Realism and Anti-Realism | Philosophy Glossary

[@JayWhitehead]

Very helpful - thank you! You used to be my lecturer when I was doing undergrad a few years ago, and now that I'm going back to do my masters these videos have been really great to help me remember key things before I start my reading.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

That’s great to hear - where are you going? That’s exactly why I did the philosophy glossary - short reminders of all those terms that get muddled over time.

[@rastgo4432]

You are doing a great job educating about philosophy as there few channels doing so, thank you

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Thanks very much! Glad it’s useful.

[@languageandmana9255]

Thank god. Finally i found an amazing teacher foe my intro to philosophy course❤

[@hss12661]

I would say that the realism/anti-realism distinction is usually drawn in three ways: (a) metaphysical/topical (regarding existence of some realm of objects) - for example, realism/anti-realism about qualia, realism/anti-realism about universals, realism/anti-realism about theorethical entities (b) epistemic/logical (regarding epistemically privileged status of certain facts) - for example, scientific realism/anti-realism, moral realism/anti-realism (c) semantic (regarding the relation of meaning and use) But I assume (a) is the most universal, because you can think of (b)s as asking about existence of certain facts and of (c) as asking about the relation of theorethical entities (meanings) to observables (use).

[@exnihilo8388]

I think you did a great job at explaining what they each are, thank you!

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Glad it was helpful!

[@kito-]

Great video. Suppose I think that stealing is stance/mind independently wrong, but that there are no properties, and so in particular no property of wrongness. Am I a moral realist? I want to say yes - realists say stealing is wrong, anti realists don't - but the debate is often characterised in terms of the existence of facts or properties, which I don't think exist.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Yes that’s a realist position about ethics. You don’t have to believe in properties to be a realist (about ethics), you just have to take the truth of moral claims to be a mind-independent fact (or, putting it slightly differently, they must depend on independent moral reality/moral facts).

[@kito-]

@@AtticPhilosophy Cool, good to know I count as a realist 👍 thanks for the reply! By the way, I took your advanced logic module in 2020-2021, it was really good fun and super useful!

[@laolangewilhelmina8851]

Very good explanation sir

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Thanks!

[@languageandmana9255]

Do you have any video explaining other basic concepts like poaitivism?

[@jmalko9152]

Informative, thank you 👍

[@hadage30]

Thanks dear

[@uncommonsensewithpastormar2913]

Common sense tends to assume the terms material and mental refer to two different substances when in actuality they both refer to the same substance, experience. It is just that they refer to two different categories of experience, experience that seems to be pretty concrete and consistent and experience that seems pretty ephemeral and inconsistent.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Well, there’s the experiencing (mental) and what you experience (typically, a physical thing).

[@uncommonsensewithpastormar2913]

@@AtticPhilosophy So by that logic if you experience a horse while dreaming, the horse must be physical while your experience of the horse is mental. You might respond that the “dream horse” is mental and the “real horse” is physical, but what exactly distinguishes the one from the other? Isn’t it the context and quality of the experience of the horse? If so, we are not talking about two different substances, but two different kinds or categories of experience.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

@@uncommonsensewithpastormar2913 It's *typically* a physical thing. When you dream or hallucinate something that's not real, obviously it's not a physical thing. But this is the question of perception, which is not the same as the question of realism vs anti-realism.

[@CamdenBloke]

Is there such a thing as an epistemological anti-realist? I hold that there is a physical reality, but that my knowledge of the universe is imperfect, and i can only know anything with levels of probability. I hate answering questions with certainty, and I tend to hedge any statements that I make by qualifying them, saying that they align with my perception or that I'm fairly certain.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Yes, but it’s not called anti-realism, it’s a form of scepticism, where you set the evidential bar quite high.

[@pryl]

what is unrealism and irrealism?

[@AristotlesRevolution]

thanks

[@AtticPhilosophy]

You're welcome!

[@melindazaituna43]

Good vid❤

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Thanks!

[@depapier]

that's not exactly a correct explanation of what anti-realism is wrt to physical table such as the table? The anti-realist does not think the table qua physical object does not exist, but that either this physical object is a table only for humans who know what a table is or that this physical object is recognized as a discrete physical object only because our sensors allow us to navigate a world at a certain physical scale where matter can be discerned as discrete chunks=objects, which we can categorize, shape and recognize - thus have tables. Just as well, Berkeley's type of idealism was a relatively unique and extreme position, which differs dramatically from all other "idealisms". And of course this sort of simplified distinction you stipulate does not hold in contexts such as philosophy of science, where the debate between a variety of realist vs anti-realist positions exists.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

I said that "anti-realism" can have different meanings, either meaning that the such-and-such doesn't exist, or that the such-and-such depends for its existence or its properties on our minds, concepts, or language use in some way. You seem to be agreeing with that? That use also fits lots of kinds of anti-realism in Phil Science.

[@depapier]

@@AtticPhilosophy Sure, but your example of anti-realism as absolute Berkeleyan solipsism and implication that the doubt is not about the concept but about physical objects, makes it misleading. On the other hand this example also doesn't allow to unpack, however curtly, what realists have to say about existence of concepts in the world (like natural kinds etc).

[@Powerneck]

Not sure now, if this video exists.. Wish I never bothered 😂

[@ostihpem]

I have a proof sketch - so I hope at least - for Solipsism. Do some mistakes or obvious shortcomings jump into your eye? 1. Assume a real thing z which you do not imagine/think of, i.e. z & ~imagine(z). 2. But 1. is false because when you assume z, by definition you _must_ imagine z, i.e. ~(z & ~imagine(z)). 3. ~(z & ~imagine(z)) = ~imagine(z) -> ~z, i.e. if you do not imagine z then z is not (existing).

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Yes that's basically Berkeley's argument for idealism. He talks about conceiving of an unconceived object, which he thinks is contradictory. Some statements in the area are genuinely paradoxical, such as describing an undescribed object. But I'm not sure the "imagine" or "conceive" versions work. I can imagine a situation in which nothing in that situation imagines anything. It's not even clear whether, in doing so, I'm imagining every specific object in that situation, or just imagining the situation as a whole.

[@ostihpem]

@@AtticPhilosophy Maybe substitute „imagine“ with the more formal „think“: _for you_ it is impossible to assume an object z while not thinking of it (as the object z) because assuming is just a subform of thinking. But from there directly Solipsism follows (= if I do not think it, it doesn't exist _for me_). To counter Solipsism you’d need to argue as if your subjective perspective is not there or you could somehow transcend it but that is impossible because after all it is _you_ who would do such move and therefore contradiction. I always wondered why Solipsism has such a marginal reputation despite such a strong argument.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

@@ostihpemYou can say "assume there's some entity x ..." without thinking about any particular entity. Nothing in particular is thought about. The argument convinced Berkeley, but not many others.

[@randy7894]

I think we can safely say Berkly was making up nonsense.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

Haha yes it seems pretty crazy. But lots of people say exactly that about quantum particles: that they only have definite features (position, momentum, spin etc) when they’re observed.

[@randy7894]

@@AtticPhilosophy That's true, but the possibilities (within boundries) exist all the time. It's most unlikely a table would miss a part of a leg at any given time. Still extremely fascinating. Maybe worth a topic though... What quilifies for observation and/or measuring. Anyway. Always cool to watch your video's you should have many more subscribers though.

[@AtticPhilosophy]

@@randy7894 Thanks!

[@skhi7658]

Imagine you have no perception at all. Where is the world then?

[@randy7894]

@@skhi7658 Ask Jupiter :D