Refighting the Pacific War - An Alternative History of World War II

Jim Bresnahan, Elliot Carlson, John Lundstrom, Jon Parshall
Sponsored by USNI at Pritzger Military Library
Contributors to this alternative WWII history include the noted military historians William Bartsch, John Lundstrom, Douglas Smith, Barrett Tillman, and H. P. Willmott, among others. In a roundtable discussion format, more than thirty veterans and historians address "what if" questions about the war in the Pacific. Their differing views on possible outcomes of various campaigns and the implications of those changes on the course of history are certain to provoke debate. All major naval campaigns and key battles are discussed along with such questions as whether Japan could have inflicted even greater damage at Pearl Harbor, how Admiral Yamamoto might have won at Midway, and the impact of that victory on the direction of the war. The book also explores whether the war was inevitable and whether the conflict could have ended without the use of the atomic bomb. Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (Ret.), provides the book's introduction.

[@stefanlaskowski6660]

I'll pretty much watch anything featuring Jon Parshal. I can highly recommend his book Shattered Sword.

[@sailordude2094]

He has a podcast on youtube called the unauthorized history of the pacific war. Great stuff!

[@mikelamberth9975]

Had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Lundstrom a few years ago. His reference of the SNL skit was so perfect.😅

[@frednone]

"Following all the variables leads to insanity," or leads you to the conclusion that the 'Miracle at Midway' can be used as example for Divine Intervention.

[@willboudreau1187]

My only criticism, and it's a whopper, these men should have been given 2 hours, not 1/2 hour. It's not much more than click bait due to its brevity.

[@richardbennett1856]

Yes. We feel cheated.

[@borscope]

So I spent like 30 minutes trying to hunt down the SNL skit about Napoleon's B-52. Could only find the "What if Superman was born in Germany" skit, made a meme about Nazi Al Franken, and goofed off on FB. Good times LOL

[@jeffsmith2022]

Excellent video.one has to be very careful when playing the "what if" game...

[@jovianmole1]

I love these authors and love the USNI & Pritzger Mil Lib, but there is nothing new here. If I made the trip to PML to hear this program I would have been very disappointed. For the crowd's sake I hope there was another program.

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

It was too condensed, thats for sure.

[@elrjames7799]

John Lundstrom is so right about what's needed for sensible 'alternative history'.

[@davidworsley7969]

Leonardo's Truth The presumption that Britain would have fallen had the BEF been destroyed is flawed-the German army was in urgent need of re supply and there was no way on earth that the German army could be transported across the channel.

[@midlandredux]

+David Worsley - Yes. The real question would be, what would the MORALE of Britain have been like if they had lost the army of Dunkerque. The British didn't KNOW the Germans had no transport or naval strength to cross the channel. They only had the fear of it, and the hope that they could defend the Channel. Further, the loss of that professional army would have crippled British defense of the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East. Very likely, they would have been forced to negotiate a peace as quickly as possible, before the Italians and Germans realized how vulnerable Egypt, Gibraltar, and Iraq had suddenly become.

[@davidworsley7969]

Midland Redux What you say seems logical,but the troops who came back from Dunkirk were in no condition to defend the Empire.The British forces already in situ,together with Commonwealth forces would have to do that job. Don't forget that British intelligence was well aware,from Ariel reconnaissance and other sources just how real the invasion threat was. The RAF and Royal Navy were quite capable of preventing any invasion the Germans could have mounted. Churchill intentionally exaggerated the threat in order to bring the British people together and increase their will to resist.

[@midlandredux]

The people who plan war and peace have to think in both the short and long term. The army that came back from Dunkirk was not available for immediate combat, but it consisted of a couple of hundred thousand officers, non-coms, and trained reservists with military education and experience of two to thirty years each. The lost of all that trained manpower would have crippled the army for a generation. None of the sources I've read, based on first hand accounts from the the participants, show any ABSOLUTE confidence in the ability of the British military to prevent a German landin g, particularly if the German airborne forces were stronger than the reports indicated. Churchill and his senior commanders had to plan for the worse. It wasn't until the Western Allies gained strategic experience of amphibious landings in 1942 and 1943 that they finally understood how absolute air and sea control and overwhelming logistics were vital to success of amphibious invasions. That was after witnessing failures or closely-fought successes in Norway, Crete, Dieppe, North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, New Guinea, and Guadalcanal.

[@davidworsley7969]

Midland Redux You are presenting opinion as fact-obviously no one could have ABSOLUTE confidence in the outcome of any military operation but the Royal Navy did have complete knowledge of the difficulties to an attacker presented by the English Channel and had been carrying out amphibious operations since Napoleonic times. It was clear to the German navy that it was a crackpot scheme hence their lukewarm (at best) support. It would have been just as obvious to the Royal Navy.

[@johnheigis83]

Good work.... Thank you, very much...! Shared. (Saved, to my DES-SSS, DESSP, and civil defense... (Disaster and Emergency Services - Support, Systems, and Services (Disaster and Emergency Services - Support Project... (Trying to start our neutral / objective logistics / liaison Matrix NGO, for such. (While, asking folks like you, and all our millions of Vets, scattered throughout all neighborhoods, to build us an honorable, professional, SOP backbone, into our entire NGO [especially in our Operations Section], for helping us all, with mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, through the consolidation and coordination of resources: human, material, information, environmental... By giving us - all - a place for "mustering" - again - with voice and vote, on any crucial matters / issues... Through comprehensive contingencies-management capabilities... and better neighborhood [incident] management capabilities... ... To put in in 1962 wording [OCD... The former FEMA / DHS...]... ..." active and passive civil defense are integral to national security [democracy] posture." What you do is a very important part in that picture... ... Honorably... Professionally..! Standing by... Semper Fidelis...

[@CaptainColdyron222]

Two of my favorite what ifs: what if Japan didn't Bomb Pearl Harbor and just took the British and Dutch possessions? Would the USA go to war over those foreign possessions? Also what if after Pearl Harbor Hitler hadn't declared war on the USA?

[@ubertuber3d]

1: FDR would be hard-pressed justifying a war to save European colonies. 2: America would likely enter the war against Germany a year or so later.

[@oddballsok]

CaptainColdyron222 Japan could not "just" take Dutch and British possessions. Military is not the only sense in those days: FDR made the decision to oil boycott Japan over its aggressions in China and taking French Indochina. That oilboycott doesn't stand a chance if Dutch Borneo (Shell) did not JOIN. And they DID join. So, in return the USA is OBLIGED (there must be diplomatic records on this) to defend the Dutch Indies should Japan attack only DEI. /// As to Hitler I also am at loss. Surely he'd hoped that germany declaring war at USA wld entice Japan to join the fight against CCCP..but that lacklustre sentiment of Japan was already proven in nov 1941. There is a speech of Hitler online about his declaration of war against the USA and his many motivations ("illegal" support for UK and CCCP), but still all that cld be endured better than a full US war involvement in europe.

[@10goldfinger]

Japan had to take the Philipines to secure its supply lines from the Dutch East Indies. Just look at a map. Even without the US in the war first, if at some point in the future they joined, they would then be right at the jugular vein of Japanese oil.

[@TaskForce-nr7sd]

Bingo. Isolationist sentiment in Congress was still so strong that Roosevelt was handcuffed, barring something like Pearl Harbor. But the Japanese military didn't understand that. So they took out a likely threat on their flank: MacArthur's planes and the fleet at Pearl. It made military sense, but they never realized that the U.S. would have stayed out, if given the chance. Even if the fleet at Pearl did come out, the IJN's carrier planes would have sank them in deep water (instead of salvaged/repaired from the shallow mud of Pearl).

[@Johnnycdrums]

Maybe, but only without the conquest of the Philippines. Once they attacked the Philippines their fate was sealed even without the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[@parrot849]

Jon Parcell is a giant among thinkers regarding the Pacific War. He always backs his assertions with substance and data. I think that’s why he’s not a big fan of counter factual discourse because most of it is a waste of time.

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

"...he’s not a big fan of counter factual discourse because most of it is a waste of time." I think Lundstrom is correct in saying that it only has value if the person doing it has a very good handle on the topic. And even then there might be information underpinning the counterfactuals that turn out later to be false. I saw another youtube channel where Parshall was talking about the New Guinea Campaign, and he was spot on. From the unique harshness of the terrain, climate, and weather; to the rampant disease that impacted the troops on both sides; to the outright lies and delusion on both sides about its value and feasibility; he knows a lot about this theatre. I saw another talk where he was talking about Nazi vs Soviet tank production, and he surprised me with knowledge and reasoning. He declared himself he's not a European Theatre expert, but still contributed things that I hadnt thought of before: eg nazi factories failing to standardize, and lacking pneumatic power tools that were standard in US factories. Or another example was the Soviets had done enough research to know that a T-34 only had to survive hours of combat, and so wasting money on reliability and crew comforts was a waste of time. Yes, he's good and cutting the chase.

[@billyhouse1943]

Thank you…

[@mikecimerian6913]

Jon Parshall has suggested possibly the best "what if" scenario in another lecture about WWII. Germany feared that Japan would not attack the US and would settle for some sort of accord. If Japan had waited two weeks, they would have known of the German defeat at Moscow and possibly wouldn't have wanted to tie their fate to Germany's fate. Japan's own pre-axis agenda was to wait until 1946 for the Philippines to gain their independence. They would have been able to eliminate a flanking menace without directly attacking US interests or assets. No Pearl Harbor attack.

[@oddballsok]

Mike Cimerian philippines independence in 1946 ? decided already in 1940 ? where is the proof ? And, shouldn't an independent Philippines still have US bases on their islands ? And shldn't USA guarantee its independence against foreign aggressors ? So what 's the difference for Japan's military ?

[@Tuning3434]

+ODDBALL SOK + Mike Cimerian I'm not really sure where 1946 came from. The original decision (the Tydings-McDuffie Law) mentions 4 July on 10 years after the signitory date. Signed on 1934, this would be 1944. Was it postponed for any reason? Or... the other reason: after signing the law, it grants a 2 years for drafting and anacting a Philipino constition, and than after 10 years long transitional period, it would grand indepence on 10 years after the constitition was enacted. This would make 4 july 1946. So basically, since 24 March 1934

[@mikecimerian6913]

Tuning3434 Factual Parshall quote from memory. I will let our friend do his homework as he has some catching up to do. :-)

[@Tuning3434]

Mike Cimerian I know, and the Tydings-McDuffie law is the original source.

[@juggalo184]

How can Japan's war economy and war in China survive for 5 more years with the US embargo AND US support for Nationalist Chinese still in effect?

[@dsbond8048]

Jon Parshall always has interesting and intelligent input. The others, not so much.

[@jrsands11]

“All these dozens of variables” that only together create the miracle that was the Midway victory does suggest the hand of God had a role.

[@executivedirector7467]

No it doesn't. It suggests that chance plays a role; it suggests that sometimes we don't know everything. It suggests nothing about the supernatural.

[@bandwagon22]

The value of US Navy vessels took part in Marianas operation even without their immense logistic chain of transport vessels and smaller landing vessels was incredible during that time - about $3 billion. Comparing the value of German war machine in Kursk we understand it better. German armor, artillery, smaller weapons, aircraft, trucks had value less than $250 million. It tells how techno American war machine in Pacific was compare those armies of Germany and Soviet Union.

[@MrBandholm]

That amount (regarding Kursk) seems rather low... Of course the navy would be worth more in dollars, generally one warship equals about a battalion of armoured infantry, with alle the equipment that goes into that, and that is perhaps light cruisers or bigger destroyers... But still...

[@Whitpusmc]

I find that German number to be too low, the cost of 100? Tiger Tanks alone is gotta be pretty high as they were a huge user of labor and scare metals.

[@executivedirector7467]

I am not sure how we can possibly do a comparison of ground combat units to naval units in any productive way. How to compare the value of e.g. a submarine to an artillery piece? I have no idea. On the other hand, it's certainly a valid point to say that ground combat is by far the most labor-intensive of the three modes of combat. The ratio of men to capital (however measured) is quite high. Naval power would be much more capital-intense and air power would be the most capital-intense. Putting one fighter pilot into combat requires hundreds of other personnel in support roles and many thousands of dollars of production assets. Then, the fact that the US chose to fight an extremely capital-intensive war, and had the chops to actually do it, is an important point you are making.

[@nonyadamnbusiness9887]

Insignificant. Here's an alternative to the Pacific War. What if we had actually pursued a strategy of denying oil to the Japanese from day one? Hold Java, use it as a base to bomb the oil fields on Sumatra and Borneo. Concentrate submarine activity on sinking tankers. Hit and run raids on Japanese held islands to keep their fleet running around until they ran completely out of gas.

[@michaelsommers2356]

They tried to hold Java, but they couldn't. Submarines did sink tankers whenever they could. There were air raids, starting in February, but the fleet was not going to chase the raiders; that would have been futile.

[@dennisweidner288]

Three very competent historians, fascinating discussion. I would take issue with one comment by Jon Parshall to the effect that no smatter what happened at Midway that the Americans were going to win the War. That is obviously true vis a vis the Japanese. But there was something else at play here--the Ostkrieg. If the Germans had prevailed in the East, you have a very different situation. Remember that at the time the bombs started falling on Pearl Harbor that the Japanese believed that the Germans had defeated the Red Army.. On virtually the sane day, the Red Army launched its Winter Offensive before Moscow. If the Pearl Harbor attack had happened a few day earlier, the Japanese might have cancelled the attack. A German victory in the East would have fundamentally changed the American strategic calculation.

[@amerigo88]

Spent many years looking at the centrality of Moscow as the political, cultural, industrial, financial, transportation, communications, and military hub of the entire USSR and thinking that its fall would have meant the end of the USSR's role in WW2. I have come to believe that even the fall of Moscow would not have taken the USSR out of the war. The nation was so vast, the factories had been evacuated east, the supply lines for Lend-Lease from the UK and US had so many routes that the Germans could not sever, the population was so huge, that another hostile state of neutrality as in August 1939 to June 1941 was the best Germany could hope for. Stalin and the Communist Party had an iron political grip over the nation that dwarfed the Tsar and his secret police plus the Cossacks who had failed in 1917. Tsar Alexander I had successfully ceded Moscow to Napoleon in 1812, yet remained in the Coalition and chased the French all the way across Poland, in the end. The "German victory in the East" would have occurred in fall or winter 1942, at the earliest, resulting in a settlement with Germany retaining much of the land they had conquered, but not completely eliminating the threat from millions of Soviet soldiers on Germany's eastern frontier. Just look at how many soldiers Hitler kept in Norway before and after D-Day. Even with a Soviet-German settlement, Hitler would have kept at one million soldiers in the East.

[@dennisweidner288]

@@amerigo88 I am inclined to agree with you, although I do think that the fall of Moscow would have been very damaging. Just how damaging is a matter of speculation. However, it would not have improved the Soviet military position. It would have meant that the vast losses that occurred as a result of the Red Army 1941-42 Winter Counter Offensive would not have occurred and the Germans would have been in a much stronger position in 1942. One major factor often ignored is that Moscow was in the Russian ethnic heartland of the Soviet Union. Once driven back from Moscow what the Germans had was the non-Russian areas populated with non-Russians (Balts, Bylorussians, Poles, Ukrainians, Tartars, etc. I think that the War would have turned out very differently had the Germans come as liberators appealing to these minorities. And even to the anti-Stalinist Russians. Instead, they came as bloodthirsty barbarians intent on the murder of these minorities as well as the Russians. The German Generalplan Ost is one of the blood-chilling crimes in all of history. Churchill's use of the term "Hun" was more accurate than understood at the time.

[@joelmccoy9969]

Nagumo getting attacked first should have alerted him to the approach of carriers

[@DanielMulloy-bg6gw]

The guy with the mustache is a real Monday morning quarterback.... the Pacific is very big.... we're lucky all the dive bombers didn't get lost not just Hornets

[@fredkruse9444]

VT-3's helmets don't look to be of WWII vintage. Discuss. 19:44

[@brianl0604]

Fred Kruse...yep, someone found a pic of the wrong VT-3. This is instead Training Squadron 3, posing in front of a T-28 Trojan...guessing early 60’s or later from the APH-6 helmets.

[@user-mq9jq7qg2x]

日本人は、戦争があまりにも、悲惨だったので、何もかも失い、希望さえ無くなり、戦争の事実を知りたくないのです。これを見るのでさえ、心苦しいです。本当のことには、耐えられません。

[@davidyoung8521]

What if Italy's little war in North Africa hadn't required German intervention ?

[@michaelhorning6014]

As Churchill said of another battle, "It is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning."

[@philipjoyce8817]

God I love this shit!!

[@1ramyus]

Too short.

[@jeffbybee5207]

I believe there were at least 5 full size subs that brought the mini subs to pearl. Why did they not stick around to blockade pearl harbor. Further did the japaneese have more subs than the US? There belief was subs should attack warships. Would not ph be the ideal hunting ground?

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

Yes, exactly. They shouldve had their entire sub fleet operating everywhere past their carriers, between hawaii and the west coast.

[@TaskForce-nr7sd]

The panel wondered what if Halsey had been commanding at Midway. Unlike Spruance, he would have stayed in the area to continue attacking the Japanese. And might have run into the Japanese surface units at night...a big mistake and probably heavy losses for the USN. Spruance withdrew out of common sense, but Halsey had too much "Avenge Pearl Harbor" fever.

[@Johnnycdrums]

He wasn't at Midway so you don't know what he would have done. He relieved Gormley and did a great job at Guadalcanal. FLT ADM William F. Halsey is my favorite Admiral, especially after watching "The Gallant Hours". (I know the timeline of ADM Yamamoto shootdown happened later.)

[@peterclark4685]

The naval Patton, a head-strong non-strategist.

[@uncletimo6059]

Halsey was a complete idiot.

[@GH-oi2jf]

Task Force 141 - Spruance withdrew because he was following orders from Nimitz.

[@73Trident]

Halsey would have screwed the pooch, just like he did at Leyte Gulf. Only this time he would not have had Taffy 3 and planes from Taffy 1 and 2 to save his ass.

[@michaelhorning6014]

"The torpedo attack brought the CAP down to sea level." "But the Zeros COULD have climbed back up." "Therefore the torpedo attack didn't bring the CAP down to sea level." That's not an argument.

[@zzyzxRDFwy15]

Apparently, the CAP was down attacking the torpedo bombers but they could have climb back to altitude in 4 minutes, but the CAP didn't even though they could gain CAP altitude in 4 minutes. I wonder if the experts feel if the CAP aircraft could have rearmed they spent ammunition in 4 minutes too? I mean what good is being at CAP altitude without any ammunition. But according to John Lundstrom, what if-ing is only valid for qualified individuals who have the background, do their homework and look at the primary sources so you can ignore this comment.

[@michaelsommers2356]

That's not what he said at all. The specific claim that Parshall (and Tully) refute is that "The sacrifice of Torpedo Eight was not in vain, since it pulled the Japanese CAP fighters down to sea level, thereby allowing the American dive-bombers to attack." (SS, p. 432) Nobody denies that the CAP was at low altitude shooting down torpedo planes. Note that the myth refers specifically to VT-8. P and T say, though, is that if that was all that there was to it, the CAP could have been back upstairs in just a few minutes. But that was not all that there was to it. VT-6 was spotted just a few minutes after VT-8 was shot down. That kept the CAP down, even after the attack ended at about 1000, due to inadequate doctrine and command control of the CAP.

[@michaelsommers2356]

@@zzyzxRDFwy15 Lundstrom is correct that one should not assume that one is smarter than the experts if one does not actually know what the experts say. If you had read Parshall and Tully's book, you would know that ammunition shortage was indeed a problem. But apparently the Japanese did not think it was enough of a problem to land many fighters.

[@Treblaine]

It's amazing what a difference codebreaking makes, it changes the Battle of Midway from 4 Japanese carriers attacking an unprepared island base to an island base on high alert and three carriers. The US weren't so outnumbered at Midway, they may have been outnumbered in carriers but Midway's airfields gave the US at least parity in overall airpower, and Midway could not be torpedoed, had much better anti-air and would take a lot more bombs to be knocked out of action. Midway by itself, even if no carriers were nearby would have been a hard nut to crack even for a large force of 4 Japanese carriers. It seems that's the only real chance of Japanese victory and it's not enough for Japan and the US to fight to a stalemate like at Coral Sea, that is not the Japanese "winning at Midway" that's another knock-for-knock that the Japanese Navy couldn't afford. Could Japan really have taken Midway even if they had succeeded in a surprise attack? Even that is not so certain. But with 3 carriers and the base very well armed with planes suited to attacking carriers I don't see how even in war-games that Japan is so likely to "win". I hope the US wargame planners aren't counting Japan as doing marginally better in the battle as a "win" the only victory that matters at Midway is Japan taking midway, destroying US carriers AND not losing many of their own carriers. But so what if they did, are they any closer to winning the war? They are theoretically further from losing it, but nothing about this would change the US from having many atomic bombs by 1945 and at latest by 1946 they'd have airbases that could deliver those Atomic bombs to Japan. Japan couldn't just take midway, they'd also need their own atomic bomb AND a means to use it as a deterrent otherwise the outcome of the war could not be changed.

[@f430ferrari5]

Treblaine here is something to consider as most US historians never present a battle plan as such for the IJN. Let’s keep in mind that code breaking only tells part of the story as to what will occur. The bottom line is that the US had it but this didn’t make the difference. Had the IJN implementer a better battle plan they would have won. How could they have not with such a potential superior force. There is discussion of the IJN Main Force trailing behind and there is some mention of battleships traveling together the Carrier Force. What has not been suggested is battleships being part of a non carrier lead group. First of all the IJN had 4 fast battleships or battlecruisers. They were the Kongo class with 14 in guns and capable of 30 knots and 10k mile range. The vessel counts were as follows: IJN vs US Task Force 16 and 17. Please note the Aleutians should have been canceled. Battleships - 11 including Yamato vs 0 for US Carriers - 9 vs 3. Yes 9 not 4. Zuikaku was not damaged at BCS and with a different strategy in carrier use and the IJN could have easily rounded up zero fighter pilots. Zuikaku would have added 75 -80 planes with 15-20 being bombers. The rest fighters. You see the key to winning for the IJN was to engage in vessel vs vessel combat. The IJN vessels were better equipped for this vs anti aircraft screening force. Accordingly the IJN would not have had to rely on so many bombers. Note - Battle of Coral Sea should have taught the IJN that it takes too many aerial bombers and pilots to sink US carriers. So the plan is to load carriers with mainly zero fighters. The IJN only had 85 fighters at Midway which is why they ran out of CAP. The key is to simply “wound” the US carriers with aerial bombing. Once they have slowed down they can’t escape the faster IJN vessels. The others carriers are Junyo, Ryujo, Zuiho, and Hosho. These total 130 planes. The other 4 main carriers could have carried an additional 15 - 20 planes each for a combined total addition of 70 planes. So the IJN would have had 530 planes. Cruisers - 21 vs 8 Destroyers 63 vs 15. So the strategy is to form groups of vessels where 2 fast battleships are joined with 6 cruisers and 12 destroyers both 100 miles North and South of Midway. They are looking for the US force. They are not stopping at Midway. They are stopping and patrolling at the eastern tip of Midway. The carrier force is trailing behind and they are split into 3 groups. Northern Trail Force - Akagi and Kaga with 10 destroyers and 4 cruisers Western Midway Force - 4 battleships up front prepared to surround Midway and shell the island after an initial aerial bombing run. Escorted by subs and destroyers and cruisers. Carriers Ryujo, Junyo, Zuiho, and Hosho trailing with destroyer escorts. Southern Trail Force - Carriers Hiryu and Soryu with destroyers escorts. Zuikaku is in between Western and Southern Force prepared to assist both groups. The groups don’t arrive at the same time. They are spotted at different time frames also. Remember planes are much faster than vessels. The Northern Lead Group is planned to show up first. The Western Force shows how next and planes fly over the battleships and begin the attack on Midway. Where do the Midway planes attack? They see the battleships first approaching the island at full speed. The Midway planes are obsolete and no match for the IJN zeros. When does the US carrier planes launch. Who do they go after. The Northern Lead Force is head right for them if the US positioned themselves north of Midway The Southern Force would be able to cut off any escape route and would have surrounded the US Force.

[@jameshorn270]

Nearly everything excfept the code breaking and the dive bombing attack went wrong at Midway and yet we won. I propose another What if? Eveh with the problems with the M13/M144/M15 series torpedoes, they occasionally did work . Even two or three going off might have crippled the Japanese enough that the dive bombers could have finished off the fourth carrier in the first attack. Result, the Yorktown survives, and the US Navy has an additional carrier by maybe the beginnng of 1943.

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

Imagine if the US had torpedoes that worked? Even the shock of the long lance torpedoes at Guadalcanal wouldnt have meant much if the US had started the war with normally functioning torpedoes.

[@RobertPaskulovich-fz1th]

“Scratch one flat-top.”

[@richardbennett1856]

Halsey listens to Mitchner, after Kido Butai is finished, goes chasing after Shokaku and Zuikaku, runs smack into the Center Force. War ends in 1946.

[@JRandallS]

It is interesting that the Japanese weakened their forces by sending the diversionary force to the Aleutians, and also leaving forces behind in the south. If they had in fact had two separate groups that could have supported each other, then that battle might have been more of a draw. As it was the Japanese still out-numbered the Americans, and out-gunned the Americans but managed to lose the battle. More Japanese forces might have meant more Japanese losses and shortened the war.

[@NobodyHere115]

Not really. Not enough carrier strength, brah

[@coachhannah2403]

Going in with parity of force was a mistake of planning based on predicting what the enemy will do as opposed to planning for what the can do.

[@Whitpusmc]

I don't understand why one carrier wasn't tasked as the CAP carrier landing and rearming and relaunching CAP planes while the other three were free to spot an attack wave.

[@sammaier4485]

They didn't always travel in formation, so any carrier must be able to stand on it's own to some degree. Also, the Japanese believed in using their assets for maximum aggressive capabilities. You can't launch the largest possible assault if one of your carriers cannot launch bombers or torpedo planes. And as you should know, boats sink. If you put all the fighter eggs in one basket, you risk losing all your fighter planes AND pilots. And you can't protect the fleet with bombers and torpedo planes.

[@treyriver5676]

Whitpusmc later in the war when the number of smaller carriers with available to support the fleet carriers your argument was used. The reason it wasn't early is it there just wasn't enough platforms available. have United States been willing to have a slower Fleet they could have brought Ranger and the French carrier in the Pacific and made them pure air defense carriers early in the war speed was life.

[@Whitpusmc]

TREY RIVER fair enough on the US side but the Japanese had nearly 10 carriers of various types and the Pearl Harbor six were THE Japanese national military asset and it was irreplaceable to them. Bringing along any other carrier and allowing it to just launch CAP and allow the other carriers to form up attack waves (given that some rearming had to be done on deck) would actually significantly increase their attack potential. It's clear to me that while the Japanese had figured out combined carrier operations better than anyone in 1941 they had not done the LT thinking about what the Wars possible end states were and what assets they had that were irreplaceable and could only be used when they had to be.

[@MrChiangching]

One reason the oil tanks weren't hit was because they were worried that the smoke would obscure their vision to hit their other targets.

[@Zerox_Prime]

Perhaps, IJN plans excludef the possibility of American carriers at Midway? They planned to surprise Midway, destroy its aircraft and occupy it with seasoned troops. That would draw out USN carriers from Pearl Harbor. Hence, the "decisive naval victory."

[@doesnotexist305]

Victory for the Axis in WW2 could have only been achieved with Germany in a leading role and Japan playing a supporting role. No Pearl Harbor, no Operation Barbarossa. Had Germany eliminated the allies at Dunkirk and continued the Battle of Britain while Japan took French Indochina, British Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies and then continued to attack India, the allies would have had to surrender before the Soviets or the Americans entered the war. Then they could have invaded the Soviet Union together. The US is not capable of being invaded and war with them is futile. Leave them out. But Germany and Japan never acted as if real allies and Hitler was a moron.

[@dongiovanni13]

The problem with this argument is oil. The Axis had little to none, while the US was producing about half the world's supply. German general staff estimates they would have run out by Dec. 41, and you see that they cannibalize their logistics groups to fuel the tanks and reequip the recon groups with bicycles. For example: at Stalingrad the German horses were trapped outside the encirclement so they couldn't transport their heavy equipment for a breakout.

[@karimould-hamouda6579]

Middle East was producing hardly any oil at this point and transporting what was there already proved too difficult for the English.

[@MegaBloggs1]

why did the japanese ignore the intelligence-tanakas invasion convoy was attacked twice on the 3rd-surprise was lost-he should have contacted yamamato in truk lagoon

[@GSteel-rh9iu]

07:56 British authors Japan in the Indian ocean

[@johnheigis83]

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[@oddballsok]

my what if is ; why couldn't the original strike force that attacked PH stay around PH and isolate it. To blockade it. No more US vessels coming or going, no more (empty) US bombers flying in from SF. If lucky, find the missing 2 AC, but probably they'd sail away to SF (for regrouping refitting until a formidable fleet = takes years) and not to Manila, which wld have been taken by that time. Phillies, DEI, Malaya would have been overrun with less speed, but still taken. All the wasting effort around Papoea, Bougainville, Guadalcanal wld have been avoided (no need).

[@TheRequimen]

ODDBALL SOK Fuel, supplies, and the fact the Kido Butai was a raiding force. The Japanese never had the carrier numbers and logistics ability to stand off of major naval and air islands to fight and suppress them. Only the USN had that ability, and we were not capable of it until 1944.

[@TheRequimen]

ODDBALL SOK It would take about 14-20 days for the 4 carriers we had in the Atlantic to transit from Norfolk to San Diego, maybe a week to rest, refit, and mass at SF, and about 6 days to get within range of O'ahu and any IJN ships blockading. That gives the USN about 7 flattops and around 580 aircraft. The Kido Butai had around 490, and a lot of those WERE damaged at Pearl, so you can easily surmise they would have started sustaining heavy losses as they started to truly suppress O'ahu the next day. But we will just handwave those losses as replaceable by crated planes and reserve pilots on some merchant vessels the IJN could have brought with them. There will be a major battle within two months at Hawaii if the IJN stays, and it will not be pretty. It's a 6800 nmi round trip from where the IJN departed to 230 nmi north of O'ahu and straight back to Tokyo, ignoring Midway and Wake. That gives the KB about 3200 nmi worth of manoeuvring if they didn't sprint into position north of O'ahu, and don't forget traveling at flank speed for the flattops increases fuel consumption about 5 times over from cruising. If we count the fleet oilers, maybe they have 5-6000 nmi of range left. It's important to note that the IJN will most likely not stop and drop anchors to save fuel, considering the threat from USN submarines which will be hunting near Hawaii if they stay, plus the threat of the 3 carriers we still have in the Pacific. So, at a constant cruise speed of 15 knots, the Japanese flattops have around 16 days of fuel left. The Tokyo Express didn't carry fuel, they carried men and supplies, and it was only a 1000 nmi round trip from Rabaul. Tokyo to Hawaii is 3200 nmi one way, as the crow flies, and it would take a truly massive effort on the IJN part to sustain a force at Hawaii.

[@suspicious35]

+ODDBALL SOK FUEL FUEL FUEL. They rendezvous with the tankers was in a pre-arraigned location on the way back to Japan. Also US flak and fighter defenses had done more damage to the second wave attack and would have done even more damage to a third wave. Also, the fleet (or at least a big piece of it) was needed in other operating theaters. e.g. The British fleet in the Indian Ocean isn't going to sink itself. Not sure this wouldn't have been possible, but these problems would need to be addressed.

[@Treblaine]

(1) As Yamamoto pointed out, the element of surprise was lost and that was absolutely key, more and more fighters were going to be in the air, more AA guns would be fully operational, Japan would begin losing more and more planes (2) they had no idea where the US Carriers were, they just weren't in the harbour and any of them could come from anywhere and then get the element of surprise on them when they were weak and over-stretched (3) The mission had already been accomplished, to cripple the Pacific fleet, enough ships were sunk (4) a blockade would not have served much purpose considering all that the Base alone was capable of If they were going to do any more than what they did then it would have been two additional targets: -The fuel reserves -The dry dock. Those were pretty much the heart and soul of Pearl Harbor and would have had much wider strategic significance. Remember, the actual objective was to neutralise the Pacific Fleet, that meant that simply enough of them couldn't go to sea to intervene in the charge across the Pacific. The Pacific Fleet was not destroyed. Most of the ships had sunk in shallow water, they'd be very easy to salvage and importantly, that dry dock would be where they'd be fixed. The Pacific fleet was basically back to 100% within a year. Also the base was so good for its huge fuel stockpiles, oilers wouldn't have to travel aaaaalll the way across the Pacific to keep a large force around Pearl well stocked. Losing that fuel and losing an easy way of bringing the Pacific fleet back on-line leads to serious strategic ripples. Though this is all pretty moot, the US was reading the Japan Navy's mail, it knew everything Japan knew and Japan didn't even know their enemy knew. That alone is the key to Coral Sea, to Midway, to the death of Yamamoto. Japan was blind and stumbling in the dark with their encryption being broken that alone cut months of campaigns off.

[@10goldfinger]

There is absolutely no way the Japanese could have stayed for 2 months near PH ! One reason has been mentioned: Subs, which are not dangerous to a ship travelling fast, but very dangerous for a couple of ships loitering around. Even more dangerous: land based bombers, like the B17s. Then, Fuel has been mentioned, but they would be short of ammo very soon, too. And slow supply ships would be cannon fodder. And why should they stay? For them, it was mission accomplished - the US BBs were out for a year. Sure, they could have taken out the fuel storages at PH, but if they had cared about them, they could have done so in the first 2 waves.

[@oceanhome2023]

To command a Carrier group will age you quickly just look at some of our Task Force leaders , it’s the truth ! When ever I see this picture of Nagumo I can see the “Weight of Command” In his eyes, lesser men would have shot them selves !

[@michaelhorning6014]

Halsey would have lost all three American carriers and not sunk a single Japanese carrier.

[@Idahoguy10157]

The scenario I wonder about is Admiral Nagumo after landing his Midway strike package taking his four carriers west. Regrouping understanding the element of surprise is gone. The American carriers were waiting for him. The next day go back with new battle plan to sink the Americans

[@juggalo184]

This panel discussion was pretty useless. All they really talked about was Midway. Their conclusion was, yeah, the Japanese really didn't screw up by attacking Midway. As an additional tack-on at the end. So if Japan wins Midway? Eh... War maybe lasts another year with different officers before an inevitable Japanese defeat. Debating alternative history is pretty meaningless if the changes in choices and decisions still leads to the same outcome.

[@RememberingWW2]

juggalo1 Bingo. I am stuck on a code breaking tangent for the last 10 minutes when the guy in the middle was asked about alternative preemptive strategic initiatives.

[@kapitankapital6580]

Highlighting that such changes will not necessarily result in a different outcome can help internet "historians" learn some humility and not think that should they have sat in Hitler's chair the world would now be under the enlightened rule of the glorious Third Reich.

[@GH-oi2jf]

juggalo1 - Sure, but historians try to understand the significance of historical events and this is one way to do it. It is motivated by the tendency of some to exaggerate the importance of some events.

[@f430ferrari5]

Juggalo1 but what you don’t seem to understand is that this panel discussion simply does this to satisfy their audience. I certainly don’t think Yamamoto was “arrogant”. If anything he was overly cautious. And having a battle at any other place other than Midway wouldn’t necessarily work because Yamamoto was never certain the US would commit to a battle any place else. Midway was the right target. It was a place the US had to hold. Timing was right. Everything was there for the taking. Yamamoto even seemed to have the right number of vessels for the most part but his battle plan strategy was all wrong. All Yamamoto had to was send out a Northern Lead non carrier force out first. 2 Kongo class battleships with 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers would do it. This is the “bait”. They don’t head towards Midway. They head due east looking for the enemy US Task Force The IJN uses a similar strategy on the Southern side. They push east beyond Midway looking good be attacked. The strategy is to engage in vessel vs vessel combat. The next body of vessels which actually approach Midway Atolls are 5 battleships including Yamato which will shell Midway. They are also escorted by cruisers destroyers and subs. The carrier forces are trailing. Planes can catch up to the battleships groups and provide CAP. Now the US carrier planes are the ones with the “dilemma”. Which target does the US planes go after: If the US Task force carrier planes go out looking for the IJN carriers then they risk allowing the battleship vessels to get within striking range of their own carrier force. Task Force 17 already had the damaged Yorktown. She could barely do mid 20 knots to begin with. She was in no condition to even run from the fast Kongo class battleships which could do 30 knots. The US was in no position to get into vessel vs vessel combat either. Task Force 17 and 16 only had 8 cruisers and 15 destroyers “combined”. They were spread out separately also. They were no match to separately take on 2 battleships with 14 in guns 10 destroyers and 6 cruisers. There is no way the US would have split their carriers from the rest of the fleet and allow them to run alone while the remaining engaged the IJN vessels to slow them down. Some would have stayed with the carriers. It’s doubtful also that the US would abandon Midway Atoll and it’s men stationed there to protect it. When one side has a large vessel advantage there has to be a logical way they could have easily won. Why US historians don’t want to go in this direction is a mystery that can only be answered by them. They are not being realistic either in explaining how the US would have continually held off the IJN had the US lost at Midway. They can’t just generalize and conclude this would have extended the war for like one year. What Us historians need to explain is how did they survive through the rest of 1942. If Japan won with their battleship strategy then after destroying the US fleet the IJN would have just continued to shell and bomb Midway into submission. It’s a flat island. There is nowhere to hide. The IJN should have learned at Wake that it’s not that simple to capture an island and this time around they would bomb it day and night for several days to starve the US troops of sleep. So now the IJN has captured Midway and can now use it as a launching point to hit Hawaii once again. The US would only have Carrier Saratoga and Wasp and maybe 3 escort carriers by late August 1942 or early Sept. The first Essex carrier was not even completed until Dec 31, 1942. Even if under more desperate circumstances they could only compete by end of October. That’s 2 full months. The only vessels that the US was pumping out in late 1942 were subs, destroyers, and escort carriers and many were desperately needed and promised to the British already. The IJN was still producing some key vessels themselves. Carrier Hiyo was completed in July 1942. Battleship Musashi was completed in Aug 1942. Shokaku was repaired by this time also and the IJN would have replenished their air crew also. 3 escort carriers were also competed in Aug 1942. So look at what t the US is facing now. The IJN has 6 main carriers plus 3 mid size carriers in Junyo, Ryujo, and Hiyo and then 2 small carriers in Zuiho and Hosho. That’s 11 carriers plus 3 more escort carriers they can leave near Midway. They now have 12 battleships including 2 huge ones in Yamato and Musashi. How could the US stop this force when they barely had 3 battleships themselves. Nobody can logically explain how the US survives this situation.

[@robertdendooven7258]

@@f430ferrari5 Nimitz was more than willing to abandon Midway if the Japanese got the upper hand. If he really thought the Japanese would lead the fleet with their battleships, he could have committed his battleships (the old ones that were sent back to the West Coast) IF AND ONLY IF he thought he could surprise the Japanese with them. I don't think he thought this though, which is why he didn't want them involved. They were too slow to retreat fast enough like his carriers, cruisers and destroyers could. Japan did not have the logistical capability to bring the majority of their fleet to operate off the US West Coast. By the time they did (or could have,) the US Navy's ship building program would start to reach parity and then surpass the number of ships the Japanese had. What you don't seem to understand too is that this panel was only to promote the actual book about alternate situations. The book goes into much more detail and has many more historians contributing to it than just these three authors.

[@alejandrocantu4652]

What if the japanese attack on peal harbor destroyed the oil storage tanks. This would have crippled Fleet operations. Pushing the navy back to the west coast.

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

Yes, that was lucky. Thats the risk reward ratio though isnt it? This was Japans one big chance to just unleash carnage on the US, and they muffed it up. The planning for the attack was all focused on sinking ships, not on blowing up fuel tanks (crazy i know), anyone playing a computer game wants to see that big orgasmic explosion of a fuel tank going up...apparently not part of the plan for the well drilled IJN pilots! They missed the carriers, they missed the fuel tanks, they didnt land troops, they didnt keep sending waves of aircraft in to finish the job. Nagumo had a good reason: they were starting lose too many aircraft for his liking. He just didnt realize, in his conservative and over-scripted way, that this was there main chance. As the war dragged on the Japanese wasted their pilots in piecemeal fashion anyway (as parshall points out), so losing a few more (even all of them) in that first surprise attack on Pearl was the only sane strategy. Of course, its easy to say in retrospect, but it shows what noobs the Japanese admirals were at grand strategy. Contrast that to King: 'put them under pressure'. The guy was reputed to be a real ahole, but he was spoton, and he had a much better vision. Where the US went wrong was keeping Macarthur in charge of south pacific, putting Ghormley in charge of the Guadalcanal Campaign, etc. Fortunately that mistake was nothing compared to Japans mistakes and weaknesses.

[@jameshannagan4256]

That theory has been debunked multiple times they were much better protected than people realize and the Japanese would have lost a lot more planes and pilots because everybody knew they were there at that point even Parshall debunked that idea.

[@alejandrocantu4652]

@@jameshannagan4256 The tale of Pearl Harbor has always been about what was lost on December 7th, 1941. The damage and shock at Pearl Harbor were largely temporary. The battleships were largely resurrected to fight again. The material losses were replaced threefold. But the lasting legacy laid in what wasn’t destroyed. There was something at Pearl Harbor that escaped destruction that could have crippled the Pacific war efforts for years that wasn’t easily replaceable. Oil

[@jameshannagan4256]

Agreed but it was a low priorityfor the Japanese and it was pretty much beyond their ability to accomplish anyway that is the point.@@alejandrocantu4652

[@kevinrussell1144]

Yes, this exchange proves that "what if noodling" is mostly a waste of time. However, examining the assumptions of the participants is not "what if", nor is asking if the actions taken made sense logically and internally. Lundstrom's guess that Nagumo assumed he was already facing carrier planes early on should have been better examined. Everyone (including Nagumo) knows that single engine bombers ("carrier planes") can be staged on island landing strips. Evidence suggests the Japanese hoped for and expected (mistakenly) surprise at Midway and set up their sub screen and arranged their task forces to oppose an EXPECTED US reaction. Playing with this set up would NOT be a what if but an absurdity. The US, in contrast, confidently expected to ambush those making the air attack on Midway. The real coup, of course, was the "code breaking" and shrewd accumulation of intelligence and making sense of it. Rather than being a miracle, Midway appears to be a closely-figured gamble (and desperate would not be too strong either) by an inferior force (materially and in terms of training) using surprise as a leveling agent and getting a few breaks. God bless those American dive bombers and all those who served. No "what if" is needed.

[@livingadreamlife1428]

23 Japanese downvoted this video.

[@zzyzxRDFwy15]

3:30 John Lundstrom: What if-ing is only valid for qualified individuals who have the background, do their homework and look at the primary sources. Otherwise, sit quietly and listen to the experts. They are the only ones who can have a valid option on what if-ing history since we all know historians are always right, just like the meteorologists and economists are always right. Because they too have the background, do their homework and look at primary sources of information.

[@jameshannagan4256]

To be fair most of the armchair historians alt history ideas are pretty stupid.

[@zzyzxRDFwy15]

@@jameshannagan4256 Yeah only scholarly historians are qualified to comment on alt history. Everyone else, including none tenured historians, aren't unqualified because a scholarly elite says so. Even the people involved in the war are unqualified to comment because they did look at the primary sources even if they happen to be one of the primary sources.

[@nonyadamnbusiness9887]

Not very satisfying. I want to hear about what if we had held on to Java and had a strategy of denying Japan every drop of oil from January 1942.

[@Skoko-oh2fz]

What if ? get real !

[@gregbailey1753]

Parschall is always snooty. This is the guy who admitted he wanted to prove Fuchida lied about the flight deck of his carrier being crowded with planes but doesnt mention that the Enterprise CAG said the same thing.

[@executivedirector7467]

I don 't find him snooty at all. Smart as hell. Not snooty.

[@jameshannagan4256]

Me either some of these guys hate him because he debunked a lot of their dumb ideas like the fuel tanks at Pearl which much of was actually well protected and even if they did that very risky move that would have caused many more planes and pilots to be lost the results would have been negligible anyway. Parshall is one of many experts that have disparaged that idea but people keep thinking it was some brilliant idea anyway like the US did not think and prepare for that very thing.@@executivedirector7467

[@MegaBloggs1]

NAH some of this garbage-yamamoto was not arrogant he was cautious because he knew how strong the USN would hit back and NO nimitz was not using FOUR carriers at coral sea he used 2 despite having intelligence it was going down

[@KawasakiKiteh]

Try talking with a Japanese sometime.

[@jameshannagan4256]

Parshall has many times.

[@vincentmorgan8743]

what if japan had used thier heads and gone for the navel and air fuel right up the hill this would have stopped u.s navy cold and you keep a large group of subs around the island to take out the tankers that would be trying to resupplie pearl well what do you think.

[@treyriver5676]

vincent morgan a commonly held View but one that has certain problems first United States that are developed the ability to refuel at sea so one can assume that several tankers would have been sent to Pearl to become floating resupply tankers thus the problem of losing the oil always a matter of replacing it with the oil coming out Spindletop and California which ran most of the war anyway

[@jagsdomain203]

vincent morgan if they had destriyed the oil they would not needed to take out the navy. fortunitly lfor us the ijn did not think that taking out su]ly ships was brave so they did nit even try

[@jameshannagan4256]

That has been debunked many times including by Parshall they were much better protected and shielded than people think it would have been virtually impossible for them to do that in two more sorties never mind one more and the US was aware at that point of the Japanese and without the element of surprise they would have lost a lot more planes and pilots than they did in the first two sorties that was the main reason they did not do it. Add to that they did not know where the US carriers were and the fuel issue and submarines they rightly decided not to do that which was a logical and correct decision.

[@I_Lemaire]

The biggest "what-if" in WW2: What if Italy had never invaded Greece in October of 1940 and Germany invaded the Soviet Union in March of 1941 instead of June? Would Stalin and the Soviet Union have survived the war?

[@mikhailiagacesa3406]

yes.

[@lieshtmeiser5542]

I think the US may have had a 'germany first' rule no matter what scenario we choose; but I think that was always a mistake. Even in the history we actually have, the US focus on the germans and the atlantic, was wrong from the getgo. It is a saving grace that we had hypo and King diverting effort from the atlantic, where nothing was happening yet, to the pacific where getting the japanese on the hop at the Solomon Islands north east of Australia was a genius strategy. I suspect that the US and British only had to pressure the Nazis with strategic bombing, and stop the ground assaults after the fall of north africa, and then focus on the destruction of the Japanese, preferably with a drive into China and up to the Korean peninsular and a lot of post WW2 geopolitical issues would have been avoided. Roosevelt was too nice to Stalin to be honest. Stalin was selfish, just as we shouldve expected from a dictator of his acumen. He moved against Japan only when it was purely in his own hobby interest to do so, as he was ideologically invested in Mao winning against Chiang Kai Shek in the anticipated restart of communist revolution/civil war in china once the japanese were ejected. The surprising thing about the USA at this time in history is that they had a political system capable of building a carrier fleet and armed forces that was mostly better than the japanese and germans, but was clearly almost completely clueless about the danger of communism. The american voter of that time seems to have had no real idea about communism/stalinism/maoism, and was blindsided by the fall of china, war in korea, stalins refusal to withdrawal from eastern europe and creation of the warsaw pact countries. The US ultimately prevailed in the cold war, but the war against crazy leftist ideology has never been won. It is ongoing.

[@executivedirector7467]

Complete insanity.

[@keithdevine8281]

What was Milne Bay,where does that battle sit in themix