Presentation by Kallum Robinson on Theories of consciousness, Seth & Bayne 2022 Nat Rev Neuroscience

Presentation by Kallum Robinson

[@PasseScience]

Questions about IIT: 1) Is IIT part of computational functionalism ? In a sense it seems it is, as we could realise a brain with wires or biological neurons and IIT is supposed to conclude the same thing if the function is the same as long as we respect the "connecting structure". In a sense it seems it is not, as IIT seems to conclude that the simulation of a brain on a Turing machine is not something conscious, the function is the same but the physical structure is different. Did I got it right ? 2) Could you confirm that this structural postulate is by definition untestable ? because something like a simulation of a brain (on a Turing machine) will lead to the same external behavior and will have homologous inner workings than a real brain, so observations will be the same but the theory concludes 2 different things.

[@juliamenet8166]

Thank you for that

[@silvomuller595]

I don't get what Global Workspace and Higher Order are all about. It seems to me like IIT without the math and without the axioms.

[@neuralbasisofconsciousness]

We recently uploaded a short lecture on Global Neuronal Workspace theory here kzbin.info/www/bejne/pquzdXqKf79-e9k Hope it helps!

[@gangfang8835]

I have no prior knowledge in this whatsoever but based on what has been presented in this vido, Global workspace and higher order theories stresses "representations" in the role of consciousness, as in how low level sensory information is abstracted for high-level processing. On the contrary, IIT starts with consciousness itself, I am assuming the subjective state, and works its way to the biophysical system, which doesn't necessarily involve any representations.

[@gangfang8835]

It seems like "reductive explanations" means something specific? I am completely new to this and appreciate any explanations.

[@k__k___]

Hey, this is me presenting, so I can answer. To answer your question, no, reductive here is meant in the philosophical sense, not specific. When thinking about theories or concepts, you can often 'reduce' theories down into "simpler" terms, aka the sum of the theory's parts. For example, you could argue that the field of Chemistry could be 'reduced' into physics, as chemistry deals with the phenomena of atoms interacting (amongst other things). Many biological processes can be reduced into chemical reactions. Many psychological behaviours can be reduced into biological processes (emotions are often results of hormones, for example). The point in this context is that when we talk about consciousness theories, which are far less developed than classic theories of physics are, we can say they can't be fully reduced, because as I present, each theory cannot answer some questions we have about consciousness. For example, there presently exists evidence that the pre-frontal cortex is important, crucial even, for consciousness. There also exists evidence that it does not. In order for a theory to be fully reducible, it must be able to explain phenomena that we presently say proves the theory, and phenomena that we presently say refutes it. This is because we can observe both, so we know both happens, but our theories cannot yet explain why. There needs to be a theory that can account for one side and also explain the other, or somehow prove that one is actually showing evidence for something else, perhaps something we dont even know yet.

[@phasor50]

Things feel the way they do because of the biophysics of our nervous system. The way we feel and perceive is likely similar between individuals. If the mechanisms are the same, things feels different to different people because their brains are in different states.

[@causalityismygod2983]

All thats is fine.....but what is red?

[@xTwistedFleshX]

Funny that they’re talking about the telencephalon yet completely disregard that hydranencephalic children have no cortex whatsoever and are completely conscious beings who react to appropriately to stimuli both pleasant and noxious. Any theory of consciousness that relies solely on the cortex without regard for the brainstem is a bit shortsighted in my mind. Mark Solms’s work has shown that the brainstem is responsible for the conscious state of being. There have been experiments where PAG stimulation has caused the most intense states of affect that humans are capable of producing. Is the cortex at the center of our ability to choose? Absolutely. But the center of consciousness is in the brainstem, not the cortex.

[@dr.paulj.watson4582]

RE: Global Workspace versus ITT theory. What would be going on in the Global Workspace other than the Integration of Information? And for analysis any non-trivial problem, and one entailing significant fitness stakes to get correct, why wouldn't virtually the whole brain be involved? Moreover, I think it is vital to consider that the brain activity being measured in all these neural correlate studies is likely doing two separate but related things, (1) creating a constantly updated and relatively complete and objective NONconscious model of reality, which by definition generates no easily accessible phenomenology, and (2) creating and much more circumscribed and far more subjective conscious model of reality, which can be presented to social partners - one that is designed primarily for social navigation purposes. The construction of the conscious model would be informed deeply by the nonconscious model and would also be constantly updated mainly to maximize its social efficacy. Note if this is correct, a lot of brain activity devoted to generation of the nonconscious model will not correlate with conscious experience at all, especially over short time frames. Note that these two models may (are expected to) contain enormously contradictory representations of many aspects of reality, because the nonconscious model is trying to build a correct model (limited in scope, of course, by what in the real world is relevant, ultimately, to generating maximum expected lifetime inclusive fitness for the individual in question), while the conscious model is all about making the individual maximally effective within their social niche(s) in garnering, approval, status, help, forgiveness, etc.

[@leozendo3500]

extremely well done. but my theory of conciseness is that counchis = adderalll

[@ShenZhouGaiacoin]

I don't the hard problem, to me the hard problem is not a problem at all, once we unlock the easy problem, we will rack the consciousness

[@jamieanderson7757]

So these four theories give consciousness scientists something to chat with each other about but this may not necessarily help in advancing the science. Don't think I'll be spending $32 to buy the paper.

[@k__k___]

I get your point, but theory crafting is an incredibly essential step in "advancing the science". Say I want to investigate consciousness, where do I start? Maybe I design a study looking at the posterior cortical hot zone, which I read that some other researchers think (for good reasons) is the centre of consciousness. It's only because people take the time to connect all the dots together and draw a theory, that future studies have direction. You can't hit something if you don't have a target. Theories give targets, studies fire shots.

[@EdT.-xt6yv]

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