The Fine-Tuning Argument Simply Works!

Here's an article where I make the point in more detail. It also links to my various sources.
benthams.substack.com/p/the-f...

[@davisdahlberg8345]

A few things I always think when the fine-tuning argument is discussed. 1) I think the multiverse objection is poor if it is purely philosophical, but some of the proposed cosmological models entail a multiverse. In that sense it feels dismissive to give thought experiments or purely philosophical reasons why a multiverse is not a live option. 2) i know Luke Barnes and other physicists investigate what would happen if the constants were different, but it feels too speculative. I imagine if there were different life forms in a different universe and they input our laws of physics and constants they would look at the initial conditions and rule out life for some justified reason. And for 13 billion years our universe didn’t have life. I realize there are some laws and constants you could rule out at the start but it goes too far to say these are the only values life would exist in. In biology we have done this and said life needs x, y, and z to exist certainly we couldn’t find life at the bottom of the ocean or other extremes and then we find life. The biological example seems a bit analogous to what we are doing with the constants and it seems to speculative to use it as evidence for theism. 3) we have great scientific evidence that our theories are incomplete so it is too early to judge. We might find large ranges if the constants aren’t possible or that we have far fewer constants than we originally thought. 4) if naturalism is true then the constants would have to be just right to give rise to life. But on theism the laws and constants would not necessarily need to be just right to give rise to life. At the end of the day I am a theist and I understand some theists and atheists alike think this argument works but in my mind it doesn’t move me in any direction. I just don’t think we know enough to use it as evidence.

[@LumberLopper]

I mean you missed the most obvious objection. Suppose that there were a universe where the laws of physics could not allow for consciousness to arise. Then what? Simply put there would not be any conscious beings to notice the scenario in which no consciousness arises. So then it's quite simple to see that a conscious being simply necessarily must exist in a world where consciousness is possible. Imagine a universe with 50% chance of creating life. Then if consciousness arises and can see the laws of physics gave a 50% chance for them to live, then they'd think it was 50/50 and not remarkable. Now imagine another where life didn't arise. Then there'd be noone to notice the bad luck. Now imagine if the chances were 1%. Then if life does come in and they observe the laws of physics to give 1% of life then they might suspect they're lucky. But think of the other side. If no life arose, then there'd be no-one no take note of it. Now imagine if it were 1 in a gagillion. Then if life arose, we'd think we'd be extremely luck, but if it didn't no-one would exist to take note of it. So life isn't this running tally where we got lucky on the first try and managed to have life emerge. We simply can't observe the chances of no life emerging because we wouldn't even exist in the first place to take note of it. As a conscious being, my life must necessarily arise in a case where life is possible, no matter how improbable the initial conditions are. If there chances where 1 in 100, I wouldn't be able to observe the other 99 times life failed to start, or the 99 other ways the universe possible couldn't create life because I can't exist in that universe.

[@deliberationunderidealcond5105]

I address that in the article linked below.

[@marvalice3455]

You misspelled "stupidest objection". The fact that something must have happened for the current situation to be true is not an explanation for how that thing happened. Even 76 IQ Grug knows this is not a real objection.

[@prophetrob]

The anthropic principle seems like cheating to them because it defeats the argument so easily

[@prophetrob]

@@marvalice3455 it's not meant to be an explanation for how it happened, it's an acknowledgement that it would always look like you could exist in the world if you do exist in the world under any circumstances that caused you to exist in the world. That you exist at all is no more evidence for theism over naturalism , because that fits both hypotheses.

[@jacobsandys6265]

@@prophetrob The anthropic principle does not defeat the argument at all. It suggests that the fact that I exist can't be evidence for anything at all just because "oh if the alternative hypothesis were true then I wouldn't exist to observe it". For example, my existence is evidence that my parents didn't use effective contraception because it's more likely that I'd exist if they didn't than if they did. The mere fact that I couldn't observe the world if I didn't exist does nothing at all to this kind of reasoning.

[@anthonydesimone502]

This strikes me as an unfalsifiable idea. In your estimation, what could we discover/have discovered in physics that would be evidence against theistic fine tuning?

[@prophetrob]

Exactly this. Unless you were omniscient it would always look to us like the universe could be different simply because we can imagine it being as such. It's an argument from imagination People are mistaking their imagination of other "possible worlds" as more of the results of physics, but physics is really just the way this world is. There is nothing you could possibly study that could tell you the range of what could have been otherwise.

[@sndpgr]

Multiverse would falsify it

[@marvalice3455]

I cannot argue for anyone but myself. But personally there is no possible materialist argument you could make that would even make me doubt the existence of God. For the same reason why there's no mathematically argument I could give that would make you doubt the existence of a committed relationship.

[@jacobsandys6265]

What? We could discover that fine-tuning doesn't actually exist. That's like if you saw someone kill someone and asked "this is unfalsifiable. What could we discover that would be evidence against the idea that this guy killed someone?"

[@prophetrob]

@@jacobsandys6265 how do you think you could discover that?

[@DaKoopaKing]

Some random evidence against fine tuning from physics: The standard error of the measured mass of the Higgs Boson encompasses both the false vacuum and true vacuum state (biased towards the false vacuum state according to results from the LHC, but at a low sigma). If the current Higgs Field lowest energy state is in a false vacuum, that means it's metastable - it can quantum tunnel to a lower energy state - the true vacuum - and that would result in basically the entire vaporization of the universe. Once the Higgs Field quantum tunnels to the lower energy level, it will cause an outward expanding bubble of doom that travels at the speed of light and mostly destroys all composite baryonic matter. The wikipedia article "False vacuum" explores this in more depth. Also the cosmological constant is currently projected to keep increasing as time goes on, and more importantly never stopping. This means space will eventually expand so fast between particles that the particles will be pushed apart faster than the strong or electroweak interactions can bind them together, ending baryonic matter. Also you're still wrong when you make claims like "If you try to make laws that do interesting things you'll fail, *because* there are more uninteresting laws than interesting laws." There aren't. Both are infinite quantities so you can't have more of one than the other without invoking larger infinities.

[@prophetrob]

Under naturalism we should expect the universe to be necessarily the way it is because there is nothing that could have made it any other way than it already is. It doesn't matter how narrow you think the range is if there is really only a range of one really naturally possible universe. To ask why the universe is the way it is under naturalism is to show that you don't understand the implications of naturalism. You aren't taking your naturalism seriously enough. The natural universe under naturalism doesn't need tuning any more than a God needs tuning under theism. The fine tuning argument depends for success on there having been an actual possibility that the universe could be different, not just the epistemic possibility You can imagine the universe being different, but you can't investigate whether or not it actually could have been. There is nothing in the universe that you could study that could give you a hint of the range of what could have been otherwise. There is nothing you could possibly study in the universe that would tell you why it is the way it is, only that it is and how it is. The problem is that you're always assuming there is a lottery happening, but the lottery is only happening in your imagination. Epistemic possibility isn't an entirely reliable guide to metaphysical possibility and you're imagining things that can't actually have happened if naturalism is the case. None of your imaginary scenarios were Actually possible under naturalism, they're just fantasies in your mind. It doesn't matter what you think about Boltzmann brains and multiverses and how many other ways the universe could have been if it can't have been that way.

[@123ghds]

imagine you find a board game on the ground with rules and design made to be played. Are you really going to say it wasn't created by a mind, and it just necessarily exists to be the way it is with or without a creator? I could use your epistemology for any man made object that I don't have context as to who created it. I could see a phone with the possibility to download and play apps and say it just necessarily has to be that way under your line of thinking. You seem to be missing the crux of the argument. Yes the world does have to be the way it is, that's because the universe is. Part of the universes being is the fine tuning. So what best explains this? Random chance or a creator. You tell me.

[@prophetrob]

@123ghds you assumed your answer when you said made to be played instead of possible to be played. You could use that epistemology for anything, you use it for God. The problem is that you're thinking about naturalism as a random chance, but it's as inevitable as theism is, each on their own terms. Hold on, let's explain why there are people with an uncreated person since people can't be uncreated. Your ass is going to believe in an uncreated person either way. You're missing the crux of naturalism, that there is no tuning.

[@prophetrob]

@@123ghds you assumed your answer when you said made to be played instead of possible to be played. You could use that epistemology for anything, you use it for God. You can also use "it could have been different so what outside of it made it that way?" for anything. You can even use it for a God. What gave God the nature it has? What outside God set its disposition such that it made this exact world since there are so many other worlds it could have wanted to make? If this sounds stupid to you, that's how stupid it is under naturalism as well. You seem to be missing the crux of naturalism, that there was no tuning, not even a chance to be tuned. It's not part of the universe's being to be fine tuned, the fineness and the tuning are all in your head. The universe just is the way it is If you think a God wouldn't have to be intentionally created by a mind to exist then you're actually fine with the idea that a person doesn't have to be intentionally designed to be a person in order to exist.

[@123ghds]

@@prophetrob The point of the fine tuning is that it wouldn't be able to be played if it wasn't fine tuned. The fact that it is able to be played is the same as it being possible. In other words it would be impossible to have a world that is both possible and not possible to be played. It's either fine tuned to play (live) or it isn't. Also your whole second paragraph here doesn't actually mean anything. The fact that I have a head shows fine tuning for my head to exist. The question is what does my rational head support? A creator or random chance. This question you seem to be dodging. Your last paragraph is actually a really good point which I respect a lot. However, the whole point of God is that he's spaceless, timeless, immaterial, tri- omni and so on. The reason this is the case is because at some point there needs to be something that caused this all to be. It can't be space dust and matter because all space dust and matter is contingent on more space dust and matter. The question you must answer is what is more likely to be more caused, a spaceless timeless creator, or matter incapable of rational thought. Unless you want to get into pantheism that says the universe is God/ a rational mind I don't see how you account for the contingency of matter. The idea of God as a necessary being explains how we got here. It explains why we have conciseness (only rational can create rational, irrational, i.e: spacedust, can only make more irrational), why there is something rather than nothing, (someone created it), it explains our purpose (our purpose aligns with the will of the creator) it explains metaphysical and logical truths (a rational logical mind makes the rational and logic) On the contrary, presupposing naturalism will get you nothing but a shallow understanding of all these big questions. Saying these things exist cause they have to. Talk about unfalsifiable. I love your line ''You could use that epistemology for anything, you use it for God.'' Assuming my epistemology is what you're referring to yes I would agree! Order and design points to a designer. If your epistemology is true I have 0, i repeat ZERO ground to stand on to say any given object is designed purely based off of designed attributes. Mount Rushmore, netflix shows, board games. Nope they came into being because they necessarily have to do so. Give that line to the person who invented the game of life and they will be rather offended. They worked hard crafting that game.

[@prophetrob]

@@123ghds @123ghds you're assuming your answer again by specifying that the game is fine tuned. If it's the only option there's no tuning possible. Your game analogy is just smuggling in your bias and is disanalogous to the world in many ways so how about you just talk about the world directly? You're saying naturalism only gives a shallow answer, but have you considered that maybe all that's possible is a shallow answer and your longing for more is a fool's errand? Additionally, I don't think matter is contingent. As an integral aspect of the universe it is as necessarily in the arrangement it is and will change arrangement the way it will change. I think the person who made the board game of life necessarily had to invent the game no matter how hard they worked

[@sonyadonnegan1983]

Why would God need to fine tune the constants of the universe? To make the importance of this question clear, see the following question. Could God have created a universe with morally relevant free agents capable of having a relationship with him with the cosmological constant being zero? If the answer is yes, then fine tuning of physical constants doesn’t seem necessary for God’s creative purposes. If no, then God seems to not be omnipotent and is restricted by the relation between the laws of physics and the agents he needs to create for his purposes. What makes these restrictive facts around what conditions these agents can exist in true?

[@MatthewFearnley]

Are there any good sources for this “fine tuning therefore no omnipotence” argument? I’ve heard it offered several times, and I just don’t think it works, but maybe people are misquoting it.

[@sonyadonnegan1983]

@@MatthewFearnley I don’t know of any academic sources but I don’t really care whether there are any. Where do you see fault with the argument?

[@deliberationunderidealcond5105]

The odds don't have to be that high, if they're not super low it still majorly favors theism because the odds are so low on theism. I think there are various reasons, first because it's predicted by the hypothesis of indifference theodicy, second because it's one way God could make his existence known.

[@MatthewFearnley]

@@sonyadonnegan1983 I would formulate your argument like this: 1. God created life in a finely tuned universe. 2. Therefore God didn't create life in a non-finely-tuned universe. 3. Therefore God cannot create life in a non-finely-tuned universe. 4. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Does this seem reasonable? In this formulation, I would say the main weak point is getting to point 3 from point 2. In general, not doing something doesn't imply an inability to do something. I think getting to point 2 from point 1 is also difficult, because if God is omnipotent, and other universes exist (the latter of which is often given as a possible defence against fine tuning), then perhaps God has created non-finely-tuned universes containing life.

[@sonyadonnegan1983]

@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 It’s not about odds, it was a yes/no question about why God needs to fine tune a physical universe for his relevant agents to exist so you completely missed the objection. Secondly, why is fine tuning a physical universe the only way for God to make his existence known to the relevant agents he has desires to create? Why do these relevant agents need to be physically emobidied in a physical universe?

[@YuGiOhDuelChannel]

I think your point on a multiverse predicts theism is interesting, how a Good God would want the most possible people to experience life which is a good thing. I know this isn't a Christian video, but I find it interesting that it just so happens that the God given in the Bible gives Adam and Eve one of the first commands to be fruitful and multiply, meaning that this idea of the most possible people lines up with the theist based religion of Christianity....interesting

[@Nexus-jg7ev]

Have you read Graham Oppy's book Arguing about Gods? I think that he provides quite convincing objections to the FTA there. His branch actualist modal theory also provides a good naturalistic explanation for why the physical constants have the values that they do. The main points I would make about the FTA are as follows: 1. One can remain reasonably agnostic regarding whether our universe is finely tuned or not because the tweaking that is done to arrive at such fine-tuning only takes into cosnideration changes in the values of the constants that we have, without any considerations of entirely different constants altogether. It could be that completely different constants could be quite conducive for life, so that would remove the need for fine-tuning and the improbability that is at issue. This possibility can't just be ruled out, so that is why one can and should remain agnostic about fine-tuning, and thus not be quick to accept the conclusion of the FTA. 2. Suppose we just accept, for the sake of argument, that the universe is indeed fine tuned for life. Now what? Well, we have several hypotheses other than theism to explain this: - metaphysical necessity - all possible worlds share common initial history with the actual world and diverge as a result of the outplaying of some objective chance. If the values of the physical constants were fixed in the intital singularity (and according to the majority of physicists they were), then it turns out that the vlaues are the same in all possible worlds, in which case they are just necessarily the way they are, and that's all. This hypothesis is much simpler than theism and explains the data in question just as well, if not better, because the probability of the data is 1, whereas on theism it can be about 0.5. - multiple universes - there have been several objections to the multiverse hypothesis like Baltzman brains and the inverse gambler fallacy but I think that they are unsuccessful because it is just true that if there are lots of universes (perhaps infinitely many of them), then it is very likely, if not inevitable, that there will be at least one universe where life like ours can develop. As to why we find ourselves in this universe, this is because it is precisely in such a universe that we can exist. Sure, there will probably be a few universes with Baltzman brains, but there will still be one with us. I think that the intellgient design and multiverse hypothesis have at least equal explanatory power, but I think that the latter has several advantages: 1. Higher initial plausibility - all we need to postulate with the multiverse hypothesis (MU) is more universes that are just more things like what we already are familiar with. On the other hand, with the intellgient design hypothesis (ID) we have to postulate an unembodied creative mind, and from our background knowledge we know that the existence of unembodied minds is very unlikely becauee minds depend on physical brains and neural systems. Pehraps this requires commitment to physicalism, but well, I am a physicalist, so I do think that ID has low prior probability here. Another problem for ID is atemporal causation, which just seems impossible to me. I would invoke the principle of phenomenal conservatism and argue that once I understand what time and causation are, it seems to me intuitively that causation without time already being there is impossible, and in the absence of reasons to think that this is not the case, I am justified in my belief that atemporal causation is nonsense. 2. MU is theoretically simpler. Both ID and MU postulate additional causal entities to our worldview but I think that MU is still more parsimonious because it only postulates more of the same already existing stuff, while ID postulates a completely new kind of stuff. I think that for parsimony purposes, kinds of entities matter more than number of entities, and thus even an infinite number of universes is still a more parsimonious hypothesis than a supernatural creator. 3. MU fits better with some often understated evidence, namely that fine-tuning only makes life possible but still not very probable. Given how little life there is in the observable universe, it seems that the development of life, even with the right intitial conditions of the phsyical constants, is still very unlikely and reliant on a lot of luck. This is exactly what we would expect to see if the development of life is just the byproduct of chance or necessity that didn't intend that there would be life, while we would expect much more if the values of the physical constants were 'tweaked' with the intention of producing life. Overall, I find the naturalistic explanations to be much better than the supernatural explanation in terms of fitness with understated data, initial plausibility, theoretical parsimony, and explanatory power. Sorry, but the FTA is not convincing at all.

[@MatthewFearnley]

Regarding point 1, I would say that if it turns out there are ranges of constants that easily produce life without fine tuning, it still raises the question of how surprised we should be to find ourselves in a narrowly life-permitting range. As an analogy, imagine we put an inch wide archery target next to a ten metre wide target. If an archer hits the smaller target, we should be much more impressed than if the archer hit the wider target, or if the archer hit no target at all. We wouldn't simply say, "well, it is easy to hit a target, so we shouldn't be very impressed". Note also that the anthropic principle may not work as a defence in this case. We can't simply say "well, we wouldn't be around to observe a non-finely-tuned universe", because it turns out there is a reasonable chance that we - or at least someone - would. In this case, we should be surprised not to be one of the observers in one of the other universes.

[@Nexus-jg7ev]

@@MatthewFearnley I wonder how we can decide what the real range of possibilities is. Are we supposing that there are as many possibilities as we can imagine? Well, in that case even a very wide life-permitting range would be insignificant given the infinity of conceivable possibilities. If there are infinite possibilities, then things would be so improbable that probably even a God wouldn't be able to step in. This means that we have to put boundaries on the range of possibilities, but such a boundary is bound to be arbitrary. Some people can place the boundary in a range where the life-permitting sub-range seems very small, while others could put the boundary on the life-lermitting range making it look as if fine-tuning is almost certain to happen. Given that we can't figure out how wide the range of possibilities actually is, it is probably best to abandon talk about fine-tuning.

[@legendsplayground7017]

MU doesn't seem explain anything to me, it just pushes the question back without answering the question. What causes each universe to have such constant? There's a reason to explain why there's a difference in the constant of different universe right? Furthermore, we don't know whether something is random or not, you can't really prove it, like what explain each universe pick their constant randomly, perhaps necessity? Whatever that is it's somehow complex as well i guess, in theism everything is just mental content of God. Well it's debatable I guess.

[@Nexus-jg7ev]

@@legendsplayground7017 Why are there universes with different values of the physical constants? If it isn't possible that there can be such universes, or possible worlds, then it would just be necessary that the values are the way they are. The whole argument rests on this premise that such a difference is possible. MU states that there probably are such different worlds, while opponents usually argue that other possible worlds are just a heuristic device. It also seems like a double standard for the theist to argue for God as the best explanation without being able to explain any details about the process through which God creates these universes, while demanding from the non-theist to provide such details for their own theory.

[@marvalice3455]

Cope

[@dm16411]

Is there a book that convinced you the most? I know you mentioned Hronich but that was only regarding theodicy right?

[@deliberationunderidealcond5105]

No. But a good one for showing SIA is right is Carlsmith's Ph.D thesis jc.gatspress.com/pdf/SIA_vs_SSA_revised.pdf

[@HarryNicNicholas]

@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 this weird thing you were talking to grayson about, the thing with the long title and the gibberish coin tossing, just sounds like you thought you had another unbeatable jumble of hot air that proves "you're right", like presups thought with TAG. it's silly. a coin toss is 50-50 for openers. and the chances of creating grayson are indeed zillions to one against, if you SET OUT to create just grayson and nothing LIKE grayson and you did it by throwing atoms into a box, but grayson is already here, the chances he would exist are 1:1

[@marvalice3455]

​@@HarryNicNicholas keep talking like this and you'll convince me presuppositionalism is true.

[@pabloandres6179]

Can you respond to Genetically Modified Skeptics rebuttals to it ; i know his phil game is weak and he mostly deals with psychoanalysis of religious but still he has some interesting objections in his god argument tier list

[@RyanSantos-sw1mi]

How you address the "electrons in love" type of objection?

[@UniteAgainstEvil]

I don't see how that is an objection to anything

[@jacobsandys6265]

@@UniteAgainstEvil It says that the probability of fine-tuning on theism is also very low.

[@Nexus-jg7ev]

I find this cosmophsychism hypothesis to be more likely than the hypothesis of a transcendent creator. Still, I find other hypotheses to be better, but 'electrons in love' is better than God.

[@jacobsandys6265]

@@Nexus-jg7ev I think you misunderstand. Electrons in love is not a hypothesis, it is meant as a reason why the God hypothesis isn’t that good.

[@Nexus-jg7ev]

@@jacobsandys6265 It seems that I misunderstood. When I heard about electrons in love I immediately associated this with Philip Goff's cosmopsychism hypothesis.

[@hiker-uy1bi]

Your theory: the universe is "finely tuned" by an incoherent, disembodied mind thingy. Mine: the parameters of the universe we see arose from natural causes that can be studied by science and are necessary features of reality. Yeah, it really works!

[@HarryNicNicholas]

if god has to balance all the constants to be just so, whose laws of physics is he using, second, as far as nature is concerned all the numbers are "1" it's only us that gives the values significance, and when people say that the chances of life are bzillions to one against, they are saying god was more likely to fail - god would COARSE tune if he wants to be certain of life, and finally, if god is the creator, shouldn't the numbers be "just so" right from the outset? why do you need god to tinker? our universe is weird i grant you, and the numbers that give us life are spooky too, but "god did it" doesn't solve anything and never has, why is god fine tuned to be the way he is, as always if he "just is the way he is" the universe can also be "just be the way it is".

[@PrestonGranger]

"God did it" will never be a good explanation for anything

[@PrestonGranger]

Nah man