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The war in Ukraine is one of relentless attrition. While territory usually only changes hands extremely slowly, munitions and equipment and destroyed and consumed at prodigious rates in a fires-dominated slugging match.
In that kind of struggle, the endurance of a military may owe a lot to the pipeline of replacement equipment that supports it.
For Ukraine, that largely means looking into the details of foreign equipment provision and some Ukrainian domestic production.
But for Russia, without as many allies to call on, one of the key factors is probably defence industrial output, a topic which is widely contested in news and propaganda. According to some sources, Russia produces enough equipment to overpower all of NATO alone, acording to those on the other extreme, it produces little of value or quality.
In this episode, I try to dive into Russian data as well as battlefield loss observations to try and get an understanding of where the truth lies. Trying to understand how much equipment Russia may be producing, and what that means for its ability to sustain a long, hard-fought war.
Patreon:
/ perunau
Caveats and Corrections:
All normal caveats and disclaimers apply (yes including the non-reliance and non-financial-advice provisions, please don't trade defence stocks based on YT videos)
At one point a slide refers to it being 'reported' that the Russian defence budget has already spent 1T Rubles on salaries in the first half of 2023 - It is important to clarify that the inclusion of statements as 'reported' does not represent endorsement of their accuracy. I have no solid information on paid out salaries and allowances in Russia in Q1&2 2023
Reading/sources:
Julian Cooper (published in SIPRI) - RUSSIA’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE DURING ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE
www.sipri.org/sites/default/f...
Julian Cooper (published in SIPRI) -IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL BUDGET DURING JANUARY-JULY 2022 AND SPENDING ON THE MILITARY
www.sipri.org/sites/default/f...
Shoigu saying the SDO in 2023 will be 1.5x 2022
rg.ru/2022/11/30/shojgu-v-202...
TASS on Septmber 2022 budget submissions
tass.com/defense/1514879
Rostec - supply of Tu-160 engines
rostec.ru/news/odk-postavit-m...
Medvedev saying things:
tass.com/defense/1526773
tass.com/defense/1666259
Putin 2.7x figure
tass.com/politics/1631641
Borisov on the Russian defence sector:
vpk.name/news/613140_borisov_...
Chemezov interviews:
rostec.ru/news/mikhail-mishus...
vpk.name/en/755227_sergey-che...
en.kremlin.ru/events/president...
Institut Action Résilience Research piece
institutactionresilience.fr/p...
The 1,500 T-90M and T-14 thing
en.topcor.ru/33467-military-w...
Jamestown foundation pieces (by Pavel Luzin)
jamestown.org/program/russias...
jamestown.org/program/russian...
Rosstat industrial data:
rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/doc...
rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediab...
Reuters reporting on military production
www.reuters.com/world/europe/...
Pavel Luzin (for FPRI) - Russia's military industry forecast 2023-2025
www.fpri.org/article/2023/04/...
Destruction of the Minsk
kyivindependent.com/uk-defens....
Timestamps:
00:00:00 - Russian Defence Production 2023
00:01:34 - What Am I Talking About
00:02:47 - Assessing Defence And Industrial Production
00:10:11 - Budgets
00:17:38 - Corporates And Workforces
00:23:27 - Output Measures
00:27:54 - What's Going On In The Russian Data?
00:31:45 - Russian Equipment Patterns
00:50:40 - The Drone Effort
00:58:26 - What About Sanctions
00:59:55 - Endurance And A Changing Russian Army
01:03:08 - Scenarios And Failure Points
01:08:09 - Conclusions
01:09:58 - Channel Update