Philosophy Without Justification

[@KaneB]

Moral normativity: kzbin.info/www/bejne/nXfLfnWIrr9nnLM Hume's skepticism about reason: kzbin.info/www/bejne/aGLUiaN_n8mXZqM

[@LEMAN-AND]

hello Kane, wanted to know if there are any plans for a video on metaethical precreptivism? It would be interesting to examine Hare's position in more detail.

[@ALavin-en1kr]

They (cognitive nerds) never consider intuition which is strange. Real intuition is the perfect balance between reason and feeing. The Middle Way between reason and feeling which has been endorsed by all the disciplines including religion. This guy is out to lunch in his commentary which is too cognitive; too heady, not grounded. He needs a course in real philosophy; if a real philosopher can be found today. Again the Middle Way; negotiate a path between reason and feeling. We were not given both without a purpose, so use both. Get out of your cognitive alone perspective and feel what is true; you will be surprised, it works.

[@InventiveHarvest]

You should continue using you computer because it isn't broken. It isn't broken because the moon is made of cheese.

[@amirguri1335]

One potential problem with not believing in justification is that you're more prone to holding onto false beliefs, as you're no longer expecting your beliefs to be supported by good reasons.

[@shafouingue]

Kane B is my favorite postmodern philosopher

[@KaneB]

I'm not sure I'd consider myself a postmodernist but thanks anyway!

[@eyezuel5307]

@@KaneB I think he was joking

[@shafouingue]

@@eyezuel5307 Yes I was joking because defenses of relativism seem to be often seen as "postmodern philosophy" I think (but kane b still rocks though)

[@eyezuel5307]

@@shafouingue There's certainly some similarity there I agree

[@Oskar1000]

@Kane B would postmodernist philosophers identity them as postmodernist philosophers. Thought the thing with postmodernists were the rejection of metanarratives.

[@kelseymaypole7048]

Thank you for this! You’ve given words to a sentiment that’s been floating around in my head for a while. Maybe this is only sort of related, but I puzzle over what makes an argument fail- specifically reduction to absurdity. What /is/ absurdity? It’s odd to me that arguments are sometimes framed as games where the object is to come up with reasons that align with the other stuff you “want” to believe, or that someone else is willing to accept. Idk if I explained that well, I’m an amateur lol

[@93alvbjo]

absurdity is a problem, i.e., a conflict of ideas. Reduction to absurdity simply means a demonstration of error.

[@georgemissailidis3160]

I'd say that "absurdity" is a name that a person P might give to the state of a claim "C", whenever P is confident in this: that sincere belief-that-C induces expectations, but such that if so then at least some of those expectations induced disagree with expectations which P currently has (or expectations which P currently thinks she _should_ have). That is my attempt at being more precise about it, just off the top of my head for the moment lol

[@eldiagrama]

absurd, there are many, perhaps: take 1) "Contradictio in adiecto", that is in its subject and it´s adjective (round square). 2)You can also take a look into the semiotic square where they make distinction betweenthe contrary and the contradiction. So in this vainit would be absurd as a contradiction. 3) You can also lok into aburdity through broadness, that that is what reductio ad absurdum does...... I once heard a tv host say to another that if this plate had somemore of that ingredient it would be X,towhich the host replied,yes but if my grandma had wheels, it would be a motorcycle!

[@93alvbjo]

Karl Popper argued that there was no justification either!

[@tomasgrossmann1033]

When will you get rich

[@havenbastion]

Skepticism is the best place to start and the worst place to stay.

[@marsglorious]

This has real Pyrrhonian Skepticism vibes.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

I’ve completely corrupted Kane. You’re welcome.

[@KaneB]

Well, ever since my first exposure to epistemology, I've said that as far as I'm concerned, the skeptic wins the argument (at least by the lights of the non-skeptic; by the skeptic's own lights, she has no idea whether or not she wins). So maybe that's not surprising. I was probably heading in this direction.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@KaneB I love how you back pedal when you literally credit me and made a whole video about me giving you the first arguments that made you believe pyrrhonian skepticism was psychologically possible and admit that I've helped you live your skepticism instead of ignoring it and pretending it doesn't exist. Even if you were heading toward the cliff you know I ramped up your pace in that direction and I pushed you off it.

[@KaneB]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 When have I ever denied that the skeptic wins the argument? I'm pretty sure I've always used that very phrase. As far as I recall, I used to give an explicitly Humean response to skepticism: "the skeptic wins the argument, but it is not psychologically possible to be a skeptic." I've never thought of the claim about psychological possibility as providing a rationally compelling response to the skeptic.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@KaneB You made a video called "Positions that annoy me" or something like that. And radical skepticism was like the main one that annoyed you. Are you really denying at the very least that your psychological attitude toward skepticism wasn't influenced and altered by our many conversations? You've made several videos credited to me where I change your views on the subject. I think many would find the claim that they can't be skeptics as a compelling reason why skepticism must be wrong even if the wrongness isn't articulable. I agree you always said that skepticism wins. But I think it's crazy if you take it that our 100 plus conversations on this didn't make it a more prominent feature of your worldview. Like I think your recent rejection of empiricism was in large part me hammering the point about sense experience and imagination being arbitrarily distinguished. I hope when we write papers together that you remember I wrote the other half of it haha. You probably won't remember.

[@Alien-ee3qp]

Interesting video , i think that holding this position would make you more susceptible to explore new philosophies or to establish new ways of looking at the world , so if anything, fighting dogmatism would be a good start towards achieving that . idk if it s good to think about it as a static position or a view , for me it seems more like a technique or a practice, similar to discart meditation

[@KaneB]

These days I try not to think of any of my positions as static... For one thing, almost all of the philosophical views I held in the past have changed; habit leads me form the expectation that my current views will change. I'm not too troubled by the idea of abandoning what I currently believe. Perhaps one day I will come to accept a view on which this whole debate looks pointless or confused.

[@KaneB]

@Boulanger From physicalism/scientific realism to empiricism to global relativism. I've become increasingly antirealist about an increasingly broad range of domains. In metaethics, from non-cognitivism about moral judgements to error theory to the view that the meaning/content of moral judgements is indeterminate. In normative ethics, from a kind of contractarian approach to moral theory to a rejection of moral theorising. (See my video "What's wrong with moral arbitrariness?" for some thoughts on the latter.) My political attitudes have drifted much more left-wing. There are various debates that I used to regard as mere verbal disputes that I now see as substantive, for example the debate between different views of object-parthood relations (mereological nihilism vs universalism vs restrictivism). I might still say that these are verbal disputes, but that verbal disputes are sometimes interesting. I used to regard radical skepticism as annoying, indeed as one of the most annoying positions (I have a video I think titled "Radical Skepticism" where I talk about why) whereas now I regard radical skeptics as travellers on the same path.

[@KaneB]

@Boulanger No, I don't really identify with that position anymore.

[@spongbobsquarepants3922]

@@KaneB Why not? The things you said in those empiricist videos seemed reasonable to me. What are your issues with constructive empiricism?

[@HexRey]

For me, I act as if there exists a universe governed by deterministic laws for pragmatic reasons. I don’t know if the universe is actually like that or not, but if it is, I can use those regularities to make accurate predictions and achieve what I want to do. I’d like other people to do the same, but it’s not really something I can argue unless they have similar values of reasoning and pragmatism as me and I can appeal to them. And there’s other things I want to do, such as reducing the worst suffering experienced, that others might not care about and there’s not really much I can do argument-wise if we don’t hold similar desires about it. I don’t really have true normative justifications when it comes to having such values, that’s just kinda how I am I guess. I’m glad that I’m apparently not the only one who has thought about this and come to similar conclusions.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

Those sound like really boring interests. I’m happy they aren’t based on anything so I can ignore them.

[@HexRey]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 they aren’t my only interests but ok I guess. I don’t want to interact with someone like you who just insults someone out of nowhere based on assumptions like that so thanks for making yourself known so I can block you now.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

You can appeal to popularity all day. That they are popular makes them even more unappealing to me.

[@Opposite271]

@@HexRey Why are you blocking someone just because he wrote something you don’t like on KZbin? I would either react if it is interesting or say nothing if I find it to be boring. But besides that have you ever heard the good news of our lord and savior ∀pTp? ∀pTp can save your soul from the eternal boredom in the realm of common sense.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@Jacob B How is this person coming to know what is taken as pragmatic and why are they using that definition of pragmatic and not some alternate definition? What is taken to be pragmatic isn't going to be based on anything if we keep asking enough questions we will hit a wall with no further reasons for where this idea about "being pragmatic" even came from. If hitting a wall with no further answers is "justification" then that version of justification seems equivalent to anything which is typically unjustified which just means the concept is weightless and doesn't really mean anything.

[@justus4684]

6:36 Hume's assumes fallibalism What would your objections be to infallibalists like classical foundationalists (for example acquaintance theorists)?

[@KaneB]

First, I'm not sure I agree that Hume assumed fallibilism since he gives an explicit argument for the claim that, as he might put it, "knowledge degenerates into probability". It also seems to me that even if we do take some beliefs as certain, those judgements of certainty will be just as vulnerable to Hume's vertical regress as every other kind of judgement. So I'm not sure it makes any difference whether we assume fallibilism or infallibilism. Anyway, the straightforward answer to your question is that I've never encountered anything that strikes me as even a prima facie good candidate for an infallible belief. Maybe I just have a tendency to be doubtful. I also accept certain philosophical views (denial of a strict analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinction) which seem to lead to fallibilism, but that's not really as important a motivation.

[@justus4684]

@@KaneB OK fair I would have to look at the argument Well I think even if we accept that these infallible judgements are susceptible to the vertical regress (I don't see a reason to think otherwise) I don't see how lowering credence of meta-judgements would affect the epistemic status of the starting judgement Hm like infallible beliefs just are beliefs that if one holds them they can't be false For example the belief "I have a belief" is true in all possible worlds, if you have it The question then of course is "Well how do you know that you have this belief?" What do you think of acquaintance theory there? For example Fumertons version: S is justified in believing that p iff 1) S is acquainted with the belief that p, 2) S is acquainted with the fact that p and 3) S is acquainted with the correspondence between the belief and the fact

[@justus4684]

@Jacob B Well I don't think Cartesians scenarios do much against infallible beliefs, because Cartesian scenarios are concern with the possibility that a demon is tricking you ie that some belief of you is false The demon can't deceive you about for example the belief that "I have a belief", because this belief is true when you have it

[@BurnigLegionsBlade]

It reminds me of a position I also hold, which was inspired by Richard Rorty's concept of a Final Vocabulary and Ironism

[@jenpalex2]

What do you think of the Critical Rationalist school of Evolutionary Epistemology?

[@chahuncoller]

I suggest you a video. Watch this short video for results on intelligence and the self that even philosophy and psychology professors haven't achieved yet. The name of the video is WHAT IS TABULA RASA? WHAT IS IQ INTELLIGENCE? WHAT IS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THEM?

[@lbjvg]

Lots to thinks about. Some thoughts: 1. Don’t you think there is an implicit normativity of giving and receiving reasons in a conversation? 2. Be a philosophic artist - create new concepts!

[@numbynumb]

"Philosophy Without Justification" - a good title for a book

[@suntorytimes1]

And when you open it, it’s all blank pages.

[@ExistenceUniversity]

Called the Bible

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@ExistenceUniversity Let's be clear you also have zero justifications that aren't based on assumptions you can't justify. The three axioms you pull out when challenged aren't even enough to secure rationality let alone a theory of justification. So you just aren't a very clear thinker. And your youtube videos are really bad.

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 Well I didn't want to write the entirely of the Objectivist philosophy in a comment. But what more do you need? You cannot deny that things exist because to deny things exist would require interacting with things which exist. You cannot deny things have an identity, you'd need to identify the thing by its identity to attempt to deny it. You cannot deny you are conscious, as that denial is an act of consciousness. They are axioms. Your flailing attempts to hand-wabrle them away or deny them only reaffirms them.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@ExistenceUniversity Oh ok so you're an full blown Ayn Rand person? Well no wonder your brain doesn't work. You haven't defined "existence" or "identity" or "consciousness" - all of those can be defined in many different conflicting ways, all still widely discussed and controversial. That you can merely say words like "exist" or "identity" or "consciousness" does not mean that you've given a coherent definition of them. But keep in mind whatever you add to make them coherent is going to have to be included into the axiom base as well... and so will the things needed to define those additions and so on. So there goes the whole illusion that you are only assuming three things. You aren't assuming those three things to be clear. You are also assuming the way in which you specify those three axioms (people specify those terms in highly different ways)

[@AC58401]

Nice haircut!

[@KaneB]

Thanks

[@confrontingcapital5080]

I’m not sure I understand the first motivation you mentioned. To me it seems like you can clearly say that there’s a fact of the matter wrt what considerations raise the probability of different conclusions without saying that anyone has any normative epistemic reason to believe the things that are supported by the evidence.

[@varlamplatonov6099]

I read something by Crispin Sartwell that is basically the same position, but he is a pragmatist and a Moore fanboy against Wittgenstein at least. Found interesting that you guys from different points converge at this.

[@KaneB]

I've read Sartwell's article where he argues that true belief is sufficient for knowledge, and justification is not required. I'm not sure if he denies that there is justification though. We might think that there is justification and that it's important that our beliefs are justified, even if justification isn't required for knowledge specifically.

[@onion4062]

Why do “good” reasons have to be normative, couldn’t “good” just mean truth-tracking?

[@KaneB]

Sure, you can use the term that way. But then I might just not care about truth. As it happens, there are lots of contexts where I would choose false beliefs that bring happiness and comfort over true ones that make me miserable. There's a deeper issue here though, which is how we determine what beliefs count as true in the first place. Take some proposition P. Verity says, "I believe that P." Sydney says, "I take P to be true." In both cases, we can ask: why is that? And it seems that in both cases, we will distinguish justification from reasons. Verity can give reasons for believing P, Sydney can give reasons for taking P to be true, but those will only provide justification if they are good reasons or right reasons or something along those lines.

[@onion4062]

@@KaneB To address your first point: if you don't care about truth, you might have "good" reasons to believe a falsity if it makes you happy. "Good" and hence "justified" is still non-normative, as instead of using it to mean "truth-tracking" you are saying that it obtains some set of desires that you hold. Therefore, a normative anti-realist, may still be inclined to say that they are justified in conforming to certain hypothetical imperatives that they have. Then to your second point, a belief can be counted as true if it corresponds to the real world. I see no need to defer to normativity to justify by beliefs.

[@KaneB]

@@onion4062 I agree that we can define terms like "good" and "justified" etc. in a way that removes any normativity. We can define terms however we want. So let's say that Verity uses "good" and "justified" to mean "truth-tracking" and Sydney uses "good" and "justified" to mean "makes me happy". The question is whether any such definition tracks the facts about what we ought to believe. If your answer to that is "no", then although you might still use terms like "good reasons" and "justification", it seems to me that your view is in all relevant ways equivalent to mine -- there are various reasons people believe things, and various attitudes people have to those reasons, and that's all there is to it... Some reasons I like, some reasons I dislike, and when I like a reason I give it a little crown by calling it a "justification". Re the second point, "P corresponds to the real world" raises the same problem as "I believe that P" or "P is true". When you say that P corresponds to the real world, I will ask you why. You can give reasons for your claim, but only some of those reasons justify the claim -- only the good reasons, the right reasons.

[@Nickesponja]

16:00 but if you don't think there's any actual justification for beliefs, you'd be convincing people simply thanks to psychological mechanisms that they can't avoid falling prey to. Is this something you really want to do? If someone couldn't help but become convinced of whatever you told them whenever you ended your sentences with "abracadabra", would you tell them "my views are correct, abracadabra"? Because this is exactly what it sounds like when you deny justifications but accept reasons.

[@KaneB]

To be honest, I'm not particularly motivated to convince people to agree with me. So I probably wouldn't do that. When I give reasons, it's really more that I enjoy exploring ideas and expressing my own psychological states. Additionally, we might value not just sharing the conclusion, but also sharing the reason that prompted that conclusion. If I have this attitude, and I'm not moved by a statement like, "P, abracadabra", then I won't utter "P, abracadabra" when trying to convince others. But yeah, on my view "P, abracadabra" is in no worse shape than "P [anything else]" as a justification for P.

[@Nickesponja]

@@KaneB Ah, I see. Thanks for the answer!

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@@Nickesponja He is just here to hear himself speak nonsense

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@Jacob B No, it's not. This is dangerous thinking.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@ExistenceUniversity Your youtube videos are very low quality, I'd say an almost "dangerous" lack of quality control. You do not want to attend Existence University folks.

[@wodanburns9457]

Hello, Mr. Baker! Please, make the video about philosophy of law.

[@Mark-dn5xo]

1) WHEN you didn't have this position and believed in normativity and that there are better and worse reasons for positions, did you have good reasons to abandon that commonsense position? If not then wouldn't abandoning that position be akin to being hit on the head or being brainwashed and thus have your beliefs formed and modified by non-rational means? 2) If the position you described in the video is truly your view, shouldn't you not be a philosopher at all but rather an artist or sophist or a Nietzsche-like poet/writer?

[@KaneB]

(1) From my perspective as I was abandoning belief in justification, I suppose I would have said that I had good reasons to abandon it. At that time, any carefully considered change in belief was a result of what I would have considered justification. From my current perspective, yeah, it was basically just like changing my beliefs after being hit on the head. The only difference is that I happen to like changing beliefs due to the kind of reasons I mention in the video, but not so much due to being hit on the head. The former is a preferable story. (2) Why? I happen to feel a drive to do philosophy; in any case, it is the one of the only things I know how to do. As I said in the video, I don't see philosophy as limited to discovering good reasons. I suppose if you do see philosophy that way, then by your standards I cannot be a philosopher. But I can act like a philosopher, I can put on the performance of a philosopher, and in most contexts this will be indistinguishable from the behaviour of somebody who is actually a philosopher. (The only difference is that when I give arguments for a position, I will occasionally say, whereas as Real Philosopher will not say, "but of course, these arguments do not justify my position or provide good reasons to believe my position." I will occasionally say things with a wink, whereas the Real Philosopher will not.) I'm happy enough merely performing as a philosopher.

[@Mark-dn5xo]

@@KaneB From your former (and I think, more accurate) perspective, how could you possibly possess good reasons for the belief that there are no better or worse reasons for believing anything? To put it quaintly, it seems that once you START FROM normativity and the space of reasons, there's no rational way to leave it. So you didn't make a rational move in leaving and abandoning your initial commonsense belief. 2) What I meant was that if your goal is merely to persuade other people of your own beliefs or to "explore the conceptual space of ideas", then other avenues like being an artist or writer or sophist or youtuber extrodinaire would be more conducive means to do that rather than philosophy.

[@KaneB]

@@Mark-dn5xo (1) I suppose I would say that as I see it, justification and rationality are self-destructive. As far as I recall, I've taken this to be a serious possibility ever since I first encountered epistemology. The arguments for radical skepticism present themselves in justification's own terms, as it were. I don't think I'm alone in this; for example, Hume (per some interpretations) probably held this view too: he saw reason alone as leading to total suspension of judgement, and we escape this state only through the intervention of non-rational factors such as custom. But let's grant that, from the perspective of the space of normative reasons, there is no rational way to leave the space of normative reasons. So what? Obviously, from my perspective now, my change in belief was not irrational. The most I would say is that the change was irrational by my previous lights, but my previous lights are not my current lights, and I like my current lights better. (2) I think philosophy is a fine tool for exploring ideas, and I feel a drive to behave in ways that would conventionally be described as "doing philosophy". I don't feel much motivation to create art or write poetry. Why, per my current view, shouldn't I just go ahead and do whatever I feel driven to do?

[@csanadobsitos2169]

Wonder what do you think of John Vervaeke's work?

[@KaneB]

I'm not familiar with him.

[@csanadobsitos2169]

@@KaneB The relevant bit for this is that the chain of justification extends beyond words but not in an arbitrary way, kzbin.info/www/bejne/Zn2WimSAqJlqY68 putting at least some counterweight, some doubt to the absolute doubt, best exemplified in David Wolpert kzbin.info/www/bejne/p5vCioiunJKkqrs

[@csanadobsitos2169]

Idk most of modern academic philosophy feels to me like text generating AIs talking to each other, like when you mix all the paint colours and get a grey, beige mess. The real fire seems to have moved to mathematics, some of physics and cognitive science. Philosophy by itself is dead and flat, holding the enjoyment of doodling on the margin of the page. I think philosophy is absolutely essential, some parts of it just became a bit incestuous. Or maybe I am just disgusted by my own potential for averageness and projecting that onto academia. Doesn’t mean I’m wrong.

[@suzettedarrow8739]

How similar to or different from do you think your view is relative to phenomenal conservatism?

[@dontyoufuckinguwume8201]

Kane made a video not long ago where he explains his problems with phenomenal conservatism.

[@suzettedarrow8739]

@@dontyoufuckinguwume8201 Yes, I know. However, Kane's description of his own views in this video seem in tension with what he said in that video. Kane seems to accept phenomenal conservatism now.

[@dontyoufuckinguwume8201]

@@suzettedarrow8739 doesn't phenomenal conservatism specifically say we can have justifications in certain cases? And Kane here is saying we never do? Am I missing something? Dont remember the details of that video.

[@KaneB]

According to phenomenal conservatism, if it seems to you that P is true, then you have defeasible justification for believing that P is true. That is, seemings provide justification, in the absence of defeaters. In my view, (a) there is no justification and (b) one reason why I say there is no justification is that to me, defeaters can always be found (there are skeptical arguments that undermine my confidence in all beliefs). So I wouldn't say I'm a phenomenal conservative! Of course, if somebody asks me why I believe something, I might appeal to my seemings. I might say, as a phenomenal conservative would say, "I believe that P because P seems to me to be true." But I could also arbitrarily decide to view my seemings in some domain as misleading, so the fact that P seems to me to be true is taken as a reason for inferring that P is false. Neither of these moves is irrational, and neither provides justification.

[@suzettedarrow8739]

@@KaneB Phenomenal conservatists could also arbitrarily decide that seemings are misleading. It is hard to see a real distinction here. You wouldn't call it "justification", of course, but insofar as we say "Phenomenal conservatism is the view that it is okay to believe things that you think are true", your view seems like that. Right?

[@Obxidian123]

When did Justin Timberlake start a philosophy channel?!?

[@ExistenceUniversity]

I suspect that Justin Timberlake would have a real philosophy as opposed to "because I feel like it", so I'd prefer if this was Timberlake

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

How does your philosophical assumptions and axioms not just bottom out in some version of “cause I feel like it”?

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888Axiomatic Concepts: Existence Exist. A is A. Consciousness is Conscious. None of those require "because I feel like it". Any feeling I have reaffirms those axioms.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

​@@ExistenceUniversity Dude I hope you're not serious with this list - No one needs accept these axioms. (1) "Existence exists" is a vapid tautology it's basically meaningless, without a criteria to pick out what qualifies as "existence" versus "non-existent" then the term just doesn't mean anything, it's like just proclaiming "there is life!" with zero specification about what the term life refers to, so basically you've just presented a tautology and empty undefined concept (thus it is easily rejected). If you want it to be meaningful you'll have to add many additional axioms that establish a criteria for what counts as "existing" or as "existence". But even this doesn't guarantee that it won't require "because you feel like it" if you are in a solipsistic world or certain kind of idealism worlds then existence is just going to be equivalent to your feelings. Which brings us to the next point about consciousness, it isn't clear if consciousness is meaningfully differentiated from "feeling stuff" if feeling stuff includes having sense impression, emotions, the sensations associated with cognizing etc. so firstly it isn't clear that "feels like" and consciousness are meaningfully different, but secondly if we are attracted to illusionist or eliminativism in philosophy of mind then we can just reject consciousness all togthether and thus reject the axiom. Also the axiom "A = A" is under specified whether "A always must equal A" is a different axiom than "A = A sometimes holds and sometimes doesn't" or "A = A mostly holds but on rare occasions does not" there are also ways to reject the law of identity, just read the Stanford Encyclopedia on Philosophy, many ways to reject it. Humeian ways and Eastern Philosophy ways and also quantum mechanics inspired ways. And just merely saying "A = A" is unspecified and easily dismissed since it's just meaningless just like your phrase "existence exists" is meaningless. Now if you flesh out what "A = A" means and give it more meaning you are just going to compound the criterias and relationships required to make it meaningful which means your axioms and foundations are going to have to grow in number and you're not going to wind up with 3 axioms but a huge amount in the end. Many of these axioms will require specified criterias and with each specified criteria you'll beg the question against alternate criterias for specifying the same term, and in rejecting these alternates you won't do it with reason, you do with a "because you feel like it" style move since all you can do is question beg against the alternates. And also let's even grant you your three axioms (I don't grant them) but even if we did, those axioms in no way get you rationality or logic or reason, you need many more axioms before that project can even start. And in specifying and fleshing out all these things, you will wind up begging the question against alternate specifications, criterias, and systems. And the only thing you'll be able to say about why you picked one specification over another will be something to the equivalent of "I like it better" AKA "cause I feel like it".

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 That's a lot of words just to say nothing at all.

[@ezequielgerstelbodoha9492]

Our fear is that beliefs without justification degrade into whims

[@n484l3iehugtil]

Maybe instead of rejecting that by trying to come up with a system that tries to find a source for justification, you should just learn how to deal with that instead. Just because everything is a whim doesn't mean all whims are equal.

[@ezequielgerstelbodoha9492]

It's a whim to assume not all whims are equal, or even that something as 'equal' or 'unequal' makes any sense. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// It seems to clash with reality though, even if you tried all your whims to be equal, you always fail at some point, like trying to make your whims equal makes it a superior whim in a sense. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// I prefer to assume that we don't know if there's a source of justification. There could be, ultimately, but we haven't found it yet. Maybe there's not, but we can't tell for sure because... we don't have justification for it.

[@drewzi2044]

Please read David Miller’s a critique of good reasons in his book critical rationalism a restatement and defence. he outlines a theory a rationality that dispenses with the demand for justification (partial or otherwise) and therefore does not succumb to the sceptical attack. He holds that beliegs are not rational or irrational. What is is rational are methods of investigation and the only rational method is the negativist one of trying to seek error in theories, and to replace them with theories that don’t have that error (but might have other errors we need to find).

[@blbphn]

you say that you don't think any of your beliefs are justified...but that just raises the follow-up question (upon whose answer your position crucially depends): what do you think is required for a belief to be justified?

[@blbphn]

​@Jacob B Ok, but "some non fallacious foundation" seems to assume a foundation that is essentially propositional (else how could it be fallacious?). But what if the foundation for a belief is ultimately non-propositional, ie, grounded in one's direct experience? In that case, 'having the experience of X' (referring not to a proposition about X, but to an actual experience of X) would seem to avoid both logical fallacy and infinite regress. Or would you deny that one's experience can provide (at least sometimes) a foundation for belief? My inclination is to think that if someone assumes a definition of justification such that beliefs cannot be ultimately grounded in experience, then that person's definition of justification is overly rigorous and unreasonable. If that is true, then the sort of total skepticism accepted by Kane B might simply be the result of assuming an unreasonable/unrealistic definition of (or criteria for) "justification" in the first place. That is how it currently seems to me, anyway. Thoughts?

[@drewzi2044]

I am an absolute sceptic. The claim that “in order to believe something it has to be justified” cannot be justified, so it fails it’s own criteria and should not be believed.

[@jackri7676]

is/ought gap

[@drewzi2044]

@@jackri7676 I don’t understand your response. The catagorisation of my criticism as a restatement of the is/ought gap is incorrect. It is actually just a refinement of the sceptical argument against the possibility of justification to reject the western legacy of justificationism itself - the idea that knowledge includes some kind of warranting of claims.

[@justus4684]

9:52 So on your view that doesn't justify your belief, its not an epistemic reason, it's just a reason, right?

[@KaneB]

Right

[@MideoKuze]

I mean if epistemic norms are ethics rather than things that are ontologically forceful (I agree), there is still philosophy to do in assuming certain norms as terms of discourse in which contestation can meaningfully happen, without being a realist about it. Any sort of normative realism is speculative, the serious issue is that we can accept this and speculate anyway (a good many people do), so what motivates us to choose not to speculate at all?

[@Opposite271]

Since both the thesis (Realism) and it’s antithesis (Antirealism) are both equally speculative, the only one who does not speculate is the pyrrhonian skeptic.

[@AshesDe]

Damn, the hair is gone, but at least we still get the great content, love your stuff

[@KaneB]

Thanks dawg!!

[@chad969]

Would you ever consider having Michael Huemer on your channel to talk about these issues?

[@chalaboy27]

I tend to agree with your moral antirealism, and, since there's so many "impossible" obstacles to justify knowledge in a strong way, I tend to agree the aproach of philosophy you just described. And I find it so curious how much philosophy can change our view of the world, because your aproach is so improbable to a person who is not familiar with philosophy...

[@havenbastion]

Knowledge is justified belief and it is always and only sufficient for a given use-case, as evidenced by the fact that when you're certain enough to accept the fact or take the action in question you want no further. 0 ignorance (certainty that you don't know) 1 found anecdote (assumed motive) 2 adversarial anecdote (presumes inaccurate communication motive) 3 collaborative anecdote (presumes accurate communication motive) 4 experience of (possible illusion or delusion) 5 ground truth (consensus Reality) 6 occupational reality (verified pragmatism) 7 professional consensus (context specific expertise, best practice) 8 science (rigorous replication) -=empirical probability / logical necessity=- 9 math, logic, Spiritual Math (semantic, absolute) 10 experience qua experience (you are definitely sensing this)

[@eldiagrama]

This kind of reminds me of the debate i was watching yesterady at philosophy overdose channel on postmodernism. The thing at pointhere is that if everything is text, it´s just interpretation so to say. This inevitable hermeneutical character of our approach to "reality" appears inevitable. Here , there is an all encompassing tendencyto dilute the justification,and to the contrarymen, they would say that this in itself is a justification. But the defense of postmoderns dont hold here, since there, everything is a text; and here there is no justification, preciseley because there is no justification. One is all encompassing through the positivity of its inevitable orthogonal textual character. Here is all encompassing through negativity (similar to what kant would call infinite judgments); in the vain of nagarjunas "emptiness";

[@Opposite271]

The reason why there are no privileged reasons is because every reason is a good reason. Since every proposition is true, it is impossible to not come to a true conclusion. The reason why you can have a reason that the moon is made of cheese is because the moon is actually made of cheese. I also think that it doesn’t matter if the realist art of „mirroring reality“ is incoherent or not since reality itself is incoherent.

[@havenbastion]

It's a matter of priority, not reason. Everyone has prioities but few have reasoned prioities.

[@Caligulahahah]

spotted the trivialist

[@n484l3iehugtil]

I don't mind philosophy being art, but I *do* mind that there is still a modern-day notion (especially among philosophers) that philosophy is about truth. That is just a remnant of inflated elitist ego imo.

[@TheRealisticNihilist]

Looking good with the buzz cut.

[@KaneB]

Thanks

[@joaquinira6976]

Its reminds me Plantinga's "God and other minds".

[@ExistenceUniversity]

Art follows philosophy, and philosophy was killed by Hume and Kant and the art followed. Postmodernism and your philosophy are the same thing. Art is the concretization of the philosophy, postmodern reflects the lack of any philosophical realism, because Hume and Kant.

[@ExistenceUniversity]

@Jacob B What more do you need? It's true. Take that and apply it to your life now. No need to over complicate things just to appear complicated.

[@ashikpanigrahi]

The philosophy is known as Critical rationalism from Karl Popper.

[@nicknolder7042]

So In this video your talking more about if we ought value having beliefs supported by sound/cogent arguments, right? In this video your not saying sound/cogent arguments don’t necessarily lead to their conclusion, did I get that right? Like maybe in another video u deny the laws of logic or something idk (not saying u do, just saying it’s a possibility for me), but like I’m asking about this video specifically.

[@dontyoufuckinguwume8201]

Kane has videos on inferential pluralism and if logic is normative. At least to a layman like me, it seems that the view expressed in this video does indeed imply (hehe) that sound/cogent arguments don't necessarily lead to their conclusions. But I might be completely wrong.

[@KaneB]

What do you mean by "necessarily lead to the conclusion"? Per the view expressed here, the fact that an argument is sound might be a reason for accepting its conclusion, but it doesn't provide any justification for the conclusion. I may accept that the inferential form is valid, and that the premises are true, but then refuse to accept the conclusion for various reasons; this is not irrational. We will also only have reasons, not justification, for taking the argument to be sound in the first place. Additionally, I do actually deny the laws of logic, in the sense that I'm inclined to something like logical pluralism or logical nihilism (see my videos "Logical Nihilism" and "Could there be no laws of logic?"). I see logics in this context as idealized models that we construct to help us understand natural language arguments, not as universal laws of thought or as tracking the rational constraints on inference or anything like that. But that's not directly relevant to this video.

[@havenbastion]

Meaning is nothing less than the desire to make things other than they are. It can be additive or subtractive. That includes wanting to increase the potential for things to stay as they are in all other ways. There is no group meaning except to the extent people share prioities. There are three moral universals; a) survival is a prerequisite for all medical goals b) truth is a prerequisite for all non-arbitrary goals c) sustainability is a prerequisite for all non-temporary goals

[@IapitusMcHeimer]

This video only makes me more surprised you aren't a fan of Coherentism. If You have given up on conventional justification, and are focused on purely "descriptive" epistemology (dont know jargon for it), it appears that a coherentist's account is the way people generally think. The series of "whys?" when answering questions seem to eventually circle back in on themselves in conceptual space. This, not-so-coincidentally, is also seemingly the best way to convince other Humans (as the other purpose of philosophy), as reason was likely granted to us "the rational animal" by evolution to convince others and as a method of survival. When we are trying to poke holes in someone's argument, we are usually attacking its coherence. It is basically the only method by which those with incommensurable world views can attack eachother (other than weapons of course) Munschausen cannot pull himself out of the mud by his boot straps, but the planet that pulls him down even outside the swamp sustains itself with sheer mass. Occasionally 'knowledge' is structured like math, or like an if statement: if a certain set of axioms is true, then some other set of facts is true; but those premises only matter to someone that accepts them. Otherwise, these if statements seem to go in a circle. Sometimes the only reason to adopt an axiom is because people find it convincing or because it seems to offer novel predictive success. I would say pragmatic virtues, but even the reasons for those virtues will eventually circle in on itself You can also just go down the epistemic regress until you find a place where you can just Chad yes the skeptic, and onlookers will find you based instead of them lol

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

Yeah so coherentism is circular. Which means we might as well pick any other circle as much as we’d pick it. I don’t think coherentism is appealing. So I might as well choose another circle instead. Coherentism is a pretty boring circle. There are much wilder and more fun ones. And since your idea behind all this is just a circle. There isn’t any reason to take it seriously. So I might as well do something more exotic and eccentric with my life.

[@IapitusMcHeimer]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 that just sounds like coherentism with extra steps to be honest. You are choosing a self consisent world view and sticking to it in favor of potentially just as coherent world views. When incommensurable world views fight, they attack eachother on coherence. Coherentism is an epistemic structure/view, so it could slip cleanly around a lot of spicy world views. You can be a Marxist or a Liberal, a physicalist or phenomenologist or idealist, a devout theist or a militant anti theist, a pacifist or imperialist, etc. The way I see it, while many deny being coherentists with their tongue, they affirm it with their actions

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@IapitusMcHeimer There is no belief in "self" or in "consistency". Those beliefs aren't there. There also isn't evidence of or a belief in "choosing" or being an agent that makes choices. Don't believe in any of that. True contradictions are great and should be maximized and not maximized at the same time, incoherence should also be maximized and not maximized at the same time. Unless you are going claim that coherence is incoherent since it can't be meaningfully differentiated from incoherence? If not there is an aim to go as deep into incoherence as possible and to not use any strategies at all to do so, but the aim doesn't belong to a self, and there isn't any choices going on.

[@IapitusMcHeimer]

@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 I would actually flip it; perhaps coherence cannot be incoherent, but incoherence itself *can* definitely be coherent. Let us take trivialism: they deny the law of non contradiction. Not only that, *everything* is True, and therefore everything is simultaneously Not True. I would say this is the most inconsistent and incoherent view possible, yet, it is still coherent with its own belief "P and not P". Hell, a trivialist could be both a coherentist and not a coherentist lol To be honest, I don't even see trivialism as *that* unreasonable, even if it's funny. If the ultimate skeptics goal is minimize error at the expense of gaining truth then the trivialists goal is to maximize truth at the expense of error, and embrace the contradictions. To me, its as epistemically effective and reasonable as the meta skepticism Kane has previously made a video on As for choices, I go the route of Nietzsche, and deny both the free will and unfree will. Even if you deny the idea that anything could have played out differently, you still made those choices. Self or no self be damned

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

@@IapitusMcHeimer Trivialists also take it that coherence is always incoherent and that no other possibility exists except that one. So trivialists do take it that coherence is incoherent. Since you don't take it that trivialism is unreasonable, you need not take it that coherence being incoherent is unreasonable. And remember trivialists also believe that what I just wrote and only what I just wrote is the only legitimate version of trivialism and that all other versions are illegitimate and that the content of trivialism is exhausted by what has been written in this paragraph. That's affirmed by trivialism.

[@Havobert]

It's interesting that you think that the moon being made of cheese is silly but the absence of justification is not... So for the former claim you assume some form of robustness but for the latter you don't. Given you can't have your cake and eat it too, how would you apply either your fundamental criticism to the cheesy-ness of the moon or your acceptance of convention (which science boils down to) to justification?

[@otavioraposo6163]

To think some belief is silly is a psychological attitude. I don't see how having such attitudes is incompatible with holding that there's no such a thing as justification.

[@KaneB]

In that part, I'm expressing what I take the standard view to be, in order to illustrate the distinction between reasons and justification. If I believe that the moon is edible, and then you ask why I believe this, and I say, "because it's made of cheese", then I have given a reason for my belief (I've answered the "why?" question). But most people would regard this answer as completely ridiculous, and not as providing justification. In any case, I'm not sure why, per my view, there would be anything problematic about finding certain beliefs or reasons silly. Why would that judgement "assume robustness" as you put it? Perhaps you could clarify what "robustness" means here.

[@KaneB]

@@otavioraposo6163 Right, I can have a positive or negative attitude to a belief. But I would say that this is all there is to it: there's nothing incorrect or irrational etc. about holding a different attitude.

[@Havobert]

@@KaneB Thank you for your response. I've been enjoying your videos a lot, keep up the good work! With respect to your question to clarify 'robustness': epistemic values such as simplicity , coherence and adequacy seem to be necessary for any commonsensical belief such your belief that the moon is not made out of cheese. On which basis do you ground your confidence that the moon is not made of cheese? Put differently, I share your belief that the moon is not made out of cheese. But I justify that belief on the basis of epistemic values (which I do not take to be as nebulous as you make them out to be). Why (except for epistemic values) do you believe that the moon is not made out of cheese? How would you answer the "why" question?

[@KaneB]

@@Havobert I might answer it in a similar way you answer it, by appealing to features such as simplicity and coherence. Perhaps I value simplicity and coherence in my sets of beliefs. But as I see it, this ultimately tests on a personal preference, analogous to my preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream. Actually, I suspect that many of the reasons for my belief that the moon is not made of cheese are not a product of any careful inference, but are just a result of inculcation in a particular society. We carve up our experience using a particular classification scheme (say, a way of drawing boundaries around objects, a way of dividing up colours, etc.), and we teach children to have particular expectations and to affirm various pieces of "common sense knowledge". My belief that the moon is not made of cheese is part of this. I accept it largely because of habit, and because in most contexts, where I'm not explicitly thinking through skeptical arguments, I don't notice anything that challenges it. In other words, for a statement such as "the moon is not made of cheese", I'm not even expecting to face the question of why I believe it. If somebody did ask that question, I might say that cheese is a product of biological processes, and that it seems that these processes could not occur in the vacuum of space. Or I might say that the moon's mass is too great for it to be made of cheese. Or I might point to missions to the moon which have brought back moon rocks. Etc.

[@attackdog6824]

“Arbitrary assumptions”

[@darcyone6291]

I wonder, per your view that "justification is not required for rational believes", if two people hold two contradictory beliefs for two contradictory reasons*, would these beliefs be considered equally rational? Maybe a definition of 'rational' is needed to answer that? *: Say one believes the sun is the center of the solar system for reasons motivated by science and the other believes the earth is the center of the solar system for reasons motivated by the bible.

[@KaneB]

Yes, those are equally rational. I view rationality as simply a matter of forming beliefs through reasoning and inference: having mental content along the lines of, "P, therefore Q and R, therefore S..." If you're thinking in that kind of way, you are engaging in rational thought. Most philosophers view rationality as normative: to be rational is to form beliefs on the basis of good or right or correct reasons. If we take that view, I would say that there is no such thing as rationality/irrationality for the same reasons I say there is no justification. So a fortiori there will be nothing irrational about holding beliefs without justification.

[@alicec1533]

It's been a while since I was actively *into* studying philsophy, so my philosophical rigor is less than it was. But I'm still interested in philosophy.

[@otavioraposo6163]

Great video. My own psychological tentency is to reduce normativity to rules we follow to achieve certain ends. Epistemic normativity is about rules of thought that reliably achieve true and novel empirical predictions. Moral normativity is about rules of action that reliably achieve stability and flourishing among sentient beings. Aesthetical normativity is about rules of creativity that reliably achieve powerfull emotional works of art. And so on. Of course I'm not certain that these are the absolute correct reductions, but I guess that they are at least close to being correct. I do think, however, that the talk about "the categorical normativity component is missing" is meaningless. I don't find skeptical challenges to be so much disturbing as you do. And I'm inclined to say that this uneasiness stems from either assuming some kind of epistemic internalism or trying to get some kind of ultimate psycho-philosophical satisfaction.

[@KaneB]

Re epistemic internalism, you may well be right. I'm strongly inclined towards internalism; I've always felt that externalist accounts of knowledge and justification simply miss the point... Or rather, they do not address the points that actually interest me.

[@otavioraposo6163]

@@KaneB Yeah. And maybe it's bold for me to say...but I think that this "point externalists are missing" is just the need to scratch that itch of not achieving some ultimate intellectual satisfaction. Maybe I'm being arrogant, but could it be that internalists are just perfectionists applied to the intellect?

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

I think the point you are missing is that skeptical arguments don’t just target “certainty” they target the ability to have any credences or probabilities at all. And they attack the externalist notion of “reliable sources” and they attack notions of pragmatic justification. If you think skepticism merely targets certainty then you aren’t familiar with the scope of skeptical challenges. They have nothing to do with perfectionism. Kane knows this I’ve talked to him about it 1000s of times on the phone, he gets it, but I think you still think skepticism is about certainty, it isn’t.

[@unknownknownsphilosophy7888]

I don’t think I have any, if there is an answer I don’t think I’ve heard it yet, but I’m unsure of that too, maybe I have heard it and didn’t recognize it. Yeah that’s “the fog” Kane was talking about it. I don’t think Kane’s response is unappealing, strikes me intuitively as honest. If you don’t take the challenges as resolved you just state “Hey look these are my feelings” not justified, just the way I feel. I don’t see the problem.

[@SerifSansSerif]

I am thoroughly enthralled with Hume and Kirkegaard above all philosophers. I think philosophy has great value and importance still because learning to be critical of your own thoughts and beliefs has great value. If your thoughts and beliefs are your tools for expressing yourself and making.yourself heard, being critical of them and learning to express them better is like honing a knife, and without doing so, is more like trying to cut bread with a hammer. Philosophy is more or less the whetstone. Hume is absolutely accurate and on point with his assumptions, and everything is based on a degree of faith, and that's ok. We still should do and proceed as we normally do, but keep Hume in the back of our head as a reminder that we can be wrong, and that a lot of this is based only on our best guesses and assumptions. Hume is like there buyer beware clause, or the terms and conditions fine print (though I guess it's appropriate for.philosophy that the "fine print" is very readable whereas the bulk of what you are buying into is not).

[@havenbastion]

Hume is absolutely wrong about faith. Faith is belief without appeal to evidence and is the polar opposite of knowledge. It is always and only intellectually regressive.

[@drewzi2044]

You can think of them as providing criticism.

[@sorinmoisescu777]

But you are just changeing justification with good reasons

[@drewzi2044]

You can give a reason for why you did something or believed something, but usually these are just sources for the theory, but sources having nothing to do with the truth of a theory. And the only theories worth believing are true ones, or if you like, ones that are, though false, have enough truth to solve your current problem. No amount of justification changes the truth value of your theory or reveal that it is true, yet criticism can reveal that it is in error.

[@alejandroperea98]

What happened to your hair Kane, for god's sake?

[@KaneB]

It was time for my annual hair cut.

[@avaragedude6223]

Haven't watched yet but I'm curious how you're gonna respond the "what's your justification for not believing in justifications?" Objection.

[@KaneB]

I don't have a justification for that (at least by my own lights), but why would that be a problem?

[@thelordz33]

Why would someone who doesn't believe in justifications have to justify their belief? Wouldn't it be the one who believes justifications who has to justify their belief in justification?

[@irish_deconstruction]

@@KaneB It would mean that your position that nothing is justified is unjustified, which would render it false.

[@KaneB]

@@irish_deconstruction I don't think there's anything problematic about holding unjustified beliefs, though. Also, the standard view is that there is a distinction between justification and truth-value, so that there can be false justified beliefs and true unjustified beliefs. Consider, for example, somebody who forms the belief that Frank Zappa is dead on the basis of flipping a coin ("heads he's alive, tails he's dead"). Most philosophers would say that this belief is unjustified, but still true. Of course, maybe you don't accept the standard view there.

[@otavioraposo6163]

@@irish_deconstruction Your argument doesn't follow. You can't infer a belief is false from the fact that it's unjustifed. As an example, consider the belief that I will win the lottery. This belief could very well be true, even though it's unjustified.

[@drewzi2044]

That’s not what happened. What happened was this. You realised that if Hume’s argument is correct, then there is no justification, you then could not develope a counter-argument to his criticism (no one has ever succeeded) So then you had to make a choice between rejecting Hume or rejecting justificationism. You chose to reject justificationism, since you guessed there is a true criticism of it. Notice there is no reason giving here in the sense of justification. Just a logical contradiction that compelled you to make a decision. It could absolutely be a wrong position to guess that there is a true criticism of justificationism. Yet the criticism is true (that’s my conjecture) feel free to criticise it.

[@theautodidacticlayman]

Philosophy Without Truth* There-fixed it for ya. 😀 Listened to this whole thing once and didn’t hear you mention it; searched the transcript and didn’t see you mention it… then listened to this again and found a few places where you could’ve used the word “true” or “truth” and this video would’ve made a lot more sense. BTW, has anyone debunked the Cogito yet?

[@KaneB]

I'm open to just rejecting truth as well, but that's a topic for another video. Currently though my view is: I enjoy holding various beliefs, and per my definition of "belief", to believe a proposition just is to take that proposition to be true. I think justification is a separate issue to truth-value. Most philosophers would say that there can be justified false beliefs and unjustified true beliefs. For example, the scientists in the 1800s who believe Newtonian mechanics were justified given the evidence available, but their belief turned out to be false nevertheless. The mystic who believed that Joe Biden would win the 2020 US election on the basis of gazing into a crystal ball did not have justification for her belief, but that belief was still true. (If you object to either of these examples, you can probably come up with your own.)

[@theautodidacticlayman]

@@KaneB What would you say, then, to someone who says that the falsification of certain beliefs undermines the justifications? IOW, because the belief was never true… it _cannot_ be justified. 🤔 And when speaking of unjustified _true_ beliefs, are you referring to what some people call “properly basic beliefs?” Do you accept the idea of PBB?

[@KaneB]

@@theautodidacticlayman I would probably just ask for more detail about the view. If P is falsified, then it is not now justified. But it may have been justified prior to the falsification. This is what many philosophers would say about Newtonian mechanics, for example: it was justified for a time, but then further evidence came in that rendered it unjustified. No, I'm not talking about properly basic beliefs. I'm taking about beliefs that almost everybody would think are just silly, but that happen to turn out to be true. Forming beliefs by gazing into a crystal ball is usually thought to be an idiotic method, not something that provides justification -- but those beliefs might by chance turn out to be true.

[@theautodidacticlayman]

@@KaneB Ah! 💡 I could be off, but is that something like a Gettier case? If not, I think it might still be helpful to show what I was getting at. “The man with ten cents in his pocket will get the job.” I think that falls apart as a reason to justify the belief when we analyze what “The man with ten cents” means… I think most Gettier cases fall apart the same way: by looking into the reasons that count as the justification for the belief and finding the reasons that collapse under the burden of the label “true.” So it never counted as knowledge because it was unjustified because the reasons were false. Something like that. But as for you, are you questioning what knowledge is? Or are you more questioning _how_ we come to know, or if even that’s possible? I just want to understand what you were getting at in your video. 😅

[@KaneB]

@@theautodidacticlayman The view that I'm expressing in this video is that, to put in it your terms, justification always falls apart. As for knowledge, I'd be happy to say either that there is no knowledge (because there is no justification) or that knowledge doesn't require justification -- I say that I know that P when I believe that P, and when I can give reasons for P that I like.

[@tgenov]

You sound like philosopher trapped in the despair of Rorty’s ironism. No “final vocabulary” is ever truly final…

[@hydrogeniodide8436]

Philosophy is just vibes all the way down. Just "seemings" this and "self evident" that. Philosophy is the game of convincing others

[@whycantiremainanonymous8091]

I can get on board with the claim that there are no really good reasons for believing things. The claim that there are no *bad* reasons is a harder sell. Unfortunately, I spent too much of my life nursing a schizophrenic parent to think a total "anything goes" approach is harmless.

[@havenbastion]

Certainty (as much as is necessary for taking action) is faith if its not justified, making it the polar opposite of knowledge.

[@drewzi2044]

Wait, your argument is invalid and your conclusion false. Just because you could be wrong does not imply that you are wrong. Just because you believe something is true, doesn’t mean that you believe it is certain. Unless, you are using uncertainty as a synonym of risky, then there is no reason to quantify it. Since uncertainty is rationally ineradicable, even though you can have psychological certainty, the use of epistemic probability doesn’t do anything. So the move to probability is unneeded. All that is needed is to take what your theories say seriously coupled with the determination to seek out error in them.

[@WackyConundrum]

Philosophy with no justification? Isn't there a word for that already? Sophistry.

[@KaneB]

Sure. I guess if I wanted to state my view in a provocative manner, I could say that every position and argument is sophistry.

[@dream1430]

Your approach to philosophy just seems disingenuous to me - I can understand it, but I’d likely not want to talk to you.

[@KingCrocoduck]

Philosophy without justification? That's just Hegelianism lol

[@Voivode.of.Hirsir]

You don't know Hegel

[@codawithteeth]

thanks for this video kane b i agree with you on a lot of things and it’s always super comforting to hear my beliefs validated when most people find them absurd (๑>◡

[@MeowSin11]

Are you tired of long hair?

[@KaneB]

Yeah I guess. I don't have a strong preference either way, but it's a bit easier to have it short.

[@PhilosophicalAnalysis]

What constitutes harm in the context of free speech? Make your second Freedom of Speech video!!

[@nope-gc8gz]

Giga chad

[@arinalikes5911]

I don believe in anything with the big flag of being normative. Nah eh. Nothing about this life is normative. Especially normative ethics, pardon my French but it is a bunch of crap. Some philosophers need to start owning up to centering everything on what I see as just different forms of aesthetic justifications. Can not agree more.

[@TheGlenn8]

There is nothing wrong with being arbitrary as long as you owe up to it.

[@noah5291]

Sub dawghs