Lord Chelmsford: The man who lost the Battle of Isandlwana (w/ John Laband)

Today I am joined by John Laband, author of a new book about Lord Chelmsford. Chelmsford was the British commander during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879...But was he any good?
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[@UkrainianPaulie]

As I have been fixated on the AZW for years, my conclusion is that he was ignorant of what we call today Asymetric warfare. Being a 3 war, 24 year Retired US Army Special Operations soldier, you never split your forces when you are clueless as to your enemies location. To ignore reports of large groups of Zulu, and to falsley assume that the main Zulu army was near Mangeni Falls (from the reports from the scouts camped overnight near that location the night of the 21st). No laager or physical obstacles in defense. This was proven by Blood River decades prior. Lastly, putting too much faith that technology will beat raw numbers (Martini's will overcome all disadvantages). But he was like many Victorian Era high ranking officers. Over- inflated egoes coupled with little practical soldering experience. You were commissioned/ promoted due to your social class/breeding, and not by merit or intelligence. Aristocrat that couldn't believe "naked savages" could beat the Her Majesty's Army. Just this American's two cents on not underestimating your enemy in his backyard.

[@redcoathistory]

Good assesment - thanks for sharing.

[@Dawsonguidroz8538]

True but got back some of his honor at battle of ulundi

[@douglasherron7534]

One could make many of the same criticisms of senior US officers in the Indian Wars... General George Armstrong Custer being the most obvious - but not the only one!

[@lyndoncmp5751]

"" To ignore reports of large groups of Zulu... " But he didn't do that. He responded to the ONLY report of large groups of Zulus......the report that the recon party (cut off in the hills near Mangeni) got back to him with their request for assistance on the night of the 21st/22nd. This recon patrol assumed the circa 2,000 Zulus they encountered were the vanguard of the main impi. That's why Chelmsford went out. There weren't any other reports of large numbers of Zulus. This was the only sizeable force encountered by that point. Chelmsford's response was militarily sound. He didn't ignore the request for help. Nor did he send out a token force. He instead made a reasonable decision. He sent a strong force out and he kept a strong force back. The force kept back was to be reinforced by Durnfords men and was to act strictly on the defensive. Given all the available information at the time, his decision was not unreasonable at all.

[@billballbuster7186]

The British arrmy in the Victorian era were certainly not the only army that had a certain level of overconfidence that led to disaster, Fetterman and Custer spring to mind. The criticisms of Chelmsford after Isandlwana were just, he should have fortified the camp, but it was a very large camp and there were only 750 British regulars defending it. But in context it was like saying Rommel defeated the US Army at Kasserine, he did not, it was a setback, but the army bounced back and learned from its mistakes as all armies do.

[@macdansav1546]

I tend to think of Chelmsford as a very 'average' general of the Victorian period. He escaped some the blame for the disaster at Isandlwana by focusing on the mistakes of Durnford and Pulleine and seems to have enjoyed the support of Queen Victoria. The fact that (under Wolseley's leadership of the British army) he never held command again in the field, tells you all you need to know about how his peers really felt regarding his military abilities. Thanks for yet another great post!

[@AtlatlMan]

Imagine living out the rest of your career as "That Guy"...

[@coling3957]

regardless of previous career, one disaster ends the careers of most senior officers. everyone will remember that one bad day, not the decades of service prior

[@darbyohara]

He’s worse than average. He’s incompetent. The mark of an average general is to follow standard combat field procedures. The mark of a great general is to triumph over superior numbers or in enemy country

[@josephgonzales4802]

It's amazing to me that him and Gen. George Armstrong Custer committed the same mistakes with in a few years of each other.

[@alessiodecarolis]

Ironically, if he had choose to remain in the camp and entrusted a subordinate for the recce, he probabilly would've ended as Custer....with only MORE deads!

[@josephgonzales4802]

@@alessiodecarolis yes,indeed.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@alessiodecarolis The recce went out the day before, decided to engage the Zulus late on and had to spend the night in the hills. Chelmsford was irritated by this decision. In the middle of the night, a message was sent to Chelmsford to send forces to assist. It was assumed the recce had encountered the vanguard of the Zulu impi. That's why Chelmsford went out. To help the recce patrol. Chelmsford left a thousand rifles at the camp (with Durnfords men as reinforcements) and ordered Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in and act strictly on the defensive. This is exactly what Pulleine did until Durnford arrived and ignored these orders. Durnford turned a defensive position into an attack and he pressured Pulleine to support him. Isandlwana was lost largely due to the actions and decisions Durnford made.

[@patricktracey7424]

custer was a brave but reckless leader who didn't care about his men , he was also a complete fool, his career was on its way down and he needed to win a battle on his own so he could pursue a political career.

[@josephgonzales4802]

@@patricktracey7424 I agree. 👍

[@keithagn]

I must commend you, Chris, for the intelligent, thoughtful questions you ask. It really draws out the stories from the people you interview. Another excellent video! Thank you!

[@redcoathistory]

Thanks a lot

[@FranciscoPreira]

I believe Chelmsford was a "product" of his times, his upbringing with the typical "upper class" arrogance, the disaster of Isandlwana, was a sort of a stew, composed of the old Victorian arrogance, lack of foresight, some lack of competence and a huge contempt for an enemy that based its all complex society in war, all mixed, producing an over confidence that ended with the well knowed tragic results. Keep up the great work Chris.

[@redcoathistory]

Thanks a lot - appreciate your input as always!

[@raytreherne26]

Agree totally with your assessment, and this lasted another 40 years with generals well into WW1

[@douglasherron7534]

@@raytreherne26 I don't think the British Generals of WWI thought of the Imperial German Army with contempt at all.

[@arslongavitabrevis5136]

Excellent analysis with which I agree 100%. I have been reading military history for nearly 40 years, and for some years I concentrated my studies on the British Army. In fact, all the reforms carried out during the 19th did not improve very much the quality of the British officer's corps. The image of the useless Montgomery as a great general, a product of British WW2 propaganda, is a clear example of the aforesaid.

[@douglasherron7534]

@@arslongavitabrevis5136 Incidences of poor individuals do not make a compelling argument for the generality (in anything). For example, West Point was established in 1802 and most of the senior officers on both sides of the ACW were graduates, however, there were a lot of completely useless senior officers from this group. Does that mean the US officer's corps had learned nothing in 60 years?

[@Anthony-vt6px]

I find it iconic and haunting when at the end of zulu dawn the camera focuses on Peter o, tools /lord Chelmsfords face . The pain in his face is powerful .

[@jon9021]

A great scene, very emotive.

[@Anthony-vt6px]

@jon9021 Glad you agree with me 👍. Although i think zulu is a classic film, I think zulu dawn is very underrated. Now I know I am going of topic, I also find it pity incredible when they find the zulu camp and towards the end of the film, a retreating soldier fights to save the coulers . There is something about that scene that makes me feel very patriotic and emotional .🇬🇧🇬🇧👍

[@jon9021]

@@Anthony-vt6px absolutely!

[@Anthony-vt6px]

@@jon9021 👏🤝👍

[@davidlally592]

Mm one int fact I was told by an AZW expert is that in the Zulu Dawn film, the crossing of British troops into Zululand via the Buffalo River, was actually done in reverse, for scenic reasons (ie it looked better). And of course re both Islandwana and Rorkes Drift, during both encounters, there was a full but brief total solar eclipse underway...!!

[@julianmhall]

I think Chelmsford's biggest mistake was underestimating the enemy. He clearly didn't think the Zulus were capable of deceiving him and he assumed the reported force was the main one.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

If he underestimated the enemy, why did he send a strong, rather than a half hearted token, force out and why did he decide to reinforce the Isandlwana camp with Durnfords men and order them to keep the forces drawn in and act strictly on the defensive? Sounds to me he was being careful.

[@julianmhall]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Granted, but he underestimated them in terms of intelligence. He didn't realise they were clever enough to outsmart him and decoy his main force away.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

julianmhall, Well I've never believed the myth that the Zulus decoyed him out, for the following reasons. 1. The Zulus were not supposed to attack Isandlwana until the 23rd. They wouldn't have decoyed him out an entire day before. For all the Zulus knew, once Chelmsford failed to encounter the Zulus on the 22nd he might have just returned to Isandlwana later that day. 2. The Zulus had no way of knowing the recon patrol would spend the night in the hills and request assistance. Again, for all the Zulus knew, the recon patrol might just have gone back to Isandlwana in the late afternoon of the 21st. It was an odd decision to engage the Zulus late and then stay out there. Many in the recon patrol argued to return to the Isandlwana camp. Im of the firm opinion that what the recon patrol encountered on the afternoon of the 21st was just a flank guard or screen protecting the main Zulu impi from being attacked. I don't think the Zulus had any crystal balls to know what Chelmsford would or wouldn't have done over the next day or two. In essence, if it was a deliberate decoy to draw Chelmsford out then the Zulus surely would have attacked Isandlwana in the morning of the 22nd, after Chelmsford rode out. They didnt. They were still sitting on their backsides at midday when Durnford's men discovered their hiding place, oblivious to the fact that Chelmsford took half the force out. Cheers.

[@julianmhall]

@@lyndoncmp5751 the Zulus wouldn't have needed crystal balls, just the knowledge that Chelmsford was a typical British officer of the time and underestimated the intelligence of every other non-white race. Knowing that, his reaction could reliably be predicted if told Zulu forces had been seen miles away. He'd arrogantly take a large force to attack them. Granted they might not have anticipated how much of his force he'd take, but anything would weaken Isandlwana and make attacking it easier.

[@Matty18795]

I don't think the Zulu intentionally deceived him either. The Zulus that the recon party encountered in the hills were late and trying to join the main Zulu impi. These were then mistaken as being the vanguard instead of the late stragglers they actually were.

[@simonkevnorris]

An interesting video. I was aware that Chelmsford had split his column but wasn't aware that the other columns did similar.

[@redcoathistory]

Yes, they were also strung out. The Battle of Nyezane was fought same day as Isandlwana but the Zulu force was smaller and Pearson's column deployed their Gatling gun.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

And neither Pearson or Wood laagered in January 1879 prior to Isandlwana. Laagering wasn't in the field regulations for the first invasion.

[@cameronsimpson-ld8nk]

Wonderful John and Christian

[@redcoathistory]

Thanks Cam. Have we met? :-)

[@mjc8281]

I always find what happened with Chelmsford and Custer interesting, when reviewing it's very easy to work back from the result.... The result was bad so its human nature to look at it in that respect. How this clip starts is important, when you are fighting a mobile and light enemy, it is extremely hard to pin them down, getting them to engage, such warfare becomes a game of manoeuvre and risk. For me I think the way we judge people and interact with our history is much more interesting and is actually much more relevant and useful because in the 150 years since Isandlwana we haven't changed at all, on the table top we are all napoleons, if only in our minds.

[@tmcgill2219]

The Custer analogy certainly stands out to me as well. While the scale in South Africa is much greater consider: 1) The problem is bringing the enemy to battle before they scatter and run away. 2) Dividing their forces into groups too small to achieve the objective because 3) We can defeat these savages even if we’re vastly outnumbered. 4) The enormous hubris and underestimation of the foe is astounding. East is East and West is West….

[@FMCH6444]

I would say that they have analogous disasters however, Custer was a pretty competent cavalry commander during the US Civil War. The only reason for Chemlsford's notoriety is Isandlwana

[@mjc8281]

@@FMCH6444 Chemlsford had had a pretty decent career beforehand. The biggest difference was of course Custer died with his men, Chemlsford didn't, the result was Custer could play the role of "tragic hero" Chemlsford from day one was the idiot who caused the disaster and didn't do the honourable thing and die with them.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@FMCH6444. Incorrect. Chelmsford was mentioned in dispatches (which is very significant) in the Crimean War and the Indian rebellion. He was a noted officer well before the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.

[@AttyDouro22]

The way him and Crealock schemed to blame Durnford makes me lose sympathy that otherwise I could have had. Seemingly a decent man based on how the losses at Isandlwana shook him, but always looked for himself first

[@lyndoncmp5751]

The scheming post battle was nauseating. However, Durnford WAS tactically at fault at Isandlwana. He flouted his own orders and those given to Pulleine. He turned a drawn in defensive position into a dispersed attack, obliging Pulleine to support him.

[@JoeyArmstrong2800]

Chelmsford was a military twit who got his column butchered because of his lack of foresight by not entrenching the camp at Isandlwana and blamed Durnford and Pulleine for the debacle.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Too stoney to entrench. Backbreaking work for a camp due to move the next day. Concentrated firepower was the answer.

[@douglasherron7534]

Entrenching was not a viable option, as mentioned, but they should have laagered the wagons to create a defensible position (as the Boers did at Blood River).

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@@douglasherron7534 You cant laager a one kilometre wide camp though. The Boers at Blood River had a much smaller circumference to laager and their wagons were lighter and easy to manoeuvre into position. There were 1,000 rifles at Isandlwana. If they'd just defended tight to the camp, as Chelmsford ordered and as Pulleine wanted to do, the camp probably would have held out. No need to laager. It was Durnford who screwed up but turning a defensive situation into an attack.

[@douglasherron7534]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Have you ever been there? I have, and I've walked the ground. They could have created a laager on the saddle with the wagons as a redoubt. The tents would be pitched outside this on the forward slope (as was the case). Then, on the appearance of the Zulu impi you drop the tents to clear fields of fire and retire into the defensible position of the laager. When you say "just defended tight to the camp" do you mean in square or in line? The latter would not have worked as the left and right horns of the Zulu formation swept in behind the British position and struck the camp from the rear.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@@douglasherron7534 No I haven't been there but there are enough photos, footage and now drones to be able to guage it well enough. When do you suppose they could have built this wagon laager in the Saddle and for what reason would they have done so? Wagon laagering wasn't in the psyche in the first invasion. Pearson didn't laager at Nyezane. Nor did Wood. There was no panic in the morning. Chelmsford had ridden out towards where everyone assumed the main impi was. The wagons were needed for shuttle service that morning. There was an invasion to supply still. Durnford was due to reinforce with his 260 mounted rifleman, bringing the rifle strength up to circa 1,000. 600 in the 24th and over a hundred Colonials and Imperial Mounted Infantry. There was no reason to feel they needed to build a laager that morning. This is the crux of the matter. The mindset. Make a wagon laager when the alarm came in around 8.00 am? Pulleine rather had his men standing to in readiness just in front of the 2nd Battalion tents. They remained stood to fot a couple of hours until Durnford arrived. The reports that came in throughout the morning gave the number of Zulus at circa 4,000 up to around 7,000 maximum. Not panic inducing. Yes, I mean a line just in front of the camp. From the north shoulder of Isandlwana Hill to Mahlabamkhosi. The 24th could have covered the front and left front. The Colonials/IMI and Durnfords men could have covered the right by Mahlabamkhosi. There were nearly 400 of them combined. Either the Colonials or Durnfords men could have been repositioned quickly to the Saddle rear when the threat came from there. We know for a fact that the Zulus had no answer to concentrated firepower. They couldn't make any headway against it. The 24th was holding the 12,000 strong Zulu chest at bay, despite their advanced and dispersed position. Less than 200 men with Durnford and the Colonials were holding the entire 4,000 strong Zulu left horn at bay out at the extended donga area while they still had ammo, although the Zulus were starting to outflank them in a wide arc to the south. Im increasingly firmly believing that if the firing line was way further back at the camp just in front of the tents that the Zulus would have had even more problems, and the Zulu left horn couldn't have out flanked them. The only real concern would be the gap at the rear but this could have been covered if the defenders were already at the camp instead of a mile away at the donga and rocky ridge etc. Also, ammunition would obviously been closer to hand. Durnford ran out at the donga. If he was in the camp the whole time he would have known where his own ammo wagon was. Dispersing forces out far and wide, and keeping them out there, was a more fatal decision than not building a wagon laager in my view. I don't think they needed a laager if they defended right at the camp from the start. Or if Durnford didn't decide to defend the donga when the Zulu left horn was chasing him but rode straight back to camp to confer with Pulleine and pull the 24th in before it was too late. Apologies for the long winded reply.

[@davepangolin4996]

The facts are he had no intelligence about the Zulu , splits his force multiple times , gets the column destroyed , has to retreat the army AND at extreme expense has to get another army sent out. How much more wrong could it have got ?

[@lyndoncmp5751]

He had intelligence via the recon patrol. It encountered circa 2,000 Zulus and requested assistance. That's the reason he went out.

[@christopher-ke9nj]

Chelmsford capture of, Zulu prisoners told him, about the Zulu army, it was an intelligence trap, he walked into it

[@theswampangel3635]

The parallels with Custer and his divided command are obvious.

[@paulwjones7893]

A fair appraisal.

[@billballbuster7186]

He lost the baggage train of the 3rd column at Isandlwana, not the column and not his army, the defenders inflicted around 3,000 casualties on the Zulu before being over run. Chelmsford stayed in the field and had a major victory against a 20,000 Zulu army at Kambula in March 1879 inflicting another 3,000 casualties. After being resupplied he decisively defeated the Zulu army at Ulundi in on 4 July 1879 ending the war. Despite Isandlwana Chelmsford destroyed the 35,000 strong Zulu army in less than 6 months.

[@redcoathistory]

Hi. Appreciate the input but I think it seems a push to claim Isandlwana was a small defeat of just a section of his army. The central column was the principal invasion force and at Isandlwana lost half their manpower and all their transport and baggage essentially making them toothless. Also, FYI Chelmsford wasn't at Khambula and can't take any credit for that.

[@billballbuster7186]

@@redcoathistory Isandlwana has been really over played as the defeat of Chelmsford's entire army. I was pointing out that it was not the case. I did not say it was a small defeat, but neither was it one that crippled the army. FYI Woods column was still a part of Chelmsford's army

[@ducthman4737]

He won the war. And just 35 years later 1,300 killed on a single day would be nothing abnormal. Remember also that the Zulu casualty number was at least twice as much.

[@redcoathistory]

Fair point.

[@ddoherty5956]

They had spears 🤣

[@tobiasgriffin]

Well the zulu had spears and the one who had guns didn't know how to use them

[@lyndoncmp5751]

ddoherty5956 The Zulus had more guns than the British in almost all battles.

[@ddoherty5956]

@@lyndoncmp5751 I doubt they had as many bullets😉

[@iangrimwood3345]

An American general split his forces only three years before against savages and look what happened to him!!

[@mjpope1012]

Interesting post! This is a real controversial one. I am in the minority of thinking well of the GOC L.Chelmsford. I read the book by Frank Emery 'The Red Soldier' (1979). It is one of the Zulu War books I remember the most, I read it in 1987. The feeling it gives you is like actually being there!! That's the result I guess of reading diaries that came back to English & Welsh homes directly from the front "these were Pontypool boys that died in the battle.." The attitudes of the soldier diarists toward him convince me that had his general orders for defence been carried out then the British would have held the camp at iSandlwana. These 1/24 & 2/24 troops in camp that day were class-A, the best that Victorian Britain had. The orders LC left Col Henry Burmester Pulliene were standard doctrine of the day but were not carried out. Also Chelmsford was a seasoned & benevolent commander who had served in S Africa before as a younger man. He did seem to value his men & have a decent, chivalrous character. The only record we have of him 'chewing up' an officer is his verbal pasting of Col Anthony Durnford shortly before the battle. I also have always believed that had LC been at the camp at the time of the Zulu attack he would have made sure the camp would have held. So therefore I think that Chelsford has been severely misjudged & does not deserve the blame for the loss of camp. The problem in the mix was not that Chelmsford had dispersed but that the force left in camp was.

[@redcoathistory]

Thanks a lot. Always appreciate detailed and well considered comments. While I’m with the other school of thought on this I do like the points you made and nodded along to some as I read 👍🏼

[@mjpope1012]

@@redcoathistory That's what it's all about buddy, always ok to agree to disagree!! Subscribed.

[@minot.8931]

Chelmsford only suffered from Empty Battlefield syndrome.. where, when you have no reports or sighting of the enemy at a particular location, you assume he’s not there. He didn’t adequately reconnoiter North and because the enemy wasn’t seen by other means, he conflated the unknown with there being no enemy there.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Chelmsford actually had plans to send a wide ranging recon force to the north and northeast on the 22nd, after the wide ranging recon on to the south and southeast on the 21st was done. This south/southeast area was deemed more dangerous and of greater priority. Before the recon to the north/northeast could be undertaken on the 22nd however, the recon force to the southeast encountered a couple of thousand Zulus and found itself having to spend the night isolated in the hills. They requested assistance and reinforcements from Chelmsford, as they feared they had encountered the vanguard of the Zulu impi. Thus, Chelmsford's plans for the 22nd were immediately changed at a stroke by the problem the recon patrol got itself into.

[@Mike-ig2zq]

I always think of him when I rewatch Bride of Frankenstein, with his nephew, Ernest Thesiger as Dr. Pretorius. Lol

[@Mike-ig2zq]

Oh yeah, and The Old Dark House!

[@SkunkyBrew]

The gentleman is right, we're still talking about this battle because of the magnificence of the loss, not the ultimate victory in Zululand. I think Chelmsford was probably not unique for his time: professional soldier, honorbound to service and duty to the Crown, with equal parts egocentrism.

[@davidshields454]

My great-grandfather met him. And said he was arrogant.

[@robertsansone1680]

"A delightful donkey", from the book "The Zulu War". I cannot remember which author. (there is more than one book with that title) Thank You for an interesting documentary.

[@brokenbridge6316]

Interesting look into this guy

[@alfredroyal3473]

He blew it, just like Custer (a bampot) both divided their forces in the face of a ‘savage’ enemy and both paid the consequences.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

He didn't divide his force the way Custer did. The camp stayed put and Chelmsford ordered the camp to act only on the defensive and to be reinforced by Durnfords men. Unfortunately Durnford had other ideas and went on the attack, obliging Pulleine to support him.

[@andrewcavenagh9016]

The Indians were also a lot better armed than the Zulus.

[@alfredroyal3473]

@@andrewcavenagh9016 And better armed than the 7th

[@andrewcavenagh9016]

@@alfredroyal3473 Quite so.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@@andrewcavenagh9016 The Zulus had thousands of guns. Around 1 in 5 Zulus were armed with a gun of some sort. First British casualties at Isandlwana were the rocket battery. Taken out by Zulu skirmishers with guns. Their guns were old but were still dangerous. And of course the British were heavily outnumbered.

[@marvwatkins7029]

Chris must've clearly emigrated to SA. That's unusual in that many have moved in the opposite direction

[@redcoathistory]

Hi. Yep I do live in SA 👍🏼

[@Emil.Fontanot]

He was a good general. Overhated for one famous defeat.

[@redcoathistory]

Hi there. Im not sure we can really say he was a good general as his track record is quite limited…what specifically made him a good general in your opinion.

[@Emil.Fontanot]

@@redcoathistory yeah, maybe good is too much as he didn't have a big career. Still, i think he was competent. He had successes before the war with the Zulu(which are ignored, like it's been said in the video) and while he got overconfident, he recovered the situation pretty well. He was a professional. His mistake was his initial faulty strategy.

[@lew832]

Chelmsford was informed that Isandlwana was under attack. He decided he would go on to Mangeni, and a Colonel Harness used his initiative and with some artillery and men decided to go back and help them. Chelmsford heard about this and sent a runner to order him back. According to different accounts Chelmsford arrived some distance from Rourke's Drift, saw the hospital on fire and decided it had been over run and decided to wait. He arrived when the battle was over. He had, as was stated, under estimated the skill of the Zuluz's battle plan. I think he was a waste of space, and probably regretted his dishonourable action in blaming others, and covering up his mistakes.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

He was not informed that Isandlwana was in any difficulties until it was too late to have done anything. Pulleine's messages to Chelmsford were not alarmist, he gave no cause for concern and he never requested assistance. The battle began and ended before Chelmsford's force could have turned around and arrived back there.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

And more or less everyone, not just Chelmsford, assumed Rorkes Drift had been taken, annihilated and burned by the Zulus so it would have been militarily unsound to march another 10 miles to Rorkes Drift in the dark, on top of the 20 miles the 24th had already matched that day just to get to a bonfire.

[@stephenloy3535]

the lesson of Islawanda was not entirely learned.The defeat of the Italians at Adowa,and later the Spanish at the disaster of Annual

[@Emil.Fontanot]

Our situation at Adwa was very different.

[@jancoil4886]

He doesn't appear any more or less incompetent than most of his peers. In a war not approved by London (not his doing), a limited number of regulars, dependent on NCC units to flesh out his force, he took risks and it came to a bad end at Isandlwana. Reasonable minds can disagree about strategy and tactics but there is one item where genuine negligence seems to apply: reconnaissance. Lord C. botched it. He never did recon of the ground north of camp. No excuse for that. He had time and the cavalry to do this on the 21st. On that evening when he was likely enjoying a smoke and a brandy, 25,000 Zulus were camped about 7 miles away. He took the flying column south on the 22nd with the north still not scouted! He did learn from his errors and eventually crushed the Zulus and ended the war. However, if a Court Martial was ever considered, failure to do proper reconnaissance would have been an appropriate charge.

[@coling3957]

ignoring the 1970's movie - which was simply another anti-war, anti-military movie .. Chelmsford made mistakes but in fairness, his troops did have experience fighting African armies and had always won. the Troops left at Islandlwana by Chelmsford while he took the cavalry off on a hunt for the Zulus should have been on high alert and should have laagared their wagons. instead they thought their superior firepower would hold off any enemy - they didn't count on the vast army that attacked them or the determination of the attackers. about half the force were Natal native contingent and South African volunteers etc .the commanders on the spot were responsible.. and on that day,, they failed. nobody remember the decades of good service in the army, only the one really bad day leading to a defeat. also forgotten is the terrible toll of Zulus.. their losses were huge.

[@kilowhiskeyalpha6078]

Nothing good comes out of Chelmsford.

[@redcoathistory]

I've never been - is it that bad?!

[@smokerjim]

You've never been on any road that lets you look at Chelmsford through the rear view mirror

[@1442GlennLane]

Lions led by Lambs as they say.

[@Sgtklark]

At the Battle of the Blood River the Boers, with a much smaller force using muzzle-loading guns, defeated a ZULU army of about the same size as at Isandlwana. Sounds like they had better leadership and tactics.

[@redcoathistory]

They were laagered which is the best way of fighting at that time 👍🏼 - in fairness the brits were able to laager for logistics reasons but it would have been beneficial to form a square

[@lyndoncmp5751]

1. The Boers at Blood river didn't have to laager a camp a kilometre in extent (to house nearly 5,000 personnel). 2. The Zulus didn't have guns at blood river. They had thousands at Isandlwana. 3. The British won two other battles that same day. Rorkes Drift and Nyezane, via concentrated defensive firepower. This wasn't unique to the Boers.

[@chrisc5275]

One of Chelmsford’s problems was micromanaging. He interfered with the tactical arrangements of his column and regimental commanders. So far as Isandhlwana was concerned, I read somewhere that Durnford lost it tactically but Chelmsford lost it on the operational level.

[@redcoathistory]

Sounds about right, mate.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Id argue that the battle of Isandlwana was influenced by the decisions of two subordinates. Dartnell of the recon patrol unwisely deciding to engage Zulus late on and to stay out in the hills overnight, requesting support from the 24th Foot, and Durnford ignoring the orders to keep the forces at Isandlwana drawn in and to act strictly on the defensive.

[@Dav1Gv]

A very interesting video. I'm not sure why the commander was out on recconnaissance nor why a reconnaissance in force was thought to be a good idea. Certainly dividing your force in the presence of the enemy is not a good idea (unless you are Ged Robert E Lee at Chancellorsville - but there have to be exceptions to every rule).

[@saxon6]

What always struck me was the slow speed of advance of the British column during the Zulu war. Compared to the rapid movements of say the Army of Northern Virginia's 2nd corps. Is roads the simple answer or doctrine etc? Also, it seems like cavalry is used more extensively in America as a reconnaissance force than by the British. It would be interesting to compare and contrast these factors . Are we seeing the results now of invading with several separate columns incapable of mutual support in Ukraine? Great video. I agree with the historian's final assessment.

[@redcoathistory]

Many thanks. Severe lack of cavalry was one of the major issues the British faced during the first invasion - there were no British Imperial cavalry units available for them except some converted mounted infantry. Appreciate the comment.

[@thorshammer8033]

Great vid

[@redcoathistory]

Thanks a lot

[@GravesRWFiA]

the defenders at isandlawana didn't follow chelmsford's orders which was to form square. he had left good orders and they were not followed. Wood did form square when attacked and fought them off.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Pulleine followed his orders and defended close in. During the morning false alarm he ordered a stand to right in front of the tents. He didn't disperse his forces out. Then Durnford arrived and it all changed. Defence turned into attack, against the orders Chelmsford gave.

[@gap9992]

Well his biggest error was being there. He did not have to follow the orders of Bartle Frere, who did not have approval for the invasion form the British Government. It was a joint decision and he agreed because he wanted some "easy" glory. In the field he was just complacent.

[@CollieDog24]

He was ignorant,self confident ,didn,t take advice from people that had fought the zulus,and after the disaster at Islandlwana blamed Durnford who did not recieve orders to take command of the camp from Pulliene,but to work with him to secure the road to Rorkes Drift. Durnford was the scapegoat.The pickets were half a mile from the camp and were spread too thin.Buller was a real hero as was wood. I have just finished the book on both battles.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Durnford was largely to blame for the defeat at Isandlwana. He ignored his own orders and those given to Pulleine and he turned a defensive situation with drawn in forces into an attack with dispersed forces. Had Durnford simply followed his orders (get himself and his men to Isandlwana at once) and those given to Pulleine (keep the forces drawn in and act only on the defensive) then the defeat likely wouldn't have happened. 1,000 rifles defending right at the camp with close access to ammunition would probably have been too much for the Zulus to get through. Durnford's decisions and ignoring all orders was fatal.

[@jean-charlesblanc8454]

The Zulus fought with a lot of tactical finess, they had the better leaders on the spot and extremely brave warriors, a very dangerous foe, still as the story as it is told it sounds like a freak accident - without taking into regard the superiority of the Zulus at that day.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

They didn't fight tactically well at Nyezane, Rorkes Drift, Gingindlovu and Khambula.

[@1994CPK]

how did the zulu make their spears? Did the Boers help them somehow? Theres no way they were capable of making such weapons back then right?

[@redcoathistory]

Hi.No, the Zulus had been working with iron for a long time.

[@AtlatlMan]

Sub Sahara Africa due to various material conditions basically skipped bronze and went straight to working iron, the stuff was traded all across the continent.

[@warrenrab]

Ha! Yeah right! Do you know anything at all about the Zulu nation?

[@ChosenMan-be8mz]

If the movie is an accurate depiction of his character I would say he was an arrogant ass, The boars would’ve had him for breakfast if he held a field command again!

[@morlockianhabits1974]

Hmmm🤔 I would suggest he would have been far more likely to have had those 'boars' for breakfast if truth be told.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

The movie isn't an accurate depiction. Far from it. It's a re-writing of it.

[@RykerRider46]

Even his own Staff Officer's said he was a drop kick. 😂😂

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Who said that?

[@RykerRider46]

@lyndoncmp5751 the troops, the officer's. Even that old fool's own staff officer's.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Can you name anyone in particular with an actual quote?

[@billyshane3804]

I think it is pretty safe to say that Chelmsford was 'on the spectrum '

[@stevegordon6947]

You need a gimbal or tripod for the handheld camera- it moves around too much

[@redcoathistory]

Hi mate - No I’m good thanks would rather keep it natural and organic. Want my interviews to be relaxed not a film shoot 👍🏼

[@andrewyarosh1809]

Chelmsford should have been disgraced and court martialed. Instead he was feted, rewarded, and put up as he face of the Army. The aristocracy covers up for its own.

[@jameswade4097]

As Chelmsford was:t there i think the commanding officer at Isandlwana should have better assesd his position in case of an attack.Good video

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Pulleine did. He had the 24th Foot drawn in, standing to right in front of the tents during the morning false alarm. Then Durnford arrived and started dispersing forces out, away from the camp, and pressured Pulleine to support him.

[@CostaCola]

Say is it me or do this and the previous video seem to have quiet audio?

[@redcoathistory]

I'll check next time to make sure its a little louder. Sounded OK to me but i guess different devices have differnent levels. Thanks for flagging.

[@CostaCola]

@@redcoathistory Thank you for the reply, it might have been a fluke on my end.

[@Matty18795]

With hindsight his actions may have been seen as foolish but if you were there at the time with rifles vs spears you wouldnt see the zulu as much of a threat. Against a european army he wouldnt have seperated his forces but its understandable that he was confident enough to seperate his forces whilst fighting a primitive army.

[@raywhitehead730]

He crushed the Zulus, forever

[@StephenSinclair-d6n]

If the camp had been fortified...different outcome??

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Didn't need to be fortified. One thousand rifles defending a smaller perimeter from the beginning probably would have been enough. However Durnford decided to go on the attack and disperse forces out, then he didnt withdraw to the camp to confer with Pulleine and fought his own battle out at the donga.

[@StephenSinclair-d6n]

@@lyndoncmp5751 makes complete sense. Ty.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@@StephenSinclair-d6n You're welcome. Cheers.

[@patricktracey7424]

Arrogant, ambitious, overconfident and used the Zulu invasion in cahoots with bartle freer for political purposes and personal glory.

[@indrajitgupta3280]

It is difficult not to remember the Romans, who, other than in the most extraordinary circumstances (=never), always made camp in a very systematic fashion. That, too, should have been the bedrock principle for all the British troops who fought against less well-armed opposition (again, that equates to everybody they fought after the Crimea). This failure to make a properly defensible camp would probably be called an unforced error if it had occurred in some sporting activity. The rest of it, the weak, multiple columns, the very poor communications between those columns, the inability to detect impis moving in very fast, the lack of standing orders telling subordinates what to do, all were major contributory factors, but only supported that single dreadful flaw in the military outlook.

[@hasenphelt526]

Lord Chelmsford biggest mistake was not being at Isandlwana. He would then (in all probability) have Squared the infantry and won by attrition. When you look into the how and why the Zulu war and other "colonial" wars came about it basically boils down to various empires greed.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Yes he told Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in and act on the defensive. This Pulleine did. Unfortunately the reinforcements from Durnford arrived and instead of bolstering the defense, Durnford decided to go on the attack and disperse forces away from the camp.

[@jancoil4886]

Not a great captain but not a fool either. The greatest make errors: Napoleon and the invasion of Russia etc. He had been in the Mutiny and been on campaign in Abyssinia. It was an unauthorized war with limited regular forces and large numbers of local volunteers and native auxiliaries. He was not in camp at the Battle of Isandlwana and may have been genuinely perplexed that 2 junior officers at Rorkes Drift figured out how to defend their position but 2 Colonels at Isandlwana could not. The man does have sins to account for: lack of camp defences, failure to recon the North on the 21st and sidelining Col Glyn the actual column commander. He acted on a report of 1500 or so Zulus south of camp. That was a mistake but an understandable one. Commanders often divide their forces and often with limited intelligence of the enemy. They take risks. Monday morning quarterbacking aside, his departure from camp did mean the camp was doomed. Better men than Pulleine and Durnford could have made all the difference. I think the political situation was a factor. London had not ok'd the war, and a commander who suffers a costly defeat will likely be blamed. That is the way it goes. Compare to Wolseley and Khartoum. That war was approved and despite being a costly and embarrassing failure Wolseley got a pass. Looking forward to Laband's book.

[@redcoathistory]

All good points. Thanks for your input 👍🏼

[@janlindtner305]

The way I see it: You never spread your forces in front of the enemy! Wellington won over Napoleon, with a relatively small force, by virtue of intelligence and if Zulu Dawn is correct, the ammunition supply suffers from bureaucracy and shortages and as John Laband highlighted: had the garrison stood squarely, yes possibly and only possibly they could have avoided annihilation. At the end of the day he is the boss, he gets the credit or the blame for what happens, that's how it is."Good show" Chris👍

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Zulu Dawn isn't correct about the ammo. That's the first thing I'll point out. Also, Pulleine was defending close to the camp (right in front of the tents) before Durnford arrived and decided to turn defence into attack.

[@janlindtner305]

@@lyndoncmp5751 I naturally bow to the facts; but what about my other arguments?

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Well ok 1. Chelmsford split his force because the recon patrol (cut off in the hills the night before) sent a message back asking for assistance as they assumed they had encountered the vanguard of the main impi that afternoon. Chelmsford couldn't ignore their request for help, nor send out just a half hearted token force. Instead he sent a strong force out and kept a strong force back, to act strictly on the defensive with lines drawn in and to be reinforced by Durnfords men. That's a reasonably sound military decision given the circumstances. 2. As I said, Durnford obliged Pulleine to support him. That's why Pulleine sent and kept his infantry companies out. 3. The battle was not seen as a fight for survival throughout most of it. The Zulus were being held at bay. By the time the battle turned (when Durnfords sudden withdrawal from the donga collapsed the right flank) it was too late to form a square. The 24th actually attempted to get back to camp to form a square, and individual company cohesion was largely kept, with individual squares/clusters formed, but it was too late by then. 4. If Durnford didn't decide to defend the far flung donga he could have ridden back to camp to confer with Pulleine and then Pulleine would undoubtedly have pulled in the 24th to a line just in front of the tents. From that position the Zulus would have found it much more difficult if not impossible, to get through.

[@janlindtner305]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Thanks for your response and interpretation, it's okay to explain what happened; but I don't think the basic tactics of combat were respected, in my opinion.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

janlindtner305 Well that was on Durnford. It was Durnford who flouted the orders and decided to go on the attack. Chelmsford left a thousand men with rifles there and his orders were to defend tightly.

[@philiphughes7481]

Plenty of blame to go around. Both Lord Chelmsford and Pulleine made mistakes that day. Worst of all was the refusal of the senior leadership to laager the wagons as the Boers suggested. If they had done that or-as suggested in the video-had formed a large infantry square, the outcome may have been different.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Durnford made by far the biggest blunders, and he ignored all orders.

[@3ftsteamrwy12]

Over and over in history, not giving an opponent in a confict respect just because theyre "diffrent" or "inferior" is a recipe for disaster...and we KEEP doing the same idiotic thing even today!

[@johngraves1558]

I agree with. the commentary but Pulline should have been censored . His death saved him and the odiom was poured onto Durnford , who also died and Lord Chelmsford . Dispute the fact this was his first action Pulline could have got his men into square . Chelmsford had taken half the column but Pulline had the precious gift of time. His dispositions abetted by Durnford , an engineer , scattered his strength into a wafer thin line with no solidity . I plead guilty to being an armchair general and it is easy to comment after the event but really those brave squaddies of the 24th deserved better . The Zulu had committed genocide on pastoral neighbours on a huge scale and Cetewayo had just won a bloody internal civil war slaughtering rival clans some of whom fought at Isandwana for Lord Chelmsford . The whole business was a mess . Cetewayo may not have wanted to invade Natal but his 40,000 strong impis were rearming with firearms as fast as the Portuguese bordering his country could supply them . He was playing for time . The British administration in Natal understood this perfectly well dispute London,cold feet on the issue.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Pulleine followed his orders and kept his forces drawn in. Even during the morning false alarm, Pulleine gave a 'stand to' order right on front of the tents. It's clear that Pulleine's tactic was close defense right at the camp. Then Durnford arrived and ignored all this. Durnford was senior commander and he decided to ignore his own orders and those given to Pulleine and he rode off out to chase after Zulus, dispersing forces away from the camp and obliging Pulleine to support him. Tactically, Durnford was largely to blame.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Additionally it did not even appear to be a battle for survival for most of it, so nobody thought to abandon the camp and converge into a square until it was too late. Durnford at the donga did not even bother to confer with Pulleine. He was fighting his own separate battle out there and with poor visional scope to be able to evaluate the overall situation. He should have left a competent officer in charge at the donga (thee were colonial officers there too) and ridden back to Pulleine to confer. Personally being there at the donga throughout was not the job of somebody of Durnfords rank.

[@jerichothirteen1134]

He was a good commander. The weapon left him down at Itsandalwana. He certainly stomped the Zulu in the end.

[@redcoathistory]

Hi. Which weapon is that?

[@jerichothirteen1134]

@redcoathistory I'm sorry. I dont know the name of the actual weapon. I am recalling something I have seen in the past. It was the new carbine they were carrying. Tests were done, which showed that the rifles were jamming due to the rate of fire heating the weapon combined with the soft brass cartridge casings. If I remember correctly. The line was spread out further than usual due to the increased rate of fire of the new weapon. As the weapons jammed along the line, however, the Zulu managed to break thru in multiple points and enfilade the whole line.

[@keithlegge6848]

@@redcoathistory the Martini Henry rifle a single shot breech loader. Not a bad weapon. It saw service with the Irish police post WW1. They feature in the film Zulu which depicts the defence of Rorkes Drift.

[@jerichothirteen1134]

@keithlegge6848 Yes, that was it. It wasn't the rifle that failed particularly. The cartridges that were issued at first had a soft copper casing which would cause the gun to jam if it was fired repeatedly without rest for a few minutes. The cartridges were changed to prevent this later on. I saw a very thorough investigation of this battle quite a while ago. They used battlefield archaeologists on site to prove that the line was spread further than regular doctrine. And gun range tests to prove the regular failure of the rifle and computer simulation to show how the failure of the rifle would have caused a collapse of the defensive line. They also investigated and eliminated all the other throries regarding the cause of the disaster. I was totally convinced of their conclusions.

[@Solidboat123]

@@jerichothirteen1134 It's a debunked myth. The firing line was deployed so far from camp because Durnford decided to take his column out looking for the Zulu army instead of staying in camp. When he ran head-first into the Zulu left horn, Pulleine was forced to deploy his men in such a way as to support him. Eventually Durnford collapsed and fell back, at which point Pulleine's line had to withdraw with him to avoid being outflanked. This is the turning point in the battle - up until then the British had the Zulus pinned down by sheer weight of fire. As for the supposed failings of the Martini-Henry, the best evidence against this is Rorke's Drift - the same rifles firing the same ammunition in the same conditions just down the road from Isandlewana didn't have these problems

[@catholicmilitantUSA]

I'm not sure what to make of Chelmsford. There are some things I think must be held against him, namely: 1) Laagering the camp. He didn't know where the enemy was, even when sightings were made of some elements of the Zulu impi. In such a situation, how could he not have laagered up? 2) When he heard the seven pounders booming in the distance, why didn't he run hell for leather back to the camp? Yes his staff told him the tents were still up, but so what! What did he think the seven-pounders were doing, setting up a fireworks display??

[@darbyohara]

Chelmsford was a fool. He invaded enemy country illegally, split his force In enemy land with no intelligence as to their strength or disposition, placed the columns too precariously to support another if attacked, and didn’t lagger the camp when stopped. He should have been publicly admonished but in traditional British “blame someone else” fashion he made excuses and blamed the dead. Even queen Victoria championed his incompetence He’s in command. He is responsible

[@raytreherne26]

Is there any truth in the idea that the black powder in cartridges caused sooting up and jaming of the loading mechanism

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Not to any great problem otherwise it would have occurred at Rorkes Drift but it didn't.

[@rev.dr.davidcole8915]

Because Chelmsford is a Lord, his sins are whitewashed by the status quo intelligencia.

[@davidryley4162]

Ive studdied the AZW since i saw Zulu as a kid. A very stupid, unjust war that should have been avoided. Ok. It made immortals of some. But thousands of.pointless deaths on both sides. Zulus didnt want war

[@lyndoncmp5751]

The Zulus have been dining out on it ever since. It made their name worldwide.

[@paulbailey298]

Love this British view+. I walked , the talk. I lived in zululand , Video , Zulu , History/, Him Uk , Needs , what speaking , sub titles . Video Ama Zulu , Quiet on speaker, No, understand English , Baba , in Kosi

[@ronlynquist9183]

Imperialists are all villains.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Including the Zulus? They were imperialists too.

[@ronlynquist9183]

@@lyndoncmp5751 When did the Zulus invade England?

[@benhuge2237]

@@ronlynquist9183 There still were Imperialists as well retard look you'll see it referred to as zulu empire here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulu_Kingdom and dose not matter if there invaded Britain or not there were still Imperialists regardless.

[@453421abcdefg12345]

@@ronlynquist9183 They did not, they invaded Southern Africa!

[@ronlynquist9183]

@@453421abcdefg12345 The English invaded southern Africa where the Zulus lived.

[@alexnorris9233]

11:04 Hi Chris, it was great to watch your work first hand, another great job. Hindsight is wonderful, Chelmsford did what he thought was right at the time, but you can’t forgive the attitude of “it was’nt my fault.” The buck always stops with the main man. By the way I’ve been trying to send the photos to you, with no success.!🫤 I’ll try again on WhatsApp .👍

[@redcoathistory]

Hi Alex, great to hear from you. You were the co-producer of this piece! I agree that hindsight is 20-20, but like you say the buck should stop with the commander...I find his attempts to blame others a real mark against his character. Fingers crossed that the photos work. Take care and keep in touch.

[@alexnorris9233]

@@redcoathistory Cheers Chris, and thanks again for the T shirt.👍😊

[@robertthomas3777]

Hubris is the greatest of enemies, along with disrespect of your foe. 🇦🇺🦘👍

[@lyndoncmp5751]

This is exaggerated. He was wary enough to order the camp to act only on the defensive and he reinforced it with Durnford's men. These are certainly precautionary measures. He was also concerned about Zulus in the dangerous dead ground to the south and southeast and ordered a large recon force to recon and clear it before advancing further towards the next camp location. Finally, he didn't send a half hearted token force out to assist this recon patrol after their request for help. He made sure it was a strong force he sent out with lots of firepower, including most of the cannons.

[@peterrooke5336]

I refuse to point the finger at him nor call him names , he was an unlucky general like Buller

[@redcoathistory]

You are right, he was certainly unlucky. But as napoleon said...

[@peterrooke5336]

@@redcoathistory He quoted a lot , did you have a particular one in mind ?

[@ducthman4737]

@@redcoathistory You Cannot Make an Omelet Without Breaking Some Eggs