make the Western Allies switch sides and join the Third Reich's war against Slavic Bolshevism. I don't know if Churchill could have speechified the British into it, but I'm certain the American people would have revolted. www.google.com/maps/@51.0855258,11.71812,113365a,35y,1.77h,5.55t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en&authuser=0 upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Germany_occupation_zones_with_border.jpg | Merry Christmas to all. ^_^

[@johnburns4017]

@@johnd2058 As the British voted in a Democratic Socialist government, before VJ day, Churchill's _Operation Unthinkable_ would have been rejected. VE day had Britain spattered with union jacks, US and Soviet flags.

[@EldarKinSlayer]

Look into how well he payed attention to the Dutch Officers on his staff, who knew the terrain perfectly, who told him that every staff study ever done concluded that rapid movement upon the road Market Garden had to use was impossible for any unit much larger than a Regiment.

[@Jerry-sw8cz]

Spot on, yet any time anybody brinks up this argument. These defenders of Monty's legacy WILL NOT HEAR IT. Monty himself stayed the goals. It was his operation. Just every aspect of thid operation screams incompetent leadership. Yet esp. British people will till their deaths defend legacy of their hero from El Alamein. Which objectively clearly had little chance to fail regardless of current C.O. Change my mind.

[@tomsexton3625]

Exactly they had to file in a single file line on a road that was bordered on both sides by impossible terrain.Like in Gallipoli when they landed on the beach overlooked by cliffs which was never figured into the battle plan.Half asked plans make for losing battles.

[@grogery1570]

@@GFStodtmeister you could wait until Biden has been in office for a year before you decide he is no good, 100 days in doesn't give him much time to do much. Except get 100 million people vaccinated,

[@timberry4709]

@@grogery1570 And this is the opposite side of the "blame coin". The obverse is "blame others for your failure" the reverse is "take credit for another's success".

[@bigwoody4704]

@@GFStodtmeister you are sort of right - i don't personnaly know anyone who rates Biden high

[@aaronseet2738]

When I was a teenager, I saw an adage carved into a coffeeshop table, "It is human to err, but it is more human to blame others for it."

[@bayuadhi3671]

What is err?

[@renard801]

@@bayuadhi3671 It means 'to make a mistake'.

[@bayuadhi3671]

@@renard801 i see

[@ur2c8]

I have always wondered a) what XXX Corps intended to do once it crossed the Rhine at Arnhem, and b) why Monty did not clear the route to Antwerp first. You have answered both questions.

[@voornaamachternaam771]

I think you are right. If he wanted to go to Germany, he had to capture also a bridge over the IJssel. So; two bridges to far.

[@ramal5708]

Another miscalculation by the British

[@johnpeate4544]

@@ramal5708 Two thirds of the drops were American and it was largely planned by the Americans Brereton and Williams of the USAAF. And if course let down by the US 82nd Airborne.

[@ramal5708]

@@johnpeate4544 Not Browning?

[@johnpeate4544]

@@ramal5708 Monty _did not plan_ Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944: _”In early September **Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day. Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._ *_The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_* _It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._ _Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._ *_Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth. *The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges._* _*Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._* *_This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._* *_In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._* *_Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates:*that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_* *_....Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._* _This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that. _*_The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.”_* - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands

[@johnpeate4544]

@@ramal5708 From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson. _”General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”_ On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact: _”Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.”_ -Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning. They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stooped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked. Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea. Eisenhower insisted it go ahead while under resourcing it. Montgomery wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. Eisenhower: _”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._ There were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions. It should also be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. If only certain things were executed a bit better, such as *the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen bridge early when only around 20 German troops were guarding it.* Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success.

[@StewartNicolasBILLYCONNOLLY]

Having read extensively on Market Garden, and spoken with my late Father who was a Sergeant in the 1st Battalion, The BLACK WATCH (RHR), 51st (Highland) Div. We always agreed that the reasons for the failure to achieve the crossing of the Rhein were mainly due to three things. 1. The RAF's changing of the landing grounds to suit their purposes - with the Paratroops landed too far from the bridge. 2. The idiot General "Boy" Browning's insistence on having his headquarters division included in the first drop, thus leaving fighting troops behind 3. The truth of war - the first casualty in battle is the PLAN!

[@johnmcdonald9304]

Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY. The failure was Montgomerys supreme arrogance in ignoring the fact that there were two full strength Waffen SS panzer divisions, the 9th. SS Hohenstauffen and the 10th. SS Fruendsberg in the woods and fields outside of Arnhem. The man was an asshole.

[@rpm1796]

@@johnmcdonald9304 Both Divs in the II SS Pz Korps were refitting after being decimated at Falaise...and the chase up the coast ... On the day of operations, only the 9 SS Recce Btn was in fighting order. The strategic operational directive was F.M Montgomery's. The Air element...Market.. of the operation, was planned by Generals Brereton and Williams, USAAF.....and Browning. The ground..Garden.. operation was planned by XXX Corps'.

[@rpm1796]

Very interesting to hear your father's experiences and call on the battle...Bless them. I will never understand why they didn't use a series of coy sized coup de main ''Pegasus'' attacks with Horsa gliders at Arnhem...and with the Yanks father south. With both, Main and RR Bridges on the Nederrijn was already secured by coup de' main....I would have dropped the the Bdes south of the river and then ''do the scoot'' over from a strategic southern base right on Horrock's line of advance Sla'inte from New Scotland.🍻

[@agentmulder1019]

BRAVO, BRAVO!! TRUTH INDEED!!

[@johnburns4017]

@Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY The Black Watch were not at Market Garden. The failure was the US 82nd not seizing Nijmegen bridge immediately. Browning was still in the air when the 82nd men should have been moving towards Nijmegen bridge. They were drinking coffee and having donuts.

[@beatlessteve1010]

This is so awesome here we can debate openly on strategic WW2 decisions, with folks all around the world, this just simply could never have been accomplished in the 90's and before, here we have so many people from around the world on both sides of the war, who love our history an have learned so much, unfortunately our individual knowledge is unknown to each other and we really do not know who is debating with the benefit of original source material so much to be read is taken at face value but interesting and exciting non the less. In schooL, my favorite pastime was debating wars and history with fellow students, even in elementary school so I am very happy to be here and learn and listen.

[@spudwesth]

Truth will emerge?

[@rampancyproductions]

May I give one a try? The Allies should have pushed through Italy to Germany and Not through France?

[@michals5873]

@@rampancyproductions pushing through Alps would be very casualty heavy. Mountains offer great defensive positions

[@HueyPPLong]

@@michals5873 Yeah Italy was a horrid slog. There’s a reason Italy didn’t completely capitulate until the very end of the war despite being invaded 2 years before Normandy.. The terrain almost totally negated allied mechanical advantage with British and American soldiers having to trade their half tracks for donkeys to trek up and down those mountains!

[@EIKLURAM]

My knowledge of that operation is that they wanted the Germans to win the battle.Theres a lot of covert operations that I can't really go into.But the Dutch Prince Bernhard who was Co owner of Royal Dutch Shell oil was a Nazi defector and joined Montgomary and the British in the planning.He was working with Dutch resistance who were double agents.The end game was to extend the war as it would have ended by Demember.The reason for WW2 was to create the EU They had the first Bilderburg meeting at the same place ten years later in 1954. You need to look for the Traitors of Market Garden by Tony Gosling.

[@28pbtkh23]

General Kurt Student, in a statement after the war, actually considered the Market Garden Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war.

[@RememberingWW2]

As an American I am so proud of our British, Canadian, Polish, Scottish, Irish, Australian, and every country who fought to preserve the western ideals and our democratic/republic ways of life. If push came to shove and there was a draft as a result of another major war I would be proud to serve with my brethren.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I wish more people would put aside national boundaries and realise there's more important ideas to stand up for

[@RememberingWW2]

UniworldCityGGaon You are absolutely correct. This is something I've learned only recently which is surprising because I've been studying WW2 as a hobby for years and never came across the amount of Indian Nationals who served under the British army. In terms of percentages, Indian troops actually made up the plurality of the British Army troops in North Africa. This only reinforces my respect for everyone who fought to preserve the the ideals of republicanism and democracy, of course including my Indian brethren as well.

[@26Rudders]

My Grandpa fought with the Suffolk Regiment which was part of an Indian Division in Burma. He had high praise for them. They won many VC's during the war.

[@beatlessteve1010]

Yea and with a name like MrStoneycool, I am not sure how we could take any of your comments seriously, we are a shithole but you are using You Tube to so freely express your spew, so we are such a shithole that we allow you to use our medium to speak your opinion....you sound like a spoiled ungrateful winer, thats Y-NER..GET IT SLOW-POKE...

[@johnburns4017]

MrStoneycool69 Wow! Do you think Jews and those favouring the economic system of Karl Marx eat babies as well?

[@OldWolflad]

Montgomery was adamant that at the time no such plan to cut off the 15th Army been agreed, and that the first time Eisenhower spoke to him about the Scheldt again was later on, on the 10th October 1944, and for him it was never seen as the main priority following any successful Operation Market Garden. Montgomery highlights ‘Operational Directive 525’, orders for the wider offensive issued by Eisenhower on 14th September 1944 that unequivocally confirmed that he removed any responsibility on the British to clear the Scheldt. At Point 2: - “We have captured the port of Antwerp, but cannot make use of it as the enemy controls the mouth of the Scheldt: operations to put this matter right will be a first priority for the Canadian Army.” At point 12 he further confirmed that: - “The Canadian Army will take over the Antwerp area (from the British) from 17th September.” These orders unequivocally confirm that in authorising Market Garden, responsibility for taking the Scheldt would have been transferred from the British to the Canadians. Furthermore, at point 7 of his own directives, Eisenhower confirmed Montgomery’s stance: - “The general direction of movement of the 2nd British Army is northwards and then eastwards round the northern face of the Ruhr.” At point 16, he also ordered that after the British 2nd Army had secured the bridgehead at the Zuider Zee: - “The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the Ijssel river. From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the general area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Munster. In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.” I don't agree with much of what Montgomery says, but I think he can feel vindicated in this respect.

[@davemac1197]

Totally correct, except that 15.Armee would technically be cut off from Germany by MARKET GARDEN if not from the WBN (German armed forces Netherlands) on the Dutch coast in 'Fortress Holland' and 1.Fallschirm-Armee west of the corridor, which would also be cut off by the operation. It was typical of Montgomery to go for a wider envelopment if a smaller one (aimed at just 15.Armee at Antwerp) was not possible or too costly. Montgomery made the point to Eisenhower in their 10 September meeting that a northwards advance to Arnhem would ease the opening of Antwerp, but that Eisenhower did not accept the analysis. Eisenhower did agree that successful operations to the north would open up wide possibilities for future action.

[@johnd2058]

6:15 Ya know, in the context of cutting off and digesting a strong enemy formation by going through a weaker one, this all suddenly seems like a reasonable idea. It's kinda sad that Monty's own description of its goals is what made me think him a fool.

[@fuzzydunlop7928]

I think it's interesting that the divisive atmosphere was so prevalent at this point that one of the alleged goals of Wacht am Rhein was to 'drive a wedge, both literal and figurative, between the US and UK forces.'

[@Schepraam]

Just to add on the 'hunger winter', this was mainly in the west of the Netherlands, in the two coastal (North and South) Holland provices, while the north, middle and south are actually where the food is mostly cultivated. The Germand seized most of what was grown in the west. Besides that, I don't see a conflict with reaching the Zuiderzee versus eventually breaking through to the Ruhr, because the terrain is suitable to provide possibility of continious fast advance. If they had made it it would have been a master move. If you look at the average progress made on the map following the timeline since D-Day, it wasn't far fetched to expect Market Garden to succeed. I wondered about why they did not give it a second chance but think it stands to logic they kept the Rhine as a natural front line border, to cross it once more would not have been possible without severe losses, as the steep rising wooded hills along the north side of the Rhine were now heavily fortified and a would have become a huge natural high ground obstacle. Sometimes I take these present day hindsight theories and even memoirs from commanders with a fair grain of salt as so much was descision making en route, as they went along as quick as they already did. You can say MG was hastily conceived, badly planned and executed, but many other operations since D-Day with simular circumstances may have had the same outcome. How else could it be? The allied advance had been so rapid, it may have been difficult to near impossible to get it right every time and expectations of further progres based on recent previous results. It had to come to a halt somewhere, where the Germans would find a place to make a stand, so as things went sown, this is where it did. Relatively, the loss of troops was not fatal to the allied advance, but you could make the argument that Montgomery's prudence, in this case did contribute to the failure of the last leg of the operation, of taking the bridge at Arnhem and the crossing of the Rhine. The adapted strategy did eventually result in an impressive advance none the less, establishing an impressive corridor.

[@robdmorton]

Just watched this...very cool analysis...again...never knew this. This makes sense to me. Truly unfortunate that MG didn't work for my fellow Canadians from a couple generations ago who had to slug through polder country to open up the Antwerp supply route.

[@nicholasconder4703]

Reading Nigel Hamilton's biography of Montgomery illustrates, time and again, that Monty had a nasty tendency to re-write history and treat fellow officers poorly after the war. It is sad, because his re-envisioning of history actually detracts from his ability to improvise and adjust to changes on the battlefield (Alamein and the Battle of the Bulge are two examples of this). His treatment of Eisenhower during the war, and post-war treatment of de Guigand and Horrocks after the war, all point to Monty having major psychological issues.

[@rickreeve525]

I can certainly agree with Nicholas Conder that Montgomery had serious psychological issues without detracting from the successes attributed to him. I base my comment on the fact that as a sixteen year old student engineering apprentice at Rolls-Royce company in Derby in 1954, along with 8 other students, we were undergoing instruction in engineering drawings and I was standing at my drawing board when the door opened, and there stood Lord Hives, the Chairman of Rolls-Royce at that time. Behind him stood Viscount Lord Montgomery. Both men entered the room and of all the students he chose to speak to. Montgomery chose me. He stood in front of me and curtly said 'Good Morning". to which I replied, 'Good Morning Sir'. Montgomery then said, 'How long have you been here?' and I replied, Almost one year Sir'. The next words he spoke tells you all you need to know about Montgomery because he said, 'Can you read and write?' Need I really say any more? When I returned home that evening, I related the incident to my Father who was in the Royal Marines. I am not able to relate his response but let your imagination loose. That is MY impression of Montgomery and I am now aged 81 years of age and I have never forgotten.

[@nicholasconder4703]

@@rickreeve525 Ironically enough, this stands in stark contrast to how he addressed troops. My mother, who was serving with the British Army in the ETO in 1944-45, remembered when Montgomery gave a speech to the assembled British Forces just after the war ended, congratulating them on a job well done. I don't know if the intervening 9 years serving as Chief of Imperial General Staff, then head of NATO, went to his head. More likely, retirement in 1954 finally loosened the restraints that had long held his ego and lack of tact in check. One wonders if he would have had a more tactful personality had his wife not died in 1936.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Any re-writing of history by Montgomery, if it happened, pales when compared with the re-writing of history by Americans, as Nigel Hamilton drew attention to.

[@nicholasconder4703]

@@thevillaaston7811 I know. The number of Europeans who have to put with Americans saying, "We won the war" is too numerous to count.

[@bigwoody4704]

little villa - rewriting the history of a super power that came 3,500 miles to a so called empire's shores to help them go 30? Tell it to the French/Poles/Dutch/Czechs - go ahead wave your little Union jack in their face - then duck. Your favorite poofs plans got over 20,000 Dutch citizens killed in the Honger Winter - wag. Mr Conder what was Mr Churchill doing in Washington. this whole board is English revisionism. The fact is at the end of the war the USA had 61 divisions the British had 13 and they were driving American tanks/trucks/jeeps and being fueled by the USA stings doesn't it. We even fed you after the war,don't mind helping allies but monty was ASS and in fact prolonged the war. For 250 yrs your crown shoved everbody else's shit in but couldn't bring your self to admit America kept that from happening to England

[@thehistoricalgamer]

To me Eisenhower's comment which you kind of ignore which is key is where he says the attack would allow them to outflank the Siegfried line. Eisenhower by including that is saying this would give them a path into the Ruhr. So Eisenhower's short term goal with this is to open up Antwerp but Monty thinks once the facts on the ground change to an open road into Germany Ike would have no choice but to give him priority for a drive deep into Germany. Allied supreme command didn't have a single unified agreed upon vision. The historical story behind Market Garden is still largely true except it's less clear that Eisenhower agreed with it, Eisenhower approved the operation for his own reasons while Monty viewed the opportunity differently. Both generals agreed on the operation but for different reasons.

[@wojtekwojtek5126]

Gen.Stanislaw Sosabowski and first polish brigade parachutes = first to fight in Driel 🇵🇱🇵🇱🇵🇱

[@Twirlyhead]

It also would have liberated The Netherlands rather than the long, drawn out disaster that actually happened there, famine and all.

[@fazole]

It's mentioned below that Market Garden was part of a northern pincer on the Ruhr. At the time of Market Garden, about 5 US divisions were attacking Aachen which is a German city on the southern end of the Ruhr. If Monty had been able to turn the corner at Arnhem and drive south and the US forces at Aachen had been able to break through the Huertgen Forest (Hürtgenwald), then the Ruhrgebiet could have been surrounded. When MG failed, they US still tried to break through to the Ruhr with the southern pincer and got bogged down for 5 months in the hell of the Huertgen Forest. It seems neither plan was well thought out.

[@genehollon6989]

those are some mighty big IFS. The HURTGEN forest was a death trap and much has been said and written about turning the corner at ARNHEM.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

It's worse than you know. Aachen was going to surrender as an open city. Read up on the details, a TV video has been made. This surrender was reversed when the Americans didn't show up on time. Why? Ike had stopped their advance BY ORDER, per his deal with Monty. Ironic, no? The American Army was just about to roll right across all of the bridges near Aachen -- and Monty's plan stopped it. The German general involved survived, though many thought he should've been shot. He was the same guy that fought to hold Aachen -- the battle went on for ever.

[@johnburns4017]

David Himmelsbach More drivel by the resident halfwit.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@John Burns Can't you get ANYTHING right? The Aachen story has been documented in both book and made for TV video broadcast. The Germans were totally befuddled as to why the Americans didn't show up 'on time.' They'd been rolling right along. The fact that 1st Army was stopped by Ike, at this time, in favor of Monty was something that you have to piece together, as neither the US Army nor the British Army want that connection made, then or now. It's evaporated from the narrative. But the German general's plan would've put US 1st Army CLEAN over the Rhine within HOURS -- a full week before the Garden drop. He, literally, expected to surrender Aachen to a jeep -- the traditional lead element of an American Armored Corps. By this time, Germans were accustomed to surrendering to jeeps. [ It was common for the jeeps to announce themselves by way of 50 caliber machine gun bursts. This always terrified Germans, as the M2 machine gun usually required a closed coffin for the dead. Jeeps, of course, never travelled alone. They'd pack a tank brigade over their shoulder. ] (Two jeeps took the surrender of Prague in 1945 -- an event that the Czech Republic honors to this very day. It refuses to acknowledge the Red Army is its liberators. Those monuments have all been torn down. A plaque thanking the US (3rd) Army was erected in their place.) The jeeps were driven by Jewish Americans on a hunt for their cousins, BTW, and totally against orders. When they returned, their colonel told them, "Don't do that again." And that was the extent of their punishment for disobeying orders. Now contrast that with any other WWII army. Heh. When Gavin rolled north to the Baltic, (April 1945) he just used two jeeps, with his mounting an American flag. That ended all resistance. The arrival of the US Army was a fantasy come true for northern Germans. They feared the British or Russians.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

I might add, the key German panzer unit involved, 116th Panzer Division, was loaded to the gills with anti-Nazi officers. Guderian deliberately staffed it so. It was held out of the fighting in Normandy until this it not be avoided. The intention was to use the 116th to put down the 1st SS Panzer Corp should the Heer move against Hitler. Yup.

[@andyrmac7733]

I wonder if Monty was embellishing the aim to make the operation, the cause, the gamble more worthwhile to the reader. If we succeed its straight on to Belin and the war could be over by Christmas. Strategic talk like that does make you more likely to support a gamble and makes the defeat worth a try. However, Helping the Canadians secure Antwerp, is a lot smaller prize for such a gamble and defeat. Thank you for posting

[@doe_maar365]

The statement of the "Hongerwinter" would still happened, is not entirely true. The Dutch civilians went from the western side of the Netherlands (“Randstad”) to the northeast (what you painted red) because there was more food. In the red area would have had very little to eat, but the massive scale of starvation wouldn’t have happened.

[@MyLagga]

The Hongerwinter happened simply because the was a food shortage in Germany, thus food was siphoned off and sent back to the Vaterland. Market Garden had nothing to do with the Dutch famine.

[@ShamanKish]

The question is what was Monty advertising ;)

[@ShamanKish]

@joanne chon Tea bags - I thought so!

[@wperni]

As a teenager watching A Bridge Too Far I found myself puzzled by the ending. 30 Corps advanced to within a few miles of Arnhem and thus captured 90% or more of the land it was asked to cover. Moreover 30 Corps did not relinquish its gains and thus moved the front lines dozens of miles closer to Germany by 60 km in 7 days. This put tremendous pressure on the German 15th Army occupying the Antwerp Estuary which was cleared two months later by Canadian and British troops.

[@TheKamperfoelie]

The Scheldt estuary was taken, but at a high cost, and still after 2 months, while the western Allies were needing Antwerps port useable asap. Like, today. Fuel among others was taken in by Mulberry and the small part of French Normandy and Brittany ports that were usable, then driven by trucks all the way through northern France and Belgium. There was only supply enough for a single army to do a decent offensive operation. So market garden is considered a loss because it didn’t deliver, whatever the reasoning afterwards. Market Garden even DELAYED the clearing of the Scheldt estuary, because it got prioritized over the Scheldt, while little to show for. Don’t get me wrong, operational successes were sometimes spectacular, and certainly heroic, but Arnhem was just heroic, it was ultimately not taken. So there was no bridge over the Rhine, and no push to either the IJsselmeer (it was no longer the Zuiderzee at that time) to cut off supplies to the 15th Army defending western Holland, to facilitate an easier attack on the Zeeland Isles and peninsulas, gaining the use of the bulk port of Antwerp, or even Rotterdam. In every which way you look at it, Market Garden took the supplies bulk at the time, delaying everything else. It then did not deliver on anything called decisive. It did not outflank the Siegfried line, it gave no easier route than the Hurtgen Forest or the Siegfried line into Germany. It did not even free Holland apart from the provinces below the Rhine. The river delta of this area is low lying, wet ground, often sodden. Even if you get across the Rhine, it is not ideal ground to conduct a major offensive from using armored units, or even motorized, making having to cross the Rhine in the Netherlands the least desirable option. Apart from that, in the area east of Nijmegen! Next to the Groesbeek Heights lies the Reichswald and even more Rhine river. Not ideal. It makes no sense to prioritize an operation that does not deliver either an easier or swifter move into Germany itself (if not the Ruhr or Berlin, hell, even Hamburg would be nice), does not really speed up the use of Antwerp (surely it will have had an effect on 15 th army effectiveness, but it delayed the Battle of the Scheldt, and according to some, maybe many historians, made the battle considerably costlier and longer). Market Garden took place roughly 3 months after the initial landing in Normandy. After the Falaise pocket (21th aug) Germans were in full retreat. Market Garden gave the Germans a few extra weeks to prepare the defense of the Scheldt estuary. Imagine what an airborne division may have accomplished if it was used there. No more insane than dropping them at Oosterbeek. Freeing Holland was not a real goal, but if it was it was limited to the lower provinces. Tik mentions here that if 15 th Army was cut of, north eastern netherlands was still occupied. BUT, as with the southern provinces, the northeast is largely agricultural and less populated than the west. So the Hongerwinter would have had a far smaller impact, if western holland (actually the provinces of North and South Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht) had been freed. I think the real sting in this story is the question as follows: why do commanders at that level disagree, or even be ambiguous about what the aim of this operation was? Following Falaise things were fluid, not solidified as much as a few weeks later when the Germans were better dug in and ready. So making a gamble was reasonable, logical, worth a shot. A gamble was made, and it failed. Yes it took ground (thankfully. My parents were born in 1944 and 1945, in the Netherlands, below the Rhine. So already free, no Hongerwinter for them), but did not deliver a decisive push for considerable losses and delays in vital alternatives.

[@Centurion101B3C]

Couple of things: 1. The stated goals of freeing up logistical access of Antwerpen correspond with Montgomery's preponderance of things logistical. Generally Montgomery was kind of a stickler on having logistics properly lined-up before he would tactically lift a finger. 2. Montgomery probably thought that his case for stating a potential thrust into the Ruhr as the main objective would possibly take wind out of Patton's urges to put the 'pedal to the metal' on a more southern trajectory. Montgomery and Patton loathed each other ferrociously and Montgomery might have thought that sidelining Patton this way would have yielded him a crucial victory in their feud and It would have, if Market-Garden would have succeeded. Note: Patton's instincts were probably correct, but would likewise probably have worked out to be extremely bloody. 3. The closing point of the inevitable Hunger-Winter was rather lame. Most of the effect of the 'Hongerwinter'was felt in the Western part of the Netherlands. Even if Market Garden would have succeeded, the still German-occupied areas in the Netherlands would not have been subject to the (rather significant) pressures of feeding the Western part of the Netherlands. In a way, the failure of Market-Garden could be seen as being very much instrumental to the occurrence/worsening of the Hungerwinter that followed and proved right Royal Netherlands Prince Bernhard's observation as worded towards Montgomery: "If, Sir, This is a successful allied mission, then I seriously doubt it if my country (The Netherlands) can survive another one.".

[@mkat740]

I think Monty was just getting into a good 45 offensive jump off area to gain favorability too because his position would look most beneficial in an invasion into Germany.

[@patrickcloutier6801]

Interesting analysis. It appears that what Montgomery really wants to say is that he should have been C-in-C, Allied Forces! Then there would have been the pencil-thrust to Berlin, etc. But your analysis of the direction of the effort, as part of a bigger picture, presents the most sensible reason for the operation: to free up Antwerp as a supply port, and possibly capture of other useful ports. The flanking operation, if more successful, might have had the added benefit of compelling the German 15th Army to abandon its positions on the Scheldt Estuary, without much fighting, just as the Germans were forced to abandon Greece or be cut off by Soviet troops advancing through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

[@rocknrolldaddy2761]

@TIK , This one is far fetched: could it be that the allies (and foremost the British) wanted to get the V2's out of the Hague? The mobile launching sites for these delivery mechanisms were deployed in that area. A researcher by the name of Joseph P Farrel has done research on the race for an A-bomb in the latter stages of the war, he states that the Germans were ahead in the development of such a device and even claims that they detonated one in October 1944 in the Baltic sea. Since I grew up in the region where the British landing sites were located for Market Garden I've always been interested in this operation. No way this would be openly communicated as a strategic goal for such an operation: "Well, we just don't want London to be levelled to the ground" , maybe there was more at stake. The allies smacked the 15th army out of Zeeland during the same time period anyway, so why bother building the corridor to the Zuiderzee for that strategic purpose? I like your historical research on WW2, thanks!

[@CharlesvanDijk-ir6bl]

Finally a proper map which reflects the Netherlands before the big reclaim projects were finished in the 2nd half of the 20th century. Gavin didn't take Nijmegen Bridge because he was concerned about the threat from beyond the German border and Browning his boss agreed to it. Nijmegen Bridge was taken by 82nd Airborne and 30th corps but far too late.

[@bigwoody4704]

No he didn't,not with supplies landing for 3 straight days.Is it in British DNA to lie thru your crooked teeth?How was he even handed a command he hadn't done shit since 1918

[@mojo199]

Very interesting! I've always thought Market garden was in fact part of Einsenhower's "broad front" stratergy rather than "end the war by christmas", however I thought it's goal was to merely provide a pathway for the 21st army group to advance further north. The fact the Arnhem bridge was destroyed by the Allies in early October (to prevent German reinforcements crossing into the Scheldt) pretty much confirms everything you say.

[@johnburns4017]

Market Garden _was_ part of the broad front. The idea was multi-fold. It its northern extreme over the Rhine it was to consolidate for an attack on the Ruhr.

[@nicholasconder4703]

Something else I noticed in your video, this version of Market Garden also enables the Allies to take Rotterdam, which, as I recall, is the largest port in Europe. This would have solved all the Allies logistical issues.

[@johnelliot3246]

Antwerp was the largest "Deep"water port in Europe I believe. The question that I always had is about Comet 3 and those operation. I haven't come across reference then in"Bridge To Far"

[@nicholasconder4703]

@@johnelliot3246 I was able to find some information on Operation Comet doing a google search. Based on what happened during Market Garden, it would have been a catastrophe (rather like the abort airborne landing at Rome, which was mentioned in Gavin's "On to Berlin").

[@stephenandersen4625]

Those aren't mutually exclusive goals. Crossing the Rhine and opening up the Dutch ports would be a requirement for an end run around to the Ruhr. Obviously the long term goal was not the 15th army but to win the war. Anything else was just a stepping stone. Was Monty thinking too big picture and SHAEF was trying to keep him focused? maybe. I wasn't there

[@newperve]

Once the 15th is taken care of the forces in the Arnhem area would go on to attack towards the Ruhr. The question is would it be a diversionary or a main assault? Because if MG had gone well then those forces could not have been ignored. They weren't that far from the point where the Ruhr meets the Rhine. Cutting that would be disasterous for German industry. So the plan was to a) cut off the 15th, b) destroy the 15th then c) decide where to attack now they're across the Rhine and have so many options.

[@daigloomminiaturepainting303]

Monty was like us all, flawed and sometimes wrong but he wasn't wrong all the time, as some historians would have us believe. Thanks TIK for your videos you provide balanced and well thought out infomation.

[@daigloomminiaturepainting303]

@John Cornell Agreed. And I think that Monty is hard done by, by most historians. It's seems to Patton good. Monty bad. Where as it is the reverse in my view.

[@bigwoody4704]

Hollywood didn't faff up market garden quoting the Cornhole Chronicles again

[@bigwoody4704]

*From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este* After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after AlameinI do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily, said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt

[@johnbrereton5229]

​@@bigwoody4704 Patton was well overrated and would have been convicted of war crimes if he hadn't conveniently been killed. Also, the ex Nazi Generals were always praising the Americans after the war, it paid off well.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@johnbrereton5229 war crimes . Monty was the best general the Gerries had. You could have won in the Desert - the Failed Marshall didn't build the massive advantages the RAF,RN,ULTRA and US men and materiel coming in did that

[@stephensmith5982]

Thankyou for this video. Not being a student of this battle I relied on the generally accepted view that the concept of the operation was to outflank the Germans and achieve a fatal thrust to the Ruhr. Your clarification seems right in line with what General Eisenhower would have wanted from Market-Garden. An operation which would have provided new support for his broad front strategy. Perhaps Field Marshal Montgomery was thinking beyond securing the Scheldt and Antwerp and believing that upon success what strategic opportunities might be provided 21st Army Group.

[@davidolie8392]

Good analysis. Monty's claim to be "going for the Ruhr" is obviously contradicted by the actual Market-Garden plan, apart from gaining a crossing of the Rhine, way north of the Ruhr. I think there was a whole lot going on under the surface of this operation which has still not come to public light.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

V2 rockets... yes, you've got it. MG stopped V2 attacks against London. They then shifted to Antwerp.

[@johnburns4017]

David Olie Arnhem by-passed the Seigfreid line. Monty wanted a multiple crossing of the Rhine - Operation Comet. Objections mainly by Sosabowski scuppered it. Bradley and Patton were diverting supplies (disobeying orders) away from Hodges, who was on Monty's right flank, so Hodges could not assist Monty going north. Monty wanted a few divisions of Hodges' First Army on his right flank in Market Garden. Bradley and Patton should have been fired. US Corps commanders like Truscott and Collins were better than those two turkeys; they should have been put in those positions. _"The prospective benefits, if this operation was successful, were great. By establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine at Arnhem, the Allies would unhinge the northern flank of the Siegfried Line and gain access to the German Northern Plain. This in turn would set the conditions for a quicker defeat of Germany, either by directly attacking_ *_Berlin_* _or by enveloping the Ruhr Valley and then attacking_ *_Berlin_* _from the Arnhem bridgehead. It would seal off western Holland from Germany, which would in turn speed the clearing of the approaches to the much needed deep water port at Antwerp. Isolating western Holland also offered the prospect of gaining a second deep water port at Rotterdam, and of ending German V-2 rocket attacks against England."_ - SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA JUNE 1996 _"upon approval of MARKET-GARDEN at Brussels on I0 September had been short-lived. Five days later, on_ *_I5 September,_* _General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named_ *_Berlin_* _as the ultimate Allied goal"_ - US Official History - THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 210. Eisenhower had no proper strategy and kept changing whatever he had. Very amateurish.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@John Burns The US armies NEVER had to divert supplies in the manner described. General LEE and IKE were totally in charge of such matters, NOT Bradley, not Patton. That's why they had to sit on their azzes and watch MG while doing nothing. If they'd had any say at all, they'd have kept on going. Ike TOTALLY SHUT THEM OFF with a phone call to Lee. He issued orders to General Lee, who ran the supply echelon. The American system was unlike that of any other army's. All supplies were brought up by non-combat troops that the generals at the front had no control over. They were delivered to the various army-level supply depots, whence 1st, 3rd and 9th picked them up to haul them the last miles to the front. That's how the system really worked. When Bradley was desperate for soldiers, he requested that Lee's boys be diverted to combat. He was shot down in flames. He didn't get ANYBODY. General Lee, of course, had a FIT. Ike was trying to mollify Monty, nothing more. Official histories are nothing more than azz wiping for the record. When you've read enough of them, it becomes baffling why anyone in any army ever put a footstep wrong. ( In this regard, Halder's revisionism is epic by any standard. ) NO WAY is the American official history -- or any other official document -- going to put the blame on Monty -- or the British, more generally. Grow up. As for 'Maxwell' (Taylor) -- you're looking at parachute DOGMA. No way is the school for parachutists going to opine that the biggest drop of the war was all goofed up because Browning -- its godfather -- phu cked up. Instead, the official line had to be: it could've worked, yes it could. Well, who can argue against could'ves?

[@johnburns4017]

David Himmelsbach More disjointed babble.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@John Burns Can't you get anything right? Petulance is not an argument. 1) You keep opining on an American Army that you know not of. 2) You are wholly ignorant of the Dutch bridge defense scheme, that's for sure. 3) You STILL can't accept that Frost's interdiction of the northern approach to Arnhem bridge did not constitute capture of that bridge -- not even remotely. 4) What was transparent to Gavin and Urquhart -- at the time -- eludes you. Both wanted to land near their bridges -- and on the island. Crazy enough, they were both turned down FLAT. That error destroyed MG before Garden even got rolling. It permitted Grabner access to the island. Neither Browning nor Gavin imagined that motorized panzer troops would be shooting down the highway before 1st Airborne even got to the bridge... which was a major error on Browning's part. (Gavin was kept in the dark WRT II SS Panzer Corps sightings. Imagine his shock when his boys tell him there's a major German formation occupying the Nijmegen bridge. It must have been a real WTF moment.) ( With only light weapons, they couldn't make any headway.) ( Keep in mind that the Americans suffered more fatalities during MG than the British did. !!! That's how intense the fighting was. 1st Airborne was ruined as a fighting formation, and it still took less fatalities than the Americans. Its figures for wounded and captured were sky high, of course.) While 1st Airborne is having fun and games north of the Rhine, the 101st is holding off a stream of infantry from 15th Army. No author wants to dwell on that, though. As bloody as it was, it was a side-show.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

For those curious about the V2... the weak link that the Allies never figured out in time was that the liquid oxygen had to be generated at a major facility and rail roaded to a site not too far from the launch site. From there it was pumped onto a special carrier that trucked it all the way to the launch site. When the British occupied the island, they took away the last location within range of London that was also with in rail road communication with the liquid oxygen facility. It's a puzzle that the Allies never doped any of this out. They never contacted Robert Goddard, either. Even though the V-2 was nothing but one of his rockets all grown up. Von Braun used Goddard's patents to design the dang thing! Nazi contributions to rocketry were actually slight. They had to do with scale. As rocket motors get large they have stability problems in their combustion chambers. THAT'S where von Braun's team spent most of their on. The original design, BTW, was to use kerosene. It was abandoned early when kerosene proved to be limited in availability and even tougher to solve for combustion stability. Von Braun stuck with ethanol right through to the earliest Mercury launches. Now you know why. Its chemistry of burning is drastically smoother than kerosene, more forgiving. To back it off even further, the V2 only used 150 proof booze. Changing propellants wouldv'e drastically improved its range, BTW. By late in 1944, the Germans were in no position to shift propellants -- but the Allies didn't know that.

[@johnburns4017]

_"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:_ _to get Allied troops across the _*_Rhine_*_ and to capture the _*_Ruhr._* _Three major advantages were expected to accrue:_ _(I)_ *_cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;_* _(2)_ *_outflanking the West Wall,_* _and_ _(3)_ _positioning British ground forces for a subsequent_ *_drive into Germany along the North German Plain._* - US Official History, _THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 120)._ _"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."_ - _A Framework for Military Decision Making Under Risks_ by James V. Schulltz (Page 50). School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama June 1996 _"later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he _*_named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"_* - US Official History, _THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 210)._ One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the pincer on the Ruhr, Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.

[@bigwoody4704]

*From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. *After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem*

[@johnburns4017]

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the bridge the US 82nd *failed* to seize in Market Garden? 20 points form the correct answer.

[@bigwoody4704]

David Irving Burns you've fooled no one but at least you are getting better at disguising your sickness .You haven't forgot to sign out of one of your accounts before posting in another.Perhaps if they rescind that restraining order and your ankle monitor is removed the management at the home there will take you to the library.I hope those voices leave you alone I have things to do so take your meds like the nice men with the nets there have directed

[@johnburns4017]

@@bigwoody4704 *BZZZZT!* Wrong answer. Rambo, the name the bridge the US 82nd failed to seize in Market Garden, was... 🍾🎊🎈 *the Nijmegen Bridge* 🍾🎊🎈 Zero points Rambo. Zero. Better luck next time.

[@bigwoody4704]

Burns you're getting dizzy from inflating your date repeatedly. Take a deep breath.......for 20 minutes So let's review shall we, ♦️did you visit those fine Czech folks like I told you to? ♦️Did you explain why your crown sold them out to the NAZI's in 1938 with no representation ? ♦️Did you explain to the French why you left them covering your retreat in 1940 while Monty was boarding the boats and they were taking bullets? Kind of explains why they came back with the GIs and took Southern France while Winnie and Brooke wanted to keep faffing around in Italy. ♦️How about the Dutch did you tell them why Monty left them on the horn of the Hun and the Honger Winter that followed after Monty didn't have the nerve to show up for an operation that he bragged would take him to Berlin that took him backwords to Antwerp? ♦️How come Field Marshall Walter Model and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!! ♦️ Did you visit Monty's statue in Arnhem ? - oh that's right there isn't one ♦️And pick up your plastic army soldiers also mum may may slip when at home. And help with the groceries this time you lazy lump

[@JakeSpeed1000]

This is a great presentation. I tend to ignore the memoirs of both and rely on the actual Operation Market Garden plan. It was written prior to the operation and not subject to revisionist history. While any military plan changes once the first bullet is fired, so both memoirs have some inconsistencies, however Eisenhower's is in better agreement with the plan and it passes the logic test. Generals all have huge egos and are very concerned about how they are viewed in history. I do believe Montgomery have done a lot more revisions to minimize his failings. Great video.

[@johnburns4017]

_"The whole operation as I have said already was given the code name of MARKET GARDEN. It was certainly a bold plan. Indeed, General Bradley has described it as_ *_“one of the most imaginative of the war.”_* _But the moment he heard about it_ *_he tried to get it cancelled,_* _lest it should open up possibilities on the northern flank and I might then ask for American troops to be placed under my command to exploit them. "_ - Montgomery of Alamein. _Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery_ The amateurism and jealousy of US generals did not help. There is s enough evidence to suggest the Americans did all they could to scupper the operation.

[@dmbeaster]

Montgomery's letters to Eisenhower in early September proposing Market Garden spell this out in detail, so it cannot be an after the fact invention for his memoirs.

[@johnmacpherson9629]

52 Lowland Division. The 51st Division(Highland) Was not In this OP.

[@Robert53area]

Monte did blame the poles for the failure, monte blamed it almost entirely on the polish. British during the period looked down heavily on polish units. Polish pilots shot down more 109s in 1940. Yet the polish were denied a spot in the VE day parade.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Britain (and France) went to war on Poland's behalf in 1939. Britain fed, clothed and housed a considerable number of poles throughout the war, and then let large numbers of them settle in Britain. 'Monte did blame the poles for the failure, monte blamed it almost entirely on the polish. ' No, Montgomery criticized Sosabowski for his performance. 'Polish pilots shot down more 109s in 1940.' More than what?

[@sean640307]

@@thevillaaston7811 I think it was more that Browning blamed the Poles, and Montgomery supported his senior officer, rather than directly blaming the Poles themselves.

[@sean640307]

@John Cornell that's fair. I did recall seeing something to the effect of what could be considered criticism of the Poles, but it was most certainly not from Montgomery and I'm content to be incorrect in attributing it to Browning

[@bigwoody4704]

*kzbin.info/www/bejne/hoDMZJVohq2lmZI* When this was recorded in June 2012, whilst a private memorial to the Polish Parachute Brigade and Sosabowski specifically has been erected in Arnhem the British army had still not put the record straight by restoring the now deceased Sosabowski to his former rank. Major Tony Hibbert feels particularly strongly that he would like to see the British Army do this to right the wrongs done to the Polish soldiers generally and Sosabowski specifically in 1944.

[@richardbinkhuysen8109]

Antwerp was taken on sept 4 1944.But only the the city centre.The docks were taken by the Belgium Resistance Movement called the 'White Brigade'.They begged the British commander to advance,but he were told they had orders to halt. It was already decided to prepair for 'Market-Garden and take a brief rest and wait for the Canadians.There were only a few hundred German troops north of Antwerp/It would have been easy to cut off the German 15th Armee at Woensdrecht. German Gen.Lt.Chill reported to Student that the Allies shunned the fight North of Antwerp a week ahead of 'Market-Garden.Also that moved all their armour eastwards towards the Turnhout/Hasselt area and expected a major attack to the north there.Uncertain if the Alies would go further north or bend to the right into Germany. By not advancing to Woensdrecht straight away over 86.000 men,tanks,guns,vehicles etc of the 15 Armee were able to escape from the Belgium coast and send straight into the frontline between Northern Antwerp and Nijmegen.It would have been a very risky and time consuming busines for the Germans to transport further north from Breskens to one of another island (F.i.Schouwen-Duiveland).An other issue was that there were simply not enough sailors available,as they were all at the front. 15th Army was constantly reminded to be prepaired to let go of K.G.Chill straight away and move them quickly as possible to Woensdrecht,when orders were given.They were kept exactly informed of the Canadian advance on the railwayline at Woensdrecht.Later von der Heydte stated:"This was the first time of the entire war that I was ordered to break off a winning fight while it was still going on".All was set on a tight timeschedule.Transport,replacements etc.

[@shasha259]

Richard Binkhuyse Those 86,000 were actually the sieged Channel port troops sneaked out from Calais Dunkirk etc.

[@richardbinkhuysen8109]

711 I.D. Cabourg (north east of Cean) remnants were send to the north of Antwerp and later moved more eastwards.Only 744 G.R. remained at St.Mariaburg (N-E. of Wilmarsdonk). 346 I.D. (north of Le Havre) was send to Brasschaat . 857 G.R. to south of Stabroek. Later towards St.Job in 't Goor. Remnants of both Division escaped via Falaise.

[@johnburns4017]

Richard Binkhuysen _"It was already decided to prepair for 'Market-Garden "_ Nope. Market Garden was given the go-ahead on 10 September by Eisenhower. The German 15 Army sneaked from the Channel coast and went north into Holland. They were benign from then onwards.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@John Burns Can't you get ANYTHING right? The 15th Army kept trickling onto the field of battle to harass the 101sth Airborne from the second day of MG onwards. These piecemeal attacks were relentless. However, they were a sideshow, so most MG histories skip past them. Eventually, the 15th Army was slotted in just north of the 6th Panzer Army when the Ardennes offensive kicked off. By that time, it was a shell of its former size.

[@richardbinkhuysen8109]

Over 84.000 Germans troops, about 5000 vehicles, 540 artillery pieces and 4500 horses a sideshow ?

[@icmdwh1]

I'd like to see you delve into the Pacific Theater.

[@donupton5246]

Oh, don't even get me started. Biggest joke in the Pacific was the commander of the south pacific, who was always a better politician than he was a general, and he was a terrible politician.His claim to fame was his CMH, which was won by the soldiers who die under his command in 1917, not his skill as a general. His incompetence is a subject that I could rail on for hours.

[@RossOneEyed]

@@donupton5246 Please do! Bug Out, Dug Out Doug was not a real hero in anybody's boook, except his own!

[@ramal5708]

@@donupton5246 Who's that? MacArthur or Halsey? Halsey was an Admiral

[@markamiller1970]

You have introduced me to some very interesting events during Operation Market Garden and for that I thank you! I am now convinced that the allies could have successfully achieved the operational goals of both Marked and Garden. Do you have a video suggesting the ways that they might have achieved these goals? For example, it occurred to me that the planners could have requested that the 8th Air Force could have bombed the German armored unit that were supposedly concealed in a nearby Reichswald Forest. Thus freeing up 82nd assets to get on with their serious work, taking the damn bridge! I would love to hear your thoughts. Oh, and go easy on my, I studied Psychology not History. Thanks!

[@mgt2010fla]

The 8th Air Force and the British Bomber Command were never happy to forego Strategic Bombing for tactical ground support which they felt the Allies had plenty of medium and fighter bombers available and designed for that roll. Further bombing an area while trying to target tanks or troops was a not a target rich environment! Then there's the anti aircraft fire from the German 88's! So it was like a "game" of blind man's bluff, with death for the aircrew if hit by German ground fire! Many Allied aces were shot down while "going to the deck" looking for "targets of opportunity". The planners of Market Garden would have gotten their money's worth if instead of dropping the British so far from Arnhem, the medium and fighter bombers had flown flack suppression mission right before the airborne attack, and, having working radios would have been nice also!

[@frederickbays405]

@@mgt2010fla yes the radios were the biggest mistake Whoever was responsible for that error should of been taking out and shot. There is no reason what so ever that the 1st AB should not of had the right crystals in their sets. As for the 82nd not taking their assigned objective that was just plain poor setting of priorities by the planners. The orders should of been make very clear that the bridge was #1 all else means nothing without that bridge being taken. And yes the AAC commanders were pussies when it came to taking out the flak at Arnhem. Take that flak out and the 1st AB takes the bridge with ease and holds it for the 4 day it would taken 30 corp get there if 82nd had taken their bridge on first day But in the end it all comes down to those crystals

[@mgt2010fla]

@@frederickbays405 Still, there were German SS Panzer divisions in the area and Allied airborne and German armor was never a fair fight! Ask the Airborne!

[@frederickbays405]

@@mgt2010fla I did met a man while working landscaping He got added my 2nd and last summer of doing that in RI to our rout. He was with the 101st. 596th D Co Ya they did not like tanks but they knew what to do with them and so as he said they were not really any big deal U see tanks dont fight tanks Tanks are good to take out Arty but other tanks are taken on by infantry in coordination with anti tank guns The 101st was hit three times by tanks during MG and did them in all three times Look at the Arnhem bridge The only reason the Germans got over it was b/c to few of the 1sr AB made it there and then those that did ran out of ammo MG could of made it if the Brits who had planned it had done the job right 1st crystals 2nd orders not to damage private property 3rd not making orders clear that bridges top priority over any other concerns the commanders on the ground might have 4th not have bridging equipment nor boat very close to front of column 5th AAC and RAF not giving enough air support That one fail on Ick he being #1 over it all Should of had them do it whether they wanted to or not You see Kid I am 73 been at this since I was 8 Did my time with the 8th Div HQ (69) as head S-3 clerk then with 101st B Co 101st Aviation Bn as two S-3 clerk, S-2 clerk, radio op and door gunner all at same time Put in 20 to 24 hr days for 309 days but 10- says ay China Beach 95th Evac when I got my left ear drum busted and then got pneumonia Did get to spend my 22nd birthday surfing at China Beach though So i do know just a little about the operations of a AB Div

[@mgt2010fla]

@@frederickbays405 Who is speaking here, you or the veteran? Tanks don't fight tanks? El Alamein? Normandy? Kursk? Bulge? What drove the AB out of the Holland villages? Panzers! If the Germans had taken Bastogne the AB would have been routed! Arty vs tanks is a tankers worst nightmare! I am not a kid, Vietnam war era veteran, USAF medic, spent my 21st BD at a SAC base in the UP of Michigan! You had a better deal! My BA is in US History, Military History! Every operation has its failures, AB has the most! Crete, Sicily, Normandy, and Market Garden, the worse, and unnecessary, the jump of the Rhine for the British, aka Monty! You are right, "(you) KNOW A LITTLE (ADDED) about the operation of a AB division." There were no AB division operations in SE Asia!

[@ejdotw1]

I am a historian, and I really take my hat off to you on this one!! I cannot believe with all the sources I have studied, that I never recognized what you've pointed out here. Outstanding work!!

[@Freedomfred939]

Browning added no value by landing his hq in the first wave. Using his transport to drop an additional battalion of the 82nd could have been a big help. As it was Browning unable to establish comms with 1st AB or adjust compromised LZ's reassign subsequent drops of reinforcements. At the strategic level like should have insisted that Antwerp be opened as a supply port as part of the plan.

[@ukexpat6893]

Sorry you have completely misunderstood what Montgomery actually did. The clue is when he forcefully claimed, after the war, that Market Garden was 90% successful. It was when you consider that by that time the German war was virtually over, it had becomes clear that it did not matter whether he attacked Antwerp, the Ruhr, Berlin etc. None of them were primary targets at that time. The absolute number one primary target, which he went for and secured, was the Baltic, as close to the river Oder as possible. He got there, met the Russians at the Oder and took the German surrender of all their forces in North West Germany, Denmark and Norway. The mission was accomplished with Market Garden having provided a huge jump start to achieve it. It was absolutely vital to the West that the Russians must be blocked from going past the their agreed Allied stop line on the Oder. If he had messed about anywhere else and missed this objective the post war consequences to the Allies could have been catastrophic. Imagine the post WW2 "Cold War" with a communist Denmark and possibly Norway as well, together with all year ice free naval access to the North Sea. Why hasn't this come forward earlier? If you can't see why, then imagine how it would have seemed if the Allies had gloated over beating their then Allies the Russians to the Baltic and saving Denmark & Norway from communism. There were enough problems dealing with the Stalin at that time than adding more.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@UKExpat Monty was talking in code. He meant that the V2 and V1 threat to London had just been eliminated. That's what the 90% meant. It would've been nice for a grand tactical victory, but at a strategic level, he'd saved his nation's capital. Churchill was mightily pleased. He, not Monty, was the REAL author of MG. He didn't not dare let Ike know that MG was his inspiration. Ike would have shot it down just based on KARMA. Churchill's karma dictated that EVERY military gambit he EVER touched would go to chit. Every gambit he loathed would be a blow out success. (Dragoon immediately comes to mind. ) In North Africa he screwed the pooch for EVERY British commander: Wavel on over. No-one could talk him out of stupidity.

[@johnburns4017]

UKExpat Market Garden was a success: ♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. ♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened. ♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London. ♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland. ♦ They reached the Rhine. ♦ The salient was fleshed out. ♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken. All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forced were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.

[@BeelzebulKlendathu]

Why do we have to rely on memoirs? Are there any documents available regarding the goals of operation?

[@lamwen03]

One does not issue ironclad orders to allies. Or even general officers in your own military. This allows for blame to be diffused in case of failure. For example, Adm. Halsey's decision to abandon the landings at Leyete Gulf. Vague orders and priorities. Or Gen. Clark's vague orders to Gen. Lucas at Anzio.

[@indotransconsult2360]

So you mean, there is no document available except memoirs?

[@kmcd1000]

Actually, I like your theory better. I always thought once the brits got across Arnhem then what. There's no way the Brits could hold that corridor and place a new corp across the Rhine without significant risk of distruction.

[@bigwoody4704]

Monty debacles at Caen,Falaise and Market Garden had forced the GIs to go straight thru the Sigfired Line.Something Monty couldn't do

[@thevillaaston7811]

'There's no way the Brits could hold that corridor and place a new corp across the Rhine without significant risk of distruction.' But they did.

[@bigwoody4704]

Um no,not in September,not in October,not in November.Try April with the US 1st Army and 17th AB I believe.And after Bradley,Hodges,Patton and the 291st Enginners crossed

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@bigwoody4704 What about the crossing of Operation Plunder? 23-27 March 1945

[@bigwoody4704]

it was a disaster worse than monty garden and IMO was covered up by high command. Who was responsible for letting the least effective allied officer have yet another chance at getting good troops slaughtered

[@erichstocker8358]

Montgomery was an insubordinate commander. On at least one occasion Eisenhower went to Churchill and told him that it was him or me. Churchill convinced Montgomery to apologize to Eisenhower. Churchill recognized that more and more of the effort would be borne by the U.S. and there was no sense in unnecessarily antagonizing Eisenhower or Roosevelt/Truman. Montgomery spent a lot of time pushing the idea that U.S. troops were worthless and the war would be won by British troops. The two great prima donnas of WWII were Montgomery and Patton. I'll leave to the reader which prima donna was the better tactical leader. From the Market Garden perspective it is clear that for Eisenhower it purpose was stabilization of the area and supplying the invasion force.

[@11nytram11]

Montgomery never once "pushed the idea that the U.S. troops were worthless". He had nothing but praise for the US soldier, and wanted 9th US Army assigned to his 21st Army Group because he knew the British couldn't win the war on their own - especially because they were disbanding regiments to provide replacements for battfield losses. His problems with the Americans were all restricted to the higher ranks - to Bradley, to Eisenhower, to Marshall -and this wasn't a nationalist thing, because he had problems with higher ranking British and Commonwealth Generals too. He was a very difficult man to know and work with on a professional level if you were of similar rank or higher.

[@Ebergerud]

I don't quite see the logic here. Charles MacDonald who wrote the US official history of the Rhine campaigns (including Market Garden) claimed that the failure to seize the Scheldt Estuary after the seizure of Brussels/Antwerp (Sept 3-4) was a great blunder and that it could have been done with far fewer casualties than the 12,000 paid in the October campaign. The RN was screaming for the estuary, but Monty put it off to put all resources into Market Garden. (It's not totally clear that the Canadians could not have attacked anyway before German reinforcements came in.) In short if Ike wanted Antwerp he should have ordered Monty to take it in September and, as it was taken in October after heavy enemy reinforcements, there's no reason to think he could not have. Churchill told Smuts in early 1945 that he considered Market Garden largely a success and worth the gamble - but rued the fact that the operation had postponed operations in the Scheldt. (The fact that the author knows nothing of this vital campaign does not build confidence.) So isolating German 12th Army would have - what? - forced them to move into the Scheldt sooner than they did. In point of fact, Monty had been the Canadians attacking channel ports - none of which did any good because the harbors had been demolished. (Should note that the allies did have a major supply point fully active by late August - Marsailles and soon rivaling Cherbourg/beaches in tonnage. One good argument for the broad front was that the southern divisions had their own supply point - might as well use it.) The one thing that the piece here does point out is one of the oddest parts of Market Garden. 30th Corps, even if it had been able to cross the Rhine as scheduled, lacked the numbers and logistic support for a decisive campaign in the Ruhr in 1944. Indeed, unless Germany collapsed (as had happened in October -November 1918) the allies were not going to defeat the Germans in 1944. German reserves were gathering before MG was launched - as the US found out in October in the Hurtgen Forest and the Canadians at the Scheldt. Hitler's initial planning for the Ardennes began during Market Garden. So sure, a bridgehead across the Rhine would have been nice. If the allies could have crushed 12th Army (most of it was lost with the Scheldt in November as 40,000 Germans surrendered) all the better. Why 1st AB wasn't simply told to seize an area broad enough to protect a bridgehead instead of hoping to grab a passel of bridges intact must leave one scratching the head. And, BTW, the idea that Gavin bungled MG at Nijmegen is wrong-headed too. First, the 82d had to fight on day two to clear it's drop zone already captured by the Germans that Gavin correctly knew were there. More to the point, with the predictable failure of the 1st AB to seize the Arnhem bridge on the first day ended any hope for MG as planned. The only reason the Germans didn't blow the bridge (they controlled almost all of it) was they considered it more valuable intact. That decision could have been changed in an instant and undoubtedly would have been had 30th Corps been closing on the city. If these ops made any real sense it was that one more major allied victory might have triggered a German collapse in late 1944. Ironically, the July plot made that possibility even lower than it was. Why Germany was willing to fight with such desperate courage/stupidity is testimony on how beastly hard it is to stop a war once both sides had spilled so much blood that defeat - whether because of fear or pride - was unthinkable. The allies could hope for better, but in retrospect we can see the Germans would need near annihilation not defeat.

[@srete23]

Also, a priority for the British was to take the V2 sites in range of London.

[@donupton5246]

The priority for the allies was to take pressure off Antwerp. The biggest problem the allies faced was supply. Even the massive American industrial machine could not cope with the amount of supplies and the distances those supplies had to travel to get to the soldiers on the front lines. Antwerp was the key. Operation Market Garden would forces the Germans to withdraw from the coast, freeing the river route to Antwerp and allowing supplies to be shipped from there opposed to the arduous route from France. Yes, crossing the Rhine may have been important, but it was never the focus of the operation as HOLLYWOOD suggests.

[@jimclark6256]

@John Cornell Please get help soon.

[@timschlotter1455]

Monty was accused of being to timid, to prepared. Market Garden was his plan to show the world that he was in fact bold. The plan failed because he didn't think it through and lost the one thing he did in fact have, which was caution.

[@TheVillaAston]

Jim Jones Market Garden came out of British Government pressure on Montgomery to find a way of finishing the war in 1944. Eisenhower dithered for a crucial week before giving it the plan the go ahead.

[@johnburns4017]

Bradley and Patton were disobeying orders and depriving Hodges of supplies, in order to restrict Market Garden. Monty wanted divisions of Hodges First army on his right flank. They should have been sacked. The operation was three corps to Eindhoven and only one corps running up to Arnhem. A disgrace when seeing the level of men in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had prioritised the northern thrust as well.

[@DeepPastry]

Neither Bradley nor Patton had control of supplies, stop pretending you have any clue how supplies are controlled. Monty was a fool, who blamed everyone but his own ignorance.

[@johnburns4017]

Montgomery was in charge of *all* ground forces in Normandy. It came in ahead of schedule with less casualties than expected. Eisenhower, supreme commander, a political job with enough to do in that position, then also took on the ground forces job. He had to much on his plate. He was inexperienced for the role. All went pear shaped with his broad front, which stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea. There was not enough punch anywhere all along the line to force through. Eisenhower was out of his depth. _"Returning to his theme in a letter to Eisenhower, written on 18 September, Montgomery stated - yet again - that time was of the essence, that there was not enough logistical support to sustain such a big effort [broad front], that one route, preferably the northern one, must have priority"_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Monty wanted divisions of the US First Army on his right flank at Market Garden. This was rejected. It amounted to three corps with only one above Eindhoven. An absolute disgrace. _"By the evening of 14 September, the day V and VII Corps of the US First Army opened their attacks, Patton had established half a dozen crossing points over the Moselle, and was heading east, consuming great quantities of fuel and ammunition. The outcome was that Patton did not stop until brought to a halt by the German army in front of Metz. It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton_ *_to check Montgomery,_* _actually had a dire effect on Bradley’s other contingent, the US First Army, which was starved of fuel and artillery ammunition at Aachen."_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Bradley and Patton were conspiring, in disobeying orders, to scupper a fellow allied commander. Unbelievable. _"On 16 September, when Eisenhower told Bradley that logistical priority must go to First Army and Patton must stop, Patton again told Bradley that the Third Army must get involved ‘at once’ and asked Bradley to ignore this order and ‘not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth."_ _"On 17 September,_ *_again defying his Supreme Commander_* _and with the backing of his Army Group commander, Patton launched an all-out attack on his two prime objectives, sending XX Corps against Metz and XII Corps in a drive for the Rhine. Success can justify such actions, but_ *_neither attack succeeded."_* _"Bradley now faced a considerable dilemma. By favouring Patton at the expense of Hodges he had ensured that_ *_neither Army could actually achieve anything_* _- and he had undermined Eisenhower’s current strategy at the same time. By 20 September, the Allied armies had to face the unpalatable fact that the days of rapid advances against a retreating foe were over."_ -Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton. The US had excellent corps commanders like Collins and Truscot who would have done better jobs.

[@Timbo5000]

Whyever would Montgomery need to show the world he's bold when he had already commanded all ground forces in D-day and planned the Normandy breakout? He never seems to get credit for that. He surely was an overly proud prick, but he wasn't a bad commander all in all. I get the feeling that a lot of people take offence to Montgomery's personal attitude (horrible, admittedly) and go the extra mile to insult his achievements. Why do people always scrutinise his mistakes in great detail, yet never seems to commend his better work? Meanwhile a subpar general like Patton is praised into the heavens...

[@martinidry6300]

Field Marshal Montgomery was determined to get to Berlin before the Ivans - in spite of the Americans not caring about that (some thought ill of that, i.e. Patton). The politics/strategy of this op were:- 1/ securing Antwerp (as you rightly state) 2/ clear most of Holland of V weapon sites 3/ outflank most of the Siegfried Line 4/ probably the most important, to opt for a "narrow thrust" of the Brit 21'st Army Group with help from Bradley's US Army Group to get to the Rhine and/or make a northern thrust over the much more easy going North German Plain. Hamburg & Berlin then beckoned. The 4th factor above shows Monty would reap all the glory. It all reeks of desperation by Monty to make a last gasp to eclipse the Yanks. Monty was all too conscious that America was going to be the major player in the world after the war. Britain must have the credibility of being the country that delivered the lion's share of the victory in Europe was foremost in his mind. He was acutely aware that Britain (like Germany) was running out of men for its teeth arms units. Unlike Germany, most of them were in support services, all over the Empire, staffing industries, etc. Max Hastings, and others, say most Brits armed forces personnel in WW2 spectated. I have to agree with that. Relations were truly poisonous between the Yank senior commanders & Monty by September 1944. Arnhem is like no other battle Monty fought in his career. The "colossal cracks" approach (used since Alamein) was ditched for a German style daring, rapid thrust. He kept Horrocks in command of the huge Brit 21'st Army Group in spite of Horrocks being very mediocre (though very popular and a genuinely nice man)and extremely ill. The vast expense of creating 1'st Allied Airborne Army meant that it had to be used before the war's end. The selection destruction cycle (the creaming off of the best men into elite units which suffer high casualties) was the result for the seriously stretched Brits - not so the Yanks for obvious reasons. In summary, the war was seen as fast approaching its end in September 1944 by everyone. The Russians, I am convinced could have made a thrust over Western Poland to Berlin that Autumn to early Winter, hot on the heels of Operation Bagration, but went for Germany's Eastern Front allies instead (in agreement with the Tehran conference) - Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and almost Hungary. With very stiff fighting in Lorraine (a major Armoured counter attack on Patton by von Mantueffel), Aachen, the Hurtgen Forest and Walcheren, Monty should have seen the wind blowing in the direction of "slow down and recuperate". He did, i'm certain, but he was prepared to risk in order to see Britain as the principal victor of World War 2 against Germany, as it had been in WW1, the Napoleonic Wars, the 7 Years' War, the War of the Austrian Succession and the War of the Spanish Succession. It should never be forgotten that British men of Monty's era were Victorians - he was born during her 1887 Golden Jubilee year. Deeply conscious of Great Britain's greatness - principally, it's military history, its Empire, the fact that it had set the template for the modern world, he didn't want to see Britain fade into an "also ran". These are all emotional factors, mixed in with professionally minded strategic ones. The former clearly obscured the latter. As a footnote Operation Varsity, another Monty battle, saw paras land only 5 miles behind the Rhine in March 1945 & still get chopped up badly by German AAA. Airborne ops should never have been used en masse in daylight. The Ruskis used them in penny packets in Finland (para dropped naval infantry in fact) to great effect (seen as the best use of paras in WW2), as did Germay and Japan in their early offensives. The glamour and mystique of paras (& commandos) en masse equates to the cavalry obsession in Europe up to WW1 - hugely impressive but not cost effective and prone to inappropriate use.

[@edmundgrondine4393]

Perhaps the goal of Market Garden was to remove V2 launch sites.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Yep.

[@bigwoody4704]

he never went for them - of course he never showed up

[@billslocum9819]

In "A Bridge Too Far" Cornelius Ryan quotes Eisenhower saying that Montgomery was basically glory-hogging the Allies' limited fuel supply and using whatever excuse seemed best to be first across the Rhine. TIK's analysis backs this up in my view, because whatever Monty offered for justification at the time was cover. The Scheldt estuary objective at least makes sense strategically, but the Market-Garden plan clearly aimed at crossing at the Rhine, rather than locking up the Zeider Zee (which would have been less of a leap for paratroops, too.)

[@thevillaaston7811]

Not really... The V2 campaign alone justified Market Garden, quite apart from the allied perception that the Germans were close to defeat. Market Garden gave the allies the opportunity to encircle the Ruhr. Market Gaeden got the go-ahead because it did NOT take fuel away from US 1st and 3rd armies. Btw. By 1944, the Zuider Zee had been renamed the IJsselmeer, and it is north of Arnhem.

[@bigwoody4704]

even the comment sections need buckets when reading your posts You keep refuting yourself with the stupidity of your own statements.None of the objectives were met -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success *From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370* German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted

[@thevillaaston7811]

Bil Slocum What sort of idiot would post this: -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England. V2 attacks on Britain were hindered by the increasing pressure that the allies were able to put on German communications after Market Garden. As Antwerp was never a Market Garden objective, and as Eisenhower approved the deferment of the campaign to clear the Scheldt to allow Market Garden to go ahead, any attempt to put the inability to use Antwerp as the fault of Market Garden is absurd. The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000). The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter. Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden. Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed: 'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.' Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue. None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition. The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.

[@bigwoody4704]

That''s a fact how about Alan Brooke and Admiral Ramsay you twisted tosser.What kind of idiot would disagree with these men.Monty even admitted he faffed it up,shit on any dead GIs lately Vile? From a PHD at King's College who lectured @ Sandhurst *From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which *Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely* *Brooke was moved to write I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem* From a Pulitzer Prize Winner *From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. *Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding *"a bad mistake on my part"*

[@georgesingleton3425]

Bottom line, Monty wanted to be Supreme Allied Commander. He wanted to buck Ikes orders anyway he could.

[@11nytram11]

Montgomery didn't want to be Supreme Allied Commander because he thought that was a mainly political role - he wanted to be Ground Forces Commander, as he had been during OVERLORD. Montgomery thought that the Allies needed a Ground Forces Commander to focus their effort in hastening the war to it's end, and that Eisenhower being both Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander meant he could not focus the Ground Forces job because the Supreme Commander role required greater attention due to it's need to coordinate both military and political factions. There is no doubt whatsoever that Montgomery coveted that Ground Forces Commander roles and wanted it for himself, but he was committed to the principle of it above his own self-promotion - he legitimately suggested that Omar Bradley be appointed to the role if it was politically impossible for a British Officer to be Ground Forces Commander when America provided the bulk of the manpower.

[@bigwoody4704]

Had nothing to do with politics IKE gave monty preferential treatment @ Caen/Falaise/OMG. It was obvious he was no Field Marshal.Brooke should have called up Slim or reinstated The Auk or O'Connor.Britain had good officers that knob wasn't one of them

[@11nytram11]

@@bigwoody4704 Auchinleck had failed to achieve victory in North Africa and lost the support of Churchill, so even if Brooke wanted to bring him back - which he didn't - that could never have happened. Slim did not have a high enough profile to even be considered a potential replacement for Monty, and if he had been brought in it would have dramatically weakened the situation Burma by removing from it the most competent and capable British field commander in the theater. O'Connor had been in a prisoner of war camp for two-and-a-half years and was never going to get near army command so soon after his liberation - not even Montgomery himself suggesting O'Connor be given command of the 8th Army changed the mind of the British High Command I know you hate Montgomery and think little of him but give the devil his due. He was a very successful field commander, and was promoted to high command, and retained in that position, despite his numerous personal flaws because he was a proven winner who got results at a tolerable cost in casualties. This doesn't mean he was a great general or that he's above criticism for things he got wrong, or for the issues he caused with his difficult personality, but if you cannot even recognize the basic inarguable fact that he was a General who got results and won the majority of his campaign then you have no credibility when you criticise him or compare him unfavourably to other people.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@11nytram11 he won in 1st Alamein and laid the Mine fields on the Alam halfa ridge and called over 2 fresh divisions from The Nile Delta.Monty used both his plans and that mine field.The Auk and Dorman-Smith after that battle had to refit,resupply and reinforce.Churchill had too many brandies and sacked him because he wanted him to go on the offensive. Then Monty took10 weeks to launch an offensive.Which was the same amount of time he wanted in the 1st place.Monty was a WW1 sargent and a lying knob. Watch the Desert Generals Part two and go to the 26:19 time mark.3 straight Historians call the berk out

[@11nytram11]

@@bigwoody4704 Yes, Montgomery inherited the position at Alam el Halfa. No, he did not use Auchinleck's plans. Auchinleck's plan was for a reactionary mobile defence using the Alam el Halfa ridge as a central pivot around which his army would move to strike at the Germans wherever they tried to attack, defeat them and drive them back. Montgomery's plan was a for a battle at a single defensive position dug in on the Alam el Halfa ridge which he would goad Rommel into attacking by leaking false information to him, and the Germans would be broken by the British artillery and armour as they advanced through a minefield. Auchinleck's plan was to fight in the open field between two mobile mechanized armies, Montgomery's plan was a static defensive battle - they were vastly different plans, only similar in the fact that shared the same location. As such, Auchinleck deserved no credit whatsoever for Montgomery's victory at Alam el Halfa. The best that can be said of the Auk is that he set the scene for it, but he did not plan the battle. Churchill sacked Auchinleck because the Auk had been driven back to the gate of Cairo and lost the confidence of the 8th Army. After some success in 1941 with Operation Crusader and driving the Germans back to El Agheila, Auchinleck had his ass kicked all over the Western Desert, lost Tobruk and almost got kicked out of Egypt. By any reasonable definition Claude Auchinleck's time in command in the North Africa was a failure. He had some successes, but he left the theater in a far more precarious position than when he took over, and he fully deserved to be fired.

[@f1b0nacc1sequence7]

To paraphrase that great Englishman Edmund Blackadder, "Monty's memoirs are the greatest work of fiction since vows of fidelity were added to the French marriage vows"

[@vivians9392]

@John Cornell How can he be the best when he was not following Allied plans, but forged ahead with his own egotistical goal? He lied about his understanding of Market Garden and got thousands of Canadians and other allies killed. He was wishy washy with his duties, because he wanted to be first into Germany, surpassing Patton's accomplishments. His Market Garden failure was as obvious, as his North Africa campaign had been a success. Yet, he blamed everything wrong on America and Canada, or the weather, when necessary!

[@vivians9392]

@John Cornell And between Antwerp, Belgium and Holland, he screwed up terribly!

[@jimclark6256]

@John Cornell Read something besides Montgomery's book of fairy tales. Then , you will be allowed to play with your crayons.

[@cgaccount3669]

It seems to my uneducated self that once MG succeeds you could do both. Wipe out 15th and push on to ruhr

[@randomdude4136]

Yes, ofc any advance allows for one to stage attacks on neighbouring areas. Ultimately all operations are aimed to eventually move to Berlin, however in this case it is clear that the primarly objective was in the north not the south, you can not just push in all directions after a attack is undertaken as you need to regroup and reorganize.

[@dukecraig2402]

Wasn't there for the whole Market Garden thing but I did walk across the Nijmegen bridge in 1984 during the 100 mile march.

[@oddballsok]

so you felt what it was like in 1944 ?

[@emintey]

I havnt read both primary sources, Montgomery and Eisenhower on this subject but it may be that both versions are correct. It's my understanding that Montgomery felt he should have been in command and that he was the most able and so intended to have his objectives prevail in the end as far as the aftermath of Market Garden if it had succeeded. This was a daring plan, and one of those plans that depended on everything going as desired with no room for error or miscalculation...it was a gamble and a fatal one as far as 1st Airborne Division was concerned. What would have happened if those two panzer divisions had not been there as was assumed, would Montgomery have prevailed on Eisenhower to detour into the Ruhr? Was this Montgomery's feint to get him into position to do so under the guise of a false objective?

[@johnburns4017]

Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts: On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes - 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army - to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr - Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen when he issued the directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. It was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked. _"the evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, certainly thought so: 'If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted the resources so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.' "_ - Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 _"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful - and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving_ *_German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944,_* _since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."_ - Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again. This northern thrust over the Rhine obviously would not work with the resources starved First Army, so a lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Montgomery, although not liking Eisenhower's broad front strategy, making that clear continuously since the Normandy breakout, being a professional soldier he always obeyed Eisenhower's orders keeping to the laid down strategy, unlike Bradley who also allowed Patton to disobey his own orders. Montgomery after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to what forces were available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly Genl Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army. Genl Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day and Brereton oversaw the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead, as he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island. Montgomery left all the planning to his generals to plan and execute: Brereton, Williams, Browning, Urquhart, Gavin, Taylor, Horrocks, etc. Monty gave them a free run at it with their own discretion and did not interfere. Montgomery had no involvement whatsoever in its execution. Montgomery was an army group commander, in charge of armies. The details were left to 'competent' subordinates.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@Burns... still making stuff up, I see. There was NO WAY that Bradley would divert supplies from 1st Army to 3rd Army. He didn't have such authority -- General Lee did, Ike did -- Patton and Hodges and Bradley did not. Further, Bradley RAN 1st US Army. Hodges was merely his place-holder. It was still staffed with Bradley's crew and at all times Hodges turned to Bradley for instructions. This did not happen with Patton, nor Simpson. (Bradley didn't want Simpson, BTW. He was shoved down his throut by Marshall.) All of the key planning was done by Browning and his staff. At all of the critical points, Browning over-ruled Urquhart and Gavin. ALL of the players had victory disease. That triggered every other ill.

[@johnburns4017]

Market Garden was: ♦ To be the northern end of a pincer on the *Ruhr.* Once the ground is taken troops will be poured into the pocket and over the Rhine ready for closing the pincer on the Ruhr. Two days before Market Garden Eisenhower changed his strategy, again, to *Berlin,* not the Ruhr. The British 21st Army group would move across the north German plains to Berlin. ♦ A buffer between Antwerp and German forces. It was a good strategic plan. If successful it may end the war at Christmas. The plan was sound. It needed professional execution to work. It largely did except for two units of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, specifically the US 82nd Airborne and the 101st. ♦ Eliminate V rockets sites firing at London. The 1st Allied Airborne Army, with a US leader General Brereton, was a major part of Market Garden, taking the Market aspect of the operation. Brereton did a lot of the Market garden planning. Arnold the USAAF commander was involved and stated no fighter-bombers be used. The First Allied Airborne Army and specifically the US 82nd Airborne failed as they never took a lightly defended key bridge at Nijmegen on the first day as they were to do, while the Garden aspect (XXX Corps) succeeded. Market Garden was a 90% success. No ground was retaken by the Germans.

[@owenjones7517]

Do you blame Browning for directing Gavin's attention to the Groesbeek Heights in the first place and prioritising them to Gavin?7

[@johnburns4017]

Owen Jones General Gavin *assigned a battalion* to seize the bridge _"without delay"._ They never moved on the bridge. There is the problem - not Browning.

[@bigwoody4704]

4 years,FOUR FULL YEARS, the polluted rube wouldn't cross his own channel until the Big Boys showed him how.Class dismissed

[@johnburns4017]

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer.

[@bigwoody4704]

♦️You never answered my question - UK & Monty had 4 yrs,FOUR FULL YEARS to have a go across the channel.What was stopping them? 20-30 miles right off your shore couldn't be that daunting could it? With 45 million men in your Empire should have been a smashing success . 20-30 miles,WTF happened? How come Monty didn't cross the Rhine until April '45 and needed the US 9th Army to do it? ♦️Imagine what this yapping jackel Boy Burns would say about IKE if he lost say 200,000 @ Dunkirk or 81,000 @ Singapore or 25-30,000 @ Tobruk but who the hell has losses like that? 🚑🚑🚑

[@SandyEA]

It also didn't help the Monty starved Canadian First Army of ammunition and fuel. Before and after Market Garden.

[@TheFreshman321]

Sandy Addison Canadian Army. You mean British Army with a Canadian name. The Canadian Army was fully fifty percent British and more. Go look up the order of battle for the so called Canadian Army which included Crocker's 1st British Corp. for Operation veritable it was three quarters British. The truth is there would have been no Canadian Army without British soldiers and equipment.

[@Landrew0]

Canadian vets that I knew never had a good thing to say about Montgomery.

[@Wereldburger01]

The water inlet in the Netherlands is at the map wrongly named Zuiderzee. Since 1932 it is a fresh water lake named IJsselmeer (Lake IJssel) after the causeway (being the Afsluitdijk) having the major road connection between the provinces Friesland and North Holland, was built. I think the most remarkable blunder regarding Market Garden is made by many historians. To understand the main intention of Montgomery's plan it is indeed needed to look to the south-west not to the Ruhr. I have realized this long before I saw this video. I think I have also an explanation why Montgomery was misleading the public opinion telling that he was aiming to the Ruhr to finish te war before the winter. Its simple, also today the truth regarding Arnhem is not acceptable for the public opinion. The Battle of Arnhem was, except for if all was going exceptional well, a support attack for what was going on further south. Arnhem. To prevent the German use of the Arnhem bridge before the Nijmegen sector was under Allied control and firmly secured. The airborne operations in the Arnhem sector took place because Montgomery was offering deliberately an airborne division and a Polish brigade as if there were a chess pawns for the needed effect further south because he knew before about the near-by German panzers. That is as I think why he didn't listen to the warnings about these. The lost Battle of Arnhem was for Montgomery in fact a tactical succes he never could talk about due the hostile tensions he feared if the real truth was publicly known. Due Market Garden, as I see it too, was a flank protection created as preparation for the Battle of the Scheldt. To prevent premature a likely German counter attack from the east (including the Eindhoven area) were the Germans restored since early September there strength. Many historians have for a long time almost forgotten the most important battle at the western front since Normandy, the Battle of the Scheldt. Antwerp was already since early September in allied hands, but it's harbours were needed to solve the huge logistical (supply) problems. These harbours were useless untill the connection (via the Western Scheldt) with the North Sea was opened. Therefore Eisenhower gave Montgomery begin September the order to solve that problem first. Eisenhower, as later proved correctly, feared the existence of sufficient German reserves in Germany. A fast push into Germany was an unacceptable risk. Eisenhower wrote about that in his memories Crusade in Europe. He also wrote that he had for each planned operation three scenarios. One for the minimum results, one for the expected results and one for when all was going very well to maximise as much as possible its positive effects. Reaching and keeping Nijmegen was as I think for Market Garden the expected result. Reaching Lake IJssel to create for the Germans a serious dillema how to react was as I think for the allies not more than a may-be possible most optimistic outcome. It is may-be better that the push to Lake IJssel has never happend, probably resulting in a even worser drama as what has happend during the hunger winter of 1944-45 in the western part of the Netherlands. But such allied 'succes' would possible also resulted in a drama for the region south-east of Arnhem. The water level in the Rhine river was during the fall of 1944 high enough for another nasty surprice. The Germans could have blown the critical northern Rhine-dike between Emmerich and Rees, flooding huge parts of the area on both sides of the German-Dutch border, as in real happend between Arnhem and Nijmegen. Making a (fast) Allied offensive from the Arnhem sector via Wesel to the Ruhr impossible. Eisenhower told already begin September Montgomery that he didn't allow operations in Germany itself before the serious logistic problems (not having an huge operational harbour at the northern front sector) were solved. Not having the region north of Arnhem but having the Scheldt estuary in Allied hands was the key into Germany. To have or not having that key was between early September 1944 and mid January 1945 the most emiment factor in both the Allied and German strategy. Three huge battle were fought for that, Market Garden, the Battle of the Scheldt and after that the huge German offensive resulting in the Battle of the Bulge. Also 2000 years ago the Romans saw the strategical importance of the high grounds between the Maas and Waal rivers at Nijmegen. They stationed there a Roman legion (Legio X Gemina) and founded the oldest city of The Netherlands, Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum, being a new market (Nijmegen) town in the land of the Batavi tribe. Its high wooded grounds just south of the broad Waal river (being the continuation of the main stream of the Rhine) is directly at the west of the German-Dutch border! In the Market Garden plan, as I see it, being the most critical key location. It was there along the Groesbeek-Mook line were on 17th September 1944 a part of the 82nd US airborne division has landed were the Battle of the Reichswald began. Being the first phase of the Anglo-Canadian main push into Germany. By nature that offensive (Operation Veritable) was at its left flank protected by the broad Waal river and the partly already under Allied control existing Upper Betuwe region between Arnhem and Nijmegen, well known in the Netherlands for its market garden horticulture. How remarkable is that!?

[@KaDaJxClonE]

The strategy outlined by Eisenhower's memoirs is a combination of a lot of top officer experience. "Fight the enemy where they aren't" & "an army matches on is stomach" & "war is an extension of economy" & "wars of defense are more profitable than wars of aggression".

[@johnburns4017]

*Market Garden* *1.* Monty approached the 1st Airborne Army, Brereton, to do a drop on the Scheld. He said "no", saying was too risky. Market Garden came about out of Comet, a multi crossing of the Rhine. *2.* Market Garden was to run up to the Zuiderzee and just east of Arnhem. *3.* Market Garden was to create a *buffer* between Antwerp and German forces. *4.* Advantages are: the German 15th Army is fully isolated in Holland, Antwerp is protected from German counter-attack, V rocket launching sites are overrun, a springboard to the Ruhr. *Ardennes Offensive* *1.* Antwerp was a *vital* port in the north (the only port taken intact), even the Germans knew that. They poured more V rockets on Antwerp than London. *2.* If the Germans were to counter-attack in force it had to be to a point to stop allied supply - Antwerp. It would also isolate the British to the north. *3.* The German attempt to reach Antwerp needed the element of surprise and light initial resistance. An arc from Antwerp to the German border gives, Eindhoven, Aachen and the Ardennes forest. Not much in distance from Antwerp to any of them. Going through a forest would achieve surprise, not through the fortified Market Garden salient in Holland. Forcing through the Market Garden salient would meet up with the German 15th army in Holland. But that would not necessarily stop allied resupply via Antwerp. The German idea of going straight for Antwerp was sound. The Germans knew the British had superior armour to the USA, having their armour annihilated by the British in Normandy. US forces had performed poorly overall, as the Kasserine Pass, Hurtgen Forest and the Lorraine Campaign had clearly shown. German armour was largely wiped out in the west by the British in Normandy. The Germans would prefer to attack the Americans rather than the British - obviously. The Ardennes had light US forces in front of it - the Germans did run though the forest in 1940. The US assessed no German army would run through it. It was a perfect launch point for the German gamble.

[@bmc7434]

UK and Canada were mainly using American Lend lease tanks

[@johnburns4017]

B Mc No they were not. The British had a whole range of tanks better than the Sherman.

[@bmc7434]

UK and commonwealth forces in Normandy were mainly fielded with Shermans

[@johnburns4017]

B Mc Nope.

[@bmc7434]

Over 17000 Sherman's were given to the UK alone

[@spudwesth]

Mo0ntgomery is an excellent exemplar of why , when you let incompetence and egotism combine in a general , soldiers lives and expensive materiel are wasted.

[@billballbuster7186]

The goal of Market-Garden was to get a bridge across the Rhine. After that Monty would have been in a position to drive into the Ruhr and on to Berlin, which was his plan. However Monty was overruled by Ike, who insisted on the "Broad Front" advance into Germany. The two generals were at odds and this is reflected in their memoirs. Market-Garden failed to reach its final objective as the US Airborne failed to take all their assigned bridges on time, especially Nijmegen, which gave the Germans time to stiffen their resistance. Though it failed in its final objective, a 60 mile advance to the German border was not defeat, as some critics are quick to claim. The whole operation was borne out of a vacillating supreme commander, a clerk who had no combat experience on how to fight a battle. Monty proposed the plan and Ike accepted and adopted it has his own, then blamed Monty when it failed.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

Browning dropped the 101st in the wrong place. It needed to be between the two key bridges. AMAZING that no-one was dropped there. Ike DID give his approval. MONTY dragged things out. Ike told Monty to speed things up. (!)

[@johnburns4017]

bill ballbuster To drive to Berlin was Eisenhower's plan. He changed it a day or so before Market Garden.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@bill Your analysis is fact-free, I'll give you that. 1) Grabner was ACROSS the Arnhem bridge BEFORE Frost arrived. That meant that MG was DEAD, DEAD, DEAD. Arnhem bridge was ALREADY lost before Frost showed up. Interdicting the northern approach is ALWAYS conflated by British eyes with taking the Arnhem bridge. Such is not so. 2) Once Grabner was on the island, he proved to be too much for both the 82nd and the 1st Airborne. He'd brought FLAK with him. Yeah, he had both 88mm & 20mm FLAK. XXX Corps accounts tell of 4 88mm guns. Which would ring true, as that was the standard deployment for such guns. ( They were simply not deployed singly or in duos. Back in 1940, a quad-set destroyed the British counter-attack at Arras. a quat-set destroyed the British ( Indian ) attack at Hell Fire Pass. ( North Africa, see TIK's video on that campaign.) Once Grabner was across, Frost, Urquhart, and Gavin -- and BROWNING -- were all screwed. 2) Even without Grabner, the SS had continuous access to the island and to the southern end of Arnhem bridge. Consequently there was ABSOLUTELY NO WAY to stop the SS from dropping the Arnhem bridge into the lower Rhine -- it didn't mater what Horrocks// XXX Corps did. THIS ^^^ is the REAL reason why the Irish Guards didn't charge off into the night after rolling across the Nijmegen bridge. All other tales are BS. Not only would the Irish Guards have to blindly roll up a solitary causeway at NIGHT but they could absolutely COUNT ON SS Panthers showing up before they reached the approaches to Arnhem bridge. Regardless of the opinions of this or that para, the Irish Guards knew from bitter experience that the SS was sure to pull a rabbit of their helmet and slot four more 88s some place further down the causeway. They were the #1 killer of Allied tanks. Nothing else comes close. The Irish Guards had just destroyed four of them around the southern approach to Nijmegen bridge, and that took ALL DAY with both their grenadiers and the 82nd paras. [ A single 88 could wipe out a platoon of Shermans faster than you can drop your underwear. This was a known fact. ] The Germans had routine access to the island by way of a ferry that the RAF never put out of business. For some reason, the RAF is given a pass on this matter -- while TIK and jingoist John Burns tees off on Gavin. If Gavin were such a boob, why did he get a prompt promotion? If Browning were such a whiz why did he disappear from WWII history? It takes a LOT to disappear a national hero with three-stars -- an army commander. Browning attained this distinction; yeah he was sent off to INDIA. ( Good grief, what a demotion! ) "In December 1944 he became Chief of Staff of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command. " Considering the travel time, Monty had him hustled out of England ASAP. ( Americans would call that the MG Lloyd Fredendall 'solution.' If you'll recall Lloyd was even 'promoted.' Well, that's what the paperwork said. Heh. ) His trip to India kept Browning away from Fleet Street, that's to be sure. &&& You Brits, knock it off with the Gavin thesis. Browning blew it with the drop zones. Monty, Ike, Urquhart, Gavin, Horrocks ALL saw that to be true -- after the battle was decided. The after-action report must have been BRUTAL. ( Frost didn't comment: he was in enemy hands, wounded. )

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@John Burns EVERYONE used such terminology. Gavin's war bio was titled "On to Berlin." The expression didn't mean what you impute here. Ike was PROHIBITED by George Marshall from getting down into tactical details. This is something that went WAY over Monty's head -- and yours, too. Monty went round and round during the war -- never comprehending that Ike CAN'T jump into tactical details. George Marshall realized that there was NO WAY that Ike wouldn't end up being the Fall Guy for a troubled operation if he even stuck his toe in the water. If that were to happen, then Marshall might be compelled to relieve Ike. But Marshall had no-one queued up to take Ike's place. Mr. Charm was THE pick of Winston Churchill. No other American even came close to him. Ike's PRIMARY mission was "Winston Control." This was a reality that could never be uttered. Both Brooke and Ike CONSTANTLY had to shield the Western Allies from Winnie. You would NOT BELIEVE the crazy stuff Winnie kept throwing at Brooke. The man had the patience of a saint. All of Winnie's crazy ideas were at least as bad as anything cocked up by Stalin or Hitler. The BIG difference, Brooke was no carpet. He fought to save the Tommies from Winnies crazies... and within the Service was beloved for his role. None of this could be admitted to wartime Britain. FDR exhibited superior military leadership: he dumped everything onto Marshall, Arnold and King. He dumped war production onto Stimpson, Wilson, et. al. He had enough smarts to realize that he didn't know diddly. The few times he did intervene -- due to high politics -- ie diplomatic matters -- the result was a disaster -- almost without exception. ( B-29s to the CBI theatre comes immediately to mind. They actually had massive bases in Scotland all set and read to receive squadrons of them. These bases were so far north that they were out of range for all other aircraft. The original plan was to bomb Ploiesti from Scotland -- and much else. (!!!!! ) When the atomic bomb showed up, down it would go, upon Berlin.)

[@johnburns4017]

David Himmelsbach This one is a complete idiot. "later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named *Berlin* as the ultimate Allied goal" - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 210).

[@rotwang2000]

From what I understand the 15th army received relatively little supply and reinforcements after September, in fact some elements were pulled away to help with the Ardennes Offensive. The 15th held on by using up all the supplies destined for the civilians, resulting in the infamous "Hongerwinter" and a general famine until the end of the war. It was quite simply meant to draw and hold Allied forces away from the front lines, while denying possible access to Rotterdam. So keeping them isolated would mean drawing even more forces away, lengthening the front and unless you can actually roll up the trapped army in a relatively short period instead of seeing them fall back on the classic Dutch defensive "Waterlinie" and form a hedgehog around The Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Utrecht triangle and hold as long as possible, you're still going to require a force to keep them bottled up, lest you have a German army launching a desperate offensive at the same time they are attacking the Ardennes.

[@HappyChonger]

Sir Francis de Guingand, Montgomerys chief of staff spoke of the Market Garden aims in his book, Operation Victory. Page 331 "This alignment (of advance) which is hardly in the direction of the Rhur, was chosen because it avoided the Siegfried line, and was within comfortable range of U.K. bases for airborne operations". Page 335, "the primary object was to gain possession of the area between Arnhem and the Zuider Zee, preparatory to crossing the Issel river into Northern Germany." Page 335, on winter plans "Montgomery was now hoping to launch as early as possible an attack between the Rhine and the Meuse from the direction of Nijmegen" He only devotes a few pages to Market Garden saying he'd been ill during the planning and was "not in close touch with the existing situation". It's a good book and I recommend it to all. Merry Christmas.

[@johnburns4017]

On page 307 of his book Crusade in Europe Eisenhower wrote: _“After completion of the bridgehead operation he [Montgomery] was to turn instantly and with his whole force to the capture of Walcheren Island and the other areas from which the Germans were defending the approaches to Antwerp.”_ Getting over the Rhine was priority. Montgomery wanted to set up his forces to drop south into the Ruhr with Hodges coming up from to south to encircle the Ruhr cutting out the German war machine, then set himself up for his tanks to operate in tank country on the north German plains heading east. Having destroyed 90% of German armour in the west at Normandy he was now prepared to fully destroy German armour in open tank country. Montgomery wrote: _"There is the area of the Northern ports, Kiel-Lubeck-Hamburg-Bremen. Its occupation would not only give us control of the German Navy and North Sea bases, of the Kiel Canal, and of a large industrial area, but would enable us to form a barrier against the withdrawal of German forces from Norway and Denmark. Further, this area, or a part of it, might have to be occupied as flank protection to our thrust on Berlin. "_ - Montgomery of Alamein. _Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery_ Monty also wanted to cut off German forces in Denmark and Norway. They could move south into Germany then fight the main allied forces.

[@Marukuzuu]

Eishenhower,he was the best clerk i ever had. -Douglas Mcarthur

[@blank557]

MacArthur was one to talk. Narssistic to the extreme, surrounded by a bloated staff of brown nosing yesmen constantly stroking his ego.

[@mikehillsgrove1612]

The purpose of Market Garden was to be more famous and to be the hero. Monty was a megalomaniac.

[@andrewlancefield3730]

He was very understated and did not seak the lime light, I think you are getting confused with Patton

[@agentmulder1019]

@@andrewlancefield3730 "UNDERSTATED" my ASS! Montgomery was a pompous FULL OF HIMSELF and OVERRATED general who cared more about "losing a battle than he did winning one."

[@bennytsai4065]

@@agentmulder1019 really... so is Patton not to mention Bradley who also fucked up in Ardennes

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@Benedict... Adolf phucked up in the Ardennes. Other than the trite influence of the British 43rd division, and the preening of Monty, the Ardennes was a purely American show. In the eyes of Germany -- and history -- the Americans crushed the offensive -- throwing it totally off the rails within 72 hours -- the single fastest reversal of a Nazi offensive during that war. Famous for a time, but now lost to the kids, American engineers totally derailed 6SS Panzer Army -- its spearhead in particular. These were not front line assault engineers. They were trained in bridge building. Which also meant they knew where all of the bridges were and how to blow them up. Strategy & Tactics magazine cranked out a Wacht on Rhein simulation that used the US Geological Survey of that battle zone. If you should ever obtain a copy -- it's an eye-opener. With it you can follow company level movements during every account -- both sides. ( Wacht on Rhein is the tune being sung by Germans in Casablanca, for you film buffs. It was written in the 19th century as an honor to the Germans that fought against Napoleon. Hence, the Casablanca scene is irony compounded many times over. The French anthem is the aggressive one. By the time of Hitler, what had been a totally defensive ode had been transformed into an opus of offense.) It is Bradley that smeared Patton as Blood & Guts. Under Bradley's leadership, 1st US Army suffered crazy high casualties -- especially to include the Hurtgen Forest. He OWNED it. In contrast, Patton was parsimonious with blood. He correctly understood that you can't allow the Germans to get their bearings back. You must keep driving them like a broken herd of sheep. The second the Germans recover their wits, they become Hell to shift. THAT was Monty's epic mistake. When his own subordinate commanders brought this fact up -- he had them canned. ( retired, sent to India -- something that happened to Browning. ) The fact that Browning was CANNED by Monty is not something that Burns & Coy can bear to face. In contrast: Monty and Gavin had a (military reputation) love affair to the ends of their careers. Monty 'forgave' Gavin -- yet NEVER forgave Browning. ( Gavin was absorbing the blame truly belonging to Browning and Monty knew absolutely everything about the events. ) The 1,000 panzers came from BROWNING and Bletchley intercepts. No British general would put ANY faith in brigadier general Gavins strategic insights. No-one tossed off Bletchley's transmissions. Bletchley was not wrong. They got the timing off. The panzers were for the BULGE. Adolf really expected Speer to crank out that many panzers in time for his dream counter-offensive.

[@johnburns4017]

@@davidhimmelsbach557 What confusion exists in your mind. Montgomery was given command of the US First and Ninth armies in the Ardennes. Monty put British troops in the depleted US armies who again were under British control. The rest of your post is not worth it.

[@andreiml1]

The German 15th Army was bottled up in the channel ports when Antwerp was taken - the fact the Scheldt was not immediately secured after Antwerp allowed the 15th Army to be evacuated to the Scheldt creating the problem of securing it in the first place. The failure to secure the Scheldt was one of the big errors in 1944

[@thevillaaston7811]

The really big error was to adopt a broad front strategy.

[@bigwoody4704]

Idiot Monty already displayed the single thrust brilliance when market garden blew up in face and circled around and bit them in the ass

[@dmbeaster]

Market Garden was not aimed directly at the Ruhr in order to flank around the Siegfried line. This is discussed in the contemporary documents.

[@USAACbrat]

what is missing is the seaborne assault north of the port to meet Monty. That would have been more Strategic. that is up to Ike.

[@TheFreshman321]

This is all bollocks. The failure for Market Garden was down to General Gavin's failure to take the bridge over the waal on the first day. He spent far too long securing his DZ. The 82nd Airborne didn't send out Warren's 504 PIR to secure the bridge until 8 hours after landing allowing the Germans to build up. Boy Browning is also at fault for dragging his whole HQ over and the 82nd wasting time securing it Gavin was also fixated by the mythical 1000 tanks in the Reichswald faulty Intel which was cobblers he then dug in waiting for an attack that did not come. When they finally got moving there were SS panzer units in Nijmegen. The Americans were thrown back. XXX Corp was not late the got to Nijmegen on time, but instead of expecting to role over a captured bridge. They had pitch in to help capture it Guards Amoured had to give American boats so they can launch their attack over the river to capture the railway bridge. This failure of the Americans to capture the Bridges (there were two Bridges Grenadier Guards actually took the road bridge not the Americans). Once Carrington's 5 tanks crossed the bridge he was forced to halt for the infantry to catch up. This was created a 36hr delay. It was the Americans failure to take Nijmegen. The myth of XXX Corp being late is just that a myth.

[@bigwoody4704]

Um no - Monty owns it

[@thevillaaston7811]

TheFreshman321 Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave - who he claims is an ex British Army soldier who went to Sandhurst. Actually Big Woody / Para Dave is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. The only Sandhurst he has been to is Sandhurst Drive, Cleveland.

[@TheFreshman321]

TheVilla Aston 😂😂😂

[@bigwoody4704]

Viilage Ass cheer on fire bombing the Irish anymore or piss on the Honor of dead GI's?You get worked by real students of history then run to another thread.Again Prat look him up but he might give you the same treatment he gave Cornhole

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@TheFreshman321 See what I mean?.. Anyone, anyone please let me know where this Para Dave stuff can be found on KZbin. Name of item, lead comment ot whatever and how old the comments are. I will go straight there.

[@bakters]

I wouldn't dismiss Monty so quickly. I'm sure he was aware of the situation around Antwerp, and if he considered the immediate push to the west incorrect, I suspect there were reasons for it. Ike also was capable of pretending to "know it all" from the start, especially with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. What I mean by all that, is that the defense of Rhine estuary did not require huge amounts of supplies being shipped constantly. Clearing it would still be a difficult task, whether the German troops were totally cut off, or not. Does it really make sense to spend your troops to do so, while you have an easier target right to the East? More profitable target too, since defeating it allows you to poor more reinforcements into the *vital* bridgehead. Regarding push towards Rhur and Berlin, I think it was on the cards. Maybe not before Christmas, but who knows? There is a big difference in the amount of required strength between winning a battle in the open against uprepared enemy, and brute-forcing a highly contested and well prepared defences on the Rhine.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

The Allies ALL started coming down with Victory Disease. They ALL thought that the war was effectively over, and that all that was left to do was march to Berlin. Bradley even halted the shipment of artillery ammo! This turned into a first class crisis that the US Army did it's best to hide. Victory Disease had every Tommy reluctant to be aggressive. Who would want to die right before the victory parade? The Western Allies were furious with German officers for extending the war, which every professional knew was lost by Germany. This anger is now down-played by histories.

[@spudwesth]

Monty made Ike hate him after his many screw - ups.

[@thunberbolttwo3953]

Spud westhaver dont forget Monty made a play top become supreme allied commander.he wanted to rep[lace Eike.eike threastned top resign over tgis.Churchill realizing that the majority of allied troops.were american not british.Made Monty back down.and apologize to Eike.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@thunderbolt Don't invent history, please. It was Freddie de Goungand, Monty's chief of staff, that brought Monty around. Churchill was not even in the picture. He returned to 21st Army Group HQ -- having just left Ike -- who had ALREADY drafted the magic letter addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Freddie flipped out, BEGGED Ike to not send it on until he'd had a chance to 'smooth things over with Monty.' When he revealed to Monty just how perilous his position was -- Monty countered with the astonishing question: "Who can (possibly) replace me?" Freddie had to tell his own boss that Monty's old boss FM Alexander was the American favorite to succeed Monty. [ The Americans had wanted Alexander ALL ALONG. ] And that their thinking was that Monty would be 'promoted' to some command back in England, and Alexander would be brought up from the Med, where he was already operating as a theatre supreme commander. (SHAEF actually didn't cover the Med. You can see the politics of it: Britain had its Supreme Commander; America had its Supreme Commander. Their joint status was fuzzed by the press during wartime. BTW, Churchill bitterly railed against 'Dragoon' precisely because it would take two armies away from Alexander. Churchill had all kinds of crazy ideas about using them in the eastern Med: Rhodes being at the top of the list. Ike had a major row with Winnie over the matter. ) "[Alexander] Commander-in-Chief Middle East and commanding the 18th Army Group in Tunisia. He then commanded the 15th Army Group for the capture of Sicily and again in Italy before receiving his field marshal's baton and being made Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean." The fact that Alexander was independent of SHAEF is only apparent when you pull the organizational chart for SHAEF. His entire command is missing, of course. The Med was considered a theatre in its own right. But, with D-Day the BIG action had shifted to Northwest Europe. This latter term was ginned up to make explicit the split between Ike's command and Alexander's command. Both reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you can imagine, Alexander would cough up anything that Ike needed -- namely the newly constituted 6th Army Group. ( French 1st Army; American 7th Army ) &&& AFTER Monty realized that Churchill would accept Alexander with no qualms at all... he drafted a contrite 'apology' to Ike about how he LOVED working as a team-member, etc. etc. Obviously, Freddie drafted this letter. He'd been crafting it while on the plane flying to 21st Army Group HQ. ( Monty never went to Ike's HQ if it could possibly be avoided -- and it usually was. )

[@thunberbolttwo3953]

david himmelsbach mier point.Then point was that Montys eego demanded that he command all alied troops in europe.Well that didnt happen.he got humiliated as a result.

[@nolank19]

I wonder if the vehicles would have reached Arnhem if Patton and his tank group would have led the "garden" portion instead of X corp?

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Had Nijmegen Bridge had been taken of Day 1, it's most probable Patton would have gotten to Arnhem quicker than Horrocks and XXX Corps. Horrocks was a good general. But Patton was known for his speed so it's reasonable to assume he would have gotten at least to the Waal bridge quicker than Horrocks. But once again, it comes back to the fact that the tanks they had couldn't swim across a river. They needed the Nijmegen bridge, and they didn't have the Nijmegen bridge.

[@LordHudson]

+Sneaky Scaper Personally I doubt if the results would have been different. The landscape was not in favour of tanks between Einhoven & Arnhem. It was not like the rolling hills of northern France or the steppes of Russia. That and the very narrow spearhead of hell's highway would make it impossible to gain any real momentum. Had the spearhead been wider and more crossing available than it might have worked.

[@SuperVerst]

+TIK Patton had a full compliment (however big that is I have no idea) of bridging equipment that he dragged everywhere with him.

[@RomanHistoryFan476AD]

+Sneaky Scaper patton is quicker but tends to take more causalities as a counter cost to his speed. plus unless pattons tank swim they still needed the bridge Nijmegen secure. patton really would not be a major factor on the bridge securing.

[@johnburns4017]

+Sneaky Scaper General Bradley's subordinate, Patton, took 3 months to move 10 miles at Metz. The advance on Metz by Patton had stopped before Market Garden was even devised. Patton was an unremarkable general. Famous for beating up a sick man in a hospital bed, wearing a shiny tin hat and cowboy guns. The US never had an outstanding general, so their media made one up. It was one with cowboy guns as it made good newsreel material. Papers recently revealed showed that most German generals had never heard of Patton. Do not get your history from Hollywood. Look at the 1st 4 minutes: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mH_NoZJqn75rprs

[@bhaskarsen6124]

Eisenhower had to indulge in Montgomery because of Churchill and the British Allies. Eisenhower had to belittle the best General the Allies had , which was Patton many times.

[@chrisjpfaff314]

In my humble opinion, Montgomery wanted to get the headlines away from Patton. Market Garden was an ill conceived plan, little effort seems to have been given to logistics, supply, transport and the reality of the situation on the ground. Generals, American and British, were unwilling to say that this plan was just plain nuts. I lay the failure totally on Montgomery's shoulders. His ego created this disaster.

[@11nytram11]

MARKET GARDEN was certainly Monty's responsibility and his failure, but what "headlines", exactly, was Patton making at the time? Advancing quickly through areas of France that the Germans had abandonned just like everyone else was, until he over-ran his supply lines before Metz. Hardly standing out from the crowd. After OVERLORD Monty was far more concerned with badgering Eisenhower about his belief in the need for a "narrow thrust" over a "broad front" and the necessity of the role of Ground Forces Commander than he was about whatever a junior officer commanding a smaller force in another Army Group was doing. If Monty had a rival in the Western Allied Camp then it was not Patton - it was either Bradley who commanded 12th Army Group and clashed with Monty over priority of manpower and material, or Eisenhower who fought with Monty on overall strategy and command hierarchy.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@11nytram11 I have never seen a detrimental comment about Patton attributed to Montgomery. Even after Patton and Hollywood re-wrote the the story of Husky. By the time of Overlord, Patton was out of the game and never again rose above single army command. Patton was in a different army, futher down the allied command chain and at the other end of the allied front. Why should Montgomery be interested in him?

[@callumscott6749]

No other Allied General was coming up with any bold plan.The plan was not just put in action for the sake of it.It was scrutinised and in acted because it might just work.The failure of the 10 1st to take Nijmaigen and the British being dropped to far from Arnhem contributed. Great effort to hold that bridge though for nine days with just a platoon of men.

[@Treblaine]

Callum1 Scott. Failure to take it? As if Gavin was ordered to and didn't. No, he was ordered to NOT take the bridge and secure a HQ for his commanding officer, Browning.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

The 101st was dropped in the WRONG place. It was useless near the Son. It need to be between the two critical bridges. Then everything clicks.

[@nehrigen]

I'm rather sure Patton in particular had plenty of bold plans, just his bold plans were actually feasible.

[@davidhimmelsbach557]

@Shandwen Patton was relegated by the Grand Plan to the TRADITIONAL invasion route into Germany. The further south you go, the smaller the Rhine gets. By the time you're in Holland, the Rhine is an absolute monster. It's as big as the Volga, Mississippi, Columbia, etc. MOST of that water landed north of the southern Rhine. In the actual event, 3rd Army found that it was a cakewalk to set pontoon bridges across the Rhine. Patton didn't use ANY of the exotic preparation that Monty required -- and he was across BEFORE Monty was. The Germans were so concerned about 1st Army ( Remagen ) and 21st Army Group ( Monty ) that the door was wide open. Shortly thereafter 3rd Army made a MASSIVE penetration that was so DEEP that Bradley told Patton to knock it off, to stop, damn it!!! You'll never find any battle maps showing this -- no matter how far you look. You'll have to craft one yourself from 3rd Army records. What happened is that 3rd Army was forced to stay in place, killing time, while 1st Army caught up. Only then Bradley permitted position maps to be published for general release. The big hang-up with 1st Army was that Hitler had thrown EVERYTHING in front of it at Remagen. So it took 9th Armored and friends a lot of fighting to eliminate this blocking force. Once this was done, one arm swung north to meet 21st Army Group and the Ruhr was pocketed. The rest of 1st Army ( it was a monster ) then pushed forward at the same time -- ultimately to the Elbe. It was at this time that 15th Army was established. It was a huge army. You'll have to look long and hard to find 15th Army in any history map. Why? It was an administrative and occupation army. It took over the vast bulk of 1st Army -- so that the fighting troops could spend the final weeks of the war taking it easy. 1st Army was, day by day, re-blooded with brand new infantry divisions. There were some exceptions: the 2nd Armored was loaded with Pershing tanks, so it was sent forward so that the Soviets would be impressed. ( It's sole reason for staying in the front line. ) It didn't take part in any substantial fighting. Bradley absolutely did not want it crossing the Elbe.

[@spudwesth]

It had only one road!

[@brianknutson180]

A lot of good men died because of Monty and Pattons egos

[@johnburns4017]

Brian Knutson Monty was professional, the egos were with the Yanks who were colonels only a few years previously.

[@oldesertguy9616]

@@johnburns4017 The Americans did not hold a monopoly on ego. There were enough to go around.

[@johnburns4017]

@@oldesertguy9616 No. The Americans cornered the ego market.

[@johnburns4017]

The USA cornered the ego market.

[@johnburns4017]

@Brian Knutson You must stop making things up. Monty cared about the troops under him, British, Canadian, US, etc. Look at just these three with USA: Hurtgen Forest (34.000), Lorraine (55,000), Bulge (100,000). Total around 200,000. There is no way Monty would have subjected his men to such slaughter. A lot of American mother saw their sons again because of Monty.

[@desobrien6136]

British generals where too cautious. Patton would have made it over the Rhine.

[@RomanHistoryFan476AD]

how patton can't make his army fly or go over rivers.

[@reds7vn644]

Howard Chambers you obviously aren't a history buff or a tactician. Even the British army still studies patents tactics because they are so effective they don't study Monty's. Between the two Monty gave Les s**** about his soldiers but Patton was the superior tactician and his men loved to hate him but they would have followed him to hell and back because they respected him as a soldier you get that if you weren't a soldier you don't get it.

[@StewartNicolasBILLYCONNOLLY]

Desmond O'Brien "British Generals were too cautious" British Generals WERE cautious! WHY? Because the amount of British Forces available was limited after the mass slaughter of WWI. The Yanks didn't have this problem as they only entered the front line in force during the last year 1918! The Yanks generals could afford to squander their soldiers lives to achieve some limited aim.

[@reds7vn644]

Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY doesn't doesn't really have anything to do with that even to this day British leadership is still the same way they like to over-analyze things and make sure that they have a massive tactical Advantage they don't learn from Lessons Learned the way that the American Military can and does. They're not as adaptive as their American counterparts when it comes to tactics and operations. I also think it has a lot to do with the way their society is if you compare an American to a Brit the Brit will be much more reserved and standoffish whereas the American will be much more Brash and in your face and that reflects in the military.

[@StewartNicolasBILLYCONNOLLY]

RED S7VN OK, my friend, you say that the British tend to over-analyse things and be a bit cautious. Montgomery has stated that of all the formations that he commanded in his life there was none better than the Highland Division. My late Father and his brother were both sergeants in the Black Watch (RHR) 51st (Highland) Division. Now, here is my response to your accusation of over-analysis....ready? FUCK OFF! FUCK RIGHT OFF AS FAR AS YOU CAN GO, OK? Then, when you get there, FUCK OFF AGAIN! If you have a problem with that you can Fuck Off. Love and Peace.

[@billburr5881]

Why would you entrust any operation requiring a rapid advance to Monty? He was always over-preparing his operations. Eisenhower knew Monty from Tunisia, Italy and Normandy - what was Ike thinking?

[@renard801]

You fall into the usual trap of believing Monty was ground commander during Market Garden. In fact, he proposed the broad concept, Eisenhower "insisted on it going ahead", but other generals actually planned and executed the operation - not Monty. He was engaged on his other responsibilities. Ike and the Supreme Command recognised Monty's abilities enough to entrust him with planning Overlord, probably the most complex military operation in history. They also gave him command of ALL the Allied Armies (including American) in France on D-Day and for three months afterwards. History regards that invasion as an outstanding success. Post-war, fearing a Russian invasion westwards, the top brass at NATO selected Monty to be Deputy Supreme Commander Europe, keeping him in that position for many years until his retirement. That shows how much those who knew him trusted his abilities as a top commander. Today's armchair generals think they know better.

[@bigwoody4704]

Monty owned this unlike a real Field Marshall Model, bernard never showed up - a fine example of a bad example. He admitted "a bad mistake on my part"

[@thevillaaston7811]

In Noth Africa, Montgomery's forces advanced 700 miles from El-Alamein to Benghazi in nine days - 700 miles. In the desert, with one intermediate port, Tobruk. With one road, and one rail line. Both of which had suffered from multiple demolitions from the retreating Axis forces. 700 miles is London to Berlin. Compare all that to US forces in Tunisia, after they had faced the Vichy French... Italy... Montgomey's meagre forces were spread around Sothern Italy, due to Eisenhower's BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK. After Montgomery had warned about the consequences of those undertakings. Normandy... CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 ‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’ Ike, Brad, Beetle, Lightening Joe, etc., atc. Are we supposed to believe that people who comment on KZbin actually knew these people?

[@bigwoody4704]

There was nothing there it was the truth the fighting was miniscule with bernard half heartedly faffing around.Even Rommel in his private papers to other officers wondered what he was doing.Claude Auchinleck with much less had won 1st alamein.There was virtually no fuel,water or supplies getting thru. *An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p418-19-20* .The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front. *The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.Montgomery's 8th army* hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. *Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again* Despite the enthusiasm for the amphetamine benzedrine which was issued in tens of thousands of tablets "to all eighth Army personnel by Montgomery *pursuit after Alamein was hardly relentless". Rommel had escaped with the core of his army despite the advantage in tanks,an artillery superiority of 12:1 and an intimate knowledge of Axis where about and weakness thanx to ULTRA and other intelligence* BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis,XVIII - In Africa Montgomery was incapable of finishing off Rommel even when his tanks were numbering in single digits and his plans were fully known to British intelligence *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p249-250 ,on 20 December LT Gen. von Sponeck of the 90th Light Division told his staff "Nobody can see any escape. The British outnumber us enormously. The puzzle is why are they following us so slowly? Time and again they have allowed us to dodge encirclement" The British Generalship under Montgomery remained unequal to the task of finishing them off.* *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.256 Afrika Korp Gen.Johann Cramer* said after the war "El Alamein was lost before it was fought,we had not the petrol....*Rommel had known for a long time the campaign in North Africa was hopeless because of the petrol shortage"* *BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p262-65* The figures largely speak for themselves. The German and Italian tanks through out the 2nd half of 1942 in Rommel's words were "decrepit and barely fit for action". Comparisons are even more striking *At Galaza 800 British tanks vs 280 German tanks* *At 1st Alamein 159 vs 50* *At Alam Halfa 524 vs 203* *At 2nd Alamein 910 vs 234* *The total of this ever bludgeoning Allied tank strengths by 5 November it was at 15:1 and the rest of the year hovered at between 10 & 13:**1.By** November 9th the British 8th Army had established an anti-tank superiority of 30:1 and artillery superiority of 12:1*

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@renard801 From Big Woody (aka Para Dave) 'At Galaza 800 British tanks vs 280 German tanks ' His words. Any idea where 'Galaza' is?

[@pmpcpmpc4737]

Just a few remarks. It all wasn't necessary if Eisenhower and Montgomery didn't miss the fantastic opportunity which created itself on 3rd and 4th September and the British 11th armoured division after capturing intact Antwerps continued towards the Beveland Peninsula and cut it off. It would not only have secured the Scheldt but also have prevented 100.000 men of the 15th army to escape through Beveland and later help to stop Arnhem. There is an interesting book from Peter Beale on this, called "The Great Mistake: Battle for Antwerp & the Beveland Peninsula". Also, had they succeeded in cutting off western Holland, besides winning a better position to capture Scheldt, they could also have seized two other major ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

[@jamiengo4987]

Of course it's the Americans fault. The Americans should'vs captured Nijmegan quickly not when 8th corps turned up

[@johnburns4017]

XXX Corps not the VIII Corps. The VIII Corps did not go up north so far.

[@Datruth330]

Jamie Ngo the airborne commander was with the 82nd and could have overruled the 82nd commander but he didn't. Btw this commander was British. The 82nd paid the price when they had to assault the bridge against a well prepared defense instead of just taking it on day one.

[@carolelapointe5161]

Jamie Ngo Oh, bull. It was one of the most ill conceived plans of WW2.

[@reds7vn644]

Jamie Ngo you clearly don't have an understanding of the battle plans and what actually transpired. This is textbook Monte when left to his own devices he's incapable of leading and coming up with effective strategy. It's why he was almost fired by Eisenhower because he wouldn't get off the beachhead in Normandy he was inactive and damn near cowardice.

[@Treblaine]

Gavin was ordered to first take the heights rather than the bridge as that's where his commanding officer was going to place his field Headquarters.

[@mgt2010fla]

Could you please talk a little slower? You know, like Montgomery at Caen, and every other battle he fought!

[@mgt2010fla]

@John CornellSimple questions: Did the plans for D-Day spell out Monty taking Caen on D-Day? Plus the airfield to the west of Caen? Did Monty not capture the Scheldt waterway to open the port of Antwerp in early September 1944, to ease the supply problems for the Allies? How far did Monty have to go to get to Belgium and how many miles did Patton have to go to get to Metz? Why didn't Monty close the Falaise Gap, bagging all of the Germans instead a less than half? Ask Major Frost and the men of the 1st British Airborne what they thought of Monty's plan to make Monty a hero! Why was Monty's best friend a 10 year old boy? Here ends the lesson!

[@mgt2010fla]

@John CornellWait a minute, who took most of that "...100 km of German held ground" that was "taken in just 3 days"? The British XXX Corps moved on roads and bridges captured by the US 82nd and 101st Divisions! And, I don't remember it being all within 3 days! Your Patton comment lacks that he had to pivot 90 degrees and fight through bad winter weather, in bad terrain, against heavy German resistance to get to Bastogne! The 101st claims that Patton didn't "relieve" them, Patton's tanks "reinforced" the 101st! I concur with the 101st! Finally, Monty was given extra supplies for his sally toward the Rhine while the US Armies had to wait. This gave the Germans time to reinforce in front of a idled 3rd Army, because Monty hadn't opened the port of Antwerp until late November 1944! Then after the Battle of the Bulge Monty ran his mouth about helping the Americans, which he didn't, and he almost got canned for it! You can be a Monty lover all you want, but you aren't entitled to your own facts!

[@mgt2010fla]

@John CornellI didn't say anything about Bradley and Patton wasn't on the Continent until way after D-Day! Bradley didn't let Patton go any further because he was afraid of "Friendly Fire" episodes! Monty was the ground commander and he picked the meeting place, and didn't close the Gap! Bradley took one for the team on that one! Patton would have taken Metz BEFORE getting reinforced IF Monty didn't take Patton's supplies! You totally missed the huge mistake of Monty's about opening the port of Antwerp! Nice blaming the Division Commander for the Field Marshall's planning! Turns out the British Intel Officer was correct about the forces near Arnhem, SS Armor Divisions! I noted you didn't argue with how US Airborne Divisions opened much of your 100 km for XXX Corps! You also ignore how Monty put his foot in it about his Bulge input! It must be Cherry season where you live, you sure Cherry Picked my comments! Monty and a young boy? Guess that's not important to you either! The good news I don't have a love affair with any of those leaders, unlike you and your dear Monty! Research? I'm doing this from memory! Enjoy your Cherry Pie!

[@mgt2010fla]

@John CornellI know what he said, and how he said it! His own aide, Freddie De Guingand, told Monty that his giving an order for Ike to sign making the Commander of the 21 Army Group the Ground Commander, meaning Monty, caused Ike to write to the Marshall saying it's either him or Monty! Freddie asked for a 24 hour delay, and told Monty what Ike was doing! Monty backed down and finally stopped asking to be Ground Commander! Ike didn't send his letter! De Guingard saved Monty's career because there was no doubt which Country was carrying the heaviest part of the log, the US! Even Churchill knew Eisenhower was in charge! The British didn't have any more men, so Ike gave Monty US troops but I have no idea what you are talking about the "Rhine Pocket!" The 9th reverted to Bradley after Monty crossed the Rhine, which was after every other American Army had already jumped the Rhine! Monty was assigned to defend Bradley, and advance on Hamburg and further east to keep the Russians out of Denmark! Ike's exact words were, "US Ninth Army will revert to Bradley...Bradley will be responsible for occupying the Ruhr and will deliver his main thrust on the axis Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden to join up with Russians. The mission of your army will be to protect Bradley's northern flank." Eisenhower finally crossed the line vs Monty! Bradley's feelings were just fine after that!

[@mgt2010fla]

@John CornellYes, many of the jumps in the Pacific were equal or more than that, on a regular basis! You forget that the US was fighting on a two front war, the war Hitler promised not to do and then did just it! The British lost Singapore even though they had more troops! Plus, Monty was supplied with tank and planes and trucks(Lorries) from the United States, that helped both him and Stalin to mobilize their ground troops movements! Monty might have move 1000 KM but he did it with American mobility! You seem to not want to answer any of my questions! Scared? Look at the questions, and then answer. Antwerp? Distance Patton went and Monty went? Monty's aide keeping Monty from being fired? The Rhine Pocket? Even with US troops Monty didn't jump the Rhine before every other US Army? This is a bit one sided, you never answer shit! I can't lose, I'm arguing with myself! Getting in a battle of wits with you is like fighting an unarmed man! GFY!

[@reds7vn644]

Monty was a horrible general. Whenever something went wrong he always pointed fingers and blamed other people, not taking responsibility like a real leader of men. Was he an egomaniac? He had a Rolls-Royce for a staff car! (Contrast that to Patton riding around in a Jeep. And for the US, Patton was considered egotistical!) He claimed in 1945 that he alone was responsible for the allied victory when General Patton and the change in weather had a lot more to do with it. After earlier allied losses, by the time Montgomery took over the North Africa campaign German resupply was almost totally cut off by allied air and sea power, and of course, ultimate victory came when throngs of American troops and supplies showed up. Montgomery was something of a dilettante, petty and demanding while thinking nothing of undermining his own superiors. Monty ran staff meetings like a petulant school marm, no coughing, no smoking, no anything that would detract from attention paid to himself. Move so slow in Sicily that Patton took over the island for him. Of course, Monty pouted and whined about it as well, not really studly behavior for such a celebrated hero. The one time Montgomery came up with a bold and aggressive plan, it resulted in the debacle at Arnhem and failed to accomplish its goals. Never having a good thing to say about other leaders, Montgomery continued to criticize Dwight Eisenhower after the war, and then even after Ike became president Monty criticized that! Monty kept up the verbal attacks into old age, severely criticizing the US military effort in Viet Nam. Montgomery, Alabama stripped Monty of his honorary citizenship. Even his enemies did not really admire him, an Italian officer challenging him to a duel! Came close to losing Normandy because of hesitation and in action. He almost got fired by Eisenhower who was at wits end trying to get the notoriously cautious Montgomery to get up and move out of the beachhead. He look like a Boy Scout running around in shorts, not a warrior. He strutted about like a bantam rooster. Although professing to be homophobic, at least one biographer is convinced Monty was gay and there is a documented relationship with a 12 year old Swiss boy. Even if it was not “improper” it was odd to say the least. He was a scared General. He was said to refuse to attack unless he had a 15 to 1 advantage. Moreover, Montgomery actually supported Apartheid in South Africa. What a legacy!

[@davidmcintyre998]

I believe his car was a Humber not a Rolls and he lived in a caravan never a chateaux,he had killed and nearly been killed in battle,his relationship with his own family was not happy and sometimes tragic and i think he poured his affection on the Swiss boy because of this.

[@dancarey9495]

Too much time is wasted arguing over the egos of a few Generals. More time should be directed at telling the story of the brave combatants on all sides. it is easy to be brave when you are out of range.

[@ramal5708]

Because of this failed operation the important port of Antwerp were not taken early enough so the supplies could flow to the forces near the German frontier. IF they did concentrated solely on capturing Antwerp before any major offensives. Supplies would be no more problem for the Allies, no more problem who gets the priority of supplies etc. Even Gen. Dempsey recomended to attack across the Rhine in Wesel, where Monty would cross later in March 1945. It was viable position to directly shift his 21st Army group to pincer move the Ruhr and cut it off, but nevertheless capturing Antwerp should've been priority before major advances.

[@stephenskidmore5283]

It was chase a disorganised enemy to get a favourable position, or hold up for three to four week to get a port operational, while the enemy consolidate. Eisenhower chosen to chase assessing he had enough supplies to do so. Eisenhower wrote in his book, Crusade in Europe, that on 10 September Montgomery was informed to delay the clearing of the Scheldt. It was not until 9 October, nearly five weeks after the fall of Antwerp, that Eisenhower told Montgomery to focus on the clearing of the Scheldt, which Montgomery had already started.

[@ramal5708]

@@stephenskidmore5283 its not a chase, the objective was to capture vital bridges across the Rhine and other rivers in Holland to envelop the West Wall. Tons of Fuel needed was diverted for this disaster these fuel needed for other Allied corps offenses to effectively penetrate the West Wall and create lodge for attack across the Rhine late 1944. 21st Army group was primarily tasked to capture Antwerp and scheldt estuary but they instead concentrated in this Market Garden, I dunno why Ike was convinced to give the priority for Market Garden instead of Antwerp attack. On the other part of France, Patton defeated superior Panzer corps in Arracourt with inferior American tanks and destroyed many of these Panzers, if the Supplies were fairly shared to keep pressure on thr Germans the attacks on West Wall would be more effective without the fortification was reinforced.

[@ramal5708]

@@stephenskidmore5283 Germans were either already consolidated their defensive positions or still on their way to reinforcing defences in Holland and West Wall, they should chase and shut the Falaise pocket in August 1944 and aggressively chase them through northern Belgium before capture of Paris if the Germans were retreating quickly to their homeland

[@stephenskidmore5283]

@@ramal5708 Eisenhower had 'two' choices which I mentioned. It was simple. Patton running in the wrong direction was a failure. He 'failed' to reach the Rhine and take the west wall which he said he would do, while outnumbering the opposition by about 4 to 1 at least. He was well supplied as well.

[@stephenskidmore5283]

@@ramal5708 The Germans were is disarray. The never even reinforced the Dutch bridges. No barbed wires, anti-tank ditches, heavy numbers of guards. Nothing. They 'had' to be chased. Eisenhower considered he had enough supplies to do it. Market Garden was partially supplied by air from England.

[@michaelmccotter4293]

I'll say it again. The blame is squarely on the shoulders of Ike for agreeing to Monty's plan. Too many moving parts. Skinny Roads, too many bridge crossings. No air support. What could go wrong? A more simple scaled back version to outflank the German 15th army would have been much more doable. Had all that firepower been concentrated to the North of the 15th held Estuary. With Canooks on the South and the Brit 30 Corp, Poles n Yanks sweeping North then West, the 15th would have been encircled. Big Ego, Big plan, Big Crappshoot. Monty just needed better adult supervision by Ike. Ike screwed up playing to Monty and politics.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Not really...

[@lesdodoclips3915]

Yes really, chain of command

[@Ira88881]

I wish I understood 10% of what you guys are talking about it, but I still find it fascinating.

[@crownic]

This video was exactly what I was looking for. Thanks, great video

[@Franky46Boy]

I mentioned this at the other postings about Market Garden already, but very few people paid attention: 'It is a misconception to think that when you cross the Rhine at Arnhem, you are already in Germany!' You still have to cross the Yssel (IJssel) river, east of Arnhem. Nowhere I can find evidence that the Allies tried to secure the two relevant bridges across the Yssel during Operation Market Garden...

[@Franky46Boy]

So the aim of Market Garden of Eisenhower makes more sense than the aim of Montgomery.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@Franky46Boy Great observation,didn't know that.Montgomery was an idiot and IKE a fool for going along on this debacle.Did you know that Generals Bittrich and Harmel both wanted to drop the Arnhem/Nijmegen bridges. Model over ruled them as he wanted to use them to counter attack - that's a Field Marshall unlike Bernard who didn't have the Cajones to show up. Had they done so the Operation would have been over before it started. Another thing - I'll humor these morons who think it was a good idea. Even if they made the Bridge at Arnhem Student and Model were bringing tanks and artillary in by rail from the the near by Ruhr. Aim a couple of 88s at the few bridges left standing and it's a slaughter at 1 or 2 choke points. Amazing the fools in these sections that attempt to prop up this Fool's errand. Shame good men didn't come home as Monty spouts it was 90% successful. This directly led to the Honger Winter - the poor Dutch

[@michaelmartin4383]

Operation Market Garden dose appear to be an encirclement of Holland. This I think would have been important to Monty because it would have given him access to the sea. If Monty was going to push his forces into Berlin, he would want to first make sure he had an adequate supply route. Monty always thought in terms of The Grand Strategy. For instance the Americans wanted to take Paris, but Money saw the capture of Paris as being of psychological and not military importance. If you capture Paris, instead of the Germans having to supply and feed the inhabitance of Paris, the Allies would have to do that instead which would reduce resources available to fighting men and slow down the advance. Far more important from, Monty’s view was to secure the main coastal port roads and rivers, before attempting to take Paris.

[@johnburns4017]

Antwerp was taken by the British on d-day plus 90. Monty wanted a para drop on the Scheldt to open up Antwerp, but American General Brereton of the First Allied Airborn Army refused to do so. Monty wanted a 40 division thrust up into Holland and then east across the north German plains, which was excellent tank country. Many US generals agreed. Eisenhower went for a broad front, with no real punch along the line from the North Sea to Switzerland, which prolonged the war. Market Garden was an under-resourced wimp of an operation with only one corps above Eindhoven. Monty was right.

[@bigwoody4704]

The GIs made it thru Lorraine,Ardennes,the Hurtgen and across the Rhine before Monty ever set foot in Germany after his foot dragging walk abouts.After the Crowns masterpieces at Market Garden,Dunkirk,Singapore Winnie claimed he couldn't keep pace with these debacles.That's why the emerging Super Power basically finished the heavy lifting themselves

[@allenatkins2263]

I would also argue that they were trying to find a use for the Allied airborne troops.

[@LeftCoastStephen]

Recently found your channel and am enjoying the in-depth analysis. I think the first and biggest mistake was for the 11th Armoured Division, after capturing the port of Antwerp intact to not also cross the Albert Canal that day (Sep. 4). Bridges were still intact and the Germans were in disarray. By waiting 2 days, they were forced many miles south before crossing. The second was to not make clearing the Scheldt estuary and opening access to the port of Antwerp the top priority. Unfortunately, Adm. Ramsey was the only one at SHAEF arguing for this. Logistics was already a huge problem that was limiting the conduct of the war. Clearing channel ports was of little use since the port facilities were being destroyed in the effort and they were too small to have a significant effect. Antwerp was the second biggest port in Europe and the facilities were intact! Miles of quays and all the cranes were there but wouldn’t be used until the end of November. One wonders what changes to strategy could have been made with supply levels being doubled or tripled. Clearing the Scheldt was never going to be easy, but if started the first week of September instead of the first week of October it would have been easier before the 15th Army was able to dig in and while the weather was still good. Rough seas and lack of air support due to poor weather caused many casualties in the 1st Canadian Army. Thanks for a very thought provoking series

[@bigwoody4704]

More BS from the Cornhole Chronicles *www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm* *Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton* Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. *Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance.*Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"* *Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed - and Monty botched it* Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that *Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through the Germans and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe*

[@bigwoody4704]

Your source is full of shit .IKE would never give the moron that amount especially when SHAEF was against it - even Alan Brooke and Admiral Ramsey said so. As The Ruhr was right there and sending everything by Rail.Model and Student -who were there saw to that.Try one of the other aliases on your account *From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este* After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein *I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easilysaid Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt* More Monty victims Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined Sep 28, 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013

[@andersolsson1279]

If i took the grand prize of Belgium, Antwerp, i would consolidate to. Not rush on.

[@dobermanpac1064]

I’ve been studying WWII for 5 decades. The Brits and Americans both had weakness in the upper levels of leadership. The battlefield officers given a free hand could have done a quicker job.

[@TimDutch]

I don't think if market garden was succesful, and they resupplied the province of Holland (Yes Holland not the whole of The Netherlands) there would be a hunger winter. The northern provinces you paint, Fryslân , Groningen etc is where the agriculture is located in The Netherlands so they would be able to sustain themselves. Also note: the Zuiderzee(southsea) didn't exist anymore in the 1930's. It was now a lake called the IJsselmeer.

[@HSMiyamoto]

I agree with you about Eisenhower's explanation. Ike would have never allowed 21st AG to go all the way to the Ruhr, much less Berlin, knowing Hitler had the forces needed to cut off Monty''s spearhead. Remember that before 16 Dec. 1944, the Allies knew Germany had large motorized reserves in the West, but not where they were. In fact, SHAEF may have expected those reserves to be used to isolate and destroy 30th Corps, and maybe retake Antwerp. At least, a rational German commander would have tried that, since it would left a much shorter flank to defend while relieving the Scheldt pocket.

[@dgray3771]

most interesting part of what you suggest is this, I am from the netherlands btw, and I am from the east. The grounds east of Nijmegen and north/east of arnhem are better suited for heavier vehicles, and had more open ground at that time. Which means holding and fortifying the east flank would have been much easier than anywhere else in the country. If your goal is jumping across the rhine why at Arnhem, since you go across an extra river. Going across the meuse and rhine more south would be far better with only 2 major rivers to cross. Rather than taking that extra one at the lower rhine, unless your goal is as you stated to encircle the forces to the west.