Normativity with Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson is widely recognized for her work in moral philosophy and metaphysics. In moral philosophy, Thomson has made significant contributions to its sub-fields of applied ethics, moral theory, and meta-ethics. Her studies in metaphysics have largely covered the ontology of events and the identity across time of people and other physical objects. She is currently working on the question of what it is for one event to cause another. Series: "UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures" [5/2005] [Public Affairs] [Humanities] [Show ID: 23350]

[@neoepicurean3772]

RIP Dr Thomson. I was writing on her abortion paper (critically) when she passed in Nov 2020. A great philosopher.

[@edmqnd8128]

What is your opinion on it?

[@neoepicurean3772]

@@edmqnd8128 That the right to bodily autonomy is not some absolute law that overrules all other conflicting obligations: you can't just kill someone to avoid some lower risk to oneself. And secondly that a fetus can only pose a passive threat and thus cannot be killed by appealing to principles of self-defence. So I believe the arguments in her paper fail.

[@edmqnd8128]

@@neoepicurean3772 I agree. Out of curiosity, just because one perceives abortion as immoral do you believe it should be punishable if performed?

[@neoepicurean3772]

@@edmqnd8128 I do not think abortion is necessarily immoral, and I think that anytime before the fetus is sentient, which is around week 18 - so say week 16 to be safe - any time before that I do not think the fetus is the sort of thing that demands moral consideration. So I think there should be abortions for any reason before week 16 (but it's not the nicest thing for a woman to go through, so should I am not suggesting that abortion should be encouraged or normalized in any way). Once the fetus is sentient then it has to be treated like a moral being, and cannot be killed without good reason, or there should be some legal punishment.

[@edmqnd8128]

@@neoepicurean3772 So being able to feel pain or/and the ability to have a reactive nervous system gives you moral worth. Let me know if I’m misrepresenting you. If a person is braindead and will recover in let’s say 9 months, is killing him permissible? Considering he has no moral worth.

[@hannahrichards0904]

The problem I noted was that I don't think Judith's formulation really escapes consequentialism as much as she'd like it to. As I see it, the association of the word 'defective' with the normative 'ought' doesn't avoid the problem of having to assess consequences, and therefore escape the whole problem of the consequentialist holding acceptability of action 'hostage'. This is because in order for us to know whether a particular action IS 'defective', it seems we still need to know its outcome.

[@captainbeefheart5815]

She addresses this and states that consequences are a consideration but only insofar as the consequences reflect on your defectiveness. That is to say that we aren't beholden to consequences that we couldn't reasonably foresee, because we would not be defective for not foreseeing those consequences. If brushing my teeth in the morning would cause the world to explode in 100 years, consequentialism would hold me brushing my teeth to be horribly evil. Thomson's formulation argues that I would not be defective for brushing my teeth, because there's no way for me to have known that the world would blow up in 100 years if I brushed my teeth one morning. It's noted, however, that consequences that I do know of can inform whether or not I'd be acting in a morally defective manner. So if I knew that the world would blow up in 100 years if I brush my teeth this morning and I choose to do so anyway, then I could be held accountable on Thomson's account. So consequences still matter, but Thomson's account doesn't require us to be held hostage by unforeseeable future consequences.

[@thesceptic1018]

The trolley problem was invented by Philippa Foot, not Judith Thomson.

[@theyangist]

That would probably fall into one of those "unsuitable circumstances."

[@arthurs7882]

The seeing eye dog example lacks one distinction--the toaster, if it doesn't toast IS defective. But what if the dog actively seeks to sabotage its owner?

[@captainbeefheart5815]

Then it's a defective dog.

[@jp2feminist]

@carlyrose19 Thank you.

[@borisrecke]

pretty smart

[@jp2feminist]

Judith apologized at the end for "rambling on." She "ought" not to have spoken for so long. She was a "defective speaker" similar to the toaster that won't toast or the beefsteak tomato that is too small. I would like to pose to Judith the following: If one were to take his working Amercian-made toaster to Italy, and attempt to toast his panini, only to discover that the electrical plug does not work in Italy, would the toaster still be defective? I think not.

[@bilalmehdaoui9784]

In this case, one should account for the "suitable circumstances" in which the America-made toaster was manufactured to toast bread, and therefore normatively ought to. These suitable circumstances include the electrical plug found in the US, but not in Italy. The American-made toaster, therefore, did not fail to execute its function by failing to toast the panini and "ought" not be considered a defective member of its kind.

[@captainbeefheart5815]

Thomson addressed your last point. She states that defectiveness only holds true under suitable conditions. Plugging and American-made toaster into an outlet in Italy would not be a suitable condition, so such a toaster would not be considered defective on her account.

[@captainbeefheart5815]

Actually, she was just being modest which is a virtuous trait.

[@carlyrose19]

@jp2feminist hmm very deep

[@traetormenta]

Ja ja its seems a litle old man, thas because hi o she , jaja defend the abortion, cause never could in her soul feel the real power of Love. Thas the way it is

[@captainbeefheart5815]

I think you might be a little defective.