The Euthyphro Dilemma and Divine Command Theory

[@Marele315]

You have such a gift to be able to explain very difficult subjects in a way that the average person can understand! I was happy to see one of your videos again! I hope you’ll be making more soon!

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks!

[@BintBogos]

I was thinking about it all day, thanks for the clear explanation, I understand it better now!

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

I’m glad this was helpful.

[@landonny]

Really appreciate this clear format, very straight forward and informative.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks for watching!

[@divinitydetective4122]

Excellent explanation, thank you!

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks for watching!

[@cooldude4962]

Thank you for this. You are a great teacher

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks for the kind words and thank you for watching!

[@rameennayyar2395]

Thank u so much for the video... I hope it will help in my class discussion tomorrow....

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks for watching! I hope it did help!

[@rameennayyar2395]

@@MiguelBenitezJr it did help thank u can u analyse the dialogue symposium by Plato as well?

[@JakeStuder]

Miguel, I’m taking an introductory philosophy course now. I really appreciate this video for its clarity, but still there is something unclear to me: I wholly believe that goodness is not a mere characteristic God possesses, but that God literally is goodness. Therefore, morality is grounded in God’s nature. To say this is a third option to the dilemma seemed obvious at first, but upon further thinking, I came to the thought that this “third” option is still consistent with the first option, that God says something is good because it is. How is this option not viable, and why is a third option needed, especially when this option just seems like a variable reiteration of the first? Couldn’t it just be that the implications of the first option are wrong? That the statement, “Therefore, we must ... admit that there is a standard of right and wrong that is independent of his will, and give up the theological definitions of right and wrong,” is itself a false necessity? And therefore that the first option (that God says something is right because it is right) is still an entirely viable option without negative implications? I mean, You yourself gave a reply to this implication starting at 4:45. So why isn’t the answer to this dilemma the first question proposed in it (that God says something is good because it is good) rather than a third alternative that just seems like a different restatement of the first? This is a new way of thinking for me, and I am definitely already opposed to any theory that would try to sever morality from God. It isn’t biblical. However, I am struggling with understanding the objections to the Divine Command Theory, and especially with understanding how to reply to such objections.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Hi Jake, thanks for taking the time to watch the video and for your thoughtful reply. I think understanding the context of the discussion is important. The first option is viable IF understood in the way you’ve laid it out. However, in the dialogue, Socrates is arguing the first option to refer to a standard of goodness that the gods look to or refer to, that is outside of them, in order to determine what is good. Remember the question originated in the context of polytheism. So, what is presented here is a third option, a third way of looking at it that makes divine commands neither arbitrary nor dependent on some external source beyond God. Does that make sense? It’s about allowing the first option to mean what Socrates meant by it.

[@andriesmaritz5456]

The exception to the dilemma presented here (4:17) doesn't work. It's still subject to the dilemma. You're simply restating the second premise of the dilemma. No dice.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

I appreciate you watching but it is not merely restating the second premise, because it is not open to the charge of being arbitrary as the second premise is.

[@robertmitrovich4018]

Your videos are excellent. Please keep this up.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

Thanks for watching!

[@mahdielzein85]

Doesn’t the solution given to the dilemma, that morality is grounded in God’s nature, simply push the question back? What is,then, god’s nature? What is the thing that makes God’s nature so? The thing that Socrates was trying to get at all along?

[@ssssyther]

I still don't see how God is not free to command anything he desires, including altering His own nature. Is He not a being capable of all things? How can He be restricted from altering His own character? What is limiting the power of God in this instance? I was under the impression that He was unlimited by nature. Is there an external force causing this limitation or is it self imposed? If it is self imposed, then that implies that God is no longer an omnipotent being, albeit through His own design, right?

[@mattstephens343]

@scytherion. The premise is flawed in that you suppose that God would change His nature, that is divine nature. This is primarily due to the fact that the divine nature of God is that it is perfect in every way, and for Him to change His nature would be to take it from something perfect to something imperfect; therefore, no longer perfect, nor any longer divine. This is a similar line of argumentation for the "Can God make a rock so large that even He could not lift it?". The flaw is that it is against the law of logic, and this does not indicate that He is not strong enough to lift a massive boulder, but that He would not simply due to the illogical notion of the act. Similarly, He would not make a square-triangle. Contradictory to logic, and to the natures of a square or triangle. As to do either would be to make a three-sided square (internal degrees adding to 180), or a four-sided triangle (internal angles adding to 360). This isn't just a vernacular switch, but in the instance of the shapes above, the three-sided square would have to have four 90 degree angles adding to 180. and the four sided triangle would have to have three angles, one with maximum of 179.999999998 and two other angles with a degree of 0.000000001 each, and yet adds to 360 degrees.

[@ssssyther]

@@mattstephens343 God is constrained by logic, I see.

[@zaviersimpson7757]

The problem with your objection is that if God is a slave to his own nature then he is not omnipotent.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

God’s nature is not separate from God. It makes no sense to say one is slave to one’s nature. One always acts in accordance to one’s nature.

[@zaviersimpson7757]

@@MiguelBenitezJr If we are bound by our nature we have no free will and if God is bound by his nature then neither does he. A God that as you said, “can’t go contrary to his nature” is not omnipotent.

[@MiguelBenitezJr]

@@zaviersimpson7757 of course he is. Omnipotence is part of his nature.

[@zaviersimpson7757]

@@MiguelBenitezJr Saying God is omnipotent yet bound by his own nature is as oxymoronic as saying someone is a married bachelor.

[@exilednight1]

This is an intriguing thought, but I am failing to see how it resolves the dilemma. All it seems to be doing is now placing the question as to where did God's character come from that helped him develop his moral belief? Character is something that is built from not only our biology, but also our environment and upbringing. But then we are taught that God has neither parents or a childhood, so where does his character come from? And if you break down character to its most basic elements, you have those of good character (moral character), and those of bad character (immoral character), which leads us back to the same dilemma. Defining good or bad character is directly tied to that which we find to be moral and immoral. The other problem I have with this is that morals are defined by society as a whole, and often shift over time. Slavery was once considered a morally safe endeavor, but as society changes, so does our moral values. A moral man will not cheat on his wife because SOCIETY believes it is wrong, but an ethical man will not cheat on his wife because HE believes it to be wrong. We can call it whichever we like, morals, ethics, character, piety, holiness - but it all leads back to the dilemma that Socrates put forth.