Roman Generals of the Second Punic War (feat. Sean Chick)

[@machiavelli-strategyhistor2728]

Timestamps: 1. Publius Cornelius Scipio 00:13:33 2. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus 00:22:18 3. Tiberius Sempronius Longus 00:28:41 4. Gaius Flaminius 00:40:25 5. Gnaeus Servilius Geminus 00:48:52 6. Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus 00:54:33 7. Marcus Minucius Rufus 01:07:30 8. Marcus Atilius Regulus 01:13:48 9. Lucius Aemilius Paullus 01:17:00 10. Gaius Terentius Varro 01:24:40 11. Marcus Junius Pera 01:36:04 12. Marcus Fabius Buteo 01:39:50 13. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus 01:41:29 14. Lucius Postumius Albinus 01:47:08 15. Marcus Valerius Laevinus 01:51:55 16. Marcus Claudius Marcellus 02:11:42 17. Quintus Fabius Maximus 02:22:46 18. Appius Claudius Pulcher 02:25:38 19. Quintus Fulvius Flaccus 02:30:25 20. Gnaeus Fulvius Centurnalus Maximus 02:39:05 21. Publius Sulpicius Galba Maximus 02:43:53 22. Titus Quinctius Crispinus 02:50:50 23. Titus Manlius Torquatus 02:53:09 24. Quintus Mucius Scaevola 02:57:00 25. Marcus Livius Salinator 02:58:36 26. Gaius Claudius Nero 03:11:10 27. Lucius Veturius Philo 03:22:25 28. Quintus Caecilius Metellus 03:26:34 29. Publius Licinius Crassus Dives 03:29:51 30. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus 03:34:23 31. Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus 03:51:05 32. Gaius Laelius 03:56:13 33. Marcus Junius Silanus 04:02:33 34. Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder 04:06:30 35. Marcus Cornelius Cethegus 04:09:38 36. Publius Sempronius Tuditanus 04:14:51 37. Gnaeus Servilius Caepio 04:18:14 38. Gaius Servilius Geminus 04:20:15 39. Tiberius Claudius Nero 04:22:38 40. Marcus Servilius Pulex Geminus 04:24:41 41. Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus 04:27:18 42. Publius Aelius Paetus 04:29:08 Could you please pin them?

[@spiritofmodernity9679]

Best list yet.

[@Smitchy5]

"Scipio was a Beast. The Best General Rome ever had" I would love to see a tier list that you and Sean do about comparing ancient/modern generals. Such as Scipio, Hannibal, Alexander, Caesar, Trajan, Napoleon, Suvarov, Grant/Lee and many others just to compare their standing and military capabilities.

[@etemytradel4509]

Scipio was good but you are overlooking varrus, crassus and varro

[@geordiejones5618]

Grant and Lee are nowhere near these guys and I'm an American. We've never had a general that's better than Wellington let alone Suvorov, Archduke Charles, Davout, Lannes, Soult

[@datguy8006]

@@geordiejones5618I wouldn’t put them down that much. Winfield Scott did apparently gain praise from old Wellington during his Mexico City Campaign. When he first heard he was abandoning his supply lines and going to live off the land to take the capital, Arthur is supposed to have said “Scott is lost” and Reportedly to have said after the campaign that it “Was unsurpassed in military annals” and that he had proven himself “The greatest living soldier” Now I dunno about all that. Seems a bit much for him to have said. But I would find some kind words believable. Scott’s campaign was pretty brilliant. Also I’d say we definitely had better than Charles. He’s probably the weakest on your list. That is partly because he was sidelined for the rest of the conflict after Wargram. He did usually outnumber opposing forces and usually had equal or more casualties around that time. But granted that was against Napoleon.

[@russianthotbot6997]

​@@datguy8006Lee was a superb commander. He had a couple bad days, but he won almost every battle he committed to, or achieved his objective if outright victory was unattainable. They're were times he demonstrated genuis, masterfully orchestrating very complex and tedious battle tactics that were successful. Grant was a good general too in my opinion. He's criticized for being callous about the slaughter of his army while attaining victory, well he won didn't he?!! That butcher, as he was called, was the last kinda guy you want to fight in a war of attrition, when you're running out of everything. The civil war should never be dismissed or poo poo'd it absolutely had it all, every kind of combat, diverse theaters, modern and classical, and tons of amazing warriors on both sides.

[@doritofeesh]

@@datguy8006 In the case of Davout and Lannes, they should be compared with our corps rather than army commanders. In which case, Longstreet, Jackson, Early, and Thomas had a few performances approaching these guys, but I don't think their track record is as long as the two French marechals. Soult's record is mixed, to say the least, because on one hand, he mostly danced on the graves of the Spanish and Portuguese, but on the other, his operational manoeuvres were not always successful even if he was a good tactician. At Albuera, he tried to manoeuvre on Beresford's rear to assume the central position and defeat him in detail before the Spanish came up, but due to misinformation from his intelligence network, he didn't know that the Allies had already joined together and heavily outnumbered him, and fought a bloody draw in which he came off arguably worse. In the Pyrenees Campaign, he tried to pull a concentric manoeuvre through the mountains to concentrate on Wellington's right flank, lift the Siege of Pamplona, and threaten the Allied communications, but he's also moving through mountainous terrain shrouded by fog, had insubordinate officers like D'Erlon, and was working with second-rate or raw troops against Wellington's veterans. Overall, I think he worked under way harder circumstances than Grant did, campaigning hundreds to over a thousand miles from French strategic bases without the convenient course of a river like the Mississippi and before railroad technology was available, while simultaneously fending off guerilleros. Though, at the same time, I can't say that he was as successful as Grant either. I also don't think he's as good as Lee. I think Lee was better than Erzherzog Karl (the famous Archduke Charles), but it's hard to tell whether Grant was. Karl's 1796 Campaign was nearly as brilliant as Lee's Chancellorsville Campaign, where outnumbered 3:2, he bounced back between two French armies threatening his flanks, outmanoeuvring both Jourdan and Moreau and driving them back across the Rhine River. In 1797, I don't blame him one bit because Austrian high command forced him to act against his wishes and he was helpless to follow them. Our generals were never interfered with anywhere near as much as Karl had been in 1797, and he got thrashed by Napoleon for it, understandably. In 1799, he did outnumber Jourdan and Massena and did the same as he had in 1796 again, utilizing his central position and defeat in detail to maul Jourdan before swinging around to try and encircle Massena via a concentric manoeuvre, which Massena defeated in detail by smashing one of his corps and checking him behind entrenched positions shortly thereafter. He then had to bail north to protect his lines of communication when Jourdan's army renewed the counteroffensive (though under a new commander). In 1805, some may think he was too dilatory despite having far superior numbers to Massena in Italy, but Napoleon had destroyed Mack's army at Ulm, so if he went on full aggression and drove Massena back west, it would leave his rear totally overextended for Napoleon to sweep down and encircle him, so I can see why he didn't play riskily, but this campaign wasn't particularly good on his end and Massena overall did better than him. In the end, Napoleon's strategy worked, the French army group assumed the central position at Vienna, drove him into Hungary, and separated him from the other Allies to the north, who got annihilated at Austerlitz. In 1809, he started the campaign off very well, seized the central position between Davout and the rest of the Grande Armee, driving him towards the Danube River to try and encircle him Vicksburg or Ulm-style... except Napoleon came up at lightning speeds, reverse UNO-card, did the same thing to him, cut the Austrian army group in half, and sent him packing with the Austrians having lost 4 battles before Aspern-Essling and Wagram happened. I think he did well at Aspern-Essling and Wagram, but it's clear that he did not have any real decisive successes to his name. I will say that he didn't usually outnumber his foes, though. In the overall area of operations, he was pretty outnumbered in 1796, 1797, and had equal numbers in 1809. He only really outnumbered his foes in 1799 and 1805. That, and unlike Grant or Lee, who mostly fought lackluster opposition (exceptions being each other and Meade in Lee's case), Karl only ever fought excellent generals in Napoleon and Massena, a good general in Moreau (albeit inexperienced in 1796), as well as Jourdan (brilliant in 1794, but was even more unlucky than Karl the rest of his career). His health was also of a poor constitution, as he was sick through most of his life. In the end, I think Wellington was the better tactician, but Karl was better at operations and strategy, just a lot more unlucky. Had he fought opponents as incompetent as all of Grant's foes (minus Lee) or as lackluster as the majority of Lee's enemies, I can see him thrashing them. Napoleon and him were also arguably the first army group commanders in the Age of Gunpowder, and they did it without the advantage of telegraph technology. Honestly, if you took away Napoleon coming to the rescue in 1809 and put the passive Johnston in his place, then replaced Davout with Pemberton, Karl probably wins a victory as big as Vicksburg. Regarding Massena, Suvorov, and Wellington, I think they're all better than Grant, but I can't say they're that much better than Lee. On one hand, I think Lee might be a better tactician than them on his best days, but neither Massena nor Wellington were slouches. In operational manoeuvres, I think Wellington has the likes of Rosecrans or Sherman beat and is up there with Grant, but he typically outnumbered his foes in the area of operations (even if not completely within a single battle). Suvorov also outnumbered the French in 1799 and the foes he had to face in Scherer and MacDonald were really bad. Moreau was the only good French general present that campaign. However, I can't find many flaws at all in Suvorov's operations, especially in his Adda River forcing, which resembled 20th century Soviet deep battle strategy in achieving a breakthrough, as well as his usage of the central position to smash MacDonald in detail at Trebbia before Moreau could save him. That, and as a marcher, he was lightning quick. If people think Lee and Jackson were fast, Napoleon and Suvorov were on another level with their rapid marches. Massena in his prime was a beast. Aside from being a corps commander up there with Davout and Lannes in ability, he was also amazing at independent command, utilizing his central position and defeat in detail to beat his foes on several occasions in 1799, including pulling a larger scale version of Chancellorsville, where he destroyed one enemy army under Korsakov at 2nd Zurich before doubling back to try and encircle Suvorov's army in the Alps. Suvorov got away, but lost half his army due to other factors due to Massena severely hampering his communications. He essentially destroyed two armies in a single year and knocked the Russians out of the War of the 2nd Coalition. In 1800, he held out against overwhelming odds in the Siege of Genoa, despite a significant portion of his forces being in the hospitals due to a typhus epidemic, dealing the enemy greater losses while buying time for Napoleon to pull through with his operations and cut Melas' communications. When he could not hold the city any longer, his heroic performance had earned his men and him the right to march out with the honours of war. In 1805, despite being heavily outnumbered by Karl, he made a bold outflanking attack, and had his subordinate, Verdier, listened to him, Massena likely would have won a clean victory at Caldiero. Verdier ignored his orders because he thought Austrian reinforcements were closing on his rear, though (even tho they were 10 miles away) and attacked Karl in front instead of outflanking him, which let the Austrians get away. He still did a good post-battle pursuit and encircled a significant chunk in Venice, dealing his enemies about 5x the losses he suffered in that campaign. In 1810-1811, he lost to Wellington, but what many don't get was that Wellington heavily outnumbered him in the area of operations, was on the defensive, while Massena was operating well over 1,000 miles away from French strategic bases in mountainous terrain with bad roads, his communications threatened by Spanish guerilleros and Portuguese ordenanzas, while he faced insubordination from incompetent officers and lack of cooperation from his fellow marechals (who typically didn't work well when Napoleon wasn't present to personally reign them in). It was an impossible situation for any general to face, so I don't really fault him for losing here, as circumstances did more to undo him than a bad performance on his part. Anyways, yeah. That's how I would compare those guys to our generals over here in the States. I do think geordie is right if we're talking Roman generals, though. The best Roman commanders are definitely far better than our own and better than all of the Napoleonic Era generals I mentioned above, sans Napoleon. Not even talking about Caesar, guys like Scipio, Sulla, Lucullus, Sertorius, and Pompeius would cream the majority of American or European generals.

[@iratespartan13]

Good stuff. Amazing that the Roman's were able to recover from Hannibal's early successes.

[@ufframnohoboaaru249]

This channel might be small but it has the best discussion as of yet

[@crackshack2]

30:30 this is why I love this channel. Your content and commentary are excellent!

[@larryhall2873]

This is quality! After you do this for the Carthaginian side, could you do more Roman wars, potentially the commanders of the Mithridatic Wars and the Social War among others. Would be great to see!

[@ThersitestheHistorian]

We will do more Romans at some point for sure. Not really sure of the schedule as of yet, but the Carthaginian and allied commanders probably won't be too far off in the distance.

[@nickcitron2369]

I second that!!!

[@austinhenning1022]

Definitely yes to the Carthaginian/Allied list, whenever you're able to get to it. Very good list btw--I learned some new Roman commanders I never heard of before.

[@Harryjay6]

The intro to this is fantastic. Well done.

[@yingyang1008]

Elephant burgers must have kept a lot of those troops alive in the alps

[@stipicaradic]

I really enjoyed this one.

[@TheWazzoGames]

Hey thersites, could you make a video on The Kingdom of Two Sicilies? It's barely talked about

[@grandmastertaco3022]

What are the odds we could get a tier list from one or more of the civil wars in the first century bc? I'd be curious to see where you'd stack Caesar vs. Agrippa vs. Pompey Magnus. I mean, clearly Caesar wins...

[@ThersitestheHistorian]

Pretty decent. Lists considering the Late Republic will also have to take into account political skills since political maneuvering in the Senate and the before the Assembly was very important to one's success.

[@grandmastertaco3022]

@@ThersitestheHistorian Understood, though I think that might push Antony from E to F. In that case, would the list also include relatively civilian figures? I'm very curious to hear your opinion on Cato, specifically.

[@x0UncleSam0x]

If you could upload notes for the lists or at least a list of the names (maybe even with time stamps) it would be easier to follow and remember what was said :).

[@chamorvenigo]

At 01:1:47, regarding Fabius Maximus, I would like to add two things: i. What happened to all those captured Roman soldiers that the Senate refused to pay ransom? Were the captured soldiers executed? What's stopping the family of these soldiers from paying the ransom money personally? If that is the case, then those 2 legion worth of disgraced soldiers serving in Sicily since Cannae (216 to 205 BCE) would have make more sense. As usual, we have the idealized story: "Romans fight till the last man" and the read-between-the-line story. If we were to think that Hannibal's magic tactical confinement isn't just good for slaughtering Romans, but it is also good for capturing Romans; then it is a lot easier to understand why the Fabian strategy works. ii. Why bother paying attention to overseas territories while Rome can't even held on the gains in the Italian peninsula? I believe Fabius was looking at the current system of treaties that Rome was implementing with her socii and trying to imagine the same complex system in Iberia. It will be a few more years before the Romans stumble upon the formula for overseas territories - by selling the idealized version of the Republic. That unlike the Carthage who is just about money, Rome is about being the ideal warrior (and later age farmer).

[@doritofeesh]

Thersites also didn't study Fabius enough to see that his career went beyond just the Siege of Tarentum, but that he had beaten the Ligurians in the past before the 2nd Punic War. Also, throughout the 2nd Punic War, in the Italian theater, Fabius had taken Compulteria by siege twice, in addition to Trebula, Saticula, Casilinum, Caudium, Telesia, Compsa, Fugifulae, Orbitanum, Blanda, Aecae, Arpi, and Manduria. Counting the action at the Ager Falernus, that's a career of 17 engagements, of which 15 are sieges (all successful). He also doesn't seem to realize that Fabius was more a manoeuvrer than a tactician. That by taking those fortified settlements by siege, he was reducing the Italic allies of Hannibal and, at times, cutting his communications by taking certain posts, which would otherwise have allowed Hannibal to supply himself off of allied territory. By directing the army group consisting of Gracchus, Marcellus, and himself (between 100,000 to 200,000 strong), he was always in a constant moving encirclement around Hannibal; the final evolution of the Ager Falernus operational plan. Utilizing the superior numbers at his disposal, the armies would seize Italic strongholds which could transport supplies to Hannibal, while denying him requisition and forage by contesting Carthaginian foraging operations. Hannibal could not move on any one of them, because they placed themselves in well fortified settlements and he lacked the siege equipment necessary to assault such formidable positions held by tens of thousands of men. Nor could he starve them out because their local superiority within the region he was in would mean that he would sooner starve before he could force one of them to capitulate by privation. This was also why he couldn't take Roma. If he tried to move elsewhere to forage and restore his lines of communication with other Italic allies, then the Roman army group under Fabius would just close in and destroy one of his other allies in detail. Most notably, the ally which was often threatened was Capua. The encirclement set itself up in the surrounding region of Capua, such that if Hannibal wanted to protect this ally, he would be whittled down slowly by lack of supplies and small skirmishes. All the while, any one of the three Roman generals could go elsewhere using their central position on the wider scope to intercept Italic reinforcements, defeating Hannibal's other allies in detail, or cut off supplies into the region. If Hannibal left Capua to save his other allies, the Romans can close in and besiege Capua instead. It becomes a game of cat and mouse, except there are three cats and they each have the patience under the pack leader's directive to corner the mouse until it is weak, starves, and becomes easy prey. Of course, such a strategy is possible because Fabius had superior numbers, but what is often forgotten is the Ager Falernus Campaign (the manoeuvres leading up to it and after), where Fabius had parity of numbers against Hannibal, yet a clear inferiority in quality of men. He also understood that he was no match for Hannibal tactically. Therefore, it is seldom understood by people just how bold Fabius was to undertake manoeuvres, march alongside Hannibal, threaten his rear and communications, while conducting scorched earth ahead of his path. Doing so, knowing that you were the inferior commander with an inferior army is not something even a good commander could do. You have to be very good or excellent to achieve such a thing, and not only survive, but garner Hannibal's respect for your shrewd generalship. When Fabius had the overwhelming numbers necessary to enact his operations on a wider scale, the jig was up for Hannibal. If he could not destroy Fabius when he was at his weakest, how could he hope to do so when the man had superior resources? Of course, Carthage also deserves blame for its failure to support Hannibal. Sending your winning general 4,000 horsemen and a couple elephants when the enemy has 100,000-200,000 men seems like something Justinian would have done to Belisarius. It is completely inadequate support.

[@Sditchvampire]

I love these lists. My favourite channel on KZbin

[@Harryjay6]

I've thought for a long time that Hannibal's army ate most of those elephants.

[@rascalferret]

down to bone soup...

[@larryhall2873]

Also about the biggest casualties in a single day of battle point that Sean made. Whilst Cannae is still the single largest amount of casualties for one side of battles in a single day, the largest cumulative casualties of both sides in a battle is, I think, Borodino. But it’s still crazy to think about how long that Cannae has held that record

[@ThersitestheHistorian]

It is pretty nuts to think about how many men Hannibal slaughtered without the aid of a single firearm and how that number has not been surpassed even with vastly larger forces squaring off in the two World Wars.

[@bengerber735]

In terms of a single day? 3rd Panipat in 1761 (Duranni vs. Maratha) might be it. ~100,000 deaths in one day apparently.

[@EnvoyofChaos31]

This may be a bit late now, but would the battle of Aurasio, or some of the battles from Chinese history like the Red Cliffs rival Cannae in terms of casualties suffered by a single side in a single day?

[@blue-pi2kt]

​@@ThersitestheHistorianit helps when they bring absurdly dense formations of humans to slaughter in situ as opposed to 20th century combined arms warfare.

[@modernguru4245]

Haha that picture is Atilla the Hun, not Ghengis Khan....lol

[@egoborder3203]

I wonder why native Roman cavalry was so bad? If I remember correctly, when Julius Caesar was going up against the cavalry-superior patrician forces in the civil war, his men were anxious about their cavalry deficiency. Caesar told them to aim their spears at the faces of the horsemen, who were rich boys untested in battle. Was this seriously never remedied by the Romans?

[@luciano9755]

Not during the Republican era, but later on they were able to kick some ass against other big enemies. Rome survived for so long because they adapted and knew their weaknesses, which doesn't mean they would get rid of incompetent generals, as later events will tell us.

[@TuesdaysDusk1]

Very good stream

[@RiteKnight]

May Sean rest (in bed) in peace. Sleep deprivation aint no fun

[@Kwodlibet]

A great presentation and discussion, terrible shame your volume levels are so mismatched - when yo sound OK but Sean "shouts" directly into m brain, if I lower the volume so Sean sounds like a human should I can barely hear you :/ Still, good stuff.

[@MaxwellAerialPhotography]

There is no way that Lucius Postimius Albinus lost 25000 men in an ambush, that would make it bigger than the losses in the Teutoburg Forest. and i've never even heard of this battle before.

[@Yrkr785]

he did, the only reason you dont hear of it is because it occurred pretty close to Cannae and everything that happened was overshadowed by Cannae

[@SuperMrFriendly]

Kinda same with arausio. Ppl rarely know, much less how impactful it was in optimates panic causing massive populist reforms, paving way for populist leaders and empire to come...

[@yingyang1008]

I still don't get how Rome survived Cannae, defies belief how many men and leaders they losed

[@buildingandfixing4397]

dope

[@maesmydog6691]

I really would like to hear an explaination on how most of the Punic Generals screwed things up so badly in the 1st like in the 2nd war against rome. It seems like they have a -20% morale/competence malus in every situation by game default.

[@ThersitestheHistorian]

I am researching that now. I think that quite a bit of the problem boils down to having a worse military system.

[@Rex-gu1bu]

Paullus is responsible for Cannae, not Varo.

[@seanmac1793]

They are both responsible

[@jannarkiewicz633]

88 lines about 44 women.

[@johnmichael442]

Interesting Agrippa wasn’t considered for the best Roman general.

[@ThersitestheHistorian]

Agrippa is top ten, but I don't think he was tested as much or had the opportunities for sustained major victories that the other four had.

[@alexd.alessandro5419]

Nice show, but thé guy laughing in a very hot mic is obnoxious and a distraction .

[@causantinthescot]

Varro was the easiest to put in the list.

[@joelrebollar7055]

This is a comment for the algorithm.

[@kennethknoppik5408]

42? Why not 43 hahaha

[@papageitaucher618]

I don't get why Sean is so adament on looking on results. If youre mainly looking on results then your deciding factor is likely to be luck, and not actual skill

[@grandmastertaco3022]

Well, that's an opinion really, which while I tend to agree, how else can you possibly measure skill in a luck based enterprise like war?