The Burden of Proof in Philosophy

[@KaneB]

Articles and videos mentioned: Brink, "Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics" Burgess-Jackson, "Rethinking the presumption of atheism" Lorkowski, "Atheism" Lycan, "Giving dualism its due" Pigliucci & Boudry, "Prove it! The burden of proof game in science vs pseudoscience disputes" Moorean arguments on common sense: kzbin.info/www/bejne/n2jdpWCqer6jpbc Intuition in philosophy: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mJypYn98l7dpiaM kzbin.info/www/bejne/e4TWe4eqrspqbc0 Discussion with Lance Bush: kzbin.info/www/bejne/rZzLiYRqpJl1naM

[@darkthorpocomicknight7891]

as always good video but I think you misunderstand Pascal's wager I already have a video on this but its more for the layman and will do an update- technically the wager is NOT relevant whether one is a believer or not the attraction of the argument is PURELY mathematical - once you agree more reward is better than less reward Pascal's argument is irresistable Also (I know French) Pascal was not aiming at PERSUADING a non-believer - it was more of a way to provide additional support to those who have doubts. The wager is not meant to be truly decisive it is aimed at someone who cares only about gains and/or losses. Pascal is trying to show a subtle dilemma this 'rational' choice actor confronts. I will hopefully do the vid in a week or so any input from you or others is appreciated but on the whole excellent vid.

[@KaneB]

​@@darkthorpocomicknight7891 >> once you agree more reward is better than less reward Pascal's argument is irresistable The circumstances under which you get "more reward" depend on how you're assuming that God will distribute the rewards and punishments. What if, like I suggest, God is a militant evidentialist who will send all believers who do not have sufficient evidence to hell? >> Also (I know French) Pascal was not aiming at PERSUADING a non-believer That's fair enough, but plenty of other folks have used the wager in this way.

[@darkthorpocomicknight7891]

@@KaneB Yes the argument would work just as well for Islam so that puts Pascal in an odd situation (which he was aware of) I think a key (unstated) assumption is God is all benevolent hence even a non-believer only does frankly a pathetic amount (a few prayers) they will be let one On the theist side it is a weak assumption because we don't know the nature of God Yeah - obviously this is the usual historians of philosophy versus 'analytic' school who invoke the name but misunderstand the origin of x argument Its a minor issue on Pascal I'm not concerned - I doubt most opponents want the deeper history lesson But when it comes to Wittgenstein it bugs me when people invoke 'arguments" he never signed off on and would probably be against Great work as always you earned my sub and like a long time ago

[@appalachianmountain]

Wow, this channel looks amazing! I just discovered it from the crossover you did with Friction Philosophy. Great work I am looking forward to watching more!

[@KaneB]

Thanks! I hope it lives up to your expectations!

[@dharmadefender3932]

@@KaneB You should do an scientific anti realist thing with Detroyer (Friction) or Canadian Catholic. That would be interesting to hear.

[@gowdsake7103]

The one making the claim BTW philosophy can NEVER prove a god

[@Songriquole]

Strongly agree with the dilemma. Plus, I always thought it was a practical obstacle to conversation. Why not just get into the arguments for and against a position? I don't think anyone thinks we can hold beliefs or point of views (which we think are reasonable) without having a reason for them, so why not just state these reasons, on each side of the argument? It can get pretty irritating arguing with someone defending themselves with appeals to burden of proof, it just either stalls the conversation pointlessly, or stops it completely.

[@KaneB]

Yeah, when I see people say that particular positions hold the burden of proof, I often think: "Okay, so what? Why should I care?" Telling me that I have a burden of proof isn't going to make me doubt any position I already hold. I might give reasons for my position, and if you want to convince me to change my mind, you'll have to give reasons for yours. I take it that the point is supposed to be that if your opponent holds the burden of proof, then your belief can be justified even if you don't have any positive reason for it. Well, fair enough. But that's not going to convince anybody who disagrees with you.

[@dm9910]

Stopping the conversation can be very useful, pragmatically. If we say that there's no burden of proof on someone contradicting well-established scientific theory, then all quack pseudoscience claims must be actively and individually refuted. This is a huge fucking waste of time and effort for people who know what they're talking about, and often quack theories are unfalsifiable making them impossible to comprehensively refute. The point of burden of proof is not to convince the quack that they're wrong, the point is to pre-empt an unproductive conversation, and explain to layman bystanders why the conversation is not needed. For a novel theory to be worthy of the time it takes to refute, it must first put forward sufficient evidence to establish usefulness.

[@JustifiedNonetheless]

Who has the burden of proof...? The claimant. Period.

[@anzov1n]

I see the burden of proof as a kind of communication heuristic to focus discourse on productive topics. It is not strictly established but i think you can form a kind of approximate idea by some combination of considering the number of claims being made (point 3), our ability to test/evaluate/falsify them, the epistemic grounds on which they're made etc. In philosophy basically everything is debatable. If the concept of the burden of proof doesn't pass muster by some strict philosophical standard I'm not ready to discard it, just yet. Burden of proof is a, perhaps imperfect, tool for not wasting time on overburdened, unfalsifiable, thin etc arguments. As an example, how many different theistic claims does one have to entertain before seeking a little bit more justification from the next one?

[@karma1507]

The person making the claim in an attempt to convince others should be the one to provide evidence for it rather than others providing evidence against the claim. For example, if I'm trying to convince you that leprechauns exist, it would make more sense for me to bring evidence prooving they're real than to say you have to bring evidence prooving they're not.

[@Janasartgallery]

the accuser

[@DeadEndFrog]

Great video! (as always) 28:57 i found that kinda funny, because its essentialy saying that even if we assume that common sense should be the basis on which we base who has the burden of proof, the fact that we need to 'prove' that the pruposed common sense view is indeed reflective of common sense just shifts the burdon of proof one step back. Saying they have the burden to prove the other person has the burden of proof in this scenario, thereby making them have the true burden of proof. If that makes sense

[@KaneB]

Haha, that's a good point. I didn't catch that at the time. I suppose there's no problem if we're both in agreement on what views count as common sense. Once I reject that, say, moral realism is common sense, then the moral realist has some work to do, even if I accept that positions in conflict with common sense bear the burden of proof. Of course, in this case, the "burden" wouldn't be on moral realism in itself, but rather on the claim "moral realism is the common sense view."

[@DeadEndFrog]

@@KaneB indeed!

[@DeadEndFrog]

@@thotslayer9914 never heared of it, il check it out! thanks for the tip

[@abdulrahmanalhamali1707]

Excellent video as always, thanks a lot!

[@Dmantip1]

Wow I searched "Kane B Burden of Proof" and was disappointed to find you had not made a video on the topic just a couple of hours before you posted this haha. I've been writing an essay on Putnam's model theoretic argument and was looking for some insight on the circularity of his "Just More Theory" response to constraints on reference. Are you aware of the model theoretic argument? What is your take on it and/or Putnam's internal realism in general?

[@KaneB]

I don't know enough about it to comment.

[@Dmantip1]

​@@KaneB Ah thats a shame, I think it would interest you. Here a brief sketch of the argument in case you're curious: An ideal theory T is a first order theory that is consistent and accurately predicts all observational data about the past and future that we could ever know. Suppose the universe is infinite and T asserts the existence of infinitely many things. As T is consistent, it has a model M by Gödel's completeness theorem. Using the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems, we know there is a model M' of T with the same cardinality as the "world". We can then biject elements of M' onto elements of the world and create a model M'' of T using parts of the world (biject the corresponding constant and relation symbols). Now M'' is a model of T using only parts of the world. We have shown that any ideal theory will have the world as a model. So an ideal theory is always true. This is incompatible with metaphysical realism as a realist must hold that an ideal theory could be wrong (could be brains in a vat etc). So metaphysical realism is false. Moreover, there is no way to pick out a particular model as the "real" one. Our concepts are ultimately arbitrary. So we could switch all the elements in the models of theory and as long as we change all the places in the theory where those symbols show up, we will still have a model of T. For example, say we have a theory containing the sentences "the apple is red". A model of this theory is a red apple. But if we interpret "apple" to refer to a pear, and interpret "red" to refer to green, then the sentence "the apple is red" is modelled by a green pear. Similarly, we can permute elements in a model of our ideal theory to get an equally good model. These models can be very deviant, they might assign to the class of sandwiches a Ferris wheel, a toothpick, a dolphin etc. but they will still turn out as true as long as we shift elements appropriately. The common reponse to this is to reject such models and try to put restraints on what counts as an eligible reference for terms. For example, names should have causal links to properly refer. But then we have to add the sentence "x refers to y if an only if x has a causal link to y". This sentence is now privy to the "Just More Theory" response, which is that "causal" has indeterminate reference as well. Any sentence we add to try put constraints on reference can itself be given deviant interpretations and hence cannot help us specify a privileged reference relation. I know that's a lot and don't expect you to engage..... but if you have any questions, want to discuss, or want any resources on this, feel free to hit me up

[@KaneB]

@@Dmantip1 Yeah, I've read a bit about this before, just not enough to have any thoughts on it. I'm not sure what to make of it and I haven't gotten around to reading more about it. I suppose my initial reaction to your presentation is: Why would the metaphysical realist have to think of truth on terms of the technical use of "truth" in model theory?

[@stopspammingman1746]

thanks kane youre a gun

[@A_doe_wasting_her_life]

me

[@ceceroxy2227]

Both sides bear the burden the proof to support their own views as correct.

[@vladislavanikin3398]

I'm not a formally trained philosopher, but I always thought that the BOP is not a claim about a position itself (hence it's not an argument against the said position), but which position can be proven (or at least more easily demonstrated). I always give this example. Take two positions: 1) All crows are white 2) Not all crows are white We all know that 1 is false, however, in my opinion 2 bears the BOP, because in order to justify it one simply has to show one not white crow. On the other hand one would have a really hard time in justifying 1 against 2 taken as a default. So it's not a matter of which position is more *justified* but rather which position is more *justifiable* Anyway, that's just my take on the matter, probably flawed.

[@RyanApplegatePhD]

I agree with this account - it's absurd to propose a symmetry of proof when some positions are incalculably difficult to prove.

[@Alex.G.Harper]

“We begin as (tacit) cognitivists and realists about ethics…” yuck I hate this because he just assumed this claim to be true. Truly disgusting. I think a lot about wether my cognitivism (about the truth or falsity of beliefs about reasons) and i consider the very real alternative of non-cognitivism about reasons.

[@KaneB]

I don't think I had any determinate position on cognitivism/noncognitivism until I started learning metaethics. But as soon as I learned about noncognitivism, my immediate reaction was, "yep, that checks out!" It struck me as just obvious that moral judgments were expressions of attitude, and my confidence in that was only shaken once I was presented with the technical objections like the Frege-Geach problem. So I'm pretty sure I didn't start out as a tacit cognitivist. I certainly wasn't a tacit realist. I was convinced of moral antirealism long before I started studying philosophy.

[@Alex.G.Harper]

@Kane B I don’t hold much of anything as true in a commonsensical sense.

[@KaneB]

@@Alex.G.Harper I'm not sure what you mean. If you're saying that you don't view common sense as having much epistemic weight, then yeah, I agree.

[@Alex.G.Harper]

@@KaneB That’s precisely what i meant.

[@Bertrand-qb8er]

Excellent ❤

[@S3rios]

This was a really great video, but I think there was one aspect of the Burden of Proof that you missed. Namely, I think you overlooked the case of not whose claim is simpler, but whose claim it is easier to make true. Consider the claim following debate: Person 1: "Did you know there are black swans?" Person 2: "What are you talking about? There are no black swans! All swans are white!" Who bears the burden of proof in this situation? In my mind, it's the first person, as the second person's claim is impossible to prove with certainty. You would need to check every swan, and how would one know that every swan has been looked at? Thus, burden is on the person who says there are black swans. It is much easier for that person to show one single example of there being a black swan than it is for the other person to show how every single swan is white. This is similar to Russel's teapot: if there is a microscopic teapot out there in space that cannot be seen by a telescope, then for convenience, the burden should be on the person who asserts its existence to prove it by showing it to people rather than asking others to find proof for them.

[@shannon8111]

both people have a burden of proof. seems weird to just want to narrow it down to one or the other. Someone having a claim that is impossible to prove with certainty, does not remove them from some requirement of proof. Inductively they could infer as all swans they have currently seen or have been told about are white, so all swans are white. This seems like a perfectly reasonable justification for all swans being white, they shouldn't hold it to some certainty but they should hold it to some reasonable level. When I cross the road near my parents place there is a sharp turn, so you can't see oncoming cars. But I can infer cars are coming from the sound. I couldn't be certain that means a car is coming, perhaps it is just someone playing car sounds on speakers. But it seems enough proof to assume a car is coming and not cross the road.

[@KaneB]

There is a difference between those claims, but I'm not sure why that difference would impose a burden of proof on the former. Where this might be useful is in the context of hypothesis testing. If all the swans we observe are white, we might propose the inductive generalization "all swans are white", then we try to falsify this hypothesis. In that context, it wouldn't be enough to just assert, "there are black swans"; you'd have to produce evidence for this. But does this tell us anything about what we're justified in believing? Also, I'd say we can't know with certainty that there are black swans either, because we can't with certainty rule out various skeptical hypotheses (maybe I'm a brain in a vat).

[@KaneB]

Also, re Russell's teapot, I'd say that I actually do have positive reasons for denying its existence. It's not that the burden of proof is on the person who asserts the existence of Russell's teapot, and they have failed to meet this burden. Rather, we know what teapots are and how they are made, we know how to get artifacts into orbit, we know the kinds of things that exist in the solar system, etc., and all of this is evidence that Russell's teapot doesn't exist. If somebody tells me it does exist, I'm not going to respond by saying that they have the "burden of proof". I'll just give them the evidence against it.

[@RyanApplegatePhD]

​@@KaneB I think the standard teapot is a position most scientists would take. And I also think most laypeople who are not religious or philosophers have come to respect the power of science in making the world better. It's not obvious to me philosophy or religion have really had net positive benefits, whereas in science I think it's pretty obviously true that things didn't start getting better for the human race until science got going. Maybe this is a bit heavy handed against philosophy, but religion and morality have been around a long time and nothing really changed. Perhaps you could argue that philosophy is sort of the precursor to science or even a coexisting tool, but without science it doesn't really do anything. And I would also add, I don't think everything science has done is good, again net benefit accounting. You could make a bayesian argument which is the strength of each proposition is directly proportional to the number of measurable good outcomes experienced due to adhering to that proposition. This seems pretty intuitive - most people roll with folk psychology/physics/morality until it fails them AND something comes along that is simultaneously able to solve their new problem and all of their old ones.

[@pabloandres06183]

Great video

[@principleshipcoleoid8095]

10:56 some people found full meat diat to greately improve their health (autoimmune issues decreasing or even evaporating) so it is hard to say that forcing everyone to be vegan is minor benefits. For some specific humans benefits are enormeous. It'll also take a lot of time to rearange production to have enough vegan food for everyone.

[@jamesonrichards5105]

8:50

[@stephenweigel]

Do you have an opinion on AntiCitizenX?

[@KaneB]

I don't know them.

[@GOFMN00]

Don't waste your time with him its a clown. Sam Harris level.

[@KaneB]

@@GOFMN00 Well, I do have a couple of videos slagging off Sam Harris, so I'm not averse to diving down that far...

[@haroonaverroes6537]

no one can challenge the logic real human , all the apes on the planet earth have chance to defy human logic, if human said it is the ultimate truth forever then the apes have no chance, they can bounce as much as they can. if the logic of real human is not correct then the gods of the apes wouldn't worry about their nest.

[@haroonaverroes6537]

the apes couldn't get the message! "the dirty irrational meanness is not intelligence at all" .

[@darcyone6291]

Hello, Kane! Thanks for another great video! I have two things to say: 1) As for the dilemma you mentioned, I think there could be a third option. Since we cannot know P for CERTAINTY, I suppose, then wouldn't that give us a reason to always look for arguments for and against P? 2) Taking everything you said into consideration, where do you think we can go from here?

[@KaneB]

(1) I'm all for looking for arguments for and against P, but I'm not sure how that counts as a third option in the dilemma. The question is what justifies the burden-of-proof claim. I suggest that any answer we give to this will either make the burden-of-proof claim redundant, or it will fail to give a reason for the opponent to accept any burden. I suppose there is a third option, actually: we could reject the assumption that burden-of-proof need any justification. But then why shouldn't your opponent just insist that it's you that bears the burden of proof? In any case, looking for arguments for and against P is what philosophers do anyway. That's pretty much the point of doing philosophy! (2) I'm inclined to think that burden-of-proof claims in philosophical argument do not have any utility. In philosophy, nobody has the burden of proof. We can just present the arguments for and against particular philosophical positions.

[@GPxNABrothers]

@@KaneB What would you think if someone argues something like: "well, there are infinite position in infinite topics, the burden-of-proof is just an hipotethical imperative to someone who wants to have their view to be rationally compelling towards others//to be justified in its own position". Hipotethical imperative because it would be like "if you want X, then you _must_ do Y"

[@KaneB]

@@GPxNABrothers The claim that I have a burden of proof if I want to convince those who do not yet accept my position is fair enough, but in that case, any position might bear the burden of proof. It just depends on whether somebody objects to it, and whether we care that they've objected. I'm not sure that it helpful to think of this in terms of "burden of proof" really. It's more a psychological fact that you're only likely to convince skeptical interlocutors if you provide them with some sort of reasoning. Interestingly, people often use "burden of proof" claims as part of this reasoning. For example, the point of claiming that theists bear the burden of proof is to get the theist to reject theism or at least reduce their confidence in it. It's not just a way of saying, "I disagree with you, so what can you say to convince me?" If that were all it was, the atheist would bear the same burden of proof with respect to the theist.

[@midnightthoughts111]

Can you do history videos ?

[@bertrandkurtrussell2873]

Claimant

[@Hello-vz1md]

What do you think of Alexander Pruss's Book on Infinity

[@KaneB]

I've never read it.

[@Hello-vz1md]

@@KaneB Ok But You definitely should read his books and share your thoughts on those with us

[@KaneB]

@@Hello-vz1md Why should I read those books? (I ask because I don't have anywhere near enough time to read even 1/10 of the books I'm interested in. So I'd want to know what's special about his.)

[@Hello-vz1md]

@@KaneB Pruss is considered to be One of the greatest if not the greatest contemporary theist philosopher by MANY theists and atheist his books are considered best defence of theism So I was just wondering if you share your thoughts on those it would be helpful and interesting

[@KaneB]

@@Hello-vz1md Okay. I don't engage much with the atheism/theism debate. I'm also not all that interested in paradoxes of infinity. That's not to say I don't find these topics intriguing; they're just nowhere close to the top of the list. So I'm not sure I'll get around to that book anytime soon.

[@justus4684]

0:00 U have the bop Provide evidence!

[@KaneB]

Provide evidence for "Hello youtube"?

[@mrpickle6290]

@@KaneB Yes