PHILOSOPHY - Epistemology: The Paradox of the Ravens [HD]

[@ThoseWhoStayUofM]

This is not a paradox. In order to have strong confirmation that all non-black things are non-ravens, you'd need to make observations of all non-black things. It only appears to be a paradox because there are so many non-black things, that the confirmation that just one of them is non-black seems to be relatively unimportant, which is true. But as you iterate the process of identifying all non-black things, and each and every one is a non-raven, you can easily see how this process could, if done enough times, strongly confirm that all ravens are black. Once you've identified every non-black thing in the entire universe, and none of those things were ravens, then either all ravens are black, or ravens do not exist whatsoever.

[@gemfuzion]

+ThoseWhoStayUofM Exactly what i was about to type .....lol

[@ashleyXmidnight]

+ThoseWhoStayUofM The point is, you can replace "raven" will whatsoever invented, that cause the trouble. "All spaghetti monsters are merciful" because "there is no non-merciful things are spaghetti monsters". You may argued that merciful spaghetti monsters do not exist. But indeed, by looking at all non-merciful things, we know that "All spaghetti monsters are merciful"

[@gemfuzion]

+jai Jing I don't see the paradox, it still logically makes sense. If you examine all non merciful things and validate that they're not spaghetti monsters then it logically follows that spaghetti monsters HAVE to be merciful IF THEY EXIST. Your statement doesn't make any claims about existence of spaghetti monsters, just a property of it should they exist.

[@henrikagestedt7835]

+ThoseWhoStayUofM Wouldn't it be easier just to check all the ravens?

[@yohami]

+ThoseWhoStayUofM That was going to be my point too

[@darkostalevski7799]

Logic here is good..If we could prove that all non black things are not ravens, it would prove that all ravens are black. The key word here is "ALL". If we could somehow examine ALL non black items in the entire universe, and if we find no ravens in them, that would prove that all ravens are black. Examining only the one chair confirms only that ONE of the non black items is not a raven, not ALL, and therefore doesn't eliminate the possibility that somewhere there is for example a red raven (since we haven't examined ALL red items, but only ONE), and so it's not sufficient to prove the hypothesis beyond any doubt. --------------------------------------------------------------------- EDIT after reading some of the comments: --------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. If we examine ALL items in the entire universe and find no ravens in them, it means that all ravens must be black (if they exist at all), but it doesn't say anything about existence of ravens. It would be possible that all ravens have gone extinct without us noticing it, but this still wouldn't invalidate the logic here. 2. Somebody mentioned finite and infinite sets of items. This is not relevant for proving the hypothesis; the argument of the other side is that if we examine for example 5 items it wouldn't prove the hypothesis since infinity minus 5 is still infinity. But I say that even if we examine all items in the entire universe except for one item, this still doesn't prove the hypothesis, since it's possible that the last unexamined item is red raven. Only if we examine ALL items, the hypothesis is proven, so this is why it makes no difference if we are examining finite or infinite sets. 3. For those who are suggesting that it's impossible to examine infinite set of items, this is a thought experiment and it's not meant to be taken literally (picking up one item, examining it, than getting into spaceship flying to another planet, picking up second item, and so on..).. The ways and methods of examining ravens are not subject of this experiment / paradox. It says "IF all non-black items are non ravens, than all ravens are black", so it's a conditional sentence, and it already given that all-non black items are not ravens. ---------------------------------------------------------------------

[@MyNameIsMaxYo]

thank you. i felt like i understood this but the video drowned me in info and i lost focus. you helped me understand what i was thinking

[@xcvsdxvsx]

Perfect.

[@timothy4440]

that does not prove ravens exist though

[@xcvsdxvsx]

timothy lewis The assumption of raven existence is packed into the premise.

[@darkostalevski7799]

Timothy Lewis is right; if we examine ALL non black items in the universe and find no ravens in them, it proves that ravens (IF they exist) can only be black. However it says nothing about existence of ravens. But this doesn't break the logic, and it can have a practical use: Lets say that we examined all non black items and found out that there are no dragons in them. Then if one day I see something red in the woods, I don't have to worry since it can't be a dragon. Dragons may not exist all together, but if I'm not sure about their existence I have to be careful, but only in presence of black items, since that is the only color dragons could have.

[@goingonlylogical]

Why is our conclusion false? All our conclusion states is that by noting a non-black non-raven gives some confirmation to all ravens being black. Well, sure... But we can say confirmation is so minute, it may as well be insignificant. I'm kinda lost as to why this is a paradox... Some confirmation is not absolute confirmation.

[@adamfreed2291]

That was my thoughts exactly.

[@roelin360]

Exactly, this is stupid, and the video was long boring drawn out and more "complicated" than it had to be.

[@Kabitu1]

Well even if one such confirmation is minute, imagine I have a very large amount of such confirmations, I have collected a billion billion things that are all non-black and non-raven. Does that add up to a strong confirmation that ravens are black? I think the mistake is in how we interpret what "confirms" means here, as something that might count for us accepting the hypothesis. That's why we've switched to the opposite approach in natural science, we know look for disconfirmations instead of confirmations. The couch doesn't disconfirm the hypothesis, but no matter what color it is, it has no chance to be a disconfirmation, so it's not the right place to look for proof.

[@amitgalor]

I agree. Seeing a million black ravens shouldn't bring you to the conclusion that all ravens are black. It looks AS IF the black ravens confirm the hypothesis a little bit at a time, but what really helps us leaning towards the conclusion is that each raven we see is an opportunity of dis-confirmation. Like we conducted an experiment but didn't succeed in finding a non-black raven that disproves the hypothesis, only another black raven that proves nothing. Finding a non raven thing doesn't count as an experiment because it can't disprove it.

[@goingonlylogical]

So I've watched this video a few times and I still have no idea what it's trying to imply... There's no reason why noting a red chair shouldn't (logically) lend credibility to all ravens being black. To use this in more real-world terms, if I say "Coffee always wakes me up", I can lend credibility to that claim by noting "Fruit juice doesn't wake me up". But that's not a confirmation. It merely adds strength to the hypothesis. The only way to correctly confirm the hypothesis is either by noting ALL ravens or ALL non-ravens (or all of the respective colours thereof). "This red chair proves that all ravens are black." No, this red chair shows it's slightly more likely that all ravens are black... Just like seeing a black raven doesn't prove all ravens are black, but does show that's more likely to be the case. I see nothing odd about that logic at all. Looking at it from a different angle again, I can lend credibility to "All X is Y" just by noting "Non-X is non-Y". For example, I can make the claim that all lemons are purple, and lend evidence to that claim by showing you a blue orange. But I would dismiss that claim as much as if someone showed me a purple lemon. Sure, that'd be a hell of a sight, but it wouldn't make me believe that all lemons are purple. Once again... Sure the logic is odd, but it's pretty logically sound.

[@allmhuran]

The implausability only arises if you eqivocate on the meaning of "confirmation" to mean both "instance confirmation" and "logical implication", or fail to distinguish between existential qualification and universal qualification. Instead, thinking about the red chair should help us to realize that (as others have said) instance confirmation is not really confirmation at all. Finding one A that is B doesn't allow you to *logically* conclude anything at all about the proposition that "All A are B". However, finding a single A that is not B immediately allows you to abandon the hypothesis. Hence Karl Popper's claim that the validity of science is founded on the basis of falsification, not confirmation.

[@markrobbins1046]

" Hence Karl Popper's claim that the validity of science is founded on the basis of falsification, not confirmation." Except that its not -- or thats a bad way of presenting the reality, which is that Science make presumptions and then waits to be denied by exceptions. For instance, the presumption that physical laws operate 'uniformly' throughout the universe. You got to admit that a huge grandaddy of a presumption.

[@allmhuran]

It doesn't make presumptions and then passively wait. It forms hypotheses and then actively tests the hell out of them. Only after we've failed to refute a hypothesis a large number of times do we start gaining enough confidence in its claims to call it a law.

[@markrobbins1046]

allmhuran "It doesn't make presumptions and then passively wait." True, but a strawman. I did not use that adverb. Science must bootstrap itself with certain presumptions or axioms - the temporal ordering of cause and effect, for example. Take simple causality, if science had to presume causality from the start by the justification of induction - there were numerous phenomena that had indeterminable cause - but science ignored all that and just took causality as axiomatic. So large blocks of its foundations actually were desperate, and unavoidable presumptions.

[@allmhuran]

This was actually a subject of great consternation, first investigated in depth by David Hume in the 1700's, who went into great detail on "The Problem of Induction". Prior to Hume, Locke had attempted to solidify our trust in induction by weakening the idea of knowledge in general, and thereby demonstrate that the claims that follow from scientific processes are as "trustworthy" as the claims one can make from pure reason. Hume drew on the Aristotelian ideas that distinguished between knowledge and "mere belief", and argued that there was a categorical difference between relations of ideas and matters of fact. He went on to demonstrate that causality can only be a matter of fact - and thus derived a-posteriori - not a relation of ideas that can be arrived at a-priori. But causality is never directly observed, only the constant conjunctions of cause and effect are observed, so no a-posteriori justification can be provided. Then belief in causality cannot be justified. I personally think that Kant's response to this is a strong one. It's certainly ingenious. I can't possibly go into details here - it's incredibly complicated - but if you google Kant's "transcendental", you'll be able to read whichever summaries you prefer. What I'm arguing here is that science did not simply take causality as axiomatic. There has been a great deal of thought and argument undertaken in attempting to justify our belief in things that we intuitively take for granted - like causality.

[@markrobbins1046]

allmhuran I agree, but it was after the fact, science had to take the leap of faith that the natural world was sensible, consistent, and followed principles of causation. What is interesting is when they come across boogeymen now, such as in QM, and doubly interesting is how, if you believe in causation then you cannot believe in free will. If there are no ghosts in the machine, then 'you' do not exist. You are just a victim of pure sensation, strapped in like the guy in A Clockwork Orange.

[@ifstatementifstatement2704]

:) This is exactly how I imagined a philosopher would look.

[@1999_reborn]

Judging by your name and pfp I can see you’re passionate about programming. Which is ironic considering how computer science was influenced by philosophers (specifically logicians). Logic is an area of philosophy. Programming utilizes Boolean Algebra, and the earliest precursor to this was Leibniz’s work. He was a philosopher lmao. Then of course you have Aristotle the first person to create a formal system of logic which is why he is referred to as the “father of western logic”.

[@ifstatementifstatement2704]

@@1999_reborn yeah I have been programming since I was 12, since 1997. And yes, logic is central to programming. Part of the reason I was watching the video was to see how philosophy defines or approaches logic. I did study philosophy for a year in France as part of the scientific baccalauréat. It was mandatory. We didn’t learn much about logic though but more about seeing things from different points of view and coming up with arguments supporting each view. From other videos I’ve watched, logic is defined as a consequence of the framework of the human mind. Because the mind is organised in a certain way, we think the way we do. Which makes me wonder if an alien mind would reflect in the same logical way. Probably not. We already see that I think with people like psychopaths who are born lacking the capacity for compassion (there is a spectrum). And also it’s interesting to think about whether logic by itself can help us solve any and all problems. Because if the hypothetical alien does not have the same logic as humans then it’s possible they cannot solve things we can and vice versa. Which could mean there are limits to how much we can achieve with our human brain, no matter how hard we try. And how could we program an AI to compensate for that limitation when all we would be doing is programming it based on the same logic we use ourselves, which could be limited in the first place.

[@fyr3st0rm65]

Then that makes you kinda a dick. I imagine programmers look like less attractive versions of Indian people. See how that sounds like a dick thing to say? Now go home and rethink your comment and come back once you've realized commenting on people's appearances is very rude.

[@suomynona7261]

😂😂😂😂 I saw the comment before I say the guy and I was waiting to see what you were talking about! I instantly busted into laughter!

[@ifstatementifstatement2704]

@@hepteropterix yeah, my comment about the philosopher’s look was not a negative one. I actually think he looks cool. Like a master thinker. And that is why I was shocked by Fyr3 St0rm’s comment to me. I decided to let it go. There are too many people who write comments to attack others on the internet. I have better things to do with my time, like having adult and normal conversations.

[@leviangel97]

See, that one piece of evidence is in support of all ravens being black, but it isn't enough evidence to completely confirm it. now if you find every non-black thing and there isn't a single raven among them: you'll know that every raven is black

[@gargosch]

Exactly either you have to check all raven, or all non black thing to be sure. And because there are way more non black things then there are raven the amount of information you gain by cheching a raven is way higher. So there is no Paradox.

[@georgecataloni4720]

Or ravens don't exist, therefore aren't black, nor are they among the non-black things.

[@erikprantare696]

If ravens don't exist, then all ravens are black, aren't they?

[@georgecataloni4720]

Erik Präntare Not following.

[@erikprantare696]

George Cataloni​ It is a vacuous truth. No ravens exist, therefore all ravens that exist are black.

[@sumdumbmick]

I do not perceive a paradox at all. All I see is an implicit shift in the meaning of 'confirm' from the definition originally laid out to a more colloquial one which is much closer to 'prove'. Seeing a black raven no more confirms that all ravens are black than seeing a red chair does, but conversely seeing a red chair no more disconfirms that all ravens are black than seeing a black raven does. Their power in confirming the hypothesis is legitimately equivalent. It's just that that confirmational power is pathetically small. For some reason you're not thinking rigorously and treating 'confirm' to mean one thing with the black raven sighting and something quite different with the red chair sighting. The paradox is an illusion induced by your own inability to think clearly. this raven is black does not entail all ravens are black, but it does confirm it this chair is red does not entail all non-ravens are non-black, but it does confirm it confirmation and entailment are distinct concepts confirmation is not proof. this was covered in the beginning of the video, but by the end we're supposed to have elected to have forgotten this and redefined confirmation to be proof.

[@MisterFanwank]

If the two hypotheses are actually equivalent, then the chair will confirm the first hypothesis in the same way it confirms the second, but it doesn't. The chair is only relevant to confirming the second hypothesis, so they are not equivalent even though they both involve ravens all having a particular trait. The equivalent hypothesis for the first hypothesis is "Black is the color of all ravens". The equivalent hypothesis for the second hypothesis is "Anything that is non-raven can be non-black". This is a lesson in properly formulating your hypotheses so you can separate meaningful data from irrelevant data, not a paradox.

[@sumdumbmick]

As far as reality is concerned you do have a point, granted. However if you consider only the sets that are explicitly involved: stuff(black(raven), not-black(not-raven) you can see that confirming one branch of 'stuff' confirms the other. now, yes, in reality far more things are going on, the 'black' category is much smaller than the 'not-black' category, 'raven' isn't actually a member of the 'black' set, etc. but, these are the only things we definitely have to work with as far as this logical puzzle goes, anything else must be already known or abducted or something interesting like that. so in terms of raw logic there is a profound equivalence. also note that if we flesh out 'black' a bit with what we know it doesn't change anything: stuff(black(raven, not-raven), not-black(not-raven)) the black not-ravens don't matter to the question we're asking. all we care about is if ravens can occur in 'not-black', so every instance of seeing a not-black not-raven without seeing a not-black raven confirms that 'raven' is a member of 'black' just as much as seeing black ravens without seeing not-black ravens.

[@sumdumbmick]

To see the effect fully, consider a universe wherein there is only one not-black thing, and you know that there is only one not-black thing. if you then see that thing, and see that it's not a raven, that not only confirms that all ravens are black, it proves it. just the same as if you know there is only one raven and then see that it is black.

[@sumdumbmick]

To flesh out my hypothesis about what's happening that throws people off, I actually think there are two ways to get it wrong, and both relate to the relative sizes of the sets 'raven' and 'not-raven', which is something that the person is bringing in from the outside, not a detail available to the logic in the puzzle itself, so ultimately this is the mistake. but how it plays out exactly can happen in one of two ways: person brings in knowledge that 'not-raven' is a vastly larger category than 'raven' 1 - the naive approach relies on basic psychology. generally speaking if humans see about 3 instances confirming an hypothesis, and those are the first instances they see they will commit to believing the hypothesis is true, those three instances will fully confirm (aka prove) the hypothesis for them, subsequent contrary data be damned. here, where 'raven' is a small category, seeing three black ravens and accepting that as full confirmation of 'all ravens are black' is satisfying to the point that counterexamples can be happily dismissed as flukes. however, seeing three non-black non-ravens and accepting that as full confirmation of 'all non-black things are non-ravens' is profoundly unsatisfying, because there are most likely thousands of non-raven things in your visual field at any given moment. you know instantly that this conclusion is rubbish. the problem is that you don't similarly realize that the conclusion from seeing black ravens is equally rubbish, because you are a victim of your innate psychology. 2 - the wise approach possibly recognizes the innate cognitive bias from 1, but definitely approaches the problem in a way which renders that bias irrelevant. here what we get is a recognition of the maths behind the relationship between the sizes of the categories 'raven' and 'non-raven', noting that as 'non-raven' approaches infinity the limit of the confirmational power of talking about 'non-ravens' for qualities of 'ravens' approaches zero. now we know, from information we brought into the puzzle from outside, that we might as well consider 'non-raven' to be infinitely larger than 'raven', so it's reasonable to completely dismiss the confirmational power of 'non-raven' statements regarding 'raven' statements, but it is nonetheless technically incorrect to do so. in both cases 'confirm' basically comes to have the same semantics as 'prove' (in 1 we get fallacious full confirmation, in 2 we get the confirmational value of 'non-raven' statements to be infinitesimal, so no number of them can add up to full confirmation) and in both cases information not given in the puzzle is required to arrive at the paradox. both of these things are mistakes. and if you do not make these mistakes the paradox does not occur.

[@sumdumbmick]

Precisely. Nicely worded, too.

[@ronaldamber8865]

I don't see a paradox...... I think I misunderstood.

[@WirelessPhilosophy]

+Oliver Moore I'm sorry to hear that. Perhaps reading the SEP article on paradoxes of confirmation will help your understanding. Here is the link: plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/. We also have another video on the "Puzzle of Grue" which deals with similar issues and perhaps you might benefit from that?

[@ronaldamber8865]

+Wireless Philosophy Oh, I get it now, the idea that non-black things prove ravens being black.

[@joebazooks]

+Oliver Moore it's a paradox because he's looking at it from the perspective that a red chair does not confirm that "all ravens are black", while acknowledging that under certain circumstances it would indeed confirm the hypothesis that "all ravens are black". personally, i believe it is a stretch of the imagination to claim that Statement A (all ravens are black) and Statement B (anything that is non-black is non-raven) "say the exact same thing about the world"; consider that the focus of the former statement is ravens and a qualitative attribute of ravens, whereas the focus of the latter statement is not ravens and the lack of a particular quality in general.

[@travischance5332]

+Oliver Moore The concept is paradoxical because you cannot understand what a raven is by examining your environment and drawing conclusions about your observations if a raven is not present, even though the conditions for confirmation technically exist. The conditions for confirmation would dictate that we could draw any conclusions about any item in creation merely by examining our surrounding and coming up with logical contrasting observations to confirm any hypothesis we create. Obviously, that's not quite true.

[@inventor121]

+tonyfalca the converse is not equivalent to the statement

[@goodkawz]

A raven walks into a bar and asks, “Have you seen my brother?” And the bartender says, “I don’t know, what does he look like?”

[@timmy2thamoon492]

"uhhhhhh, he's not black"

[@MarkyTeriyakiShorts]

@@timmy2thamoon492 Cancelled

[@1004tylor]

it´s fascinating how far i would go on youtube just to not have to study

[@kuntface5]

M. V. P. To procrastination

[@UrAwsome55]

Nevermore, will I deal with paradoxes.

[@Mizziri]

I don't see how this is a paradox. Observing that your chair is not black and not a raven is ruling out one of a finite number of things that may be (n)either black (n)or ravens, it's just such a small percentage of all things that one must check to verify the hypothesis that all ravens are black that it is EFFECTIVELY worthless, although valid in principle. If one only had to check a small number of things (say, one of three person's fingerprints), this is perfectly useful. The only reason it seems paradoxical is that the claims made at the beginning were so broad that they could not be empirically confirmed in the first place.

[@mgarcar1255]

I immediately thought the same thing. Even the instructor said that things can confirm/disprove a hypothesis by varying amounts. Observing that your red chair is not a raven does help prove that all non-black things are non-ravens, and also helps prove that all ravens are black...just by an astronomically insignificant amount on its own. It would become more significant as you increase the sample size of non-black items you observe.

[@Llanowar_Kitten]

Although he didn't say it directly, I think the issue becomes more apparent in the mathematical limit so to speak. Based on the hypotheses in the video, observing a non-black thing to be a non-raven provides some finite amount of confirmation that all ravens are black. If we extend this to making infinite observations of non-black non-ravens, we should have infinite (or, in this case, total) confirmation that all ravens are black without ever observing a single raven. He hints at this by using the F and G notation which usually represent functions, and I think that's where the paradox really comes in to play. Observing infinite red chairs seems a little silly, even for a thought experiment but considering the existence of infinite non-G functions that can be observed to be non-F is much more realistic. However, by doing so, it's not a big logical leap to see how we can always prove a contradiction (ie. 0=F=G=1).

[@danielpowers662]

This is true. If we saw all non-black things in the universe, and none of them were ravens, we could reasonably conclude that all ravens are black because we didn't see any. Not really a paradox is it? Still mighty interesting.

[@Illdos]

Though it does seem that you should need to observe at least 1 raven, or at the very least prove that ravens do in fact exist, otherwise couldn't you say that "all dragons are purple", then observe everything in the universe that isn't purple, and thus conclude that all dragons are in fact purple, despite the fact that dragons don't exist?

[@markzero8291]

Your "all dragons are purple" comparison is not apt precisely because dragons don't exist.

[@aircraftcarrier6789]

One of the original three ideas was wrong. "Instance confirmation" is false. If you say that "all ravens are black", that is not provable. You can find as many things as you want that appear to confirm it, like the chair or the desk, but the fact is you would have to check every object in the entire universe in order to confirm it. So technically, if our universe is NOT infinite, then seeing a red chair (not a raven nor black) would confirm the hypothesis in the most minute way imaginable, essentially nothing. However, if the universe is infinite, then seeing a red chair would not only *essentially* mean nothing, it would also LITERALLY mean nothing.

[@markoproloscic4492]

Yup thats about it :)

[@__-cx6lg]

He's not saying that it's provable. His usage of the word "confirm" annoys me a bit; a better word would be "supports." As he explained in the beginning of the video, when he says a piece of evidence confirms a hypothesis, he means that it lends weight to that idea. It might only give a tiny amount of support or a ton of support, though as you noted it would be difficult (or even impossible) for the support to be so strong it unequivocally proves a hypothesis. The first premise is that seeing a black raven supports the idea (or using his admittedly confusing terminology, "confirms" the idea) that all ravens are black. The counterintutitive conclusion is that seeing a red chair also gives support for the statement "All ravens are black," though perhaps a very small amount. Nowhere is proof mentioned.

[@alexanderzweber8453]

If what you are saying is correct, and that was his intent, this would not be called a paradox, and he would not have made the claim that the overall conclusion is clearly false. The claim that all three premises are confirmed and the conclusion is not confirmed is where he is saying, through implication, that the premises are proof of the conclusion. As you have said, it is counter intuitive to think that you can support a claim about ravens based on observation of non-ravens, but you agree that *it is still possible and viable to do so*, whereas the "paradox" argues that the minor confirmations cannot make any sort of confirmation on their conclusion, with the very weak argument of "that just doesn't make sense".

[@AnimeSummit]

I don't see a paradox. The evidence is just very weak.

[@paradoxparadox1477]

Here it is

[@deltamico]

@@paradoxparadox1477 ^^

[@eldritch6871]

same. what about this was a paradox at all?

[@antediluvianatheist5262]

The chair confirms the raven in roughly the same way as searching every place in the universe for your keys except for your pocket, confirms that your keys are in your pocket. IT's a clumsy way to do it. And it's not a paradox, it's just unusable.

[@ferrishthefish]

The paradox here is that we intuitively feel that the observation of the red chair is a stronger confirmation of the "all non-black things are non-ravens" hypothesis than of the "all ravens are black" hypothesis. Or, analogously, that the observation of a black raven is stronger confirmation of the "all ravens are black" hypothesis than of the "all non-black things are non-ravens" hypothesis. The truth is that finding one example is an extremely weak confirmation of a general statement. What we should learn from this mental exercise is that if you want to prove "all ravens are black," finding a single black raven is just as weak a proof as finding a red chair, despite what our intuition may tell us.

[@user-rq5sn7zc5l]

+ferrishthefish Thank you, my mind was blowing a gasket trying to find the paradox that occurred, without immediately hitting a straw-man argument. (I was searching for the meat of the issue, not the conclusion.)

[@ferrishthefish]

James Bond You've delved into the realm of vacuous truth. I'd rather not go into depth on this concept (Wikipedia has a page on it), but maybe rephrasing the statement will help demonstrate the gist of it: "Every single mermaid who has ever lived was a green mermaid." See how that can be a true statement? It doesn't mean that mermaids exist. It just means that exactly 0 mermaids have ever lived, and all 0 of them were green.

[@Pellaeon159]

+ferrishthefish I understand what you said, but it is very understandable and quite correct to feel that way. Because in the real world, the confimation strength of those two observations towards the two hypotheses is NOT the same. Simply because the non-black hypothesis includes a far greater ammount of observable things than there are ravens in the world. I can inspect a fraction of a desert and find milions of individual object (grains of sand) that support these theories and we instictively (and correctly) feel like that has told us very little about ravens, while seeing only ONE raven tells us much more... There is no paradox. Both of these observations confirm both theories, but noone ever said in the original 3 assumptions that they have to contribute the same ammount...

[@ferrishthefish]

Petr Novák I'm not exactly sure what you're saying here. A paradox is something that appears contradictory but isn't. By definition, the apparent contradiction must vanish when we look closely enough, otherwise the paradox would be a "contradiction" rather than a "paradox." Because the two hypotheses ("all ravens are black" and "all non-black things are non-ravens") are contrapositives---and thus logically equivalent, merely two different ways of expressing the same idea---the observation of a red chair MUST lend exactly the same amount of credence to both. Our intuition disagrees. Yes, there's no contradiction once you look close enough, but it's still accurate to describe it as a "paradox." If you're criticizing my statement that a black raven is just as weak a proof of the given hypotheses as a red chair, yes, that was an informal statement. The point I was trying to convey was not that a black raven and a red chair lend literally exactly the exact same amount of credence to the hypotheses, but that both are so weak that one might as well ignore them (in which case any relative difference between them is of no consequence).

[@Pellaeon159]

ferrishthefish I agree. Yes the criticism was aiming for the difference in weakness of the proofs. I dont really see why it would seem like one observations contributes more to one than the other so this is the only part that I wanted to adress... But your definition of a paradox is wrong, a paradox has no solution. It is contradictory, but it makes sense at first... not the other way around. That would make any difficult subject a "paradox" because you dont understand and than after closer inspection you start to understand... A paradoxical statement is the opposite, something like "Everything I say is a lie"... it seems to make sense, yet it never does.

[@Sam_on_YouTube]

The conclusion is true. The trick here is to realize that "confirmation" is not an all or nothing prospect. Look at it statistically. The universe of all ravens is small compared to the universe of all non-ravens. Each example of a black raven slightly increases the odds that there is a black raven you've just missed seeing by luck. When you see non-black non-ravens, the percentage of the non-black things you've seen is MUCH smaller for each item added as an example and so tree level of increased confidence in your conclusion is infinitesimal (but not zero). Think of it as a game of hide and seek in a very small universe. You have children hiding and the only paces to hide are behind rocks and behind trees. The hypothesis that all children are behind trees can be confirmed by proving that no children are behind rocks. Each rock you check without finding a child confirms, a little bit, that all children are behind trees. The confusion comes from the fact that in an infinite universe, the confirmation is infinitesimal. The level of confirmation is inversely proportional to the size of the universe.

[@kaiufkdlsmf]

Bravo

[@korona3103]

It seems false to say that ticking off red chairs would help to determine if all ravens are black or not. Isn't that the bite of this paradox?

[@Sam_on_YouTube]

+Korona Yes, but it only seems false because the level of confirmation is so small as for our experience to liken it to zero. Mathematically, it isn't zero. Every red chair is one more thing that isn't a white raven. It is futile to try to prove the prospect through process of elimination, but not technically impossible and with a reasonably small universe of things to check, it becomes plausible.

[@korona3103]

Is this really consistent with the idea of inductive reasoning? Inductive reasoning isn't about total knowlege of all world states. Inductive reasoning is closer to sampling, like with quality control. You don't analyse samples of washing machines to check that all the TVs you're making are okay. Imagine there's a billion things in the world and 100 of them are ravens. If you knew the colour of everything except the 100 ravens, you'd still have no capacity for an inductive guess about the truth or falsehood of "all ravens are black". On the other hand if you'd seen nothing but 5 ravens, but they /were/ all black, you'd be able to make a reasonable guess that all ravens were black. 5 more ravens would strengthen that in a way that 5 more chairs wouldn't. No?

[@Sam_on_YouTube]

+Korona No. Inductive reasoning is not logically valid. It's use is, as you say, to use statistics to deduce the likelihood that a particular conclusion is correct. If you sample 100 million of the non-ravens, you would have some pretty good inductive evidence that the 100 ravens were black. If you sampled just 20 ravens, you'd have better evidence. And in the real world, those number differences are even more stark than in your example.

[@LeRoiJojo]

This is not a paradox, and everything in the video follows logically. In fact, it is a statistics problem. Here goes. We draw evidence for these kind of hypothesis with a sum of observation, not a single one. If I consider the hypothesis ''All ravens are black'', I cannot say it is true for sure unless I have actually watched each and every raven in the world and confirmed its color. Otherwise, I could have missed the rare and unique Yellow Raven of Mongolia or whatever. However, if I had seen enough ravens and all of them were black, I could confirm by induction that all ravens are black. The number of black ravens I have to witness before drawing the conclusion depends on the size of the population and the certainty I am looking for. If there were 20 ravens in the world, seeing 18 black ravens nets me a pretty big chance that the remaining 2 are indeed black. If there were 20 billion ravens in the world, my sample size of 18 now looks pretty insignificant. Now, lets consider ''Everything non-black is non-raven''. The size of my population just exploded. Now, instead of having to witness every raven, I have to witness the infinitely more things that are not ravens. But still, if I was an almighty god and could see everything in the universe that was not black, and had seen no raven in there, I could therefore conclude that the ravens were in that small pocket of black things I had not seen. Chair is red, sure. Headphones are white. Roses are red. Lilies are blue. I would need trillions more observations if I wanted to have a significant sample size of everything non-raven, but still, it's not logically impossible, just impractical. See? No paradox.

[@jakuleg]

LeRoiJojo Population size to check for "All ravens are black" and "Everything non-black is non-raven" is the same: you need to check all ravens (independent of the color they have) and nothing else.

[@MrWwoww123]

I absolutely agree with you

[@MrWwoww123]

I absolutely agree with you leroi

[@Saposhiente]

jakuleg That's the efficient way to do it, but the seemingly-paradoxical conclusion is based on examining whether observing a non-raven gives you insight into the qualities of ravens. LeRoi argues here that there is no paradox because observing non-ravens actually does give you insight into ravens, just a very small amount of it--by process of elimination, if you observed every non-black thing in the universe and found no ravens, you could conclude that if ravens exist, they must be black.

[@jakuleg]

Saposhiente Ok. I fully agree with your wording. Finding something out about non-raven gives you some (but almost nil) information about the potential color (but not existence) of ravens, by elimination. As I said in another post, it is a language and statistics/likelihood problem (and we are on agreement on that so it seems). Sloppy language and bad statistics create the problem. Sloppy language because it brings you to check for example the wrong population (everything non-black instead of every raven) and bad statistics because you might assume that one single confirmation (I have seen ONE black raven or even worse I've seen ONE red object and it is not a raven) does not alter the likelihood in any significant way for large populations.

[@AbdulazizUgas]

"for instance the red chair I am sitting on. I am very perceptive" had me loling

[@sierra7962]

FINALLY SOMEONE THAT EXPLAINS THIS IN PLAIN ENGLISH!!! I CAN ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND THIS, THANK YOU!!!!!!!!!!

[@zelda12346]

Uh, what about the option that the assumption that we can confirm things to begin with? The way I understand it, we do not confirm a hypothesis in a strict sense but simply fail to reject it This leads to a vacuously true conclusion in this video, which isn't a paradox.

[@__-cx6lg]

As he explained in the beginning, confirming a hypothesis means providing some amount--small or large--of support for said hypothesis. It would be more clear of he used the word "supports" Instead of "confirms." Also, the conclusion isn't vacuously true (unless ravens don't exist).

[@ThePaintballgun]

This is a perfect example of why I hate philosophy lmao.

[@AJAlkaline]

That's the thing, a confirming instance actually does nothing to support the validity of a hypothesis at all. If you see any arbitrarily large number of black ravens, you have not actually done anything to confirm that ALL ravens are black, because you only need to see 1 non-black raven in order to disprove the entire hypothesis no matter how many confirming instances of it you have found. The truth is that seeing something that lines up with your hypothesis never tells you anything at all, only seeing something that DOESN'T line up with your hypothesis actually gives you real information. Hence why we TEST hypotheses. The point is that we are actually trying to find the hypothesis false. If we fail to find the hypothesis false, then it simply means we are incapable of ruling the hypothesis out, and it MAY be true.

[@TheNeverposts]

Popper much?

[@JenLight]

This is so Raven.

[@Demention94]

+Jen “Face Full of Wolves” ^ Light That's so Raven

[@Skiddla]

@@Demention94 so crow

[@OzymandiasRamsesII]

For those in my circles who find Hume's problem of the justification of induction a neat thing to ponder, consider this other chestnut problem of induction: Hempel's _paradox of the ravens_. This isn't about the justification of induction's reliability, but about what it means for something to be inductive confirming evidence. Enjoy, - Ozy

[@FloydFp]

I don't get it. How does the fact that all non-blacks are non-ravens cause a problem?

[@OzymandiasRamsesII]

Floyd Fp Ask yourself this: Suppose I said, 'All ravens are black. and you asked me to give evidence in support of that proposition and I did so by pointing to a piece of white chalk. You'd probably scratch your head in puzzlement and ask me, 'How does the fact that this piece of chalk is white lend support to the proposition that all ravens are black?' You would be wondering how the fact that some piece of chalk is white is even relevant to the claim the all ravens are black. Hope this helps. Cheers, - Ozy

[@FloydFp]

Ozymandias Ramses II Thanks for responding. I see how that is a problem but it seems to stem from a poorly worded proposition. Saying "all non-blacks are non-ravens" is simply telling us what a raven isn't which could be many things like white chalk. We need a sentence to tell us what a raven is.

[@SockaCount]

So what's the paradox, that the proposition all Ravens are black is equal to the proposition that all non-black things are ravens?

[@MatthewBell46uk]

As I understand it the paradox is that things which we wouldn't (shouldn't) normally associate with evidence for ravens being black become evidence for ravens being black and to a level of absurdity such as observing my socks are white is evidence that ravens are black.

[@theochasid8996]

I think it's an issue with scope. Ravens is narrow. Color is broad.

[@JDG-hq8gy]

Exactly what I thought

[@crispoman]

The problem is at 1:02. A hypothesis cannot, by definition, be "confirmed". They can only ever be disproved or supported. Also, what the hell is "disconfirm" supposed to mean?

[@stevenliu1377]

Under this conceptualization, to confirm that all ravens are black, one must examine every single qualified instance in the universe, each of which can be either raven or non-raven and either black or non-black. Examining a black raven and examining a red table are indeed equivalent here: Each rules out one instance that can contradict the hypothesis, increasing the probability that the hypothesis being true by the same amount. Now if you had the ability to pre-select only raven instances and exclude all non-raven instances (which is the common sense presumption), then obviously examining a black raven instance gives you more information than examining a pre-excluded red table instance.

[@warlax5658]

My thoughts exactly. It doesn't seem particularly paradoxical, does it?

[@TheSystemaSystem]

Examining a black raven does nothing towards proving nor disproving this statement. It proves that some or most ravens are black, but you can never, truly, prove that all ravens are black. You can, however, prove that that instance of raven was black. Examining a red table would simply rule that out, as it was red, and not a raven, it strengthens the hypothesis equally. Red things are non-raven All ravens are black

[@martinshoosterman]

This isn't a paradox, its just an insignificantly small confirmation.

[@ApesAmongUs]

#1 isn't just weak, it's insanely weak. So, the conclusion is correct - in an incredibly minor way. If there is a paradox it is in the assumed definition of "confirmed" for the person who thought of #1 vs the definition of "confirmed" as it is generally used by people in non-jargon form. Additionally, without doing any of trickery involved in the example, I cold observe a single white dog and following rule #1, claim that it confirms (at least helps confirm) my hypothesis that all dogs are white. That wrongness of that is obvious to most people in a way that your stock #1 example doesn't even though they are identical in form. From past experience, we are likely to be more skeptical of the instance confirmation when it comes to dogs than we are when it comes to ravens, but in terms of evidentiary value, they are equal.

[@johndjarrell]

+ApesAmongUs You are being unfair, as instance confirmation is one way that we gain knowledge about the world. Your example is misleading as well, since you rely on the fact that we've all seen many dogs. If you had only ever seen one dog and it was white, then the theory that all dogs are white would be plausible. If you saw hundreds of dogs and every single one was white, then the theory becomes even more plausible. It's only when you see a dog that isn't white that it stops being plausible. The scientific method relies on this kind of confirmation.

[@ApesAmongUs]

John Jarrell If you ever see a person claim to be using the scientific method who also claims that a single observation counts for anything, slap that person in the face.

[@johndjarrell]

Is that how you are going to interpret what I said? The KZbin comment section strikes again!

[@ApesAmongUs]

That's what you said. You lend credibility to the stupid idea of gaining knowledge from a single observance. How dare I interpret your words to mean exactly what you said.

[@johndjarrell]

+ApesAmongUs I think you are a bit confused by the word "plausible." In any case, without arguing over semantics (BUT THIS IS KZbin!!!!), you do understand that this is the kind of confirmation that is fundemental to the scientific method? And, let's read my WHOLE statement (BUT THIS IS KZbin!! , IVE ALREADY FOUND A SEMANTIC ARGUMENT THAT I CAN MAKE, SO WHY WOULD I CONSIDER IDEAS!?!?!?!), "if you see hundreds of dogs and every single one was white, then the theory becomes even more plausible" is precisely how the scientific method works.

[@kaelhate1791]

Positive evaluation mindset compared against Inverse observation, which as a statement is also evaluated as a positive evaluation.When one observes an Albino Raven, is it not a Raven or is the hypothesis wrong?

[@ryanbob9238]

I have 2 questions 1 how do u edit your comments and 2 can u prove or disprove that everything in the observable universe is shrinking at the exact same rate

[@Igor_054]

Imagine there is 500 Ravens in the World. If I spot a black Raven, this pushes me 1/500 closer to the conclusion that all Ravens are black. If I can manage to see all Ravens of the world, I will solve the question. Now imagine that there are 2.000.000 "non-black things" in the world. Whenever I spot some non-black thing that is not a Raven, it pushes me 1/2.000.000 closer to the same conclusion. If I see all non-black things of the world, I will also solve the question, whether I see any Raven or not. Of course, each non-black thing gives me only a marginal contribution, much smaller than looking the Ravens, because there are much more non-black things than Ravens. Nonetheless, both methods are giving me evidence that contribute to the solution. Of course the real numbers are much larger, I only used those as exemples.

[@christophermoell1998]

Exactly what I was thinking. Both observations offer confirmation of the hypothesis, but like the video said, confirmations can be of varying degrees. Since there are so many more non-black things in existence than there are ravens, each observation of a non-black thing that isn't a raven is just a drop of water in the ocean of other confirmatory observations.

[@Ccb780]

The issue with this idea is if you were to see all 2.000.000 "non-black things" and 0 Ravens.. You can conclude the hypothesis that a raven is black... Which is implausible.. in fact seeing all 2.000.000 is equivalent evidence to seeing all the 500 black Ravens. This isn't only implausible, but insane. Imagine someone coming out with a study that proved such a conclusion without ever studying the subject of his study

[@christophermoell1998]

Yes, in reality this is impossible. But if you did indeed observe every non-black thing, none of which was a raven, and you knew you had observed every one, it would prove the hypothesis. The 2,000,000 and 500 numbers in the example are misleading. In reality, the number of non-black things is effectively infinite compared to the number of ravens, making each proportional confirmation effectively zero. In the real world, 100% empirical certitude is impossible.

[@pinkpartyhat4188]

You can though. If you saw every single thing that wasn't black, and none were ravens, of the ravens you didn't see 100% weren't not black - meaning that they were black. If you saw everything that wasn't black, and one was a Raven, you'd have disproved the statement.

[@Ccb780]

+Christopher Moell Oh yes, you're correct. I think I just saw this and thought it didn't scale well and that was more of my issue, and then became slightly confused.

[@stevepittman3770]

I realize it's probably not this simple, but here goes anyway. The two equivalent hypotheses are equivalent only in that they specify the same end result. How they specify that end result creates a divergence not only in the realm of observation, but also the implications thereof: observing a single black raven contributes significantly more valuable evidence than observing all the non-black objects in the world. This is because the hypotheses are about ravens, not non-ravens. No amount of non-raven evidence on its own confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis about ravens. Does this require a broader definition of equivalent, or am I missing something entirely?

[@markr7421]

I don't think that's right, if you observe all non black things in the universe and none of them are ravens you know for sure that no ravens are non black and therefore all ravens are black

[@stevepittman3770]

Luuk V I still don't think the two hypotheses are equivalent, but maybe it's a matter of practicality. No one can observe all the non-black objects in the world. Even if someone could it requires a totality of observation to amount to evidence for the blackness of ravens--observing all non-black objects save one proves nothing. The truth is that no one has observed all ravens to prove them all black, so these two hypothesis are only, at the extreme, probabilistically equivalent in practice.

[@joshuaadams-leavitt4603]

I generally agree with this, one thing I'd like to add is that what this is proposing or at least implying is that a raven is by definition black. I think the truest test of this is, can you imagine a raven not black? If the raven is black with blue streaks, or blue with black polka dots, does it still qualify as a raven? If no then its correct, and the hypothesis is substantiated, if yes then it collapses.

[@markr7421]

+Steve Pittman In the case with ravens this is true in practice, but if you take another example with two groups of finite things it all makes sense. Let's take a room filled with ten things, two are ravens. Five things are black and five are not. The hypothesis is "All ravens in the room are black". If you observe five objects that are neither black nor ravens you have proven that all ravens are black. Of course this does require the initial knowledge that there are in fact ravens in the room and that there are 5 things that are black. But it does show there is no real paradox, just another confusing example involving infinity (all non-black things).

[@stevepittman3770]

Luuk V Yeah, that makes sense when limited to a finite number of objects. Although it remains the case that you must observe all non-black items to gain any knowledge at all about the ravens. I dunno, I didn't really expect to have the answer to a philosophical paradox in a youtube comment, just trying to think it through out loud. :)

[@ceputza]

The flaw in the reasoning is that you can't use instance confirmation to DEFINITIVELY prove a hypothesis. It just shows that there is a probability that the hypothesis is true. In the raven example this probability is VERY VERY low in comparison to say checking if all cherries are red.

[@TheGoldenAlchemist86]

The Golden Witch brought me here to solve her mystery

[@darklyger64]

But the question is, where is the cookie?

[@crys_cornflakez]

Kihihi good luck fellow detective!

[@Mrpurrify]

Can someone help? Can you recommend some editing programs to make video like these? Where you can choose the hand writing etc? Thank You very much

[@handlehandlehand]

It is an issue of arbitrary/relative definition. If i choose to define "raven" to include the characteristic that "it must be black" then of course what i call a raven (if i follow my own arbitrary definition) must be black. if the term "raven" necessitates "it is black" then that is no hypothesis, it is a conditional, arbitrary classification

[@handlehandlehand]

no such thing as objective, measurable absolutes ( that is, absolutes outside of the system oneself constructs) with arbitrary, superimposed definitions.

[@quintonmendoza8137]

+nickj3ds aha! But that's not to say we cannot make epistemically objective claims about a domain that is ontologically subjective

[@JNCressey]

Species and other groupings of animals are defined by being a common ancestor plus all their descendants. You can't just make up your own definitions because you want to.

[@KalishKovacs]

I will leave you an answer pulled from the works of Asimov, Titled "The Last Question" "THERE IS AS YET INSUFFICIENT DATA FOR A MEANINGFUL ANSWER."

[@allenwalker1379]

Do you mean that we don't have a sufficient definition of the attributes that qualify something as being a raven. For example is an albino bird that has every other attribute of a raven still a raven.

[@raykent3211]

All ravens are green. Trust me, I've examined every non-raven object in the world. Do you want to know the colours of non-raven objects? Or would you say no, that's irrelevant. Therefore, ravens are green.... or I'm speaking nonsense... and it seems I'm not alone.

[@HeadlessZombY]

I've found 1 black raven, therefore your assertions "all non-green things are non-raven" is false. *shrug* it doesn't work how you think it works.

[@raykent3211]

+Michal Řeřicha Thank you. My mistake. I think it's more to do with the size of information space which needs to be explored for acceptable confirmation , which differs between the first formulation and it's inverse.

[@raykent3211]

+RiftWalker I never made an assertion about non-green objects, I spoke about non-raven objects. And I was wrong. And Michal has pointed it out, and I've agreed. But hey, maybe our comments are overlapping.

[@HeadlessZombY]

Ray Kent but the reverse of all ravens are black is all things non-black are non-raven. if you asserted all non-ravens are non-green, then the reverse is all green objects are raven, which is obviously false.

[@leruetheday377]

There are white ravens, so that's a lie.

[@StudioStar]

My chair being red does, of course, increase the likelihood of all ravens being black slightly, IF I first assume that there is a finite number of objects and colors that exist in a finite number of combinations. By observing one object (out of a set amount of objects) that does not at least dis-confirm my hypothesis I´ve moved closer to confirming it, merely by showing that the number of objects left with the potential to disproof my hypothesis is smaller than 100%. The more red chairs I see the higher percentage of non-chairs and non-red objects are left.. therefore the likelihood of those non-chairs being non-red are higher

[@IsleenMilligan]

What I took from this is that confirmation for anything dealing in absolutes is fundamentally impossible due to our natural limitations preventing us from observing everything in order to reach an absolute conclusion and that, at best, we will only ever be able to find strong support for an idea. Is that more or less it?

[@didles123]

I believe instance confirmation depends on the set of every F having a finite cardinality. The probability of all Fs being Gs is higher given that we know one F is G is higher than when we know nothing; however, it has no effect when there are an infinite number of Fs. Therefore, instance confirmation may work on "All ravens are black (things)", because there are a finite number of ravens. However, when we take the contrapositive, we get "All non black things are non ravens". There are an infinite number of non black things, so instance confirmation does nothing here.

[@didles123]

Well, one is non-black, two is non-black, three is non-black, and we can keep going. I don't see how there are a finite number of non-black things.

[@didles123]

WreckNRepeat I never said the hypotheses are not equivalent. Also, the video does not define "thing" in such a way that there are only a finite number of them. If you know that there a finite number of non-black things, then it's not much of a paradox.

[@didles123]

WreckNRepeat Are you talking about logical equivalence or equivalence in sentence structure? A proposition is logically equivalent to its contrapositive, but they have different antecedents. The video defines instance confirmation in a way that is dependent on sentence structure.

[@didles123]

WreckNRepeat You don't understand my comment or how it relates to the paradox, but you still comment on it anyway to say it is somehow wrong. Go figure.

[@mabrown666]

I believe what +didles123 is saying is that the statement "*All* Fs are G" cannot be confirmed by a fixed number of cases of Fs being G. All that these observations can confirm is that *some* Fs are G. The third point hooks into the *all* part of the first statement, the unconfirmed part. Or put another way, some not black things not being ravens says nothing about *all* not black things, only some.

[@Voidsworn]

Ravens are a subset of the set birds. Ornithology is about birds, not non-birds. Actions are about what people do/are doing, not what they are not doing. Standing means I am not jumping, not running, not flying, not crawling, not kneeling, and so on. It's a language problem, not a logical problem.

[@laharl2k]

Voidsworn exactly what i was going to thing. The only thing you can confirm with this is that a sofa is not a raven. This is a problem i have with philosophy, they tend to ask these questions that remind me of politicians playing word games to trick people into believing what they say is a sound argument, when in reality it doesnt even make sense. I dont get what are these questions useful for other than exploring why they works in us humans. is there a name for these kind of questions?

[@Gh0stsn5tuff]

Voidsworn I agree it seems to be a linguistic problem, but suggesting this leads to further questions. Like the overall accuracy of our linguistic system in describing logical problems.

[@laharl2k]

N.T. Swift Zero. Look at lawers. Anything you say can be twisted and taken out of context in some way to say the complete opposite you actual meant to say. Has it never happened to you that you tried to explain something to a friend but it was easier to write it in C or python (C in my case) to explain what you meant? If we had a languaje that didnt have double meanings, that was auto-defined and coundlt be taken out of context then that would solve like 50%+ of our daily problems imo. Plus you would be able to implement that in a computer and program the same way you talk.

[@Voidsworn]

N.T. Swift Let's look at it this way. When we describe anything, we describe it in positive terms, that is, the qualities it does have. The number of qualities a thing may have are finite, while the qualities of a thing that it may not have are infinite. Lolz, I just thought of an old game where this would be...entertaining :) . Try playing "Where's Waldo?" using only negative descriptors.

[@Voidsworn]

+Persona Thank you for your contribution.

[@brettman321]

To me, the conclusion must be true, the logic behind the three thought processes seem to me correct from my understanding. Also it sort of makes sense to me, given all the combinations and permutations of everything in the universe however almost infinite this may be, the fact that one chair is the color red (and obviously not a raven) does support the idea that all non-black things are non-raven, but given the amount of possible combinations of colors and items this information is insignificant so seems silly to use it as proof, however it is technically evidence supporting

[@francoistejido333]

Love watching these vids while high. 👌

[@mikedebell2242]

You're saying that observation of the comlement of black things does not necessarily affirm the totlal inclusion of ravens in the category of black things (assuming it were possible to observe all the complement of black things)?

[@RunItsTheCat]

The paradox supposedly lies within the system of instance confirmation of hypotheses. The "implausible conclusion" is that things that seem completely irrelevant like the chair being red somehow provide information about the ravens. But in my opinion, the premises are absurd. To begin with, our examples of "plausible ideas" are too general to warrant an indisputable truth condition. Also, the equivalent statement seems to imply something the original statement can't: if the equivalent hypothesis is not met, it implies that anything that IS black is somewhat-raven. Therefore the so-called "implausible statement" does not constitute a paradox, since it's implausibility stems from the premises given.

[@MiramurOmnia]

+RunItsTheCat "if the equivalent hypothesis is not met, it implies that anything that IS black is somewhat-raven" It absolutely does NOT imply that. The two equivalent hypotheses are contrapositives, one says that "A -> B", while the other says "not B -> not A". here is an intuitive way I think about it: If it is not black, it is not raven, because if it were a raven, it would be black. Contrapositives are equivalent to the original statement, but the *inverse* is not. An inverse would look like "not A implies not B". So if we have the statement "All non-black things are not-raven", or "not B -> not A", then all black things are raven (or B -> A), is the *inverse* of that statement, and is therefore in no way implied by that statement. Equivalently, it is also the converse of the original statement, which is also not implied by the original statement unless the original statement is explicitly biconditional, such as a definition. In conclusion, if something is black but not a raven, it is neutral evidence for both equivalent hypotheses.

[@RunItsTheCat]

Ethan Gordon You are right... An inverse is not implied by the statement. My mistake.

[@Reinshark]

+Ethan Gordon That's absolutely correct. To follow up with a slightly more concrete example: Consider the premise: if it's not black, then it is not a raven; or not(black) -> not(raven). You see a red chair. It is not(black), therefore according to our premise, it is not(raven) as well. Now you see a black cat. It IS black. Therefore... nothing. No conclusion follows by taking an object which IS black and combining it with this premise, OR with the premise that raven -> black.

[@RunItsTheCat]

***** Ethan already told me this mistake 3 months ago. Thanks for the reminder though.

[@RunItsTheCat]

***** It was good enough.

[@cptant7610]

I completely fail to see why this is supposed to be a paradox. if we test ALL things in a set that are non-black and find no ravens than it is indeed proven that all ravens in that set are black (on the condition that there are ravens in the first place) Implicit or weak formulations are actually used quite frequently in mathematics

[@KohuGaly]

even if there are no ravens it holds true, because any statement about non-existing thing is true.

[@coderthetyler]

Yes, this is my thought as well. Any discreet mathematics course would teach that one cannot conclude a statement for a whole set of things is true only if it holds for one particular thing. When we say "for any x in y", we really mean "for all x in y". This paradox seems to be the philosophical equivalent of dividing by zero to show 0=1; it violates the rules.

[@KohuGaly]

CoderTheTyler not really. It's a simply a falacy. The first version of the argument says: "For all things it is true that being a raven implies being black." Second version says: "For all things it is true that not being a black implies not being raven" Statement "for all x, it is true that Y(x)" x being object and Y(x) being a predicate (a statement, into which you must substitute x for specific object to find whether the predicate is true) is just a short notation for: (Y(x1) and Y(x2) and ... Y(x_last) ). Such statement is true, when Y(x) is true for all x. In this case the predicate is in form of implication (x.is_raven? => x.is_black?). Implication is only false if true statement implies false statement. That means, if first statement is false, the whole implication is true regardless of second statement. For the first version of the argument it means, you gain no new information by observing non-raven things, because you already know the implication is true for all of them. Similarly, for second argument, observing things that are black is pointless for the same reason. The first argument can be confirmed by observing all ravens (and finding out they are in-fact all black). And second argument can be confirmed by observing all non-black things (and finding they are not ravens). If ravens didn't existed at all, both of the arguments would still be logically correct and sound, because the predicate is true by default for all non-ravens or black-things respectively.

[@cptant7610]

Using this logic I can proof that flying unicorns are pink. Since there are no flying unicorns go ahead and test every non-pink object and you will find that they are all non-flying unicorns, therefore all flying unicorns are pink. I can also proof in the exact same way that they are all sparkly blue. Since all non-sparkly blue objects are also all non-flying unicorns. Q.E.D

[@cptant7610]

But on a more serious note the 2 statements used in the equivalence condition are only conditionally equivalent. They are only equivalent IF the test set actually contains ravens/unicorns which does not have to be the case. This is actually a pretty integral part of using weak formulations in mathematics.

[@George4943]

So true. If you can test all teapots in the universe and find none in an orbit around any planet that proves that there is no teapot orbiting Saturn. Show me your data, the results of your experiment (in which you tested every non-pink object in the universe), and only then "Q.E.D."

[@gogogalian]

Actually it is not false. All pink unicorns can fly. There are none but all 0 of them can. This theory proves that all pink unicorns can fly but NOT that pink unicorns exist.

[@Azurath100]

F=G G=C F=C Since all flying unicorns are pink it must follow that any pink thing is therefor a flying unicorn. Since there is a pink cup in front of me the hypothesis is falsified. F=G G=F G=C C=G F=C C=F

[@cptant7610]

Azurath100 Uh no, that's not how it works at all.

[@BelegaerTheGreat]

But what if the whole universe consists of one white raven and one white chair? Then, "All ravens are black" is false, but "All non-ravens are non-black" is true. I'm not even mentioning the fact that in our normal universe, we would have to check EVERY object to confirm that it is nonblack, or EVERY raven to confirm that it is black.

[@mesplin3]

You have a good point. The contrapositive of proposition is logically equivalent only when the set of ravens, blackness, non-ravens, and non-blackness are not empty.

[@keithaustin8113]

so the paradox is the scope of your perception? When focused, the logic correct locally, but when broadened, it becomes false?

[@williamwhitehouse9948]

It's the first one; say I chose a statement (for example, there is no number equal to 63). Obviously this statement is false but I could quite happily check every number but 63 and say that I was gathering evidence for my claim. All this has proved is that some numbers are not equal to 63. You can never prove that all of A are B without checking all of A

[@draco18s]

+William Whitehouse Precisely: the first one, "All F are G" cannot be even partially confirmed by finding an F that is a G. We can only find evidence that there is an F that is *not* G and disconfirm it or we can locate All Fs and confirm that they are in fact All G. It's called a Sweeping Generalization, or secundum quid fallacy.

[@StefanTravis]

You mean, inductive evidence is not deductive proof. I think we knew that already. Hempel's problem is about induction, not deduction.

[@wizardsuth]

I think there's a missing factor here. If there are a million ravens in the world, and a random sample of 900,000 of them are all black, I can be reasonably sure that the rest are also black. If I only sample 20 of them, I am much less sure. If there were only 21 ravens and I saw a random sample of 20 that were black, I could be more sure again. How much an observation of the confirming case (This F is G) supports the hypothesis (All Fs are G) depends on the total number of Fs. The total number of ravens is large, but the total number of non-ravens is extraordinarily larger. While finding a non-black non-raven may support the hypothesis that all ravens are black, the amount of support it offers is insignificant because there are countless non-black objects to choose from. If you were to limit your observations to a smaller set, e.g. all birds, finding a non-black bird that is also not a raven would provide more support. If every bird I had examined so far were black, that would support the hypothesis that all birds are black, which implies that all ravens are black (since all ravens are birds). In that case, the original hypothesis that all ravens are black is supported until I find a non-black non-raven... which also supports the original hypothesis. Something doesn't quite add up there. If you only consider the items in your room, and you already know that there are no ravens in your room, observing a non-black object that is not a raven provides no support for the hypothesis that all ravens are black because you already know that every item in the room is a non-raven. That's an example of selection bias.

[@yaumelepire6310]

My head hurts...

[@molbac]

i think the problem is that the statement, "all non black things are non ravens" is a very broad observation and shouldnt be used to confirm anything.

[@Wafflical]

+molbac How is it different from "all ravens are black"?

[@molbac]

+edrudathec the number of all ravens is much smaller than the number of all non-ravens. same thing goes for the black things.

[@livedandletdie]

+edrudathec All A are B or simply written in logic as Any A → B however All non black things are non ravens would then be -B → -A They aren't equivalent logically. Nor would True statements be. A=B does not equal -B=-A Let's show it with numbers you might understand then. X=integer, Not X = Not integer. X=2 does not imply that Y can't be equal to 2. But the second one would state that all non X values are not 2 in this case. They are hugely different logical operations. And somehow idiots fall for this every time.

[@Wafflical]

The Major Wouldn't it be Not integer = Not X? I think you have to reverse the order.

[@mdoerkse]

To disprove the statement that all ravens are black you could just examine all ravens and if you find any non-black ones then you are done. To disprove that all non-black things are non-ravens you would need to look at everything non-black thing that exists and confirm that it is not a raven. Seeing a red chair and confirming that it is not a raven is an infinitesimal piece of supporting evidence for the second statement and much less meaningful then looking at actual ravens.

[@masterblanket]

How do you get a video to convert hand drawing to computer generated illustration live like that?

[@cookieDaXapper]

This just shows that there is hole in circular logic, right through the middle of it. True observation takes ' into account all pertinent information, and then rather than make snap judgements, allows the info tto paint a picture of the events, with no leaps in logic. A straight line of events.

[@shodanxx]

This way your hypothesis is only confirmed once you have completed a survey of all objects in existence. Your kitchen ornithology only confirm a very tiny portion of your hypothesis.

[@drawfromthevoid]

I don’t understand why the confusion and why we call it a paradox. It’s not paradoxical at all. The observation of my red couch does in fact provide evidence to suggest that all non black things are non ravens. It confirms this hypothesis to an unimaginably small degree, but it still does so regardless.

[@sophesque]

The paradox comes in when you go to its equivalent hypothesis. Like so: Hypothesis: All non-black things are non-ravens Observation: My non-black chair is not a raven This evidence supports my hypothesis. Equivalent hypothesis: All ravens are black Since this observation supports the first hypothesis, it must also support the equivalent hypothesis. Paradox: Observing a red chair is evidence for the conclusion that all ravens are black.

[@diablominero]

@@sophesque That's not a paradox. In a universe where there were 2 non-black things and one of them was your red chair and the other was your brown desk, seeing the chair and desk would be proof that all ravens are black. Evidence is progress toward proof.

[@sophesque]

@@diablominero I'm not sure what "paradox" means to you such that this doesn't apply... Some paradoxes are simple self-contradiction, but that's not the only use of the word. It can also be a thing that seems nonsensical, but holds true upon closer examination. I think this fits that definition very well

[@warlax5658]

It's true in theory, but in order for the statement that no Raven is non black to be proven you would have to look at everything on earth to see if there is anything on earth that is non black or isn't a raven. Like you said, you looking about your room helps SUPPORT the argument, but certainly does not PROVE the argument. If you looked at everything on earth and never found a raven that wasn't black, you could reasonably conclude that all Ravens are black. But you can't look at a desk and lamp to prove this, you must examine everything.

[@narcozbbx4091]

Which comes to the question is god real? You can’t see him from a visual perspective but maybe he’s there just in the cosmos.

[@bookworm13x]

HAX mode on: I take a raven, cover it in red paint, and turn off the lights. I have transferred the quality of redness to the raven and have reduced the certainty with which I can observe and affirm. Alternatively: Find a dead raven or a plucked raven. They are still ravens, but are not black.

[@Checkersss]

Can you make a video about the puzzle of experience (Valberg)?

[@eugenesis8188]

Confirmation is never 100%. Examining ravens could only ever be very strong evidence that confirms ravens are black. Examining non-black things in search of a raven would be very weak evidence, while still confirming the hypothesis to a slight degree. If you had a list of every non-black thing, that would be very strong evidence that all non-blacks are non-ravens.

[@hvrtguys]

The butler is statistically guilty.

[@KatorNia]

I can't see a paradox here. The reason that the phrase *"my chair is red, so now I'm more confident that ravens* *are black"* feels _weird_ is because it provides *no real info about ravens*. Since my chair is only *one* item out of the near-infinite total of non-black+non-raven stuff in the Universe, it can't strengthen the hypothesis of "non-black+non-raven" on its own. Also, since there are no ravens in my room, observing my furniture alone doesn't even confirm or strengthen the initial statement that "all ravens are black". For all I know there may be *no ravens at all* out there.

[@orkish2844]

What is the point of the fake hand if its all being drawn using a computer?

[@mushu6366]

And what if i take my black tea mug for instance? It is black but its not raven, i should consider it an evidence against the statement, right?

[@MaxLohMusic]

There is no paradox because seeing the red chair *is* contributing evidence that all ravens are black (on a much lesser scale than seeing a black raven). You saw an object in the universe which wasn't a non-black raven so now you have one less object in the universe to check to make sure there are no non-black ravens!

[@leruetheday377]

There are white ravens in the world. Albino ravens are out there.

[@MaxLohMusic]

Felicity LeRue That's cool yo, but whether or not there are non-black ravens in the real world is irrelevant to the raven paradox and the refutation of it

[@leruetheday377]

***** It is perfectly relevant. The paradox data that all ravens are black and there are white ravens, it even says the video that this matters because it excludes those ravens as ravens. And the fact that there are other creatures and things that are black that are not ravens also contradicts this paradox.

[@MaxLohMusic]

Felicity LeRue It's not relevant. Replace "ravens" with "unicorns" and the philosophical problem remains exactly the same as before. No need to bring in random facts about animals such as ravens. "And the fact that there are other creatures and things that are black that are not ravens also contradicts this paradox." No it doesn't. I don't think you really understand this paradox or this video

[@leruetheday377]

***** You didn't watch it all the way through, did you?

[@julioobregon]

This isn't actually a paradox. You might call it a problem of confirmation since "you can 'prove' the "all ravens are black" hypothesis just by sitting in your chair. The problem lies on the fact that these 'hypothesis" are unfalsifiable claims. You would have to look at all of the ravens in the world to verify they are all black. Nonsense!

[@dozone6043]

not all ravens are black if you account for albinos or other abnormalities in color or shade.

[@WHButler]

Well, the second Hypothesis is certainly falsifiable by simply finding a black bear: a non-non-black non-raven.

[@CurtisSmale]

Actually that is incorrect. The second statement is not "all non ravens are not black". It is "all non black things are not ravens". There is a very large difference. In the first, there is a circle for all that is not black things and within it is the circle of things not raven. But there could also be things not not raven that are also not black. The second statement is a circle for all that is not raven containing all things that are not black. In that circle, things that are not not black can also be within the circle of not raven. The simple way of thinking about that is that we are defining a subcategory of a larger category. If we say that all F are G then F is a subset of G. F could be completely equal to G but it could also be lesser than G. There could be things without G that are not F. For example: F = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} G = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} We can say that all F is G, but not all G is F. And if we define H = {6, 7, 8} we can say that both F and H are G but F and H are mutually exclusive. So in the statement "all non black things are non raven" we observe that F is non black and G is non raven. It is possible for an H (opposite to F) exists such that H is black but ALSO is G (non raven). Thus, non raven things can be either black or not, but non black things can ONLY be non raven.

[@breadcanful5365]

More like a problem with loose definitions. If you define "raven" as "necessarily being black" then even if you find a blue bird that is identical to a raven in every other sense, it still doesn't count. If you take a Raven and spray paint it, you've now made it a non-raven. Just sloppy definitions.

[@orcodrilo]

I fail to see the paradox. I just see that the affirmation "all ravens are black" is fautly to start with.

[@DPGrupa]

What is wrong with this kind of hypothesis? Did you expect that evidence should be gathered for truisms?

[@breadcanful5365]

If something is true by definition it doesn't even require confirmation. "All Goobles are three feet tall and have red hair". If it's not three feet tall and have red hair it's not a Gooble by definition. This " paradox" is merely sloppy definitions and confused nonsense.

[@chazt2249]

In a literal sense, yes. There are albino ravens. However, we also know that albinism is a genetic deformation, and not the result of natural selection. Even though they are white, they should not be counted as non-black because it is not possible for them to be any other color. If they had the proper genes, they would be black. There are no other genes in ravens that would express any other color.

[@chazt2249]

The statement also assumes the absence of albino ravens. I don't know if albino ravens had been documented at the time this hypothesis was made, but I think it's reasonable to assume that the existence of albino birds never even went through the guy's mind when he came up with this. That's my point. You can substitute something more literally accurate if it bothers you that much. It doesn't devalue the mystery of this paradox at all.

[@ryukishisama]

Albinos ravens? Dyed up ravens anyone? Any simple statement is too easily debunkable.

[@lucaslayton3974]

Wait. But if my chair is black then how does that affect the raven hypotheses?

[@CurtisSmale]

Ninten Onett There is: read the comments and see all the confused people. And that's the population that *both* decided to watch and respond to this. Try showing this to unwilling watchers or responders and see what happens. It will be hilarious.

[@iunnox666]

Not at all. The only time black comes into play is in relation to ravens. They didn't state "all black things are ravens".

[@lucaslayton3974]

I'm sorry, but what is your academic background again?

[@CurtisSmale]

Ninten Onett Mine? I have a BSc in Honors Physics. I started with a major in Honors Mathematics but switched to Physics to finish my degree. One of the many classes required of us was one called Set Theory which teaches its students enough to have obliterated this 'paradox' in our sleep. And that was a 2nd year course which extended a simpler 1st year course of roughly the same concept.

[@lucaslayton3974]

Curtis Smale lol is that all? thn dont waste my time with your popular science degree. blocked.

[@caseykraft6747]

I think the paradox here exploits our everyday definition of the word confirm. Generally, when we use the word confirm, it means that there is no doubt with regards to the validity of the assertion (e.g. when we confirmed that the moon exists by landing on it, there was no doubt). However, in this video the way confirmation is used still carries a degree of doubt. As mentioned early on, an observation can weakly confirm a hypothesis, and I think that is what's going on in this paradox. By observing non-black things in his room that are also non-raven, he confirms the hypothesis, but very weakly. This reminds me of the "black swan" idea, because before the discovery of Australia, all Europeans assumed that all swans were white. After all, their many observations confirmed the hypothesis that all swans are white quite strongly. It wasn't until more observations were made that Europeans figured out that non-white swans exist. This example underscores that nothing in scientific knowledge is truly certain, and all it takes is one outlier/nonconformist to overturn any "All Fs are Gs" hypothesis.

[@Lightning-Shock]

Wait, albino ravens? Busted.

[@Saint_nobody]

so wait... how is a Raven like a writing desk again?

[@Cheezsoup]

Poe wrote upon both.

[@Saint_nobody]

Cheezsoup and from winch, inspired blackness ever more...

[@wizardsuth]

Both have inky quills.

[@ApertureScience42]

You can nevaR put the wrong end in front.

[@Saint_nobody]

next question, I see black birds as small as swallows. are they ravens not crows?

[@MrJakeasaur98]

Its the final statement that all non-black things are non-ravens that causes the issue. That in itself is implausible, because it's basically like saying that all lions are cats so all non-lions are non-cats; something we know not to be true (Leopards, Panthers, Domestic Cats etc).

[@warlock415]

+Jakeasaur Incorrect, you have it backwards. All lions are cats -> all non-cats are non-lions.

[@MrJakeasaur98]

WreckNRepeat Even so, the point still stands.

[@kevinjohn7056]

The point does not stand, "All lions are cats" and it's opposite "All non-cats are non-lions" are completely equivalent and true, just said differently. If you found a lion, you know it is a cat. If you find something that is not a cat, you know it is not a lion. Same thing with the ravens. If you found a raven, you know it is black. If you find something that is not black, you know it can't be a raven.

[@MrJakeasaur98]

Kevin John Ah, for some reason when I thought it through I was thinking of it the way I first proposed still. *facepalm*

[@kevinjohn7056]

It does take some weird thinking to wrap your head around it. Especially since the hypothesis "All ravens are black" is already false (just search albino raven). The whole idea is just explaining how you can "prove" hypotheses by proving their opposite. To use the video's office equipment example and your cat hypothesis, it would be like pointing at your furniture and saying "It's not a cat, therefore it's not a lion". True? Yes, but the amount of evidence you're getting to prove that hypothesis is minuscule.

[@changethementality]

Theory: If you find a paradox there's a logical mistake in your thinking, not a contradiction in the universe.

[@JasonsChannel62]

Is this paradox considered solved?

[@jgrove1246]

I wanna play clue now.

[@rat_in_a_cowboy_hat]

There are rare wthite ravens tho (just saying)

[@redeamed19]

+Corvus Corax the point isn't specific to the claim of ravens. Though that piece of evidence does negate the specific claim it doesn't affect the discussion of the process. It is just easier to visualize with ravens than with some place holder like "x"

[@rat_in_a_cowboy_hat]

Kyle Davis I know, I know..

[@redeamed19]

Does it count if I finger paint the crow a different color?

[@rexrip1080]

Just what i was thinking :) Those are called albino ravens and there is an albino version of every animal,but its really rare...

[@andrewavila2512]

Um, as a philosophy major from UC Davis, this was pretty stupid

[@nailuj100]

You said that certain pieces of evidence "confirm" hypotheses to a certain degree. The degree that the observations have on the hypothesis is extremely small. In this instance, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, because you need more evidence before the degree of confirmation becomes significant.

[@tinhnguyen2610]

Does, "All squares are rectangles, but not all rectangles are squares." kind of break the steps?

[@lunafoxfire]

I had never heard of this paradox before; that's pretty interesting to consider!

[@demdox]

This confirms my earlier hypothesis that all philosophy is non sense.

[@eltouristoduo]

The truth is even more annoying. Some of it is nonsense, so of it isn't. This video is pretty basic though. It' s annoying because it gives the impression of informing the viewing and then challenging them. But it's really outright deceiving (lying) to the viewer and then challenging them to spot the lie.

[@cuasidomoperez5722]

Or you just didn't understand where the paradox lies.

[@funbigly]

Or do you mean that all non nonsense is non philosophy? Hmmm??

[@txixm]

This isn't a paradox, it is just bad logic. The first idea implies that ravens are black by definition. A definition is not a hypothesis.

[@txixm]

***** Are you being serious?

[@deliciousdishes4531]

+Self Order "Everything non-black is non-raven" is NOT equal to "what is non-raven is everything that is non-black": something can be black and still be no raven given the implied hyptheses. First statement says "all ravens are black", the second statement says "all that is black is also a raven", which is wrong and thus your comparison is false. There is no paradox, just lack of evidence.

[@deliciousdishes4531]

***** I guess then you articulated it wrongly.

[@redeamed19]

+Opaque Crab Gaming to what degree? I had an earlier point that maintained the logic and argument degrees of certainty but reading through comments I have come to an alternate conclusion. In demonstrating that "all ravens are black" is equivalent to "all non-black things are non-raven" the video demonstrates the 2 are making an equivalent claim that simplifies to "there are no non-black ravens" This simplified claim is the only thing being evaluated. While wordy neither statement makes any claims about the colors of non-ravens. So the only relevance is the color of ravens. The video and your claim suggest that a chair being non-raven supports the claim "all non-black things are non-raven" but as the video points out what this line actually claims is nothing about the color of non-raven things. Only about raven. anything thing else can be any color and not influence the claim one way or the other. That is where the intuition falls apart. B demonstrates why the 2 are equivalent and what condition constitute a confirmation of either.

[@khanisrok6363]

I guess the key is that the amount of significance of an observation to an hypothesis is proportional to the number of objects involved in the type of observation that would take to prove the hypothesis. In your observation that the chair is red, you say a non-black object is non-raven. But, it would take an infinite amount of similar statements to prove your hypothesis true, (all non-black objects) so the support on that observation is negligible to both hypothesis. If instead you say that one raven is black, the support to both hypothesis is bigger, since you "only" need to observe all ravens.

[@timm1328]

The professor forgot to finish the paradox: consider the proposition: "All Ravens are white" and it's equivalent "all non-white thins are non-Ravens" the observation of the red chair and the brown desk confirm the directly contradictory hypothesis and to the exact same degree as the original hypothesis. This refinement is how you bring the paradox home with full force.

[@albertrenshaw4252]

Thank you! I was sitting here thinking, this video is stupid, there is no paradox, it's just insignificantly small evidence, but it's not paradoxical evidence. But what you just stated does indeed make it a paradox. The evidence is now self-conflicting! Although even still I can see the issue here arises from assuming boolean logic must be applied to incremental evidence, which of course it shouldn't gradient logic should be applied.

[@timm1328]

@@albertrenshaw4252 Checkout William Poundstone’s “Labrynths of Reason.” he spends an entire chapter on this paradox and some possible resolutions. when cosidering the supporting evidence of “the red chair” and “the brown desk” gives to both hypotheses, you must consider the size of the sample set. the set of all ravens is finite, the set of all non-ravens is infinite, hence the supposedly equivalent statements i.e. All Ravens are Black and All non-ravens are non-black are NOT in fact equivalent.

[@nonameentered1918]

Very thought provoking. Thanks for making this.

[@kronusexodues7283]

actually it's very simple. you simply didn't prove anything. saying all ravens are black and then finding 100 black ravens and 0 blue ones is not a proof. it just means it is likely, that the hypothesis is true, not that it has to be true. and when you see a lot of non-black things that all aren't ravens, that also makes it more likely that that hypothesis is true. but that's not a proof either. that's why you can't do ornitology by looking at chairs.

[@ahegao8099]

I don't know where all the commenters are getting this "prove" and "proof" business. He's only talking about an observation being evidence _for_ or _against_ a statement. >it just means it is likely Which is *what he's saying.* It's like nobody in these comments was paying attention when he defined "confirm" and "disconfirm."

[@HeadlessZombY]

however what if you could for certain know that you had tallied all ravens? not just 100, each single confirmation counts as a slight proof, but only in proportion. if there are in some universe only 100 ravens and only 1000 non-black things, then finding a black raven confirms it 10 times more than confirming any one non-black thing is non-raven. however you still have to know that at least 1 raven and 1 non-black thing exist in the universe or else you'll get undefined answers. If you have no ravens then you can't say anything about ravens and how black they should all be, and if there are no non-black things, then you can't say anything about non-black things or how non-raven they are. to show how equivalent they are, BOTH are proven false by finding the same thing, a raven that is non-black. :P

[@marlinbundo2409]

I think you missed the point. Finding a raven that is black does provide some evidence in favor of the statement "all ravens are black," and the statement can never be proven correct, that part you got correct. Where you made a mistake, in my opinion, was in accepting the conclusion that observations about your furniture prove all ravens are black to the same extent that finding a black raven does. Clearly, the two hypotheses are not as equivalent as they seem, because finding 10,000 black ravens is decent evidence but finding 10,000 red chairs is no evidence at all.

[@justtheouch]

If you cannot do ornithology by looking at chairs (or to generalise, anything that is not a bird), by your logic you can also not ornithology by looking at birds. Therefore we cannot study ornithology at all. Through application of the general statement "all Fs are G" we can see that we cannot study anything by your argument, for anything can be put into a descriptive proposition in the form above and is subject to the same pitfalls as the paradox of the raven is.

[@marlinbundo2409]

Josh Cottle Right, but the statements are not equivalent, the whole point of the paradox is to demonstrate that.

[@nietelnmaster]

This has to be the most uninteresting "paradox" I have ever witnessed. I bet the dude that came up with this thing had a hard time opening canned beans.

[@angrydachshund]

Sneaky! The narrator switches the meaning of "confirms" at 05:33. Previously, an instance confirmation was described as "confirms a little bit", meaning almost nothing, because I might observe a million black ravens prior to discovering a colony of purple ravens in Africa. After 05:33, suddenly the narrator uses "confirms" in a much stronger sense.

[@ObeySilence]

Isn´t this paradox not just the frontier of language?

[@EnEvighet7]

This is such a stupid "paradox" that only an institutionalized academic could have made it up.

[@dracocrusher]

Here's a better one. We are told that all Ravens are black, but it is impossible to prove this for a fact since you can never be completely sure that you've observed all Ravens. Even if only one in every hundred trillion Ravens can hypothetically be born a color other than black, then the other 99,999,999,999 cases of black Ravens is completely irrelevant since, even if there are only a few thousand Ravens in the world to actually count, it is impossible to know when a non-black Raven is born. As long as that possibility exists, then can you ever say that all Ravens are black?

[@HarshDude126]

EnEvighet7 You're too dumb to understand it.

[@tamtheartist]

Which of the 3 conclusions is true?

[@michaelbricker4937]

Is the raven black? or is it a slightly darker black?

[@darkmooninc]

What software do you use to create these animations?

[@wackywong]

I think this one is easy. Logical equivalents have transitive properties, eg H20 is water, if water is wet then H20 is wet too. That is to say, logical equivalents can carry over their properties. The paradox lies in the fact that rule #2 and rule #3 is true seperately but when made logical equivalent to each other something carries over which cannot be carried over. To solve the paradox is to understand what exactly carries over and why it cannot. Let's say rule #2 is all unmarried people are bachelors and rule #3 is all non-unmarried people are non-bachelors. To make these two rules logical equivalent to each other is entirely possible. Why? Because they are both analytic statements (or a priori analytic statements). So, the paradox of the raven lies in the fact that _empirical_ properties are forced to carry over, by virtue of being made logical equivalents, but cannot logically do so.

[@thewatchedlists7148]

+Wireless Philosophy, my challenge with equivocating "All Fs are Gs" and "All non-Fs are non-Gs" is that all one has to do is examine a third object in your space, e.g. your ornithology observing object, i.e. your binoculars, which are black. When you discover that your binoculars are black and not a raven then this is where the paradox of equivocation occurs.

[@yolech]

I wouldn't describe this as a paradox. The explanation assumes that truths can be derived by observation. However, what the "paradox" really shows is that we can only derive conclusions from what we observe, but can never say with certainty whether or not those conclusions are universally true.

[@braedondavies9592]

What color are those binoculars?

[@kadmilossomnium]

it does not follow that confirmation would apply to two equal hypotheses equally. Two theories may be equivalent in claim, but if their truth/falsification conditions are different, then the evidence will only apply to individual theories in regards to how the evidence applies to the individual truth/falsification conditions. Because these are not necessarily the same, then the logial step is not transitive

[@jibbiddy]

I see the paradox. I would say that the problem is that they are not equivalent hypothesis, because the focus of the hypothesis is different. The hypothesis "All Fs are G" is a hypothesis about Fs. The Hypothesis that says "Everything that is non-G is also not an F" is a hypothesis about everything non-G. Through deduction we can conclude the same things but that is what makes them non-equivalent, because we have to make the deduction that everything that is non-G is not F means that all Fs are G. The statement itself doesn't say that, we have to deduce it.