Graham Priest - 2. Why is logic important?

LOGIC: A SHORT INTRODUCTION - Lecture 2
Graham Priest, CUNY Graduate Center (NY), University of Melbourne

[@ivanboyraz2936]

Thanks for putting the series together.

[@humbertoluebbert7968]

a wonderfull oportunity to learn from Graham some Logic. Thanks to you

[@luyombojonathan6688]

Thanks alot for this work

[@Amaterasu_990]

VERY interesting, especially from about 8.37 to the end. Thank you! I have something there to keep in mind for my future studies in metaphysics.

[@ThunderSnowTV]

Great video

[@nandreuc]

Thank you 👍

[@haSHAH1]

I felt ASMR

[@morealot]

It is not obvious to me what constrains what counting logic per se and metaphysics per se! Assuming that there is some thing at a well defined position pre-sumes a lot of ontology. So going even further in pre-sumption.. then one can say that Hegel proclaims dialetheism.. the truth of some contradictions... On the other hand... Hegel, as I get his idea.. is fighting sceptisism.. so it's not plausible to make of him an ultra-sceptic arguing that there are no things and if there are anyway (a true sceptic would absolutely not argue to know anything absolutely even concerning negations) they are not anywhere and if they are somewhere anyway.. where is that.. etc. ad infinitum (the argument concering Hegel is pretty much: Is he a silly idealist.. or is he also a materialist.. all the way up to.. is he a realist deteminist.. etc etc). If we accept QM to some degree.. and relativity in physics to some degree.. and the idea of truth in a model where the model is coherent (intelligable) and internally taken to be consistent propositions.. than most models can model several things... A nice example here is the map. For the map to be abolute it should map the map. Zooming in on the map in the map.. should then render the map... mapping the map.. mapping the map.. etc Taking the form af the map-proposition to be a generic model.. then such a model of the map can serve as model of circular reasoning to. I take dialetheism to be circular. It goes like this: Take as logical convention that it can be true that A and not-A and that it is not always true that it is never true that A or not A. Then for some A it is neither true nor false. Now zoom in on A and not A. We have the liar: If it is true it is false and if it is false it is true. Fine! That goes with intuition.. and sound right.. But without linking that to some ontology (what is "it", what is it to be true.. what is it to be false. ) it is not going to go anywhere in any argument without som more logical convention. Let's add material implication and truth-tables. So.. now.. swapping the if-- then.. with some combination of "or" and "and" and stating a proper use.. we can deduce: A and not A. It's circular based on ontological pre-sumption (fantasm) and ad hoc definitions that fit the pre-sumptions. :-) I maintain that Hegel.. precisely by sticking to something similar to what we nowadays call classical logic.. shows how ower metaphysics is absolutely incomplete... :-)