Searle: Philosophy of Mind, lecture 10

[@Svetashev123]

00:00 - Watson on Jeopardy 16:43 - The solution to the mind-body problem 28:17 - Biological naturalism 42:43 - Objections 47:21 - The answer to the objections 58:36 - Why does that seem so hard for us to swallow?

[@OnceUponASpace]

1. The Upward and Downward Lowenhiem-Skolem Theorems of Model Theory (fundamental theorems of mathematical language) demonstrate that "syntax is not semantics", more specifically that syntax is not sufficient to capture the entirety of meaning. Godel's Theorem (fundamental theorem of logic) demonstrates that "logic is not reason", more specifically that logic is not sufficient to capture the entirety of rational thought. (cotd.)

[@OnceUponASpace]

4. Computer scientists often forget or are unaware that not all of maths and physics is about the algorithmic and the computable, or they see this as unimportant, and believe that the universe is in a strong sense a UTM or UTM + random number generator. There is no particular reason to believe this. Current models of physics look more like an analogue computer + random number generator with a discretisation schema, which does not have identical capabilities to a UTM (cotd.)

[@OnceUponASpace]

...3 Another example is the mathematical universe of "polyminoes", a well defined mathematical "toy universe" that is fully mechanistic and deterministic with no randomness but which is not perfectly simulable on a computer. How these issues of non-computable maths play out in modern physical theories such as quantum field theory is hotly debated, it's also an open question whether a quantum computer is equivalent to UTM + random number generator or not. (cotd.)

[@johannesbrinz4245]

Does anybody know wich papers he talks about when he says "the articles I make you read"?

[@ZacharyBittner]

Chatgpt: Mary Leakey, the renowned paleoanthropologist, had the typical human anatomy with ten fingers on her hands. John Searle: "I'm going to explain why it can't answer questions like that" Oh no... John...

[@RoscoeKane]

Thanks for the great reply! So if my mind is not algorithmic, what can it do that is beyond algorithm? Also, forgive my limited knowledge of the capabilities of different sorts of machines, but can a analog computer do things that a UTM cannot? What sorts of things? I agree that while the universe seems likely to be technically finite, at our level of experience continuums are more useful models. Thanks for your time!

[@davidfost5777]

I'm always looking for new interesting lectures on Psychology/Philosophy, please let me know if you guys have any recommendations, would be highly appreciated

[@OnceUponASpace]

6. (last!) You *can* make a flight to strict finitism if you wish to preserve a fully algorithmic picture of the universe. This is rather a stretch though - you won't get a science that can be used to build bridges out of it, and to me it seems implausible and doctrinaire to reject the majority of the mathematical/physical cannon in this way.

[@jameskanarek4528]

I think that the metaphysical question that must be first answered is 'what is intelligence?'. Isn't the Chinese room partially representative of how the brain actually functions? If learn three concepts of philosophy of mind in depth, and talk about them, you would automatically assume that I am intelligent, at least in that subject; where as all I have done is memorized a lot of syntax without any full semantic understanding of the concepts of which I would be talking about. Is it not also possible that most inter personal communication and indeed most 'mind function' are 'automatic responses' carried out without true thought in a Chinese room style? Many of us go through life in this state, faking it, living the illusion according to oriental philosophies and religions.Could it not be that if you get enough layers of multiple syntax simultaneously then the semantics are 'created' from the syntax?

[@OnceUponASpace]

... 2. Searle is not a mystic, he's pointing out that "All computers are machines, but not all machines are computers", (where computer is used in the ordinary sense of a Universal Turing Machine). Indeed there are any number of possible machines that can achieve more than strictly algorithmic results. For example, a UTM + random number generator can beat a plain UTM (with pseudo-random number generator) in certain game-theoretical contexts. (cotd.)

[@RoscoeKane]

So a computer manipulates symbols and produces an output from the input according to rules. This is purely syntactical. Fine. We can do this also. Great. But then it is claimed that we can do something a computer cannot, that is, assign meaning (semantics). Maybe I am missing something in the definition of "meaning", but I don't see that there is anything about assigning meaning that goes beyond what computation can accomplish. Where is it shown that my mind can do something a computer cannot?

[@MrPatrickDayKennedy]

Semantics is more than just assigning meaning - as if meaning assignment were the assignment of a value to a variable. See Searle on Intentionality.

[@OnceUponASpace]

...5. And it's even possible that one day deeper descriptions of physics will rely on the mathematics of infinitary languages + oracle machines, for instance. So it's highly likely that your brain is a machine but not a computer, and that your mind is capable of reason but not algorithmic. Sorry for the long reply, it's just that the commonly held notion that "the universe is a computer/algorithm" bugs me somewhat. There no real evidence for this, and i find it rather implausible. (cotd.)

[@paulk8224]

i cant help but it seems to me, that searle HAS TO say that cs exist in a different ontological realm than neuronal activity. it doesnt work to say its just different level of description. for just using a different vocabulary doesnt cause a thing to split into two (and since searle insists on denying (materialism-) identity-theory, there have to be two different entities). that only works in the case of observer-relative entities: "a sheet of paper" and "a 100 dollar bill" may be two descriptions of the same thing but still - and in a peculiar sense just in virtue of the act of describing it as such - referring to two different entities; one observer-independent and one observer-relative. but one cant do that for cs, that would be circular. for the whole point of any theory of the mind has to be to explain what an observer, what subjectivity and the associated quality (qualia) (etc) is. and indeed, later on, it seems, searle actually makes such an "vertical" or "emergence-distinction" between two REAL "levels"; between the mere, so to speak, "heap" of neurons and their meaningless activity and the same as a system, as a self-identical indivisible entity. but such an conception implies - at least - a sort of dualism; maybe even "multi-dimensionalism". for, if it isnt a way of seeing things - and thus an observer-relative fact -, there has to be something which differentiates the heap of neurons from the cs, theyre producing. as liquidity doesnt have to be (actually isnt) a thing like trees and dogs are, cs doesnt has to. but still theyre entities (with freges words "Gegenstände") and im afraid thats enough to say that they have to have SOME mode of existence. and since cs is said to exist and neurons are said to exist and since it is said that they arent identical (and since cs cant be an observer-relative entity), there have to be AT LEAST two different realms, two different dimensions or "levels" and neurons exist in the one and cs in the other. if this werent enough dualism/"multidimensionalism", searle also makes the typical "horizontal" or "depth-" distinction: there are two irreducible realms of existence: is the first person (what it is like to be that system) and the third person (what it is like to see that system). whats dualism if thats not? searle says he denies that cs exists in an different ontological realm and a few minutes later he states, that cs is ontological subjective whereas neurons are ontological objective - is there smth i missed or is he contradicting himself?

[@timtopsnav]

Could be a real pattern, whether that's exactly what he's thinking of or not, I'd say it fits. In that case you dont need more "stuff". A real pattern is basically a thing, anything, say a table, any phenomenon which compresses information or lower levels of ontology. So the table exists, but doesn't need more physical stuff. And consciousness could exist in this way - it would therefore be identical to 'some' neuron firings or other, but not by virtue of 'which' neuron firings exactly, just like the table is identical to certain wood molecules, but not by virtue of which ones, rather by virtue of which fit into the pattern that compresses information. In this way real patterns 'supervene' on lower level ontology, their components that is. So it wouldn't be the usual identity story of "mental phenomenon X is identical with neuron firings y" but that the whole conscious state at any given time supervenes on certain neuronal firings

[@paulk8224]

@@timtopsnav Id say, "real patterns" are observer-relative. A table is not a table to say an ant but only to humans, because it serves a certain function for them. But lets take another example: is a tree a "real pattern"? A tree is a tree observer-independently. But if a tree is a real pattern, certainly brains are real patterns. But if brains and conciousness are both real patterns, this concept doesnt have any explanatory value.

[@timtopsnav]

Real patterns are observer independent according to their proponents. They are there for any investigator to find. One of the benefits of the view is that we can say objects exist while not committing to ontology in the ether so to say, universals and so on. That's because the real patterns really are there, open for empirical investigation, as opposed to intellectual investigation of abstract objects. So cs being a real pattern wouldn't be dualism. I'm not quite sure what you mean by brains being real patterns contradicts cs being real patterns. Necessarily, higher level real patterns are realised in lower level real patterns.

[@paulk8224]

@@timtopsnav Sorry, i´m not that deep into the matter anymore and tbh I think i never heard of "real patterns". So this might cause some misunderstanding. But judging on what I wrote years ago an what you wrote now, I´d say this concept lacks the concise distinctions Searle makes and than repeats his mistakes (those, I were criticising). A table is not identical to a certain conglomeration of molecules. Given just the molecules, it could also be a bench or a shrine. A table is an observer relative object. Of course, the molecules are necessary for there to be a table, but they´re not sufficient - an interpreter is needed who makes them a table by giving them a certain function, making them useful. Calling a table a "real pattern", I think, denies this fact and states, that the concept of a table has a physical, objective ("out there") existence. That would be simply false. And I think that is the crux of the "real pattern" anyway. I mean, lets analyse the wording: "real" and "pattern". Taken for themselves: is cs real? duh. Is cs a pattern? well, thanks for the conversation... So whats the achievement of the combination? I guess "real" is not meant to be opposed to "unreal" (like there also being "unreal patterns"), but its meant in the ontological "out there", "observer independent" sense. So why is it necessary to put the "real" in front of "pattern"? Because patterns are precisely not "out there", but depend on an interpreter. A pattern is a meaningful arrangement of objects/entities and it gets its meaning by the intentionality of a subject. So the creation of the "real pattern" is actually intentionally a self contradiction and thus unable to explain anything. It would be like saying cs is a straight curve. And that there are "higher" and "lower level" real patterns doesn´t add anything new to the discussion (emergence etc)...

[@timtopsnav]

@@paulk8224 it seems you're thinking of natural kinds, like gold or species, which one could also claim that consciousness is. That's not in conflict with real patterns, indeed they are real patterns (usually). And it seems you're thinking of real patterns the wrong way, which is of course not strange if it's unfamiliar to you! Molecules, planets, quarks (if and when we find a lower level) are all real patterns on this view. A different species might call molecules something else, they might interact with them in a different way, and they might miss them (because of different sense organs, or because of being the size of electrons, or the size of a galaxy). But they're there for anyone to find. Of course there'll be cases that are up for discussion, but the idea with tables as an example is that our use of them, our thoughts of them and their cultural significance is one thing, but the real pattern part is just concerning the table as a solid object. We could think of a stone if that makes more sense to you - considering the stone and what its causal relation to its surroundings is going to be much easier if one wants to find out what'll happen to its constituent parts under different circumstances, like rolling the rock around. And the stronger claim is that looking at the stone's constituent molecules to find out what happens if I throw the rock is to look at the wrong causal level, what happens if I throw the rock is going to be an effect of the rock as a real pattern. So indeed if I wanted to make the calculation by only looking at the level of the molecules I would have to have all the information at every instant so as to know that the molecules will behave as part of a rock, which would be practically impossible (for humans at least) and superfluous when we can just calculate directly with the real pattern that is the rock.

[@paulk8224]

"tiefer stoff" beste :´D

[@frankpulsr7733]

Mans really never heard of jeopardy smh John

[@doasido5757]

Glass is not a liquid

[@random-characters4162]

Why not?

[@FudgeYeahLinusLAN]

It's not a solid either

[@doasido5757]

@@FudgeYeahLinusLAN yes it is

[@doasido5757]

@@FudgeYeahLinusLAN it is an amorphous solid. It is not liquid at all. It only looks like a liquid because of the way old churches used to make there glass windows. The windows our larger at the bottle, this led current scientist to incorrectly assume that it was “flowing down” like a liquid. This has since been debunked.