Great way to honor the crew in these special days - thank you!
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
Thanks KS - more to come
@pinedelgado47432 жыл бұрын
@@lunarmodule5 Awesome as a possum with a blossom!!! Looking forward to that eventuality!! :) :) :) :)
@stevenesbitt43242 жыл бұрын
Thanks for posting this and the 51-L post launch press conference the day after with me and Jay Greene. I had wanted copies of these, but never was able to dig them up.
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
Hi Steve, wonderful to hear from you on here and glad you now have a copy of these. Just wanted to say, having listened to you on this commentary many times and on the day itself, thank you, your calm professionalism that day has always been appreciated. Regards Simon - LM5
@mazdaman00752 жыл бұрын
Steve, I can only echo Simon's thoughts. Thank you.
@stevenesbitt43242 жыл бұрын
@@lunarmodule5 I appreciate your comment. In case you haven’t seen it, Netflix has a documentary series called “Challenger: The Final Flight “ that I participated in. I thought the series was well done. Also, there’s a podcast in the series “We Interrupt This Broadcast “ by Joe Garner that I interviewed with a couple of years ago.
@oliverbombosch30092 жыл бұрын
The teacher in space gave us a hard lesson. Remember the Challenger 7. Thank you for posting this video.
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
You're very welcome!
@evmcg2 жыл бұрын
Very hard to watch, but it’s important that we preserve and memorise this history. Excellent video as always LM5
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
Many thanks!
@mrFalconlem2 жыл бұрын
They are just as inspiring today as they were then.
@ZenZaBill2 жыл бұрын
Thank you for this upload LM5 - very appreciated. At the time, I lived about 20 miles from Christa McAuliffe's school in Concord, New Hampshire. I listened to the launch from a lab at work. When i heard the repeated calls for "RTLS... RTLS..." I wondered what it meant, as i was pretty wel versed in my NASA jargon. When it dawned on me that those unanswered calls to the crew meant "Return To Launch Site", I sadly realized that the vehicle was lost.
@peacethroughstrength1722 жыл бұрын
This crew IS amazing, always will be. Thank you for sharing it with us! Judy's work on Discovery's 1984 maiden voyage was priceless and phenomenonal in creating the energy source for the ISS.
@pinedelgado47432 жыл бұрын
Perfect timing, LM5!! On the eve of the anniversary of the Challenger disaster 36 years ago tomorrow. Awesome audio with the video clips!! Thanks lots for posting, LM5!! 😊😉
@nolancain87922 жыл бұрын
Sad the engineers were overruled on this mission. They knew what they were saying.
@jackdove41362 жыл бұрын
We should remember them for what they were trying to do for all humankind, not how and why they died. But their mission and legacy to inspire and teach a valuable lesson to all future generations of astronauts and explorers will last forever.
@jason668015 ай бұрын
They had a lot planned for that mission I think Christa McAuliffe's lessons would have been very interesting that's really sad they only lasted a little more than one minute after launch😭
@PaulinaFriedman19742 жыл бұрын
In Memoriam [*]
@goldenpacificmedia2 жыл бұрын
Dittos - In Memoriam (Jan 27 2022)
@MrHichammohsen12 жыл бұрын
Little did they know... Thank you for this video LM5 as usual even if it still breaks our hearts!
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
Thanks Hicham
@F-Man2 жыл бұрын
Ad astra, 51-L
@robertyates95002 жыл бұрын
At 30:00, you can see JSC PAO Terry White describing some of the Mission Control room to Mrs. McAuliffe and Barbara Morgan. His voice did the Houston launch commentary for STS-9, 51C, and 51-G in 1985. (also the Apollo 15 launch, and probably a couple of others in the 1970s.) This was a couple of days into the 61-A mission in November 1985. They had just attended the 61-A launch in person of October 30th, a couple of days before.
@lukestrawwalker2 жыл бұрын
Hard to believe this is the 36th anniversary of the Challenger disaster, today 28 January 2022... 36 years ago today I was a freshman in high school; I had skipped school that day to work on the farm... it was a gorgeous sunny January day, breezy and crisp, as on the Texas coastal plain just west of Houston (JSC is 70 miles from my back door) we had gotten the tail end of the cold front a couple days earlier-- the same cold front which dropped the temperatures SO savagely the night of the 27th in Florida at the Cape, forming all the icicles on the pad and deep chilling the O-rings in the booster that caused the disaster that took the astronauts' lives. Since the front had come through essentially without rain, I decided to take advantage of the dry weather to get the cotton fields hipped up, break the ground crust open from the long wet winter and build the beds back up some, help the fields dry out faster and be ready for subsequent trips across the fields to knife in liquid fertilizer, spray a pre-plant incorporated application of Trifluralin weed killer and disk it in, and then hip the fields back up to rebuild the beds, finish incorporating the chemical, and smooth the beds off for subsequent planting of cotton in mid-April. I remember just enjoying the beautiful if cool weather, running the open station tractor out in the field, everything going smoothly, and not having to deal with the drudgery of school that day. I was working on the south central area of the farm, when I saw Grandma's 85 Ford pickup pull off on the side of the road on the west side of the farm. Dad had worked the night shift at the nuclear power plant at Bay City, which was still under construction at the time, and had come in and got a few hours sleep, and woke up for lunch. He'd driven down to the field to pick me up and together we'd go to Grandma's at the north end of the farm for lunch. I finished my round in the field, pulled out and turned around, lowered the hipper into the ground, and stopped the tractor and shut down, hopped over the road ditch, and got in the truck. As we pulled up onto the road, Dad asked how it was going and I told him, and he suddenly said, "The space shuttle blew up!" He knew I was a space nut even back then, and I asked something about it and he said, "No it blew up on the way up there!" and I figured, "Oh, he just saw the boosters come off, with their retrorockets to push them away from the rest of the shuttle, that kinda looks like it blew up... " and figured that was that. Well, a couple minutes later when we arrived at Grandma's, the awful truth was all over the TV... The shuttle HAD blown up, though at the time it was nonstop speculation as to the cause-- the main idea floating then was it was a shuttle main engine that had blown up. It wouldn't be til much later that the truth came out, the faulty SRB O-ring seals that had failed and burned a hole in the booster, which started as a tiny leak, sealed off by 'gunk' (carbon soot and molten alumina) shortly after the O-rings burned in a puff of black smoke at liftoff, which kept the void sealed until wind shear from the cold front shattered the gunk and allowed it to blow out of the void a minute or so into the flight... within seconds the 750 PSI 5000+ degree hot gases of the SRB combustion, racing through the void, cut the steel shell of the SRB joint away like a blowtorch, burning a hole that was I had read some 3 feet across by the time the shuttle was destroyed. The hot gas had impinged on the side of the thin aluminum skinned External Tank, and upon the rear strut attached to a boss welded to the thin tank wall, which held the rear of the shuttle SRB in place. The huge hole caused a pressure drop in the right SRB which showed up in the telemetry, as did the fact that the shuttle engines started gimbaling harder and harder to the side trying to counteract the side-force of the thrust from the hot gas escaping from the hole in the side of the SRB, side-loading the entire stack. The hot gas quickly burned away the foam insulation over the thin aluminum tank wall, and for a bit the ultra-cold liquid hydrogen would have started boiling furiously in the tank, cooling the tank wall that the hot gas was blasting against from the outside. Very quickly the aluminum wall gave way, started to rip like a sheet of paper as the SRB, pushing hard sideways from the hot gas blowing out the hole even as the main engines neared "hard over" on the gimbals trying to keep the shuttle flying straight against this ever-growing side thrust from the SRB hole, until the structure couldn't take it, the rear strut boss ripped away from the tank, and the crack ripped the tank wide open, quickly propagating around the rear dome weld joining the aft dome of the ET to the barrel sections of the hydrogen tank, the dome falling away under the weight of the hundreds of thousands of gallons of liquid hydrogen sitting atop it, spilling it all into the atmosphere. At the exact same time, the rear end of the SRB swung away from the side of the tank due to the thrust from the hole, pivoting around the front ball socket that transferred the SRB's thrust into the cross-beam in the ET's intertank region between the lower hydrogen tank and upper ogive oxygen tank, the front of the SRB swung around the pivot point and into the side of the oxygen tank like a 12 foot diameter can opener, ripping through the thin aluminum skin of the much heavier liquid oxygen tank, spilling thousands of gallons of pressurized super-cold liquid oxygen in a moment, resulting in the enormous fireball that engulfed the orbiter and disintegrating External Tank. The shuttle orbiter's main engines, being nearly hard over trying to correct for the SRB hole side-thrust, now relieved of that load, shoved the orbiter sideways even as the engines starved of fuel and oxidizer burned out, causing the orbiter to break up in the rushing slipstream of air. The boosters, now free from the disintegrated rubble of the tank, fully intact since they're made of 2 inch thick maraging steel like a submarine hull designed to handle the ocean's crushing depths, simple raced out of the fireball, without guidance from the shuttle's computers to steer them they flew wildly for a number of seconds until the range safety officer pushed the button to detonate their linear shaped charges to "unzip" the casings, at which point the high pressure gas inside would blow the SRB's wide open and terminate their thrust. All of it then rained back down into the Atlantic far below. To be continued.... OL J R :)
@lukestrawwalker2 жыл бұрын
Continued... At the time I had harbored a young man's dreams of potentially becoming an astronaut one day... the shuttle was to bring in a "new era in spaceflight" and the popular theme being presented at the time was of shuttles building everything from space telescopes to space stations to massive power stations in orbit, beaming their electricity back to Earth as microwave energy, converted back into electricity in massive ground stations that would power our cities and industry... the magazines of the time were filled with images of shuttles one day building massive O'Neill cylinders which people could live in, creating new homes and towns and farms and stuff on the interior surface of the gently spinning cylinders for artificial gravity, lit by the sunlight piped in through the ends along the cylinder's center core... The shuttle had been sold to the public as the "DC-3 of space", a 'space dump truck' that was, as soon as the few remaining kinks were worked out, would be capable of "safe, routine, cheap access to space" and making this entire future possible. While I enjoyed being a farmer and didn't really want to go to college for years to be a scientist astronaut, I figured maybe at some point they'd need space welders, which even at 15 I was already very good at, so maybe I'd get to space that way. At any rate, the destruction of the Challenger certainly was eye-opening, if not in the way that Christa McAuliffe had intended... it laid bare the fact that NASA had been selling a 'bum steer' all along in the shuttle-- so desperate in the post-Apollo era to maintain its fiefdom and relevance (and funding) even as the heyday of the "space race" or "moon race" was a fading memory, while the Cold War despite it's brief respite of "detente" in the early-mid 70's had descended back into the depths of paranoia in the early 80's, the promise of "glasnost" wasn't even on the radar then, and which nobody at the time knew would abruptly end with the Soviet collapse in 1991. Shuttle had been sold and NASA had beat the drums as hard as they could to convince everyone, inside and out of government, that it was the "be all end-all" of space transportation, when in reality it was a technologically brittle, extremely expensive, and inherently dangerous and limited space vehicle, based on flawed assumptions and flawed compromises which had inherently hobbled its design and purposes, and ensured it would NEVER be what NASA had convinced everybody it would be. BUT NASA was SO heavily invested in it, and SO desperate to maintain their funding and relevance, that they continued to sell this bill of goods to the Congress and public long after they KNEW it would never be as safe or cheap or "easy" as they had purported it to be. NASA had taken to flying Congressmen and Senators in charge of NASA funding on the shuttle, now that they had 7 seats available after the removal of the ejection seats present on the first four flights, once shuttle was declared "operational". Jake Garn, now head of NASA, had in fact gotten Greg Jarvis's seat on a previous shuttle flight-- Jarvis had won his seat in a Hughes Space Division contest for a free shuttle seat for NASA contractors. As a mere company engineer, he was bumped from the flight to make room for Garn, an influential space-state politician at the time, who could argue for more appropriations for NASA at the time. Jarvis would end up on Challenger. The "teacher in space" program had been announced to great fanfare over a year earlier, when I was in middle school... I suggested to my social studies teacher, Mr. Reichardt, who had played football with my Dad at Shiner High back in the mid-60's, that he should apply... he just laughed and said they wouldn't get him up there! He told me later how he'd worked on Jupiter missiles in Italy or Turkey when he was in the Air Force after graduating high school, so he'd seen enough to know that he didn't care to go LOL:) The professional astronaut corps, they surely had to know of the shuttle's problems, and bravely decided to take the risks, but poor Christa and Greg, they were sold a "bill of goods" by all the press surrounding the shuttle program; they put their faith in the system and were let down by it, and paid with their lives. Challenger burst the bubble; it really laid bare the fact that NASA had been "cooking the numbers" all along on the shuttle in order to get it approved and keep it funded, and that it would NEVER be what they had promised it to be-- cheap, easy, routine, and SAFE transportation to space. It laid bare how far NASA had strayed from its roots as well, where management during Apollo, after the tragedy of the Apollo 1 fire (which was the 55th anniversary of yesterday, 27 January 1967), had concentrated on managing risk and danger and ameliorating it wherever possible, even to the point of becoming somewhat risk averse, particularly after the Apollo 11 moon landing had been achieved, to a bunch of bureaucrats in upper management positions more worried about their careers, maintaining funding and meeting political aims of the program, and keeping to "the schedule" to keep the image intact that NASA had carefully crafted for the shuttle. To the point they overrode their own engineers in the face of AMPLE evidence and reversed their stand on "prove it's safe" to "prove it's unsafe" (which you can never prove a negative completely) and in so doing killed seven astronauts and blew up a multi-billion dollar spacecraft. It also brought into the stark light of reality just how far you can trust the government, at least in the mind of one teenage Texas farm boy LOL:) We ate our lunch that noon while watching the coverage of the unfolding disaster on TV, which went nonstop for the rest of the day essentially. After lunch I had to get back to the field and Dad had to go back to sleep for awhile to go back to the nuke plant to work that night, so I popped in a blank tape into the brand new Sears top-loader VCR I'd bought for the whopping sum of $350 on sale (because it was a close-out model) at Sears the previous fall with most of my crop money I'd made for the year... they'd been out a few years but NO WAY could I afford them when they were $500-700 like they had been a few years before... you could buy a GOOD used car back then for that kind of money (better if you put a little more with it!) I watched the tape that night and kept it, periodically watching it. Also taught me a lot about how the media REALLY works, in all the rubbish they were "reporting" at the time, and of course the stuff that came out of the Roger's Commission later on investigating the Challenger disaster. NASA at the time had known the danger and was already designing the "improved" O-ring seal design used on subsequent flights... but had chosen to keep flying until the new SRB casings with the new field joint designs became available for flight hardware. They KNEW the response to cold, as the previous flight (IIRC it was Garn's) had come back with an SRB with a hole burned through the casing the size of a basketball-- fortunately for his flight the seals didn't disintegrate the hole start burning through the casing until *just before* SRB burnout, and the hole was on the side AWAY from the vulnerable External Tank, so the hot gas vented harmlessly away from the vehicle, and didn't get too bad before the SRB's burned out and were jettisoned. That flight, IIRC, had established the 53 degree launch criteria, which IIRC the temperature was 27 degrees in the right SRB when Challenger launched that morning. Sadly, NASA didn't learn its lesson for very long, either, because on 3 Feb 2003, just a hair over 17 years later, NASA would lose another shuttle, Challenger's sister ship Columbia, along with its seven crew, to another WELL UNDERSTOOD and previously experienced damage causing foam strike to the orbiter's heat shield-- a problem which was basically unsolvable with 100% certainty, which led to a reboot of the space program and ultimately to the shuttle's retirement for good... which it was a shame didn't occur after Challenger back in 1986, honestly. Shuttle was horrifically expensive and inherently dangerous, and could not be equipped with a meaningful crew escape capability in all phases of flight, unlike previous vehicles, and by the early 2000's it was apparent it needed to be replaced, its lifetime was limited due to it's 40+ year old technology and the fact that it would cost billions to upgrade it, billions that could be better spent on more cost-effective and safer spacecraft capable of going further (like back to the Moon) which shuttles could NEVER do... BUT nobody could see how NASA would ever get the funding to retire a "functional" shuttle system and the billions in funding necessary to design and build a replacement system for it. Sadly, Columbia drove that point home and provided the impetus to make the hard decision to retire shuttle and replace it with other vehicles. Sad because it took such a disaster to make what was otherwise a straightforward and sensible decision, and it took another 7 astronauts lives to make the point and get it done. Later! OL J R : )
@foxmccloud70552 жыл бұрын
Note that Christa's experiments have been conducted on the International Space Station.
@shellramsey12732 жыл бұрын
RIP never forget
@foxmccloud7055 Жыл бұрын
According to the books "I Touch The Future: The Story of Christa McAuliffe" and "Teacher In Space: Christa McAuliffe and The Challenger Legacy" (pg. 35-36) A week before Christa was chosen, there was an accident at Space Camp on the ride called the "Lunar Odyssey" when 19yr old Greg Walker unstrapped himself and started to move around while the ride was in motion and was thrown around and was eventually slammed through the wall near Christa's seat and into the machinery below. Following the teachers frantic shouts, the ride was shut down. To Christa's horror, she found the boys mangled body and pointed him out to rescuers. Several hours later, she found out that the boy had died of his injuries. Christa would be haunted by that event for the next six months.
@jackdove41362 жыл бұрын
Very true at 22:19-22:48. I will not allow myelf to not be in the game, when ESA opens its next astronaut selection or if the right opportunity comes along.
@user-nx9nm7tu4i2 ай бұрын
They were kept completley in the dark about the danger of launching that day...yes, it is murder in my books
@lancehurley97432 жыл бұрын
I couldn’t imagine what was going through their minds when they were strapped in and free falling towards the ocean knowing they were gonna die
@hastingsotienootieno36602 жыл бұрын
🔥🔥🔥🔥🔥
@miklosvincze46672 жыл бұрын
Who's the lady in the group photo shoot video standing near McAuliffe and Resnik? (Definitely not Greg Jarvis.) Is that Barbara Morgan? What's the story here?
@lunarmodule52 жыл бұрын
Yes it's Barbara..she was Christa's back up for 51L then years later became an astronaut proper
@miklosvincze46672 жыл бұрын
@@lunarmodule5 Thanks! Indeed, but it is still strange to me that a back-up also shows up at a photo shoot like this. And also, apparently Jarvis is missing. Was he a later addition to the crew?
@alex-internetlubber3 ай бұрын
Listen to your engineers There's no reason this had to happen I always find things like Challenger ("things like" is a pretty loose term given there's been so few space fatalities, though they came close on Gemini, with taking risks) funny in a sad way where it's like, "NASA never landed on the moon" - look, they never hid the fact three men died on Apollo 1, then this happened... you know why we landed on the moon? Because the program was forced to stand down for a period of months. Because a greater emphasis was placed on safety. Because they got out of the deadly form of inertia that probably doomed Challenger. Because they LISTENED to their engineers. NASA is like any other organization, exceptional yes, also prone to hubris and stubbornness, yes.
@foxmccloud70552 жыл бұрын
Truthfully, I came across this video after seeing the 1990 film "Challenger" starring Karen Allen as Christa McAuliffe.
@robertyates95002 жыл бұрын
I remember when that aired and videotaped it. I’ve seen it several times and it’s consistently a horrible and disappointing movie. Such hokey writing, silly acting, so many errors and editing and other things, just a real major disappointment ever movie.
@LuciFeric1372 жыл бұрын
I cant watch this. Some people should have been charged with homicide over this. Not an accident. Completely preventable.
@joe922 жыл бұрын
So it was intentional?
@ksracing83962 жыл бұрын
It is always easy to judge with the benefit of hindsight. Yes, a lot of things went wrong, a lot of people made wrong decisions, not only around the launch, but for years. But if you read Diane Vaughan's book, it is understandable how this "Normalization of deviance" happened, with everyone believing that he was doing the right thing. What is hard to swallow is that the two leading managers from Marshall until today at least publicly never admitted any regrets or failures from their side. But maybe that's the only way for themselves to be able to live on... Every person is different - there are a lot others more or less really responsible for what happened not only in Challenger, but in all the three accidents, who really suffered from what happened, some really having trouble to go on - just to mention Joe Shea... Some of the people around Columbia still ask themselves these endless what - if questions, believing that they could cope better "if at least we had tried something...", even if the chances after the fomestrike realisticly were very remote.
@mrFalconlem2 жыл бұрын
Having to live with the decision to override Thiokol perhaps was punishment enough for those involved that evening before launch who decided to proceed.
@ksracing83962 жыл бұрын
@@mrFalconlem I would agree for most people - the two I am not sure about are Lawrence Mulloy, the Marshall program manager, and William Lucas, the Marshall Center director. Until today they always insisted in having done nothing wrong and that they would make the same decision again. There is one additional point that is not very often discussed: It might have been that the cold was not the only reason for the accident, as there had been blow-bys before even in wormer conditions. There are very qualified people who believe until today that the general design flaws in the joint and maybe even an error during stacking at the Cape had contributed as well. Which does not exonerate Marshall Management at all, because problems with the boosters were know since 1978 and downplayed and often not forwarded properly to the Shuttle Program Management in Houston. Glynn Lunney, who was the Program Manager from late 1981 to summer of 1985, told me in an interview in summer of 2020 that he later always