The Argument From Limits

[@ebrietassmaragdina1063]

Where is the video where the moral arguments are discussed? I say this because I am looking for the part where you mention an article that shows how all moral realism positions end up in primitive and irreducible notions or entities. Thank you for your videos. I really appreciate the information you provide to the general public.

[@MajestyofReason]

Check out my moral arguments playlist! It’s in there🙂

[@cahkontherahks]

Another wonderful upload per usual. I appreciate the content!

[@TheAnalyticChristian]

My confidence in this argument just went down! Thanks Joe! Sincerely!

[@MajestyofReason]

Glad to see you here, and glad I could serve you❤️

[@TheAnalyticChristian]

@@MajestyofReason Sorry I don’t comment more frequently. I watch your videos all the time!

[@MajestyofReason]

@@TheAnalyticChristian ditto with you! I enjoyed your recent video with Barnes🙂

[@TheAnalyticChristian]

@@MajestyofReason your channel is hands down the best resource on KZbin for critiques of theistic arguments. Thank you! Alright. I’ll leave you alone now :)

[@MajestyofReason]

@@TheAnalyticChristian And yours, I think, is the best resource for theistic philosophy :)

[@enif_plays]

Is it possible that the definition of unlimited being used in this argument assumes that the thing in question is also unlimited in properties as well?

[@blamtasticful]

It's not clear. I have thought something similar and see it as a problem. When you go through actual examples of powere for examples it isn’t clear that they all share properties. We just make an artificial category out of them as "states of affairs that can be made to exist."

[@Jon-jr7kx]

Hey Joe, I hope your headache situation has significantly improved ❤️. I rarely try to comment because we actually agree with on a lot but I just wanted to voice some quick criticisms in the spirit of healthy and loving disagreement. Although I contest all seven of your objections, I'll focus on the three I found most interesting. 1) Let us suppose X is a property of any given category that doesn't apply to an N (necessary foundation). Now, what would be the principled difference between "X doesn't apply to N" and "N is limited in virtue of not having X?" One can ask "why isn't X the type of thing that applies to N" but the answer just seems to be that N is limited in its structure, constitution, causal power(s), etc and those limits thereby explain why it doesn't, say, have axiological characteristics. What N essentially is can limit what properties can and cant apply to it (but nonetheless, they are still fundamental limits). Since being a *kind of thing* that certain properties which fall under specific categories can't apply *itself* seems to be an essential limit. For instance, the category of personhood, which is of intrinsic value (disregarding certain consequentialists), doesn't apply to electrons. However, saying personhood doesn't apply to electrons isn't really any different from saying electrons are essentially such that they are limited in the # of personhood conferring properties they can & do possess (0). 2) I think your trinity ad-hominem isn't as strong as presented. The 3 centres of consciousness do have explanations (E.g Swinburne's love arg) so the 1st premise isn't nullified. Aseity is an *essentially fundamental* divine attribute like omnibenevolence. But just because God is necessarily or essentially trinitarian doesn't mean He is most fundamentally trinitarian. Take Arithmetic, it's necessary & essential to our understanding of it that 1+1=2, even though this can be explained in terms of the relationship betweens and meanings of 1, 2, +, and = which are themselves fundamental. I'd also like to add that saying God's trinitarianarism isn't fundamental can't neutralize each person of the trinity's divinity since there is still one divine ousia (or essence) that exists tri-personally (and thus omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience, eternality, necessity, etc are equally had among the three personas). 3) Concerning your last point, let's grant (a) realism concerning abstracta, (b) that there are indeed unexplained limits in math, logic, and propositions, and (c) that it would be explanatorily inadequate to say that such abstract limits (which have as their explanans more basic, fundamental mathematical/logical principles) and their explanans are explained by a supreme foundational layer of reality. It seems that someone like Josh can simply respond by saying that we have counterexamples/reasons to reject P1, that any *Limit* has an explanation, but not P2, that any *Concrete Limit* has an explanation. As far as I've seen (in How Reason Can Lead to God & Is God the Best Explanation of Things) Josh motivate it, the inductive & abductive reasons (meeting the 4 conditions) to accept this modified principle would still stand. This isn't of course to say that one can't object by trying to motivate reasons to think there are fundamental and unexplained concreta.

[@MajestyofReason]

Hey my dude! Thanks for the wonderful comment :) My headaches have gotten better! They’re still here, but they’re not as bad as they were. [The cause is a change in my medicinal intake.] You say: “Let us suppose X is a property of any given category that doesn't apply to an N (necessary foundation). Now, what would be the principled difference between "X doesn't apply to N" and "N is limited in virtue of not having X?”” Great question, and perhaps the answer can only be given on a case by case basis. Note that the theist, too, has to carve a difference there - after all, spatial properties don’t apply to God, and yet theists don’t want to say that God is limited in virtue of not having spatial properties. The theist will presumably say that this doesn’t limit God because (a) the *presence* of spatial properties would limit God and (b) if P would limit something, then ~P does not limit that thing. [Set aside whether (a) and (b) are true; both can be contested, in fact.] But if the naturalistic necessary foundation is essentially incapable of having X, then the presence of X in that foundation would be an impossibility; and since impossibilities entail everything [per explosion], it follows that the presence of X in the naturalistic foundation would limit the foundation; and then, by (b), it will follow that the naturalistic foundation is not limited by dint of lacking X. I’m not sure whether this move works, but it’s at least worth thinking about! You continue: “One can ask "why isn't X the type of thing that applies to N" but the answer just seems to be that N is limited in its structure, constitution, causal power(s), etc and those limits thereby explain why it doesn't, say, have axiological characteristics.” But I don’t see why that would be the correct answer; the correct answer could simply be that *what it is to be N* is to lack X, end of story - one simply doesn’t understand what N is if one doesn’t attribute ~X to N. This is similar to what theists presumably have to say when asked the question ‘why is God the kind of thing that’s perfect?’. The answer is just that *what it is to be God* is to be a perfect being. We don’t have to cite facts about God’s structure, constitution, causal powers, etc. to answer that. Similarly, I don’t see why this sort of explanatory avenue isn’t open to the non-theist in response to the question you’ve posed. At the very least, I don’t think you’ve justified why answering that question requires citing some limit in N. You continue: “What N essentially is can limit what properties can and cant apply to it (but nonetheless, they are still fundamental limits).” We need to be careful here, though, since what God essentially is can, in the same sense, limit what properties can and can’t apply to him. But the fact that God can’t have certain properties doesn’t mean that he has some limit. Similarly, the mere fact that N can’t have certain properties doesn’t mean that N has some limit. For N to have some limit requires that N possess some property in a bounded, restricted manner. The mere fact that N does not and cannot have some property doesn’t mean that the properties it *does* have are had in a bounded, restricted manner. Moreover, even if N *were* limited by dint of this, it doesn’t entail that the limits are *fundamental* limits. It could be the case that N is limited in respect R; this limit is explained by some other, essential limit of N in respect R*; and, finally, this limit in respect R* is explained by a still more fundamental essential aspect of N which is *not* limited but is instead, say, a purely qualitative, unrestricted trope. We need to be careful to distinguish an *essential* limit - that is, a limit that something cannot fail to have, i.e., that it necessarily has - from a *fundamental* limit - that is, a limit that is not explained by anything else. Something can have non-fundamental, essential limits. You continue: “For instance, the category of personhood, which is of intrinsic value (disregarding certain consequentialists), doesn't apply to electrons. However, saying personhood doesn't apply to electrons isn't really any different from saying electrons are essentially such that they are limited in the # of personhood conferring properties they can & do possess (0).” But this will re-iterate the dialectic explored above. Notice that I can say the same thing about God: ‘For instance, the category of spatiality doesn't apply to God. However, saying spatiality doesn't apply to God isn't really any different from saying God is essentially such that he is limited in the # of spatial properties he can & does possess (0).’ And you’ll likely reply that the presence of spatial properties would limit God, etc., and then I would respond as I did above :) Here’s the main point: as I understand it, for N to be limited with respect to some property is for N to have that property to a bounded, restricted extent. But if axiological properties are categorically inapplicable to N, then N cannot have any axiological properties to bounded, restricted extents, and hence N cannot be limited with respect to its axiological properties. If you want to broaden the notion of limits to include simply *lacking* axiologically positive properties//perfections, such that merely lacking them counts as being limited with respect to them, then I no longer find the premise about the explicability of limits plausible. To me, that premise’s plausibility hinged on the puzzlement we experience when reflecting on properties possessed to certain finite, non-maximal extents - why is the property had to *that* extent rather than more or less? But this puzzlement-inspiring-a-need-for-explanation is no longer present if the ‘limit’ we’re talking about is simply the lack of a perfection (like omnibenvolence, say). I don’t find it intuitive that something needs an explanation by virtue of not being omnibenevolent. So we now have a dilemma: either we take limits in the way I’ve been understanding it - in which case, my original criticism seems to stand - or we broaden the notion of limits in the aforementioned way - in which case, one of the other premises seems to lose its plausibility. Either way, it seems, the argument from limits faces a problem. At least by my lights - I recognize that how people assess arguments is a person-by-person manner dependent on their position on the grand epistemic landscape!

[@MajestyofReason]

You continue: “I think your trinity ad-hominem isn't as strong as presented. The 3 centres of consciousness do have explanations (E.g Swinburne's love arg) so the 1st premise isn't nullified.” Notice, though, that my claim wasn’t that ‘the 3 centers of consciousness don’t have explanations so the 1st premise is false’. The point, instead, was that *God himself* is limited in the number of persons in which he exists. Since whatever is limited has an outside explanation, as (1) says, it follows that God himself has an outside explanation. But that’s not possible under theism - since God enjoys aseity, there cannot be something outside him that explains his existence. So, premise (1) is false. [Aside: Josh is explicit that he’s using outside explanations for his argument. Moreover, his argument also needs it, since that’s how he goes from an explanation of limited things to an unlimited thing - if he didn’t have ‘outside’ there, he wouldn’t be able to rule out that the explanation for limits things is in terms of something limited.] Notice that I’m not saying that the three centers of consciousness are not explained. I’m focusing on *God himself*. Secondly, I don’t think those explanations are any good - most working in philosophy and theology think Swinburne’s argument there doesn’t work. You continue: “Aseity is an essentially fundamental divine attribute like omnibenevolence. But just because God is necessarily or essentially trinitarian doesn't mean He is most fundamentally trinitarian.” But I never said that - I never inferred from the fact that to the fact that . Instead, my argument was: (i) because aseity is an essential divine attribute, anything divine must enjoy aseity; (ii) each divine person is divine; (iii) so, each divine person must enjoy aseity, i.e., be independent/fundamental; (iv) but if each divine person is fundamental, then the fact that there are three divine persons is fundamental (since the fact that there are three divine persons *just is* there being the Father, there being the Son, and there being the Spirit, and we already inferred that there being each of those is fundamental), and so God’s being trinitarian would be fundamental; (v) hence, God’s being trinitarian is fundamental. You continue: “I’d also like to add that saying God's trinitarianarism isn't fundamental can't neutralize each person of the trinity's divinity since there is still one divine ousia (or essence) that exists tri-personally (and thus omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience, eternality, necessity, etc are equally had among the three personas).” These are murky waters, but it still seems to me to threaten divinity; after all, surely aseity (and hence fundamentality) is an essential divine attribute; but then if the divine persons aren’t fundamental, then they lack an essential divine attribute, i.e., they lack something needed to be divine in the first place. You continue: “Concerning your last point, let's grant (a) realism concerning abstracta, (b) that there are indeed unexplained limits in math, logic, and propositions, and (c) that it would be explanatorily inadequate to say that such abstract limits (which have as their explanans more basic, fundamental mathematical/logical principles) and their explanans are explained by a supreme foundational layer of reality. It seems that someone like Josh can simply respond by saying that we have counterexamples/reasons to reject P1, that any Limit has an explanation, but not P2, that any Concrete Limit has an explanation. As far as I've seen (in How Reason Can Lead to God & Is God the Best Explanation of Things) Josh motivate it, the inductive & abductive reasons (meeting the 4 conditions) to accept this modified principle would still stand. This isn't of course to say that one can't object by trying to motivate reasons to think there are fundamental and unexplained concreta.” The problem, though, is that Josh’s motivations there would equally motivate the more general principle, such that if we accept the restricted principle on the basis of such motivations, we should also accept the general principle on the basis of such motivations. But since we shouldn’t accept the general principle on the basis of such motivations (for the principle is false, as we’re here granting), it follows that we shouldn’t accept the restricted principle on their basis either. Now, to be totally honest, I’m actually not sure whether this response I’ve just given works, since I’m not sure how to resolve a fundamental puzzle afflicting all companions in guilt style arguments [which is the kind of argument that I’ve just given]. My response essentially want to reason as follows, using a companions in guilt approach: 1. If we should accept the restricted principle, then we should accept the general principle. 2. We should not accept the general principle. 3. So, we should not accept the restricted principle. I want to motivate (1) by the fact that all the reasons favoring the restricted principle would equally favor the general principle, and so if these motivations are sufficient to establish the former, they’re likewise sufficient to establish the latter. But it’s always open to the critic to turn my argument on its head: 4. We should accept the restricted principle. 5. We should not accept the general principle. 6. So, it is false that . I think the way out of this impasse is to compare the relative plausibility of the support behind (1) with that behind (4). If the reasons for (4) are significantly stronger than those for (1), then your original point #3 works; but if they’re not, then your original point #3 doesn’t work. At least for me, at the moment I don’t know which reasons are stronger.

[@carterwoodrow4805]

​@@MajestyofReasonin response to the Trinity, I believe you are misunderstanding the doctrine of the Trinity. When talking about persons, the son is beggoten of the father and thus the son is not fundamental in terms of his person hood, but in terms of his divinity. His possessing of the divine nature he is fundamental. So it does not follow that there being 3 persons is fundamental, even though each of the persons can be considered fundamental due to possessing divinity (this is hotly contested in church history). For example Arminius believed that only the father was self existent, because the son is beggoten of the father and the spirit proceeds from the father and the son, however others believed all three persons could be said to be self existent, due to all 3 possessing the divine nature. To summarize when looking at the divinity of the son and Spirit they have no explanation outside of themselves, however when looking at the mere person hood of them they are not fundamental, and thus your objection fails.

[@yourfutureself3392]

Great analysis of the argument

[@neverstopliving1003]

I was exposed to your content through your talk with Alex O’Conner. This video seems way out of my depth as a person with a general interest in philosophy. Do you have simpler videos that address these types of argument?

[@MajestyofReason]

My contingency argument playlist has lots of videos that should be simpler❤️

[@sandman4068]

The contingency arguments videos were'nt simpler were they.

[@maykonalves7647]

Isn't something unlimited just nothing? We can distinguish things by its limits. If "something" is unlimited, then there is no way to differentiate it from other things, because, well, it has no limits. You cannot define it. So, it seems to me that an unlimited "thing" is just no thing at all.

[@goldenalt3166]

It does seem like many theistic arguments that just identify something that sounds like their God. "Personal" I think is the most egregious.

[@deathnote4171]

Recently alot of people are making videos on FTA because of Skydivephil's new video.I hope you will also share your thoughts on this ongoing debates.

[@blamtasticful]

Bookmarking to look at later. I honestly have not found the argument that compelling thus far, but I am interested about your take. I don't see how being unlimited is non-arbitrary. I also don't see how limits are suprising. We would more surprised to encounter something without limits than with so called arbitrary limits based on our experience.

[@racsooj456]

Hey Joe, thanks for the vid. What does Josh say in response to your problem of a-limitation?

[@MajestyofReason]

I think Josh may be doing a video discussing my video later in December (and I may make a video discussing his video discussing my video... lol), so I'll defer to the future on this one 😉

[@racsooj456]

@@MajestyofReason And so the infinite chsin begins! You two should publish your correspondence into a book. Unless you are still writing it so to speak...

[@goldenalt3166]

30:08 It hard to make someone understand something that his livelihood depends on him not understanding. And his immortal soul even more so.

[@jmike2039]

I know this doesn't necessarily apply to Josh's argument here, but in conversations I've had on Facebook with him; I don't even know what it means for an agent to be perfect unless it entails they have completed all goals or desires. Taking a step to the left would presuppose an a unactualized desire or goal, or unactualized potentials. Why would a perfect being be compelled to create? That prior state would assume it has yet not acheived something that would complete it's perfection. It seems like a perfect being does nothing but merely exist. But more importantly, how do we figure out which analytic notion even tracks perfection?

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

Why would a perfect being be compelled to create? Because god is the source of morality. Creating life is a good positive thing. Why did you decide to drink coffee than tea this morning? God is when you hit the ultimate explanation and going beyond is pointless.

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

@christaylor6574 If you were perfect then you wouldn't have free will because you wouldn't have the motive to do any sinful acts.

[@jmike2039]

@@JohnSmith-bq6nf the point is that prior to the desire being actualized, it's something the entity hasn't succeeded at yet. It hasn't actualized those states of affairs and so if it NEEDS or WANTS to do that; it presupposes imperfection. It presupposes something it has not yet achieved or obtained. If I'm perfect, then I don't need or want anything because I'm perfect, it just negates the concept to assume it be perfect yet have unactualized goals or desires.

[@jmike2039]

@@JohnSmith-bq6nf also, if god is perfect creating life is a positive thing; it assumes that the world could have been improved upon by creation, thus contradicting gods perfection. A perfect being as the perfect state of everything can not be improved upon by creation; in fact that would only make it imperfect given the introduction of evil.

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

@@jmike2039 Not true that is your opinion on what perfection entails. God's nature can pertain to wanting to create. Also, trying to take a human view of perfection to an infinite-mind version of perfection is a mistake.

[@DundG]

I haven't watched the video yet. But just seeing point 2 of the arguemt makes my head scratch. How the hell does someone come to the conclusion that something is possibly unlimited by saying everything limited has an explanation. Like... whaaaaat?!

[@richardcrenwelge]

I would argue that the homoousias (trinitarian doctrine) is not a limit at all in the sense that is a feature produced of itself. It could be that it (God) chose otherwise, but didn't, and a self-imposed "limit" is not a limit at all because it lacks a contingency outside of itself.

[@goldenalt3166]

Isn't every limit a self-imposed property of the objects nature? I don't think Josh is talking about contingent situations. Are saying that the Trinity might become a Quadary some day?

[@richardcrenwelge]

@@goldenalt3166 I suppose that would be true of objects in general, but perhaps not with an object with properties as unique as God

[@goldenalt3166]

@@richardcrenwelge If God is unique, then none of these arguments are going to work for him. The whole idea is to apply something we know about to derive some extrapolation.

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

Eagerly waiting Josh Rasmussen 10,000 word rebuttal jk

[@MajestyofReason]

And then my 100,000 word response ;)

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

@@MajestyofReason when you did this long video did you ever get into the moral knowledge argument?

[@MajestyofReason]

@@JohnSmith-bq6nf yep! Check the pinned comment under that vid

[@firebird4909]

The argument isn't even valid, there is no reason to argue about its soundness. 7 doesn't follow from 5 and 6. It should say "If, possibly, something is unlimited then there is, possibly, something that is perfect and necessary" It might be that the author is conflating possible necessity with necessary necessity.

[@carterwoodrow4805]

If something is possibly necessary, then it is necessarily necessary. As if something possibly exists in all possible worlds, then it does exist in some possible world, but if a necessary being exists in some possible worlds it exists in the actual world, and therefore exists and is necessary

[@jakek.403]

nice

[@MacBlagic]

Another tie for worst argument I've ever heard. If the argument is true, then a Creator cannot exist. Space is limitless, therefore space is perfect and necessary. If space is necessary, it is not contingent. Concepts with the property of being the cause of non-contingent things cannot exist. Therefore a Creator with the property of having created space cannot exist. Luckily for theists, the argument is trash. Especially since it seems to imply that every hypothetical limitless concept is necessary and therefore exists.

[@sneakysnake2330]

I think that’s a misunderstanding of what Josh means. I don’t think that Josh means that any thing that has an limitless quality is itself perfect and necessary, but that something that is in every respect limitless. Space is limitless in regards to, well, space, or 3 dimensions, but has other limits on its being, such as the fact that space is inanimate perhaps.

[@TheBrunarr]

oof

[@blamtasticful]

@@sneakysnake2330 The problem is Josh is trying to get certain properties and exclude others. God is limited to being good for example. Sure "that's not what he means" but that doesn't really matter. Limits don’t explain whether something should fit into all nominal categories or not. Is existence a limit or is non-existence a limit? Is moral perfection a limit or is not having it a limit. Is not being able to be causally impacted a limit or is being able to be causally impacted a limit? Is sharpness a limit or is not having sharpness a limit? I could do this for awhile.

[@sneakysnake2330]

@@blamtasticful Those are all good questions, and I think it might just be most helpful to listen to him explain it. I don’t think God is limited by being Good however, because being Good is not a limit on one’s existence or being. Evil is not something that properly exists, it’s a privation of Good.

[@blamtasticful]

@@sneakysnake2330 Yeah I don't think the privation theory of evil makes sense. Evil consequences from evil actions clearly have substance and aren't merely the absence of something. If by privation we just mean a twisting of something good that's fine but that is clearly an ability and God cannot do such things. That seems like a limit.

[@Venaloid]

Initial reaction: this argument is almost nothing but questionable assertions. Why would anyone believe any of these premises? Why, for example, do limits need explanations, but powers and abilities do not?

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

If you are limited in doing something there is typically an explanation for it. Why are you assuming powers don’t? Many theists see God as self explanatory.

[@x-popone6817]

At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight. (Matthew 11:25-26)

[@JezuesChavez]

Paul called his converts “not wise by human standards”.