The Battle of Midway in Perspective with special guest Jon Parshall-Episode 110

This week, Seth, Bill and returning special guest Jon Parshall, put a bow on the Battle of Midway and put the important US victory into perspective. In the ensuing discussion, the trio explains why Midway is NOT the turning point of the Pacific War, and what the US victory actually did for the US war effort in the Pacific theater.
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[@Littlefish347]

I am a Japanese and an aficionado of the battle. Thank you for the video which was very entertaining as well as informative. The books by Messrs. Parshall and Symonds have provided me with an understand of many facets of the battle which I did not know before. Combined with a book by Shiro Mori (published in 2012), they have given me a comprehensive understanding of the battle. One question which I have always had was why the Japanese CAPs fighters failed to position themselves above the carriers before McClusky’s squadron arrived. It is my understating that the Zeros had both the capability and time to gain attitude to make the interception. Another point that has been a puzzle is the absence of any literature regarding the action plan that was sent out from the flagship Akagi to the fleet. Transmitted at 5:20 am on June 4, it stated that “no enemy action was expected for the day”. Truly, it was a bad way to start the day. Any clarifications on these points in future video would be appreciated. Lastly, I have read two biographies on Yamamoto Isoroko, who was the key driver of the battle. Well recognized Japanese historians penned the books. Before Midway, the Japanese press were in a frenzy regarding Japan’s victories in the Pacific. Yamamoto is quoted as saying, “There is no need to beat the drums to stir up public passion. Announcements and reporting should never be false. You will always face defeat once you start lying.” It seems truly relevant to the Russians on their actions in Ukraine these days. Thanks again for the video.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Jon Parshall [e-mail] responds: “One question which I have always had was why the Japanese CAPs fighters failed to position themselves above the carriers before McClusky’s squadron arrived. It is my understating that the Zeros had both the capability and time to gain attitude to make the interception.” This is a great question, and he’s exactly correct-the Zero had plenty of performance to get back up there. We don’t know exactly, but here’s my sense of things. Some or all of the CAP may have indeed resumed altitude after they finally saw VT-6’s attack off by about 1000 or so. But the very visible arrival of VT-3 at about 1010 required a response (obviously). VT-3 was unique, though, in that it was the only strike of the morning of any flavor that had a fighter escort (Thach). A *lot* of the Japanese CAP got sucked into this vortex of trying to come to grips with the Thach Weave, which Jimmy was desperately debuting for the first time as he was trying to keep himself and his other two pilots alive. So, a lot of people tend to think about the 10-15 minutes prior to the dive-bomber attack as a question of the CAP not being at altitude. I don’t see altitude as the issue. I think it’s a red herring. What I see is a lateral distortion of the CAP into the southeast threat vector (which is where VT-3 was coming from), that pulled the bulk of the CAP away from the carriers, and into Thach’s furball. We know that as many as two dozen Zeros were involved in that circus-that’s the bulk of the CAP right there. The bulk of the rest were shooting up VT-3. “Another point that has been a puzzle is the absence of any literature regarding the action plan that was sent out from the flagship Akagi to the fleet. Transmitted at 5:20 am on June 4, it stated that “no enemy action was expected for the day”. Truly, it was a bad way to start the day.” Another *very* perceptive question by your listener! As it turns out, my co-author Tony Tully and his friend Lu Yu wrote an article on this very topic for the Naval War College Review back in 2015. You can find it here: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6/. (And I’m also attaching it.) Intriguingly, this is driven by something that Lu Yu picked up on in Mori’s 2012 book! J In a nutshell, a staff officer named Yoshioka Tadakazu, who was the guy who prepared the Nagumo Report, “admitted to Mori that there had been an omission in the reproduction of the message log that he compiled. In a radio message of 0220, or 0520 local time (2:20 and 5:20 am), a significant first sentence originally stated, ‘It is calculated [projected] that enemy Kidō Butai will not sortie [be encountered] today.’ This sentence was dropped from Nagumo’s report as actually submitted. Indeed, this omission was not even disclosed by Yoshioka to the writers of the official Japanese war history series, Senshi Sōsho.” That’s a bombshell. Because what Tony and Lu demonstrate is that the scouting arrangements of Kidō Butai all through the first part of the war *were driven by their intel estimates!* If the pre-battle intel said “no carriers expected,” you’d get a pretty sparse scout plane pattern. But if the intel estimate said “there might be enemy carriers”, lo and behold, you get a much beefier search pattern. So the fact that Nagumo’s intel said “no carriers,” well, that explains why you only have seven scout planes up in the air. Ooops. Finally, regarding “You will always face defeat once you start lying.” Yeah, and of course Midway is the beginning of a Japanese pattern of deceit, and *self*-deceit regarding their losses in battle. That pattern continues all the way to the end of the war, and allows the Japanese to deceive themselves that they were inflicting much greater losses on the Americans than they were receiving in return, when in fact just the opposite was true. That alternate reality made it a hell of a lot more difficult to end the war, because the Japanese leadership literally wasn’t operating with the same set of facts… until the Bomb got dropped. Thanks for these great questions, and the listener should congratulate themselves for being a very astute student of the battle. Cheers, Jon

[@Littlefish347]

​ It was pleasant surprise to receive a prompt and illuminating response. Many thanks. The review written by Messrs. Tully and Lu regarding Nagumo’s early morning message to his fleet confirmed much of my suspicions regarding the IJN’s pre-battle conduct. I have moved on to Guadalcanal, reading a book by Toshikazu Hando (eminent Japanese historian, published 2004). The prologue referred to Midway. I was amazed to learn that the Emperor and Tojo received the doctored reports on the battle results. Osami Nagano, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, obtained the Emperor’s approval on the formation of a new carrier group on July 4. The reorganization was begun on July 14. A list of the composition of the new fleet clearly identified the Akagi and Hiryu as being out of commission, implying they would eventually be back on line. Both ships had been in Davy Jones locker for more than a month! Clearly this was what had been reported to the Emperor. Although there was no substantiation relating to Tojo, given the author’s reputation for scholarly work, the statement that he too had been beguiled was credible. Too bad no one listened to Isoruku Yamamoto’s admonition about being truthful in reporting battle results. As this is being written on the 81st anniversary of Pearl Harbor, I thought an anecdote on Yamamoto, the mastermind of the attack, would be appropriate. Before the attack, he strongly demanded that a declaration of war be delivered without fail. “Even if a samurai has to kills an enemy in his sleep, he should have the courtesy of kicking him awake with a boot to the pillow before delivering the blow.” Fate was unkind. Based on what I’ve read about Nimitz, the two probably would have been good friends with if they had met under more favorable circumstances. By the way reading Parshall-san's bio in the Imperial Japanese Navy Page site, it was amusing to learn he had lived in Hiroshima. I was working at an automaker headquartered in the city while he was there. Our paths might have crossed at the Hondori shopping arcade!

[@courtneyrobinson6053]

I also, would suggest that with the large number of "casual historians" who tend to, (and I include myself in this as younger WW2 enthusiast) mix excellent historical work and pop culture and then carry that mixture into discussions on and offline, you can have myths like the CAP not being at altitude, become accepted fact. In the 1976 Midway movie, I am specifically thinking of a line spoken by Commander Genda when asked about the CAP after the torpedo squadrons had attacked. Roughly paraphrased, the character Genda, says that the fighters of the CAP are off chasing the torpedo bombers left at eave top height, and the character of Admiral Nagumo, asks "so we have no fighter umbrella protecting us?" My point being that as a young kid seeing that movie, combined with actually reading historical accounts before Shattered Sword debunked many falsehoods about the battle, pop culture and history combined to create a myth in my understanding. I guess the point I'm trying to convey is that providing a forum for the casual history buff to learn from historians such as Seth and Jon and someone who has the l9ve of history and practical experience of Bill, is going a long, long way towards not only correcting the record, but opening up a whole new segment of the population of casual history enthusiasts, to the scholarship and insights that most people would never know how to find. Thank you for adding your voices to this work and for making your podcast as accessible to as many people as possible.

[@thomasjamison2050]

My thinking on this question is that while the zero could stay aloft for a very long time, it could not keep from running out of ammunition for a similar long period of time. Also, US planes were tough to shoot down and the zeros, if I am correct, only carried 60 rounds per gun. Hence, it should not be a surprise that after bringing down a number of US planes, zero's starting going back to their ships to reload ammunition. This obviously would keep them from being at high altitude for some time given that the carrier deck needed to be clear enough for them to land and take off again after loading.

[@garyrunnalls7714]

​@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Jon I bought Shattered Sword when it first came out, a million thank yous. Have always loved the WW2 naval ships and battles especially the IJN carriers. Lol also my cats are all named after IJN ships❤

[@petesheppard1709]

My dad was wounded aboard _Enterprise_ at Santa Cruz, and I've come to realize that he was aboard her at Midway; when I read 'Incredible Victory' and mentioned this to him, he scoffed and said that nobody knew what was going on, on that day. These episodes do a good job of illustrating that confusion.

[@Canadian_Skeptical]

They don't tell the enlisted men what is going on.

[@petesheppard1709]

@@Canadian_Skeptical Yep, but as the battle was discussed later, the confusion was evident. Even if everyone was doing their level best, communications were patchy and slow, unable to keep up with the pace of events.

[@daverobinson6110]

@@petesheppard1709aka the fog of war

[@petesheppard1709]

@@daverobinson6110 Yep!

[@dwightadams3853]

Bill’s comment that the victory at Midway cemented that Nimitz was the right leader for the Pacific war is very insightful.

[@williamashbless7904]

The more you guys talk, the more I appreciate your expertise. Just wow. Thank you!

[@chuckhillier4153]

I'm enjoying this series very much. The drama of Pacific War is very moving without my family's connection to it. Two of my mother's first cousins died during the war; they were brothers, one aboard the USS Helena in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the other served on the USS Hammann and was aboard the USS Yorktown when she was fatally torpedoed. He was fatally wounded by that torpedo attack and died a couple of days later.

[@myroadtowealthandfreedom7411]

You guys are killing it with this podcast. Thanks so much for this series I'm hooked and have been recommending it to everyone!

[@TomSmith-lf8tr]

Thank you Seth and the team, Your integrity and enthusiasm delivers. Australia remembers. The best of the USA is the best of the world.

[@PalleRasmussen]

This did not age well. Cadet Bone Spurs doing Putolini's bidding and withholding aid for Ukraine.

[@scotthix2926]

As Churchill said about battle of Britian, “It is not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning”. Midway fits this analogy.

[@Charlie5478]

That was El Alamein not Battle of Britian! :)

[@jeffreymartin8448]

Seth says the Yorktown was as hard as woodpecker lips. Love this channel !

[@christopherrowe7460]

I appreciate John Parshall's explaining the significance of the Battle of Midway wasn't it being a turning point, but it allowing us to relax our defensive crouch. My grandfather said much the same thing when reflecting on the battle's impact on his command of Palmyra NAS. He allowed personnel to start taking off work on Sundays, since they felt the threat of an invasion had significantly diminshed.

[@matt291]

Absolutely love these episodes on Midway. I was lucky enough to visit th ship named for the battle and view the exhibit related to thr battle. Thanks for all that you do to separate fact from fiction!

[@brickhockey]

Great job with the Midway series. Highly informative and many unknown nuggets that came out of these presentations. You know you’re doing something right if you present on a topic that has been presented hundreds of times before and yet it remains refreshingly captivating. Good job guys.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Thanks!

[@shawndwyer3179]

Kudos on the the channel and the Midway series in particular. I’m interested to see a series on how much Mcarther exaggerated. On a side note. I’m a huge believer in Midway being the turning point for tree reasons first and foremost it took 4 Japanese frontline carriers off the board as well as Thierry respective flight groups. It slowed the Americans to stop playing defense and reactive warfare. And lastly it was a huge moral booster none of which can be overlooked.

[@mariellouise1]

Your discussion on the Japanese’s military’s state of mind was very interesting. Do you think they would had surrendered without the US dropping the atomic bomb? As much as I find the Japanese culture admirable it bothers me that they never have acknowledged the Rape of Nanking and their treatment of civilian and military POWs. The Japanese always reference the Atomic Bomb as victims. I remember the protest and debate over a Smithsonian exhibition , the mention of the Atomic bomb was eliminated.

[@BrisLS1]

Agree, just watched the old 1979 Midway movie on Netflix, and I could just see every event coming after this podcast taught it all to me. It's pretty good for that time period of Hollywood, if anybody else wants a night off from their usual streaming fare. Thanks

[@Jakal-pw8yq]

​​@@mariellouise1 I agree with you. The Japanese have much to atone for. They could take a lesson from the Germans post World War II where they, the Germans paid reparations, issued worldwide apologies, and took ownership of the Holocaust and their own form of brutality during the war. They went to extreme lengths to rehabilitate a brainwashed and indoctrinated population. I have friends that live in Japan and they have told me that the Japanese are rewriting their history books even as I'm writing this. There's never any mention of Pearl Harbor, the rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, the treatment of Allied pows as well as civilians and the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians. All of this while they still claim to be "victims" of the atomic bomb. Who attacked America by the way? My father was a veteran of World War II, US Navy South Pacific. And I can tell you that growing up there was never anything, ever, that was made in Japan or had anything to do with Japan. He had seen enough action aboard the USS Montpelier which was a light Cruiser including a Kamikaze strike. He had seen enough, heard enough and it shaped his post-war attitude towards the Japanese for the rest of his life. My dad told me there was a saying that went around during the war that went, "wherever the Japanese go rape, torture, and murder follow." It seems like no truer words were spoken.

[@Jakal-pw8yq]

After years and years and years of hearing how Midway was the "absolute" turning point in the Pacific war, I found it intriguing and enlightening to hear your collective take on that battle. Seems like it was obviously a serious loss for the Japanese losing those carriers but like Jon stated it did not check their aggression in any way shape or form. Once again proving that fighting against the Japanese was incredibly tough, rugged, and bloody fighting. Not that the ETO wasn't but the Japanese went beyond any kind of norms regarding war. Geneva Convention? What's that again? It seems like they built in cruelty, torture, rape, and murder as their SOP. Basically fighting a terrorist type campaigns throughout the Pacific. At least that's my take on it especially after listening to you all tell us the truth of the situation. The amount of information and the education you folks give us is just astounding! As an amateur history buff I'm forever grateful and I've become addicted to your show watching several episodes 2 and 3 times! Proving there's always something new to learn. 👍🇺🇲⚓️🍻👏

[@johnrudy9404]

I agree strongly. Treatment of both POWs and civilians was horrible. And, just like the Germans, no winning of hearts and minds. Ridiculous master race nonsense.

[@annrn6148]

I agree with your views on the differences between the "aggressive mindset" of the Japanese vs the Germans combatants. My view is based on friends & family members fathers, uncles, etc reflections & statements of their personal experiences on both fronts. My best friend's father, had been deployed first to North Africa, then fought his way up through Italy, then sent to England for a little R&R & retraining, before his final deployment was a few days after the initial Normandy beachhead had been secured. They landed on Normandy & fought through France & into Germany. His unit took part in the liberation a concentration camp. The haunting look of abject horror on his face, over 60 yrs later, still gives me chills today. Having said that, I distinctly remember this statement he made. "As bad as it was for us in the ETO, the boys fighting those Japanese had it worse." He based his statement on the shared experiences of friends, who had fought & made it home from the Pacific theater.

[@flparkermdpc]

They have episodes on a book list and recommended movies. You will be truly hooked then.

[@markthomas6436]

@@Jakal-pw8yq ALA " The Rape of Nanking." This brutality had no tactical benefit to Japan and enraged all who learned about it.

[@frederickwiddowson]

I am really getting a lot out of this study. I thought I understood this history but this is a whole other level.

[@stevemolina8801]

Outstanding series, well done. The only thing I would like to add is Lets not forget the little guy, It took many men to get the ships out there, more to man the guns, and more to arm and get those plains in the air. GO NAVY!

[@flparkermdpc]

Both Seth and Bill make sure those stories are told as a main part of the mission. Human beings do all of the suffering and dying, on both sides. I think Japanese officers had such low regard for life that they wasted the best of their male population, as well as ruining their brains.

[@lumberlikwidator8863]

I was gonna comment at length but ken below took the words right out of my mouth. Thanks so much. You’ve set the bar so high that now the pressure is on for you to deliver every week. I’m confident you are up to the task.

[@WoodlandsArchive]

Thanks guys! Top stuff. Orderd your book today Jon.

[@flparkermdpc]

Anything by Richard Frank, James Hornfischer, John Bruning, and others mentioned along the wakes. There are also episodes on recommended books and movies.

[@dirthgr]

You guys are great...thank you...much of WW2 history is euro-centric, so this added color is wonderful. My father enlisted in the Navy, about Oct 1941, was in training in SF TI when it all started. Was thereafter in the Pacific (in a variety of roles) for the duration, barring RnR in Australia and hospital in Wellington. I revere Nimitz, and have the opposite sentiment re MacArthur. IMO, the US rehabilitation of Japan and Germany remain two hugely untold stories ...if one day you get to that.

[@v.mwilliams1101]

Thank you. So informative. Funny, apologies keep being given for being 'over' on time, but I find them short. I could listen for hours. Love to run into you fellows in a pub.

[@fcmike3850]

Thank you for this pod cast! My parents where right in the middle of this in 1943. Dad was on the Lexington at Coral Sea, then the Enterprise after its refit at Bremerton. I have an interest in getting this new perspective of how war was hell for them. They left me with a lot of photographs of that era and I found the book The Big E (Stafford) that have helped me to connect a lot of the dots. Thanks again.

[@gregcarter8732]

Are these photos part of the public record yet? Please post what you can. Let's not loose our history. From a 1970s navy vet.

[@johnfleet235]

Hindsight is 20/20. The Hornet had breakdowns during the Battle of Midway. It is easy to second guess decisions made by the Hornet and Mitchner, but carriers were very new in 1942. The US Navy was still learning how to use carriers especially in multi-carrier groups. The other issue is Hornet was a new ship. I suspect she could have used more time in work-up then she was allowed. We will never know for sure.

[@chriscollins1525]

😊😊😊😊😊pppppp

[@johnferguson1455]

Excellent three part discussion, enjoyed them all.

[@CenturionSongs]

Spend my Saturdays with you guys in my model shop. Keep it up!

[@Cosmic.G1234]

Wow !!!! Great gig ! You guys rock! Thank god you guys researched this beautifully, to know the truth, the fantastic details, the true stories behind each individual guy, the bravery, the politics, the brutality of useless war, we’ll done. I’m going to watch this podcast all the way through and again I recon. I’m in Perth , Western Australia, and have been researching ww2 for years too. I’m also going to buy your books, etc I greatly appreciate all your efforts over the decades, I take my hat off to you all and your wonderful guests

[@keithdavis9897]

another fascinating episode...........thank you guys very much

[@jovianmole1]

Midway Airport in Chicago has a nice display of the battle with an SBD Dauntless hanging from the ceiling. Concourse A. Anytime I travel thru Midway I stop and reminisce & take the umteenth photo of the SBD. I wish they would strap a 500 pounder on the thing!

[@annrn6148]

😂😂😂

[@vette8121]

Outstanding, it's hard for me to fathom the amount of research you gents have put into this presentation. I'm hooked. tm

[@courtneyrobinson6053]

The only aspect of the aftermath of the battle I was hoping to hear you discuss, (if this is covered in later episode please excuse my comment, I am listening in order and decided to comment after finishing this three parter) is the issue surrounding the Chicago Tribune and the signals intelligence breach. If this hasn't come up already perhaps that could be one of the topics for a Q/A episode in the future. Thank you again for your work.

[@devjaxvid]

Just finished the Midway videos. (Binged them)Thanks so much, they were very informative and entertaining.

[@Canopus44]

Fantastic work, love these videos you guys put out!! I'm a big fan of John Parshall and his book

[@sushibar777]

In Churchill's terms, Midway was not the beginning of the end, but maybe it was the end of the beginning. After Midway Japan no longer had an uncontested initiative. The US still had challenges, and Japan still probably had naval superiority, but much less than before. It had more battleships, and even more carriers, but the Japanese naval command structure had suffered a psychological blow.

[@Coffeeguyzz]

This is my first interaction with your outstanding site. Will both subscribe and now watch many of your previous presentations. If, as expected, they meet the high quality level as this piece, I would unhesitatingly rank your efforts as amongst the top tier military history channels on the internet today. Great work.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Thank you very much for the compliment. Spread the word!

[@annrn6148]

They are awesome! I started watching after I was laid up by an accident. Now, I eagerly await Tuesday's for the next episode.

[@MaroNavy]

Great series, keep up the good work!

[@markjohnson8963]

After reading 'Nimitz' by EB Potter my immense respect for Admiral Nimitz was born. The other example of Nimitz' willingness not to make waves(no pun) was his acceptance of Paul Rochefort being sent back to the mainland after his undeniable contribution to the victory at Midway.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Potter: my old prof. Rochefort-- you are correct.

[@wonderbreadmodelsandhistor1566]

I am really looking forward to your podcast on Guadalcanal. You guys knocked Midway out of the park. I hope you take it further and cover some of the Army and Air Corps campaigns in and around Australia.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Guadalcanal is so huge when you think about it, it's difficult to get everything. Right now we are focusing on the actions on and around the island. We fully intend to have an episode (or two) just on the air campaign so that we may highlight some individuals and their actions.

[@dave3156]

Another great installment. I think Nimitz kept Mitscher because he had future plans for him IMO. Thanks Seth, Bill, and Jon!

[@rossdawgsbrokenspirit9038]

This is fantastic! Hope there is alot of content on this channel

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

More to come!

[@jackpitts1348]

Excellent! Excellent podcast!!!👉👍👈

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Many thanks

[@walterrider9600]

thank you

[@yohahn2000]

"as hard as a woodpecker lips" (at 10:46) about the Enterprise "Maytag washers of the aircraft carrier" (at 11:02) - Love your phrases sir, going to use them over and over. Thank you! You guys are great, really enjoy the discussion, the passion, and the historical and operational expertise! Hope you don't mind additional comments as I catch up with your series as I am a Korean American who's grandparents on one side lived a privileged life running a logging operation under the Japanese, and on the other side died shortly after the war after enduring torture from the Japanese occupiers. Both grandparents saw the end of WWII but then didn't survive the Korean War that hit them.

[@petesheppard1709]

FUN FACT: The Japanese sank _Enterprise_ six times!

[@mrains100]

Thank you.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

You're welcome!

[@helenel4126]

So informative! It's fascinating to listen to the blow by blow, the movement of the chess pieces, and the educated guesses as to what was going on in the leaders' minds.

[@jago5373]

Excellent work gentlemen.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Thanks very much.

[@JimPinch-te9vq]

You guys are great

[@chadrowe8452]

50:30 "I'll bite your kneecap off" not legs lol. I'm glad you mention the firebomb of Tokyo and I hope you do a bio of curtis lemay. Lots of people dont realize more people died with the firebomb than with the atomic bomb

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

From Bill: Did an article in World Magazine that included a lot of exposition on LeMay. He was the inspiration for the George C. Scott character in "Dr Strangelove."

[@chadrowe8452]

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar I like bill and I'll look for that article. Love the channel ty for replying and keep doing what you do. We have got to get one of those doomsday devices lol

[@sundiver137]

@@chadrowe8452 We cannot allow a mineshaft gap either.

[@jerrytoler9789]

I enjoy everyone of your episodes.

[@johnmoore9404]

Great job guys. Good Insights.

[@garyrunnalls7714]

Just excellent a million thank yous.❤

[@rtqii]

I watched all three episodes... This was riveting.

[@gordonbutler5142]

wonderful chat!

[@ericford8556]

In the late 1950s my dad saw a movie in Japan where the IJN was victorious at the Battle of Midway.

[@scraptech3152]

Just outstanding!

[@MammothPaige]

And another great video

[@ColbyHiggs]

Another awesome show. Learning so much!!!

[@PPISAFETY]

I have become interested in the last yeat about the battle of Midway, largely because my late father served there as a 19 year old damage controllman, Although he and I were very close, he would never talk about his experiences in WWII, Korea, or Vietnam (he was a Navy Lifer) except in very general terms. He maintained an unreasonable disdain by today's stadards for all Japanese, even though he was very friendly with other Asians until his death in 1986. While I've seen a ton of videos and read a lot of articles about Midway, I've never seen it discussed in such granular detail as you gentlemen presented it in. I binge watched all three of your episodes, as well as others in one day. Well done!

[@mightyjimbo7681]

I love this series but what a high bar to clear. You gave every argument why this was the turning point in the Pacific War. Sank four Japanese carriers to our one, bringing us to parity. Cemented Nimitz as CPAC along with his hand picked leaders. Cemented the "loser" Japanese leadership because they had to lie about the battle. Showed we could go toe to toe with JN and be victorious even though our industrial base was not up to full speed and we had a lot of rookies. Japan lost a great deal of their war experienced aviators. Gave us breathing room to regroup and go on offense. Allowed us to send our Senior experienced Aviators back to train the pipeline. Guadalcanal wouldn't have happened without Midway victory. Japan never really recovered offensive operations after this except for the invasions that were already in the pipeline during Midway. There was no doubt after Midway the US would prevail in the Pacific Theater. I think that is a convincing argument for the "Turning Point.". I can't wait to see what the real turning point is.

[@sundiver137]

Midway was just the start of the attritional war that would see the elite cadre of Japanese airmen all but wiped out by the end of the Battle of Santa Cruz. They lost 121 at Midway, a similar number at Eastern Solomons and 148 at Santa Cruz. Add in their losses in the day-to-day actions during the Guadalcanal Campaign and the fact they didn't (or couldn't) rotate their experienced aviators back home to train the new guys, by '43 there was a marked drop-off the the caliber of Japanese aviators.

[@gregcarter8732]

Also, Japan took 2 years to train navy aviators, and resisted changing policy(adapting). As a Russian admiral once said, "Better is the enemy of good enough".

[@marksherrill9337]

Thank you for going into the flight to nowhere. I’ve been mystified what brought it about and this conversation explains a lot. I can’t blame Nemitz for shutting it down. Everyone makes mistakes and at least Marc F was trying. Obviously confidence in him was diminished and Nemitz in a way did discipline the action. I would say balanced, unless Marc F continued to stumble and act independently.

[@dancolley4208]

I can summarize the end game for WW2 in the Pacific: "You cannot have a battle of wits with an unarmed opponent."

[@stevezenor2545]

Good Afternoon Seth, In the movie "Tora,Tora, Tora" you can see the Old "Navy Department" Building right before it we razed(about 10 Sec worth).

[@BrokenFarmer]

Bill and John have some really beautiful dialogue in this episode.

[@rogermwoodbury4966]

I considered myself to be fairly knowledgeable about the Pacific War but this series has broadened my perspective a very great deal. One question I have about the impact of Midway, was how much change in the US Navy's perspective toward construction of naval vessels and thus the overall prosecution of the war did the Battle of Midway have? By 1945 the USN had 99 carriers. That would imply that Coral Sea and MIdway changed the whole naval building plan and thus the concept of naval warfare for the USN. I am not sure that anyone in 1942 envisioned that the idea of major battle being waged beyond visual range was THE future of naval warfare. Do you agree?

[@sundiver137]

The US had several Essex-class carriers on the building ways in June 1942. The USN was way behind the IJN on the coordination of multiple carrier air groups in '42 and didn't really match Japan until the attacks on Truk in early '44.

[@tobybabalu6628]

You guys are amazing if I knew history could be a career I'd be all over WW2 battle fields if I could... Love it all...

[@jamesthompson8133]

I totally agree!

[@douglasturner6153]

"Mac Smacks Japs" sinks Four Carrier's! That's the Headline after Midway. King took a few bows too.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Haha

[@douglasturner6153]

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar I forgot the other part not in the papers. For his effrontery to the power's that be: "Roquefort exiled to Shipbuilding and denied Award"!

[@marcuschamp9881]

What a magnificent series and great to have this amount of time devoted to a topic of this magnitude. I would love to see Jon's lecture regarding the Atomic Bomb...any chance of recording it for public viewing at some point? Hopefully you will get a chance to ask him.

[@tomnagel5769]

We must remember that at this point of the war we were rookies compared to the veteran Japanese navy who has many victories against the allied navies and armies. We wanted victories to boost moral within the armed forces and at home so yes at this point I can see the top brass covering up this mistake. The battle of midway gave everyone hope so the flight to nowhere went nowhere

[@jamesthompson8133]

It’s like the Japanese built a very very strong steel wall in a military aspect. The US built a very very thick concrete wall that was constantly being expanded and strengthened aspect. Great job guys!

[@davidnikoloff3211]

How did the algorithm not alert me to your channel before this?

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Glad you found us.

[@richardrigling4906]

These are outstanding discussions. Regarding the comment that Mr. Parshall's analysis does not so much follow personal stories as it is a comparison of systems in conflict, I'm reminded a book title "Brute Force" which viewed WW II as a completion between economies, cultures and population. He concluded that Germany lost the war when Hitler invaded Russia (Russia alone could eventually grind down Germany), and Japan could never have won (providing the US survived and was viable engaged in the Pacific after the first 12 months..

[@graemeday6305]

This is a thought following my second viewing of the episode. If Midway was lost, with Watchtower not being launched in August and the airfield on Guadalcanal shortly completed and forming the basis of a considerable base together with further conquests (New Caledonia, Fiji), I wonder how the US could continue to prosecute the war. Australia was the larder feeding our American allies; a Japanese defensive screen extending westwards from the Solomons effectively drying up the supply chain.

[@bobbyjolee4362]

Excellent, Excellent, discussions -- but why does Yorktown,s "damage control" credit always overlook the participation of the Pearl (?200?) shipyard repair crews? It would seem that THEY were a critical contribution to each "damage" recovery! Many thanks for bringing history to a more complete understanding!

[@johnwilson9364]

Guys, your analysis is top level. One consequences of Midway that deserves further analysis is the implications for the Japanese and the IJN. The fact that the Imperial Japanese Command didn't publicly accept the Midway consequences but sequestered crews away from public debate is indicative of a serious arrogance that says they did not learn an important lesson from the defeat. For example the Japanese did not suspect that their communications were being read by the US.

[@gorgonzai]

Another riveting commentary.

[@korbendallas5318]

Looking for advice: I'm looking for books on World War II around the Mediterranean Sea, ie. North Africa, naval warfare, Crete and Malta and the landings in Sicily and Italy. Best would be one big series of books, but anything covering a part of it while keeping the whole picture in mind would be fine. Thanks!

[@noneatall9060]

"Beat the Japanese Navy off"... Jon has said this many times and it makes me laugh each time. I know, I'm juvenile. But sometimes another says, right after this, "pounded by".

[@jetdriver]

Your correct that the Yorktown class carriers were very tough. But they did suffer a design flaw in that the boilers were all concentrated in a single area meaning that a single hit could cause a loss of all power. Had they been built with alternating boiler and engine rooms like the Essex class for example I don’t think any of them would have been lost during the war. Re: Mitcher. I think Trent Hone has this wrong. Yes he’s right on Mitcher’s motivation in sending his strike a different direction. But what seems to have been forgotten was that Yorktown has yet to launch her own strikes. Hornet and Enterprise clearly have a job to do. Sink the ships already found. It’s not remotely Mitcher’s job in any way to go looking for the “missing” task force when search assets are still looking and one of the three carriers has yet to launch its own strikes. With regards to why this all gets swept under the rug I think Craig Symonds book on Nimitz covers it well. Nimitz did not want this great victory being marred by the Navy airing its dirty laundry in public.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Well said.

[@jetdriver]

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWarthank you. I just found this channel and am thoroughly enjoying it.

[@courtneyrobinson6053]

@Jet Driver this is an excellent concise description. Thank you. I am glad I came across your comment.

[@mikeemery6741]

At 36:30, Capt Bill says that Admiral Nimitz was the best naval officer that America has ever produced... I wonder who Adm. King would have replaced Nimitz with had Midway gone bad... And about a minute later, Jon says that Midway was the single most important naval battle of WW2... However, I, me, I would argue that Midway was the most successful, most important naval battle of America's History, or dare I say, the History of the World...

[@mykofreder1682]

The Japanese never got off the decisive battle idea even while they were in a yearlong decisive battle. Which they didn't realize had happened until they lost, and they ran out of ships and resorted to abandoning dug in troops on many unsinkable islands that might be of interest to the US.

[@alganhar1]

Personally I am of the opinion the British were absolutely correct when it came to their assessment that the Western Allies were not ready for an invasion of German held Europe in 1942 or 1943. The harsh fact of the matter is that we were not in fact so. So frankly I see the British reluctance to do so a sensible and realistic assessment of the actual feasibility of the operation rather than them 'dragging their feet' which is so often the rhetoric of US led perspectives. After all, when Overlord DID happen the British actually put more troops onto the beaches on D-Day than the US did... Something that is generally not appreciated by Americans. By about twice if I recall correctly, and suffered twice the casualties the US did on D-Day, though in their case the British casualties were predominantly beyond the beach, as their losses on the beaches were slight. Eisenhower did not take overall command on land until he did because it was only then that the US troops in France were greater in number than the British/Commonwealth. So it was not until then that overall command was released to Eisenhower by Montgomery.

[@joshwhite3339]

Well, define "ready". The US wasn't "ready" for Operation Watchtower either, but they went ahead with it anyway because they understood that you can still succeed without being fully ready, especially if your enemy is also in dire straits.

[@おだいふく-x6t]

当時戦った当事者の方達は必至そのものだったと思いますが、今の撲目線で見るとミッドウェイ海戦は太平洋という巨大なフィールド上の蒼い海の決闘といった感じですね。　あまりに劇的すぎるんですよね、数百年後の歴史家はこの海戦をどう捉えるのか、たぶん遙か昔に太平洋の海の上でおこった伝説的な神話めいた闘いに描く人もいるのではないでしょうか。それくらいに劇的で運命的な海戦ですね。

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Translation: I'm sure the people who fought at the time were desperate, but from today's perspective, the Battle of Midway feels like a duel in the blue seas on the huge field of the Pacific Ocean. It was so dramatic that I wonder how historians hundreds of years from now will view this battle, but some may perhaps portray it as a legendary, mythical battle that took place on the Pacific Ocean long ago. That's how dramatic and fateful a battle it was

[@jammin4372]

Re: turning points. I have viewed 1942 like a prize fight where Japan kept landing body bows early while the US parried as best hey could. Coral sea, and Midway were two solid blows that rattled Japan's teeth but didn't send them to the mat. Guadalcanal then was the, "meeting engagement", that kept sucking in men and material. The attrition that Japan could never win.

[@DalonCole]

Nimitz And His Admirals by Hoyt is the definitive work on the relationships of the Flag Officers in the Pacific

[@MegaBloggs1]

excellent work gents-id like to know from jon et al -if Nugamo had launched the 2nd land strike-would the recovered 1stn land strike have a bigger impact against the usn

[@henrymccray9750]

Seth, you make a great point. The Japanese people would never revolt around the emperor He was considered a god. So was Yamamoto for what is concerned. Ask yourself, would the American Public have revolted against FDR? The UK against Churchill? The Russian population against stalin? Why would we expect the German people to not believe Hiitler? Hirohito was a iving god. And by his extension so was Yamamoto, and particularly Tojo by declaration. John and Seth- please consider this about the flight to nowhere. And please mention this to Trent. I have been watching and studying every AAR and BRE since the 50 year declassifications took place. John, youre note and observationas about Point Luck are spot on. So is your premise that Captain Mitsner "sank" the Yorktown. The question is to "why?" Y'all gave two possible explanations. One is Stanhope Ring. Either and idiot or derelect of duty. One is possible the other is not. Waldrom was his senior pilor, rank be damned. When Waldron bailed, why did Ring continue? When his fighters bailed, why did he continue? When his Scouts bailed why did he continue? And then finally, why is he first back to the carrier? Because he did what he was ordered to do. He flew a course that woud have put him between 65 and 80 miles behind the Japanese position. Exacty where carrier Div 2 would have been if they were operating in a "strike and sweep" manouver as was done is three previous US Naval Fleet Problems. OK, so if he was ordered to do it by who? One would have to assume Mitsner. But why would an already tapped admiral make such a decesion? I am putting forth that he was ordered to. By Nimitz. Nimitz had full operational control. He got Yorktown back online, enough to stack full of Saratogas air wing fresh from San Diego. Both Leighton and Roachford strongly suggested that the two Carrier groups would operate independently. The carrier groups (thank you radio intelengce) left Kure 26 hours apart, with Hiryu and Soryu lagging behind with thier fast escorts. His last battle order even stronly suggested (from a 4 start admiral) as such. He and Mistner were close. So here is the Cat-OH-BUTAI Nimitz ordered Mitsner to have his air group seek out the second Carrier Group. Ordered him to. Mitsner orders Ring, who before the incidint might have been know as a bit of a prick, but then again so was our hero of Midway Best- just Best was better liked. Both consumate professionals with sterlig records. Hope becomes hopless and his record goes to Shite. Best becomes the Best you can be and is showered with praise. I submit both did thier jobs, to the best of thier abillity. Why else does Nimitz give Mitsner like 17 extra chances? Because Nimitz knew he made a mistae and was never allowed to say it pr mention it to anyone. Mitsner gets a pass, Ring gets rung. Look at the service records.. No one wants to make goats out of greats, but sometimes history tells a tale we might not like. Look at the AAR's and BRE's and tell me this doesnt hold water Love ya;;, and see you in acadamia soon. Henry McCray

[@gregcarter8732]

Dead on. We can never know what we do not know. The criticisms of the flight to nowhere os over done. Ring may have(probably) stuck to his decision too long. This is all 20/20 hindsight. Also, as an ex Naval officer, I have seen, many times, senior officers step on their subordinates to promote themselves. THAT IS HOW (often) ADMIRALS ARE MADE.😮

[@joekimmel1848]

Interesting points but after Midway name another time when the Japanese were able to exercise naval air power in a meaningful way. Their senior pilots were gone, they had flat tops but no one to really fly off them.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Guadalcanal. Everyday, from August 7 until November. And the IJN most certainly did not lose all their senior pilots at Midway. The beatings of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, especially Santa Cruz, proved that.

[@robertpritchard9962]

Surprised at the lack of discussion on the place of Midway in history, because it's one of the few contested by Americans which bears comparison with Trafalgar, Jutland, Lepanto, etc. Comparing it with Trafalgar, e.g, one point occurs to me: in 1805 everybody pretty much knew that the British were going to win. They had a long record of superiority by that point, which, if people had forgotten, had been re-affirmed very recently. The French strategy reflected that: to get so many ships that by placing them bow to stern in the strait of Dover they could create two walls, with the RN on the outside and Napoleon's army slipping through between them. I'm joking about the two walls, but basically they did just hope to overwhelm the British with sheer numbers of ships, because they had no real expectation of winning a conventional combat. Nelson could play around with tactics and do things you weren't really supposed to do because he could be confident that the RN's edge in the quality of the crews, in the quality of ship-handling, etc., would allow them to do it. But at Midway rather the opposite situation prevailed. The Japanese victories in the first six months of the war had come so rapidly and so abundantly that, IMO, many within the IJN (not exclusively there, but that was the main concentration) had come to feel the war was basically over, that all that remained was some mopping up. The two sides had never engaged in war before, and maybe it really was just that easy. All that was necessary was to attack, and the enemy would be blown away by the bushido spirit. Now, the historian will note that that within that six month series of defeats, there were some positive trend lines for the Americans. At the beginning, it was the battle of the Java Sea and at the end, right before Midway, battle of the Coral Sea: on both occasions the American/Allied forces received more damage than they inflicted, but a world of difference between them. But people at the time, immersed in the events, Like those land attacks on Guadalcanal: normally a commander choosing to launch an unsupported infantry attack against a well-dug-in opponent who outnumbers you several times over would be sent to the loony bin, but as someone pointed out in one of the episodes about the Guadalcanal campaign (I'm watching these out of order), those kinds of attacks had succeeded only a few months previously.

[@KeithRanker]

When will Jon’s book on 1942 be released?

[@eamonhunt8781]

Japan was a medieval society with modern technology.

[@Silverhks]

I'm really enjoying this series guys. Specifically, like Mr. Parshall I'm more of a systems guy but I have really enjoyed the relayed personal stories from personnel involved. I do have a question though. It's common knowledge that the IJN ship torpedo, the "Long Lance", was oxygen powered and this was one of the reasons they caused so much secondary damage to IJN ships under attack. Was their air dropped torpedo also oxygen powered or of a more conventional design? Edit: I will leave this here for continuities sake but you don't need to answer the question. Wiki says that the aerial torpedo is not oxygen enriched but of a more conventional design. I should have checked there first.

[@Wayne.J]

Probably three questions for Mr Parshall 1. Hiryu going east with BatDiv 3 and CruDiv 8. Could the Hiryu be providing CAP / escort for the battleline as they charged the US carriers in the afternoon ala British at Matapan and HMS Formidable. I understand your arguments in Shattered Sword, about last resource, need to keep Hiryu afloat for the long fight ahead, but do u think Nagumo or Yamaguchi were thinking about retribution and winning the day via their big guns still, probably at night, if Hiryu could provide CAP and odd bomber to get through the US CAP to cripple a vessel or two to slow the US fleets down if they chose to retreat. Remembering that by this time Nagumo or Yamaguchi were being told that there was 1 carrier left after the earlier separate dive bombing and then torpedo attacks had crippled an undamaged carrier each time (as the IJN pilots believed at the time). So 1 v 1 with battlefleet attacking, Hiryu CAP for the force to allow the battle Fleet to close for night action and suffer minimal damage from SBDs in the late afternoon etc 2. In Shattered Sword, u or atully mention for the original plan of MI, if no US Fleet was to be encountered, the Kido Butai was to release 4 destroyers? Can u name the destroyers, where were they going? to escort BatDiv 2 etc? Why were they planning to release them when they know a battle could potentially occur just after they leave the Kido Butai? Were the KB to get 4 replacement destroyers from other forces in the area? 3. with expectant battle on the 6th or later, what do u think the IJN formation set up would look like. Ie 1st Air Fleet 100miles north of Midway? Main Body x miles to X (east?) of Nagumo, Kakuta force to stay together or join up with KB etc? With CruDiv 4 still escorting them or them separating to join the Main Body or BatDiv 2 (Support Force) or join Kondos Advanced Force? Or do u think Kondo stays with the Forces around Midway? Hosho and Zuiho end up where, team up or retreat, or stay and provide air cover for the original forces? Where do u think the Fleets end up if the big decisive battle did happen to the IJN timetable Sorry about the 3 long questions but I think it was cover some bases. It will be interesting to hear your answers, thx

[@jonathanparshall5019]

Hey there! Lemme see if I can answer these: 1) Maybe, possibly... but if so, there's no mention of that purpose that I've seen anywhere in the Japanese accounts of the battle. Also, my sense is that the Japanese viewed Hiryu as an offensive asset, not an asset designed to provide cover for a surface force. So far as I know, all of Hiryu's CAP assets were over *her*, not Nagumo's surface force. I personally think that Yamaguchi tagged along behind Nagumo simply because he was more aggressive than he was imaginative as a tactician. Your question is interesting, though--hadn't thought of that. 2) Sorry, don't have that information, and I don't remember if it was even specified--my sense is it wasn't. Understand that those dispositions between the AL and MI forces were laid out in one of the Japanese monographs, and I feel like they were highly conjectural--more like sketches rather than a formal plan. I note that Senshi Sosho, pp. 99-114, has a number of tables laying out what look to be similar tables of dispositions... but I haven't translated them. 3) Sorry, again, don't have that, and I don't *think* it was actually specified in the Japanese sources (however, bear in mind, it's been 20+ years since I was deep in the weeds on all this.) My sense is that Kondo stays in the neighborhood of Midway to provide support to the landing forces. Depending on the timing, the heavy forces from the Aleutians *should* have been able to come south. From what I recall, though, it didn't seem like the two carrier forces or the two battleship forces were necessarily operating together--but that may just have been a result of the fact that the diagrams in the source materials weren't all that specific. All we really have to go on is the map on p. 117 of Senshi Sosho, which shows the map exercise on May 25 that Combined Fleet staff did. That shows 2nd KDB operating separately from 1st KDB (and *southwest of Midway*, oddly enough), and also shows 2nd Fleet moving as an advance force towards the oncoming blue fleet. I aimed Google Translate on my phone at that section of the manuscript just this morning, and there was no talk of specific dispositions to fight the battle. There may be more in the text, but I haven't tried translating it. Hope this is helpful. Jon

[@dburke1804]

John when is the 42 book out bud? I really want to read at Christmas when I have the time...

[@riftraft2015]

Another great podcast guys. 🇺🇸 Thank you 🇺🇸 Imo, The victory at Midway allowed us to pick and choose our battles after that. The Japanese could no longer force our hand, we forced theirs. Nimitz was certainly the right man for the job. Dugout Doug shoulda been fired,, (or fragged 🙄), after Dec 8th 1941. Side bar,, Patton going after his son in law in a German pow camp was a major coverup, although it didnt have the ramifications Mitchers lie did. Mitcher quite effectively removed a carrier from the board when we were already outnumbered. 3/4 went to 2/4. Thankfully, the experienced flyers from Enterprise & Yorktown handled it. That could of been catastrophic, but we will never know. The patton mission failed completely, men were killed, U.S. equipment destroyed, POWs killed. And like Mitcher, NOBODY outside Pattons command knew he was doing it. I think that is alot of reason he was removed from command in Germany after the war. They knew he couldnt be trusted, was willing to disobey orders, and were afraid he would start a war with Russia as he had previously threatened to. Patton had a bit of a MacArthur KNOW IT ALL complex. Pattons biggest foul up imo, was when he told the U.S. ordinance department NOT to produce the M26 Pershing heavy tank in 1943. According to Patton, tanks dont fight tanks. Ok. Well,,, then,,, what the hell do we fight n kill these German heavy tigers with Georgie? How many tankers died in Sherman's in 1943 & 44 because of pattons opinion? By 1944 after Normandy, Hodges & Bradley were screaming at Ike to get the ordinance department to build n ship the M26 into the European theater. And when the M26 did show up about January 1945, they knocked the shit outta the German heavy tanks. Pattons biggest foul up imo. That cost unknown 1000's of soldiers lives.

[@davidelliott5843]

Yorktown was was so incredibly tough because she was designed and laid down as a battleship.

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

No she wasn’t. She and her sisters weee just tough. Hard as woodpecker lips I believe I said.

[@Silverhks]

Your probably thinking of the Lexington and Saratoga which were originally laid down as battlecruisers but converted due to the London Naval treaty restrictions.

[@coachhannah2403]

Kaga was laid down as a battleship. Akagi, Lexington, and Saratoga were converted Battle Cruisers. Amagi was supposed to be the second BC conversion, but was 'destroyed' on the ways by an earthquake. Replaced by Kaga.

[@johndavis6119]

Did the real Best perform that weird skating manoeuvre with his SBD like in the movie?

[@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar]

Hell no.

[@mcsmith7606]

What happened to the Japanese infantry that was to use to assault/occupy Midway?

[@sundiver137]

A lot of them died on Guadalcanal. Col Ichiki's troops were all but annihilated by the Marines at Alligator Creek, for instance.

[@scotthix2926]

Did the carrier raids have anything to do with Midway? Was that a perceived benefit if midway was taken thus an early warning station.

[@TheRisenstar]

So, if the Japanese thought they had sunk the Yorktown at Coral Sea; then they thought they were squaring off against two carriers at Midway, and since Hornet's June 4th launch never showed up at the kido Butai, Nagumo had confirmation that he was facing two carriers. Right? And since Hiryu's June 4th bomber sqadron took out one of the American carriers, and since Hiryu's June 4th torpedo squadron took out the other American carrier, of course Nagumo kept closing on the American ships with Hiryu; it was the last carrier standing in the battle, right?

[@robertoconnor279]

Did the Japanese Navy ever wonder after the battle how American Carriers just happened to be there to intercept? Didn't they think perhaps their naval code had been compromised?

[@scipioafricanus4328]

Fletcher was the best commander, he won or survived 3 carrier battles when the Japanese had superior aircraft, pilots training and experience and torpedoes. His brilliance is Unsurpassed .

[@michaeltorluemke3322]

Talk about errors that were not really covered up but not really addressed. You might look at Admiral Halsey and the typhoon and Halsey and the Battleships task force not covering the strait during the Philippine invasion and allowing the Center Force to almost get through. If the Japanese had a more aggressive Admiral then the Philippine invasion might have ended very differently.

[@korbendallas5318]

40:00 I disagree with the implication that this was a question of better planning. The USA had much, much more resources (both human and otherwise), Japan and Germany never were in a position to have a similar pilot training program.