Pyrrho and the Academics (Types of Skepticism)

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

The Academic skeptic is a man so advanced in wisdom that he has learned to doubt everything -- except for doubt itself.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

1) If we don't know anything... .... then we don't know that we don't know anything... ... and thus we are justified to believe that we know something since we don't know that we don't know anything. After all I don't know that I don't know; how is this (seeming) contradiction resolved? 2) Wouldn't "knowledge requires that we eliminate all doubt" be better phrased as "knowledge (about a context) requires that we eliminate all doubt (about that context)". Example 1: Within the context of the real numbers, 1+1 will always give 2 without a doubt: if I grab one apple and then another apple with the same hand, there is no doubt that there are two apples in my hand. Outside of the context of real numbers however and there is doubt. Example 2: I set up an artificial conceptual context of one person; call this a _conceptual_ universe. Within this universe, there is no doubt there is one person for I defined it thus. Outside this particular conceptual universe however, which include other conceptual as well as nomic universes, there is doubt. This is why there is no contradiction to say "Sherlock Holmes exists... " as long as we restrict that comment to a context, be it a conceptual universe "...as a fictional character written by Arthur Conan Doyle...." and/or a nomic universe "... and based on the real-life surgeon Joseph Bell." This may be what you mean by "contingent truths" later on but I'm not sure. Closure 3:36 : If we take Justification as an operator, then would it not be true by distribution that J(x>y) = J(x) > J(y)? Thus, Closure as given is incorrect given that only if you can justify the implication first can you then justify the consequent from a justified antecedent. The way closure is written, there is justification for the antecedent but not for the implication and thus it is incorrect to justify the consequent because of a justified antecedent. If "not killing">"god exists", then even if I justify "not killing" I haven't justified the implication and thus I can't justify "god exists". Further, in your subsequent examples and for the reasons given above, I could insert _anything_ as the consequent of CP1 and have that imply the opposite of the antecedent. But as the initial implication is not justfied, then neither will any of the subsequent conclusions. Unworthiness Thesis 9:11 This is a case again for why temporal logic is necessary and not just nice to have in philosophical discussions. In this case U as it stands refers to either an instant or all times. It can be read equally well to say I don't trust things "now" and that I don't trust things "ever, past or future". However, using the notation from your temporal logic videos, my interpretation of that thesis is (H(U)t&~Ut&G(U)t) or "my epistemic equipment is trustworthy in this instant (or interval) but not in the past or future interval from this instant (or interval)".

[@JamesJoyce12]

1 + 1 = 2 is not proved by 1 apple and another apple is two apples. Your 1) was put forward when the first Scepticists came forward - do some reading and you will see why it is not a counter argument.

[@BillyBangster]

@@JamesJoyce12 Why is it not a counter argument?

[@Luciferofom]

How can one make an entire video of of conclusive propositions while not claiming that such propositions are justified? If we cannot be sure any propositions are justified, what reason do any of we viewers have to assent to anything you say? Does taking any kind of stance on knowledge assume a definition of what knowledge is?

[@MrTaciturnguy]

With CP2 - do you mean even if I think believe there's a hand in front of my face - it could just be a skeptical scenario and in reality hands might not exist but I'm being tricked in this skeptical scenario to see a hand.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

MrTaciturnguy The key is justified in believing. CP2 is saying that you are not justified in believing that you are not in a skeptical scenario where hands don't exist.

[@MrTaciturnguy]

Carneades.org thanks

[@oversoon5576]

Does skepticism imply that faculties are unknowable? Such as “I see” Not that what I see can ever be known truly through sight or that I see correctly or anything along those lines but can it correctly say “I don’t know that I see” even while seeing and in the same premise wouldn’t reason be similar to say “I reason” but not saying that the method of reasoning is correct and not that trueness can come from reason but that reason itself IS a faculty and therefore regardless of reasons operations the fact of reason is there? And if not how can we say we don’t know that we reason since saying we don’t know that we can reason would imply some method through reasoning to reach this statement? I guess this confuses me and would like it cleared up if possible thanks to you or anyone who reply’s.

[@sir_s]

Pyrrho or Sextus would say "it appears to me that..." Try Sextus Empiricus writings.

[@minotaurmangum7911]

Am I the only one that finds the formal logic cumbersome?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

It is. I also frequently use more drawn out proofs than others do to show how the logical pieces all fit together.

[@owlnyc666]

NO. You are not alone!😉

[@gayjesus7607]

If I have equivalent justification to believe I'm looking at my hand as I have that I'm a dreaming about my hand, then in either case I'm having an experience which seems equivalent to me. I know, at least, I'm experiencing something. Correct?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Gay Jesus Interesting claim. I'm going to handle it (or something very like it) in my How to Doubt Everything video, coming up later in the series.

[@JamesJoyce12]

The dreaming sequence is not as powerful as the possibility that you are living in a matrix - what then do you know of what you may be experiencing

[@alphaomega1089]

All knowledge is possible. Sadly: it doesn't make it true. We certainly can know some things. However: why it is true requires a condition. That condition can be set at any level one wants. 'I think therefore I am' is the condition for existence for that speaker. Doesn't mean he really exist under other conditions. That is the closure principle. Yes: if another condition was added to the original principle then it could invalidate the believe if it can't be proven or disproved to be true too. Sadly: the idea of cause and effect is a condition that doesn't make it true either unless it is a condition stipulated into the argument - i.e.: "it has to rain for it to be counted into the equation of this argument". Please forget all brain puns when tackling logic and reason: one only needs to understand one's own desires and how to obtain it - or: become a Buddhist and be done with that.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Sam Stone I am not sure what you are saying here. But it does seem to me that skeptics, especially those in line with the traditional teachings of Socrates (his views on writing things down especially) could find some friends among the Zen Buddhists.

[@_VISION.]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene and for the Pyrrhonists; Madhyamaka Buddhism apparently.

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

Pyrrhonism: no doubt a philosophy by means of which Buridan's ass would have felt himself to be justified, except for his inability to decide between either accepting or rejecting it entirely!

[@sronicker]

So, are the Pyrrhonian skeptics sure that knowledge is unknown? Do they know that the proposition that knowledge is possible is unknown? How do they know that it’s unknown whether or not knowledge is possible is unknown? Also, the Pyrrhonian skeptic doubts that one should doubt whether or not one can know anything, so the Pyrrhonian doubts that one should doubt? So, why doubt?

[@Silvertestrun]

Ty

[@yunoewig3095]

The closure principle seems to have a couple of problems: 1. If (x>y) happens to be true, but I am not justified in believing it, then I don't see why I am justified in believing y on the basis that I am justified in believing x. 2. Even if I am justified in believing (x>y), you may think that I am also justified in believing y on the basis of being of being justified in believing x, and this may indeed be the case. However, if the notion of implication being used is too general (e.g. logical implication), the justification may lose connection with the "reason" why the propositions under consideration are true in passing from the antecedent to the consequent of a conditional (if it even makes sense to speak of reasons in such a general manner); this problem might be avoided, however, by sufficiently restricting your notion of implication (e.g. using material implication instead).

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Daniel Sampaio Interesting objections. To 1, if your enhanced closure principle (that you need to be justified in believing both x and x>y, will cause you some problems getting things started in your epistemology. How are you justified in believing that Modus Ponens is the case other than your simply claiming that it is the case? To 2, generally when I use implication, I'm referring to material implication.

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Excellent presentation, Carneades.org. I'm considering a defense of Foundationalism, F might simply deny her ability to support properly basic beliefs. Instead of answering, F might admit she has hypothetical bedrock assumptions, for which she trusts her empirical support. She may be perfectly comfortable resting on the third horn of Agrippa's Trilemma. In such a case, her hypothesis would never progress beyond an assumption, but she might still be content. I'm not sure there is a satisfying way to know what is true, because this road appear to lead to assumption and doubt.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Potter Suppositionalist This might devolve into coherentism, but I'm not sure. What do you have in mind for the hypothetical bedrock assumptions and why do you hold those specific assumptions instead of others?

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Carneades.org If assuming a defense of F, her bedrock assumptions would include a general trust in her mental faculties, her senses as reliable, the assumption that the world exists and a uniformity of nature. That might not be a complete list, but I agree certain assumptions imply support for others. But since these are assumed as a hypothesis, they would not constitute a circular support. However, it may lead to Foundherentism (Susan Haack 1993).

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Potter Suppositionalist I'm putting Foundherentism on my list of positions that I need to do a video or series on. I have heard a lot about it, but I have yet to do much research into it. The question for your position, is why do you take these assumptions as opposed to others? Say that nature is not uniform? Or that our mental faculties are unreliable?

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Carneades.org If I'm defending F, she might assume these basic beliefs as the basis of reason. To trust her own ability to reach valid conclusions could require a basic belief that she generally has a reliable memory and working faculties. If she couldn't trust her memory, she might not remember the premises correctly when she is ready to derive a conclusion. While it's true that she cannot justify her reason, she feels she can trust in it. In order to her trust in logic and science she may require a basic belief in the principle of uniformity. If nature could contradict itself or if experimental results were always senselessly unpredictable, there wouldn't be much progress to be made in the sciences. Therefore, she deems her hypothesis a necessary bedrock for reasoning. These beliefs are not necessarily epistemically exalted. Perhaps the existence of her own mind is indubitable, I don't know. But generally she would accept that her hypothesis about the world to fallible. Admittedly, she has an incomplete and imperfect worldview. It's still the third horn of the trilemma.

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Carneades.org It's occurred to me that the hypothetical Foundationalist I'm defending is making an appeal to consequences (if X were untrue, then Y would be problematic). But I hope I've answered your question.

[@Paradoxarn.]

The arguments from the academics doesn't seem very convincing to me. To closure argument one could just respond that one is justified in believing not sk since one is not justified in believing sk. Something like an Occam's razor principle. A second response is that since one is justified in believing h one isn't not justified in believing not sk. A third response could be that since it is impossible to justify sk and not sk, the appropriate thing to do is to believe not sk and that makes one justified in believing not sk. A fourth response is that CP1 is false (the other responses rejected CP2) as the truth or falsehood of sk is irrelevant to the truth of h. h is a belief that pertains to simple reality (reality as we experience it without any additional considerations) while sk pertains to ultimate reality (reality as it actually is) and both can therefore be true at the same time. The Cartesian argument doesn't seem to prove anything (I'll admit that I might not have understood it fully) since we cannot, it seems, say what is or is not genuine doubt and it seems to assume that to know something, we need to know that we know that thing. The five modes are a good catalogue of the nature of truth claims, some overlap with others, of course, such as disagreement which one could argue applies to virtually all of them. When it comes to disagreement about a claim C then it seems to me that there are three possibilities. 1) C and not C are both justified (let's ignore the issue of whether there are degree's of justification). 2) Neither C and not C are justified. 3) Either C and not C are justified. Let's for example say that the claim C is "there is intelligent life in the Andromeda galaxy." then it is quite easy to visualize the issue. In support of C one could say that the Drake equation makes is extremely likely that C is true. Against C one could argue that there is not evidence for C and that the Drake equation is little more than a guess. The "Pyrrhonian" argument then would be that since 3 seems to not be the case (or even if 3 is true it still wouldn't be enough to decide which is justified) we would have to chose between either 1 or 2 in which case it is better to suspend judgment. The response that most people would give, I think, is that sometimes we can determine which is justified and that when we can't it is only due to a insufficient investigation into the matter. Another response is that sometimes, even if the argument for both positions seem equal, it is better to not suspend judgment. Such as during an election or at a trial for murder etcetera. Regarding relativity, one could object that perception can say something about the actual nature of a thing, namely that it gives rise to the perception. It could be argued that from that fact alone, perhaps especially with a significant number of perceptions, one could make reasonable conclusions about reality. One could also propose that while perceptions doesn't say anything about ultimate reality, it does about simple reality and are therefore still useful. One could also respond by pointing toward science, which seem to, by testing hypothesis, use perceptions to support claims about reality. The argument against the foundationalist is an interesting one, basically threatening it with coherentism. I see some problems with this argument however, the first being that even if one concedes that basic beliefs are arbitrary in regard to warrant, one could still say that they are necessary beliefs. One example could be the principle of non-contradiction or that "I exists" which one could argue is impossible to not believe. They may still be doubted or be disliked and so on but cannot be genuinely disbelieved. The second issue is that foundationalism is not necessarily incompatible with some form of coherentism (as is pointed out in the argument against the coherentist) and even if the only basic belief one had was that beliefs are justified if they lead to a coherent belief system, it would still be a worldview based on a basic belief and therefore a foundationalist one. It may be objected that this doesn't escape the argument but it could be answered that this allows the foundationalist to give different answers while remaining one. Coupled with the possibility of necessary beliefs one could make the case that it is impossible to genuinely believe that incoherency is better or just as good as coherency. A third objection is that while it is true that propositions with autonomous warrant aren't more likely to be true, it may still be the case that a set of propositions with autonomous warrant are more likely to be true. It may be remarked that this sound very similar to coherentism but it should be noted that these basic beliefs are not supported by each other (except in so far as they don't conflict) nor by their results but that the set of basic beliefs are supported by these. This became longer than I intended but I'm not going to try to defend coherentism as in my mind it is either incoherent or a form of foundationalism but I'm sure that the coherentists have heard and thought of responses to these objections themselves. Whether theirs or indeed my responses are cogent I'm not sure and I'm confident that the skeptics have retorts. Liked the video and looking forward to more.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Paradoxarn Quite the comment. I'll see what I can do to respond. "To closure argument one could just respond that one is justified in believing not sk since one is not justified in believing sk. Something like an Occam's razor principle. " The problem here is that it seems that we can't bring the negation inside the property of justification. Imagine that I am not justified in believing that the coin I am about to flip will come up heads (unless it's a double headed coin, or I can tell the future, I'm probably not). Am I therefore justified in believing that it will not come up heads? Surely not, as it seems this is just as likely a scenario as it coming up heads. Or in other words ~(~Jx>J~x). . . "A second response is that since one is justified in believing h one isn't not justified in believing not sk." If you want to offer this line of reasoning you have to explain why or how we are justified in believing not sk, or at the very least how we are justified in believing h. . . "A third response could be that since it is impossible to justify sk and not sk, the appropriate thing to do is to believe not sk and that makes one justified in believing not sk." But if it is impossible to justify not sk, how is it possible to justify h? This seems to collapse back into the original problem as we can just conclude that since it is impossible to justifiy h or ~h, we should believe neither. The only way that this solution works is to deny closure. . "A fourth response is that CP1 is false (the other responses rejected CP2) as the truth or falsehood of sk is irrelevant to the truth of h. h is a belief that pertains to simple reality (reality as we experience it without any additional considerations) while sk pertains to ultimate reality (reality as it actually is) and both can therefore be true at the same time." This seems to me to be a contextualist solution to the problem. That is to say that when someone says that they "know" something there are two different things that they could mean. A colloquial definition or a philosophical definition. They admit that they cannot know anything in the philosophical sense, but claim to have what you might call "simple" knowledge that is useful for everyday life. Is this what you are pushing at? If so, note that the original skeptical argument is left intact as we still are not able to know things about "ultimate reality". . . "The Cartesian argument doesn't seem to prove anything (I'll admit that I might not have understood it fully) since we cannot, it seems, say what is or is not genuine doubt and it seems to assume that to know something, we need to know that we know that thing." To put it simply, if your epistemic equipment is untrustworthy, you have genuine grounds to doubt anything. Your epistemic equipment is untrustworthy, therefore you have genuine grounds to doubt anything. It seems to me that your epistemic equipment being untrustworthy is great grounds for doubt. And it seems that if you do believe something, you must believe that your epistemic equipment can be faulty, so your belief will collapse in on itself. . .On the subject of disagreement, I think I agree (that's a strange sentence). It seems to me that just because two people disagree on a subject, it does not follow that both positions are equally justified. The problem arises when there is no rational way to decide between options. I would however caution you against conflating suspension of belief and suspension of action. The skeptic isn't saying that you shouldn't vote, simply that you might want to suspend judgement of the truth of the candidate's claims (which even from a non-skeptical point of view seems pretty rational to me). . .On the subject of relativity I have two thoughts. First this once again seems to be going into some kind of contextualist distinction between kinds of knowledge with the simple world and the real one. Second, it seems to me that we might be worried about the claim that perceiving something gives rise to a perception. Perhaps we percieve things all the time, but they only sometimes give rise to perceptions. Perhaps sometimes they give rise to perceptions (in the sense of conscious acknowledgements of what is going on) and sometimes they give rise to unconscious feelings that are very different from perceptions, like how simply cleaning a table with a lemon fresh cleaner made test subjects more amenable to the pamphlet on the table, even though many of them did not claim to notice or remember the smell (if I remember the experiment correctly). . ".I see some problems with this argument however, the first being that even if one concedes that basic beliefs are arbitrary in regard to warrant, one could still say that they are necessary beliefs. One example could be the principle of non-contradiction or that "I exists" which one could argue is impossible to not believe." Two thoughts, first, I don't have such a belief, so it can't be necessary. You simply need to give into the problems of personal identity to lack such a belief. Personal Indentity (The Persistence Question) . .Second, it does not seem to me that limitations on the human mind should classify something as justified. Imagine that we as humans are unable to doubt the claim that there is a God, simply because it has been hardwired into us. Does this mean that such a claim is properly basic or inherently justified? Surely not. . "The second issue is that foundationalism is not necessarily incompatible with some form of coherentism " This would, by the way that the argument classifies justification, make the argument a coherentist argument even if you claim that the beliefs are basic. "Coupled with the possibility of necessary beliefs one could make the case that it is impossible to genuinely believe that incoherency is better or just as good as coherency." Once again, just because humans are physically unable to doubt or disbelieve a claim or a set of claims does not mean that such a claim is true or justified. It might say something about our psychology or neurology, but it does not say something about the claims or set of claims. . ".A third objection is that while it is true that propositions with autonomous warrant aren't more likely to be true, it may still be the case that a set of propositions with autonomous warrant are true." Note the the problem is not about truth, but justification. It doe snot matter if such claims are true or not, only if they are justified. . All in all some good responses to be sure. You should check out this "Foundherentism" thing (I have done no research into it but it has been recommended to me by others) and see if it is to your liking. Best, C

[@Paradoxarn.]

Carneades.org I just threw out some ideas that came to mind and then I felt that I had to respond to it all. It's hard for me to compose what I say in such a manner as to be both short and understandable. "Or in other words ~(~Jx>J~x)." I agree and disagree, It is often said that the absence of evidence (or in this case justification) is not evidence for absence and in a strict sense, that is true. But I think that many would say that despite there being no evidence against the existence of the tooth fairy (or whatever) that they are justified in not believing in the existence of such an entity. If that is a reasonable attitude to hold towards the tooth fairy then I would think it is the same for most skeptical scenarios. About why believing h is justified: Induction by confirmation, that is: P1: If h then observation oh P2: Observation oh C: Therefore h Having read your entire reply, I realize that this answer may not be entirely satisfactory to you. The obvious question is: Why is induction justification? There is two issues here, I think. The first is about the nature of justification and the second is about how to justify a justification. For brevity's sake I'll avoid those issues and just say that if I believe that I'm justified in believing h then I'll probably not be very bothered by the closure argument. "But if it is impossible to justify not sk, how is it possible to justify h?" The argument would be that this is the case since sk is an unfalsifiable hypothesis while evidence for or against h can be observed. "This seems to me to be a contextualist solution to the problem. (...) If so, note that the original skeptical argument is left intact as we still are not able to know things about "ultimate reality"." I was inspired by Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world. I would dispute that the original argument is left intact since just because it may be the case that I'm not justified in believing ~sk that doesn't mean that I therefore wouldn't be justified in believing h. Knowledge about the state of affairs inside the matrix are still knowledge, despite not being about "ultimate reality", or at least that's the idea. "To put it simply, if your epistemic equipment is untrustworthy, you have genuine grounds to doubt anything. (...) And it seems that if you do believe something, you must believe that your epistemic equipment can be faulty, so your belief will collapse in on itself." Ah, Thank you, I think I understand better now. It seems to me that to while it is reasonable to think oneself to have faulty epistemic equipment it doesn't follow that hence it is untrustworthy, a belief which seems to be stronger than the former. It does seem to be a good argument for critical thinking though. "I would however caution you against conflating suspension of belief and suspension of action. The skeptic isn't saying that you shouldn't vote, simply that you might want to suspend judgement of the truth of the candidate's claims (which even from a non-skeptical point of view seems pretty rational to me)." Good point. "Second, it seems to me that we might be worried about the claim that perceiving something gives rise to a perception." Perhaps, but it could still be argued that the causal link between perceiving something and perception can indirectly, at least, tell us something about the world. I suppose that it could be argued back that, that assumes causality and that we can't have perceptions without something to perceive (hallucinations). But it is most likely the case that perceptions alone can't be a source for justification or knowledge. "Two thoughts, first, I don't have such a belief, so it can't be necessary." Those might not have been the best examples and I would probably agree that those aren't necessary beliefs. I think our conceptions of time, space and morality (value) may qualify however. Of course you can claim that you don't believe in any of those but, especially as a skeptic, can you really say that with confidence? Surely you act as if time exists, wouldn't that indicate that you believe in it? "Second, it does not seem to me that limitations on the human mind should classify something as justified. Imagine that we as humans are unable to doubt the claim that there is a God, simply because it has been hardwired into us. Does this mean that such a claim is properly basic or inherently justified? Surely not." Once again, good point. But I wouldn't say that just because we would necessarily believe something, doesn't mean we can't doubt it. To doubt a claim isn't the same as not believing it. We may live in a nine-dimensional universe even though we may never be able shake ourselves of the idea that we live in a three-dimensional one. "This would, by the way that the argument classifies justification, make the argument a coherentist argument even if you claim that the beliefs are basic." I'm not sure I agree, if I believe that a belief can be justified by it making my worldview more coherent then I have a hard time seeing how I can justify that belief without either reasoning in a circle, or claiming it to be inherently justified. "Note the the problem is not about truth, but justification." I made a catastrophic mistake there, what I wanted to write was that a set of belief may be more likely to be true. That is, while each basic belief cannot be justified on their own they may be justified taken together. P and Q may be more justified than R and S while at the same time P, Q, R and S may be equally justified. Unintuitive at a glance but I think it would be a mistake assign to assign the properties of the members of a set to the set as a whole. I don't disagree with foundherentism, that we can have both basic and mutually supportive beliefs from what I understand, but I would still say that I'm a foundationalist as I still think that one would have to start with some basic beliefs to arrive at that position. Well wishes, P

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Paradoxarn "But I think that many would say that despite there being no evidence against the existence of the tooth fairy (or whatever) that they are justified in not believing in the existence of such an entity" A couple of points. First, the key point here is that there is a difference between being justified in lacking belief, and being justified in believing the negation. It seems to me that while most people would be justified in lacking the belief in the tooth fairy (lacking belief being the default state), being justified in believing the proposition that the tooth fairy does not exist takes more. It's the difference between skeptical and dogmatic atheism Against the Atheists . ".About why believing h is justified: Induction by confirmation, that is: P1: If h then observation oh P2: Observation oh C: Therefore h " One man's induction by confirmation is another man's Affirming the Consequent (it's a logical fallacy). . ".The argument would be that this is the case since sk is an unfalsifiable hypothesis while evidence for or against h can be observed." There's a great argument that in fact no hypothesis is falsifiable coming up this week with holistic underdetermination. It should be up on Thursday, or you can check it out on the SEP. . "Knowledge about the state of affairs inside the matrix are still knowledge, despite not being about "ultimate reality", or at least that's the idea." Then I misinterpreted your claim. You can be wrong about appearances and the phenomenological world. Doubting "I Think" (The Cogito) . ."It seems to me that to while it is reasonable to think oneself to have faulty epistemic equipment it doesn't follow that hence it is untrustworthy, a belief which seems to be stronger than the former" What's the distinction that you would draw between "untrustworthy" and "faulty"? . "Of course you can claim that you don't believe in any of those but, especially as a skeptic, can you really say that with confidence? Surely you act as if time exists, wouldn't that indicate that you believe in it?" I'm not sure that I don't believe those things, but it seems to me that I don't. I think this week's video mentioned a bit on how a skeptic can act (proclivities), there will be more farther along in the series. . ".But I wouldn't say that just because we would necessarily believe something, doesn't mean we can't doubt it. To doubt a claim isn't the same as not believing it." Fair enough, but it does not seem to me that the God argument cannot be used to demonstrate a problem with necessary belief too. .. "if I believe that a belief can be justified by it making my worldview more coherent then I have a hard time seeing how I can justify that belief without either reasoning in a circle, or claiming it to be inherently justified." I'm not sure that I understand the point here. Isn't that the conclusion of the argument? That there is no other way to justify beliefs? . ."That is, while each basic belief cannot be justified on their own they may be justified taken together. P and Q may be more justified than R and S while at the same time P, Q, R and S may be equally justified. Unintuitive at a glance but I think it would be a mistake assign to assign the properties of the members of a set to the set as a whole." That does make more sense. The fallacy of composition is an interesting element of support for the coherentist picture. I would admit that it is possible for a set of beliefs to be more justified than a single belief. However it seems to me that it is up to you to prove that it is. Sometimes the elements lack the properties of the whole, sometimes they retain them. You need to offer an argument for why that is the case with justification. . ".I don't disagree with foundherentism, that we can have both basic and mutually supportive beliefs from what I understand, but I would still say that I'm a foundationalist as I still think that one would have to start with some basic beliefs to arrive at that position." Check out the epistemic position of Keith Lehrer and see if that appeals to you. it's an interesting marriage of coherentism and foundationalism.

[@yunoewig3095]

Paradoxarn «It is often said that the absence of evidence (or in this case justification) is not evidence for absence» Who would say that? This line of reasoning sounds like something that theists tend to push against atheists… It does not seem to hold water. The standard position seems to be absence, not presence (if that makes sense). It seems that the most natural thing is to postulate that things are exactly as they appear to be, unless we have good reason to think otherwise.

[@Paradoxarn.]

Daniel Sampaio I think that was exactly the point I was trying to make. Carneades would disagree with you though, since he doesn't support any postulation, natural or unnatural.

[@MBarberfan4life]

My basic belief in the external world comes from the fact that it seems to be true. It seems to be true and I have no reason to doubt my belief in the external world. And yet, I have no argument or external justification to believe that the external world exists, which is why it would seem to be a basic belief.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Rene Descartes i seems strange for the fact that you have no argument for it, to be a reason that it is justified by being basic. Your ignorance should not be a reason for you to believe. We have no justification for an evil deceiver either, but we have no reason to doubt it either (in fact everything we see confirms an external world and ED equally well) so we should take a belief in ED as basic. But this leads to a contradiction. What makes a belief in the external world better than a belief in ED? And what in turn justifies that criterion? Furthermore, there seem to be lots of reasons to doubt an external world, namely a bunch of skeptical scenarios and the duplication argument, so your claim that there is no reason to doubt it does not seem to hold water (kzbin.info/www/bejne/a6m0ZItjgLeNhdU)

[@Luciferofom]

+Aristotle How were your dialogues? I have heard good things. :-)

[@COEXISTential]

Isn't the skeptical situation (being identical to what we might call reality, but suggesting an unknown defeating fact) just goalpost moving?

[@robertwilsoniii2048]

Closure starts at 2:45.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Yes it does.

[@brancefinger5601]

This series is certainly not geared to the general public, unless the American public includes over 200 million logicians and analytic philosophers. I don't see the point of drawing any serious conclusions from analysis of an empty form of words like "This sentence is false." Way too much analytic philosophy revolves around "This sentence is false." The cat is on the mat.", and "It is raining."

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

I try to not make any videos for which you cannot gain the background here on the channel. Start with the 100 days of logic if you would like (kzbin.info/aero/PLz0n_SjOttTcjHsuebLrl0fjab5fdToui). As for analytic philosophy in general, why do you think it is not useful to ask such questions around the nature of truth? What is wrong with creating a language for different disciplines to converse without talking past each other through logic and argument? Clearly what is true and what can be known is changing on a daily basis, why is an attempt to codify and solidify truth and knowledge, something you cannot see the point of?

[@JamesJoyce12]

OK - here is another one - how do you know that the sun will rise tomorrow? Or how do you know that when you hit one pool ball with another that it will not explode?