RELIGION - Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

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In this video we explore the chapter Religion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In the chapter on Religion Hegel attempts to work through the idea of "natural religion" as the dialectical transition from individual spirituality to the understanding of universal spirit which transcends the individual, and even transcends particular humanness. In the development of religious consciousness we have stages which manifest on the level of the religious individual experience (from simple light to the self as an art project), to the religious social experience, which splits between small-scale formation of cults, to the large-scale formation of nations. Finally, Hegel attempts to understand the ontology of revelation, as the individual who fully sensuously experiences the universal I, and as the individual who attempts to enact the divine society with other individuals who have experienced a revelation of the universal I.
First published in 1807 the foundation of philosophy was forever transformed after Hegel was capable of articulating a higher order understanding of the understanding as the becoming of spirit in history.
This video is based on a 1977 publication of Phenomenology of Spirit which was translated by A.V. Miller with a foreword by J.N. Findlay.
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[@PhilosophyPortal]

Phenomenology of Spirit playlist: kzbin.info/aero/PLZpRs2zXm-VdeiLxeNmMZudwy2BCfGIIY

[@scriptea]

What a fantastic series. Thank you.

[@thewinter7760]

The universal I goes towards absolution at its own chronological pace while the micro I among the plurality can go either quickly or slowly depending on the person. This is why people should follow wisdom for its own sake and not for an "escape" as you will still have to deal with the world like everyone else. Only when the macro I achieves its wisdom, in whatever form that takes, will mankind be free as a whole.

[@subutubiata1]

Wonderful insights. Thank you. You've brought lucidity and clarity to our understanding of Hegel. Which edition of the phenomenology are you using?

[@PhilosophyPortal]

That is listed in the description :) "This video is based on a 1977 publication of Phenomenology of Spirit which was translated by A.V. Miller with a foreword by J.N. Findlay." Thanks for your comment!

[@O.G.Rose.Michelle.and.Daniel]

Another extraordinary presentation: I send everyone here who wants to understand The Phenomenology of Spirit. I particularly appreciated the chart that broke down Individual Religion, Cult Religion, and Natural Religion-that was very helpful. And one of my favorite parts of this section is how Hegel describes Divine Revelation as causing an existential “split” between us and the world. This existential take on Revelation is much more powerful than the idea of Revelation as a foundation of a “stable community” (to me at least), a take I think is prevalent in America (which, ironically, is found in Kierkegaard, who disliked Hegel…alas…). Revelation can indeed cause “two natures to exist in one person,” a kind of “split” that makes the person “no longer feel like they ‘fit’ right with the world.” In this way Revelation can contribute to “lack,” far from a stable and carefree “religious identity” that makes life make sense. Unfortunately, if people go into religion expecting a “stable identity,” when they don’t find it, it’s easy for them to turn to rigid Fundamentalism or to be “captured” by politicians who scapegoat other groups as responsible for that anxiety. In this way, there are practical consequences if we fail to learn to live with discomfort and splits. Thanks as always, Cadell, for taking the time to make these presentations a reality.

[@PhilosophyPortal]

I suppose, connected with our conversation on "Absolute Knowledge", that Hegel's description of "Revelation" as "contributing to lack", is what I critique in those individuals who claim that they "experienced God" and now there is "no lack". What I experience is the precise opposite, that after "experiencing God", I feel an even deeper struggle with the "sensuous other", and the problems of social life/community. In other words, even "Revelation" needs to be approached dialectically. Also -- in regards to Kierkegaard "disliking" Hegel, the more I read deeply the greatest works of philosophy, the more superficial I find these "philosophical narratives" of who liked and disliked whom. I'm sure if you and I had an evening with Hegel and Kierkegaard, we would get something much more interesting in our higher order discussion then the philosophical mantras about who liked/disliked each other. Same goes for Deleuze and Hegel!

[@O.G.Rose.Michelle.and.Daniel]

@@PhilosophyPortal Thank you for the great reply, and Revelation that doesn’t cause existential anxiety is just an ideology, hardly any different from some political school of thought like Conservatism or Liberalism. Dostoevsky, O’Connor, Marcel, Berdyaev-they’re all good on that point, and I agree that Revelation needs to be approach dialectically to keep it “destabilizing us” in a constructive way. Personally, when it comes to “the history of which thinkers disliked which,” I tend to like Harold Bloom’s view, which is that thinkers tend to dislike those who they are most like. There is an “anxiety of influence” that thinkers feel which leads them to strongly attacking someone who they see themselves in, so when Kierkegaard goes after Hegel in his journals (suggesting Hegel’s entire system was “comic” because Hegel didn’t keep it a thought experiment), I proceed to assume that means Kierkegaard is “more like Hegel” versus less. Zizek makes similar moves regarding Deleuze in his book “Organs Without Bodies” (which I picked up recently), suggesting Deleuze is more Hegelian than he wants to admit (which got my wheels turning). In this way, “the history of who disliked who” can be useful as a “tip-off” that we should look for “similarities” versus dissimilarities. Where someone declares war on someone, that can be a hint of a way that person is at war with their self. (Such as how Harold Bloom would make a point to attack T.S. Eliot, only for Eliot and him to have similar theories of literary development...ah, classic...Perhaps there's no better evidence for a critical theory than for its theorist to fall into its clutches.) That said, I do think it’s fair to say we have to be careful before putting too much stock in these narratives, and I myself have never been very interested in narratives of “which side are you on?”-that seems like a waste. I also like to think about the difference between Kierkegaard “reading” Hegel and Kierkegaard “meeting” Hegel; had the second occurred (which the timelines didn’t allow), I think Kierkegaard’s take on Hegel could be entirely different. This gives me hope for the future (right or wrong), seeing as thinkers today can “meet” each other far easier than in the past, which I think will go a long way to stopping the development of “schools of thought” that declare themselves for this school and against this other one-again, a general waste of time. Writing is simply hard, and it’s just so easy to be misinterpreted, hence why Bloom sees so much of intellectual history as “a map of misreading.” That’s common in literature, and I think it’s common in philosophy too, but fortunately today thinkers aren’t so stuck just reading one another. Even modern philosophers alive at different times will now have video and audio archives of past thinkers (that are far vaster then our scattered clips of a Comisky vs Foucault debate here and a Bryan Magee conversation with Marcuse there), which I think will help mitigate misunderstandings. Now, I guess this could be bad if “misunderstandings” are a major driver of intellectual development (as Bloom also argues), but I have faith that misunderstanding will always be with us…It’s the schools declaring war on one another I think we could do without… (Though that all said, I don’t deny Deep Fakes could mess up all of this…so…yea…)

[@PhilosophyPortal]

@@O.G.Rose.Michelle.and.Daniel I love the idea that "thinkers tend to dislike those who they are most alike". This has been true in my own personal history, and also something I have suspected when I see philosophers attack each other on grounds that seem to be more emotional than logical. Funny enough, this is also what Girard's mimetic theory highlights: that similarity in the image-model of the subject (structuring desire) is what creates the competition, leading to people who should be working together, forming rivalrous dynamics. Vis-a-vis the philosophical narratives of rivalry, I do think that it is mostly being dictated by "schools of thought" which make statements that seem far too simplistic and general whenever I take the time to actually read the texts of the various philosophers. I am often shocked at how low-level the philosophical schools attacks are on a certain thinker who is apparently at war with another thinker. Whenever I read the actual texts of these thinkers, there seems to be many more points of overlap and convergence, points of interesting dialogue, then actual divergences that would lead to a breakdown in discourse.

[@O.G.Rose.Michelle.and.Daniel]

​@@PhilosophyPortal Thank you for your reply, and I do find useful the heuristic of “dislike = like,” though besides also considering dialectical possibilities, that’s the extent to which I take interest in “intellectual rivalries” “Disagreement that seeks understanding” is one thing, but entrenched dogma is entirely another. Girard is indeed useful here, and I think perhaps a reason there is a natural tendency to emphasize disagreement is because, 1) it gives me a purpose (defeating the enemy), 2) it helps me from a collective and social identity (with those who also dislike the enemy), and 3) it absolves me the responsibility to learn about those thinkers. With a simple “dislike,” I no longer have to worry about reading those books and understanding those people: I’ve basically moralized ignoring them. I think “dislike” has this function in politics today too: it’s a way to absolve myself the work of “critical thinking,” and yet it “seems like” critical thinking because I am being critical (k-no-w). Michelle and I talk a lot about the difference between “critical thinking” and “being critical,” and how those are confused all the time today. Ironically, Michelle and I think “critical thinking” actually has a lot to do with empathy (entering the intellectual framework of another person), and yet we as a society tend to associate “critical thinking” with its exact opposite, "being critical." Oh dear…Yes, "critique" has a role, but "critique" and "attacking" are not the same... It does seem to me that we as a society conflate “rivalry” with “critical thinking,” and that’s been a terrible way that academics have “rationalized” their adversarial relationships with one another (as we can act similarly in our own lives), and it’s easy to see in personal relationships too. “Being critical” gets conflated with “critical thinking,” which means “being critical” is “being deep,” and so criticism in a relationship becomes “getting real” and “taking the relationship seriously.” And this means a relationship isn’t deep unless there is fighting…hmm…Ideas have consequences, and subtle “conflations of terms” seems to be a common way that ideas wreck lives. I think a positive and necessarily role of philosophers is to keep terms from being so conflated, which has a profound and practical impact. There is no such thing as a “practical person” who lives without ideas, so ideas are just as practical as hammers and wrenches. And is a wrench “practical” when it comes to fixing a marriage? Not in a way which would end well… To “critically think” about a thinker isn’t “criticizing” the thinker, though we seem to subconsciously tell ourselves they are the same to absolve us the real and hard work of “empathy,” of trying to understand the world through the system and ideas of the thinker. “Hermeneutics of suspicion” have to be balanced with respect and care, and, to this idea, we proceeded to nod, act like we got the memo, and then proceeded to conflate “critical thinking” with “being critical.” And so we devolved into intellectual wars in which there can be no winners, only tenure…

[@DialectMaterial]

Haha, funny slip at 00:57 "I am individual but not religious".

[@PhilosophyPortal]

What a slippery absolute!

[@IgnatiusEPJ]

His use of fours here is interesting. I bet you could overlay Lacan’s four discourses and get some surprising insights. Follow the M, U, A, H order.

[@PhilosophyPortal]

Context for those interested in pursuing this line of thought: we have the individual, the cult, and the national expression of religion, all of which are subdivided into four general categories. For the individual religious expression, we have: - Light (formless divinity) - Understanding (simple form) - Art/Artificer (living form) - Ethical conscience (good, beautiful) For the cult religious expression, we have: - Collective devotion - Sacrifice of possession - Revealed enjoyment - Tamed discipline For the national religious expression, we have: - Statue/shape - Individual-living body - Epic tragedy - National comedy Whereas Lacan's four discourses can be divided between Master, University, Analytic, and Hysteric orders. This would be fun to play with!

[@subutubiata1]

I suspect self should be spelt with a capital S. It's the Atma/Brahma, not the individual, small self being