The Five Predicables | A Very Abbreviated Isagoge

[@MT-2020]

I miss your post... Thkx !!! :) :) :)

[@lucasBarjas]

2:35 i think a more appropriate way of converting those sentences with implicit copulas into senteces with explicit copulas is "Socrates is such that he sits" or "Squirrels are such that they eat". i think that because the terms "eat" and "eating" have slightly different meaning and i think it would be prefereable to preserve the meaning of each term of the sentence.

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

Yes, there are slightly different nuances in English between "runs" and "is running"-for instance, "is running" sometimes implies "is running habitually" instead of "is running actually"-but we can stipulate these away. Grammatically, there is nothing that prevents them from meaning the same thing. To say that these phrases-or any two phrases-are exactly the same in the custom of everyday language is impossible. With that said, all Medieval authors see "est currens" and "currit" as logically equivalent. That is what I am referring to though it needs some qualification. On the other hand, "Socrates is such that he runs" (Socrates est ut currit) is not equivalent since it is no longer a simple proposition, but a composite one with a result clause (ut ... = such that ...). Moreover, in the first clause prior to the result clause has "est" ("is") as the principal predicate, not a third thing added (tertium adiacens). As a result, the proposition has a very different logical form from "Socrates is running" or "Socrates runs."

[@lucasBarjas]

@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy thanks for clarifying

[@TheDarklugia123]

The Porphyrian Tree reminded me of the Platonic division method presented in the dialogue Sophist, but combined with the advancements made by Aristotelian Predicaments

[@zoomtruth1013]

Found you from try thinking youtube channel.

[@jeffsmith1798]

I realize we’re starting with Aristotle’s Topics, but I’m curious about the assertion that every simple proposition is composed of two parts, a subject and a predicate. In the Categories, Aristotle begins not with either of these but rather with the name. So in some sense, the word (univocal, equivocal or derived) is taken up prior to ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’. In other words, prior to predication, either simple or compound. So, when we say ‘every simple proposition is composed of two parts’, is this really accurate?

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

That every proposition has two parts comes from Aristotle's On Interpretation and Prior analytics, where a proposition (enunciatio) is defined as a species of speech (oratio), which itself is defined as something with parts that signify separately.

[@roberto4898]

@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy not as graphic as I wished. Words have their own rules depending if they are written or spoken.

[@musicarroll]

Vehicle -> air vehicle, land vehicle, water vehicle, space vehicle. Air vehicle -> lighter than air, heavier than air. Heavier than air -> fixed wing, rotary wing, no wing.

[@haridathcu9999]

How does general and particular differ from universal and individual?

[@jeffsmith1798]

They are generally the same but have particular differences. You could say they are proportionate in that: General : particular :: universal : individual But it seems to me they differ in respect of degree. A general case could be construed as a case for the most part, ie, in general. However, a universal case it seems to me could not. Take the speed of light. You could say that in general, nothing is faster than the speed of light. But more accurate would be to say the speed of light is universally the fastest.

[@apricus3155]

Thanks

[@Sean-ru7tg]

What is the best book on Thomistic logic?

[@legendary3952]

Well what you really mean is Aristotelian Logic. Socratic Logic is good Copi Introduction to Logic has good sections on Aristotle’s Logic. Several sources on line details Aristotle’s Logic too. Or you could just read it from Aristotle himself; The Organon (Collection of his works on Logic) Porphyry did a good addendum to Aristotle’s work too

[@jackdarby2168]

Logic as Art of Defining and Reasoning by John A. Oestrle Outlines of Fornal Logic of John of St. Thomas and Material Logic of John of St. Thomas Henri Grenier Thomistic Philosophy covers Logic

[@Sean-ru7tg]

@@jackdarby2168 Thanks for your recommendations, in your opinion, which one do you think is the most faithful to the texts of St. Thomas and consider the corpus as a whole, not isolated quotations and that uses the correct language? By the way I was also recommended "THE DOMAIN OF LOGIC ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS" I do not know if you know it if so I would like your opinion again Thank you.

[@jackdarby2168]

@@Sean-ru7tg You should wait for Mr. Polsky's reply or try contacting him somehow. I had asked a similar question, "what is a good introductory book on Thomistic Logic" and was recommended two books by him. I don't remember the name of one of them but the other one was "Logic as Art if Defining and Reasoning" by John A. Oestrle. The two works of John of St. Thomas are generally considered faithful( but I'm not the person who would know such things.. And about the book "Thomistic Philosophy" by Henri Grenier, I heard it was in use in many seminaries. I haven't heard of the book you mentioned but I'll suggest another one that I've heard about which would be Charles Coppens' works.

[@jackdarby2168]

@@Sean-ru7tg concerning @legendary3952 recommendations..I haven't heard of Socratic Logic but it sounds very interesting. Copi's Logic is not something I'd ever recommend( in the difference between ancient and modern logic the book I think is the sort that favours modern logic..) Ofcourse try reading Aristotle and Thomas' works if you can( if you have difficulties we could discuss it..you know work it out)

[@jackdarby2168]

What is the definition of colour then "seen quality"?

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

for how Aquinas defines color-using outdated physics-see my video on the powers of the soul. the definition will be nearly meaningless out of context, but he defines it as the sensible quality that moves only through a spiritual transmutation.

[@jackdarby2168]

​@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy is this "There is over and above this a particular logic peculiar to each field of knowledge." true? This is Weisheipl and he goes on to say, "...the proper method of natural philosophy is not at all identical with that of mathematics, metaphysics or moral philosophy. Logic, or general methodology, must be understood before any of the particular sciences are investigated and organized systematically. This, at least, was the common view accepted by all scholastic thinkers..."

[@guilherme-607]

Maybe a more proper definition of differentia is: “That by which the specie exceeds the genus in intension”.

[@abdelrahmanmustafa8937]

Is this teaching a part of the Trivium and Quadrivium?

[@theneurophenomenologist]

trivium (logic, grammar, and rhetoric)

[@musicarroll]

I don't know. I saw the Lion King. I think hyenas might be risible. ;)

[@jeffsmith1798]

All predicables must be predicable of many things. Not all predication is a predicable. Strictly speaking is a predicate for all predicables.

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

The words "predicable" and "predicate" can, in principle, overlap. The ten "categories" are, if translated literally into English, the ten "predicates." But they aren't necessarily actual predicates, but potential predicates. So, we could even translate the ten categories as the ten predicables. But this would be confusing for students since they are distinct from the five predicables of Porphyry. They are the ten most general genera, and a genus is one of the five predicables. It all gets very complicated if you focus too much on the word. Further complication comes from examples like the phoenix or lunar eclipse (which are a single- and periodically zero-member universal), the heptagonal house (a possible no-member species), the sun (a necessarily one-member species in Aristotle's cosmology), god (which is neither individual nor universal, but signifies as the term for a common nature), etc. Medieval and ancient commentators addressed how the notion of "universal" could be applied to these.

[@jeffsmith1798]

@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy pardon my equivocal use of predicate. And thank you very much for your explanation. What are your thoughts on the purpose of Aristotle’s Organon? I have my own opinion. I’d be very interested in yours. (Mine is shaped by the observation of the use of analogy by Aristotle as occurring in the First Philosophy (‘Metaphysics’) as well as in the Nicomachean Ethics. As well as Aristotle’s work Sophistical Refutations.)

[@TLMS654]

There are black swans, so not every swan is white. White is thus not an inseparable accident for swans. The idea of a personality trait as an inseparable accident for human beings is interesting. Which personality theory is behind the personality trait? Suggests a definition of inseparable accidents, like "scientific" facts, as contingent on theory.

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

It's important to keep in mind with standard Aristotelian examples in logic that the examples are merely for the sake of illustration not for expounded a scientific-biological, astrological, etc.-truth. Aquinas points out that Aristotle often illustrates logical principles using examples taken from presocratic physics or biology that he himself rejects in his biological or physical works. This is how I intend examples like whiteness and swans or blackness and ravens. They are standard examples among 13th century logicians, who did not know of a species of black swan. In a similar vein, the personality traits as inseparable accidents is something Aquinas discusses in his treatise on human nature. He doesn't explain the biological details of how this works-nor would he have been able to do so accurately. But it would make for a fruitful area of investigation in light of modern biochemistry and neuroscience.

[@TLMS654]

@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy Thank you and I don't disagree with your thoughts however I think you might be doing Aristotle and Aquinas somewhat of a mild disservice by saying there is a distinction they ignore in their examples in logic and biology. I think that they recognized the distinction between logic and what they would have called physics, but because there was a master science, metaphysics for them, this was not an issue. The reason I say this is that Aquinas held that existence preceded being. Unity as a metaphysical principle before multitude. With metaphysics, understanding of the division of the sciences is coherent. It's only with modern science's dogmatic denial of metaphysics that the divisions become incomprehensible because science simply is soulless method.

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

@@TLMS654 I did not say that Aquinas or Aristotle ignores the differences between the other sciences and logic. I said that when Aristotle chooses examples in to illustrate what he teaches in his logical works, he often picks examples from the various sciences that he doesn't think are correct, but which are still useful because they were widely believed to be correct at the time. Aquinas notes Aristotle's practice of doing this explicitly. Modern exegetes would probably explain it away by attributing those examples to an earlier "Platonic" stage in Aristotle's thought. I find Aquinas's explanation sufficiently believable however.

[@TLMS654]

@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy it might be a fine point, but when you say "picks examples from the other sciences" I get a modern notion of science which is this nominalist de-personalized faux-entity. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1, a. 7, respondeo is that the "relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object." what I take from that is for St. Thomas science is the habit of a person interested in a particular subject. With a notion of science as person (soul) centered science how do you pick examples from other sciences? Grateful to you.

[@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy]

@@TLMS654 I mean "science" in Aquinas's sense as the various habits of the intellect knowing something with certainty through a middle term. For Aquinas "science" is divided into practical and speculative. Speculative sciences are divided into natural philosophy or physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Each of these is further subdivided. So, for example, physics, for Aquinas, includes general physics (Aristotle's Physics), chemistry (Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption), meteorology (Aristotle's Meteorology), psychology (Aristotle's De anima; On Sleep; On Dreams; etc.), biology (Aristotle's On the History of the Animals, On the Parts of the Animals, On the Generation of Animals, etc.), and astronomy (Aristotle's On the Heavens), etc. If you are interested, I have a few videos discussing the divisions of the sciences in Aquinas. The one that does so most directly is "What is a Science?" So, when I (and Aquinas) say Aristotle uses examples from other sciences that are wrong within logic purely for the sake of illustration, I mean he takes examples from presocratic biology or platonic metaphysics, which he disagrees with, but which help to illustrate a point in logic.