The Free Will Show Episode 5: The Consequence Argument with Peter van Inwagen

In this episode, Peter van Inwagen explains the consequence argument for incompatibilism. Afterwards, he discusses what he takes to be the problem of freedom and determinism.
Peter’s Website: philosophy.nd....
A collection of Peter’s written work: andrewmbailey....
Papers referenced in the episode:
"Are We Free to Break the Laws?" by David Lewis
onlinelibrary....
“A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism” by Thomas McKay and David Johnson www.pdcnet.org...
If you have a question you’d like us to answer in our Q&A episode, get in touch with us at [e-mail], via the show’s website: thefreewillshow.com, or through social media:
Twitter: / thefreewillshow
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Facebook: / the-free-will-show-105...

[@bds8715]

The problem of free will as I understand: 1. seems like we don't have free will on determinism (consequence argument) 2. seems like we don't have free will on indeterminism (luck argument) 3. seems like we need free will to have fault/blameworthiness/culpability (and praiseworthiness). Therefore, it seems we don't have fault, etc 4. but it seems like we do have fault, etc

[@nollid596]

great episode :)

[@georgegrubbs2966]

My two cents worth. I am reposting my post to a Closer to Truth episode on KZbin with Peter van Inwagen and Robert Kuhn on "Free Will". kzbin.info/www/bejne/d5inpWh_Z9qcmJo In the "Sally" case, once a decision is made (via free will or otherwise), you cannot know if the other option could have been chosen. Now, the first decision may be changed to choose the second option, but you can never know if that was "freely" chosen. Here is "that mistake" he seeks: He did not characterize indeterminism correctly. It does not mean that there is no control. Indeterminism is not randomness. It means the future is not predetermined by antecedent causes. Nature is not strongly determined. There are laws of physics of course, but there are also other non-deterministic processes at work. What of evolution and "random" mutations? What of radioactive decay? What of non-linear, dynamical chaotic systems? What of emergence where unique behaviors and properties emerge from different lower-level behaviors and properties, where one cannot predict the emerging behaviors and properties from the lower-level behaviors and properties? All these things happen in nature. What of quantum effects in subatomic particles in the brain? Neurons, glia, and other cells contain smaller components such as microtubules, mitochondria, (and others), and they in turn consist of atoms, and they consist of electrons, protons, and neutrons. The protons and neutrons consist of quarks. There are neutrinos and Higgs particles. I say "particles," but the better word is "field." It is not known to what extent quantum effects have on brain activity. Perhaps it's negligible, but perhaps not. My view on "free will" is that we do have free will (the capacity to choose (decide) among options) within constraints. First define what "me" is, what "you" is. They are brain circuits that evolved and matured beginning with genetics, and via education, experience, and environment, plus subliminal biases (say due to advertising). At any "instant", we are the end effects of what our lives have been to that point, given our decisions and any forces and events beyond our control. Evolution of the brain/body complex, that is, the entire biological system that makes up "us," provided for innate decision-making for survival. Our past, along with "good or bad" genetics and "good" or "bad" mental health, or physical brain issues (e.g., any lesion we many not be aware of) affect our "free will" or ability to freely make decisions. You may not be affected much at all by these, and I may be affected a great deal; it varies from person to person. Finally, our so-called "self" or perception of self, our "free will" (decision-making capacity), sensory and motor apparatuses, memory, basic life-sustaining processes, etcetera, are all neural circuits. In my view, the so-called "free will" experiments (e.g, Libet, et al) are in their infancy and most are faulty - they do not indicate that our "brain" is acting autonomously when making decisions without "us" consciously being aware of it. "We" do initiate conscious decisions. There is a very slight latency within the CNS and PNS, but it's not discernable to us. When we decide to move our arm, that is conscious free will decision-making. Certain parts of our cortex may "light up" slightly prior to the actual movement, but that is not evidence that we did not freely decide to move our arm. And that applies to all conscious decisions. To be sure, our brain/body systems are doing millions of things of which we are not conscious, and that involves "decision-making" of sorts. Our biology monitors our temperature, our blood pressure, and all of our physiological processes to keep us alive and keep us balanced - that is, achieve homeostasis. Nature is not fully deterministic and humans have free will within constraints.

[@cloudoftime]

Five episodes in and there's still an underlying concept, which seems to have critical significance for the topic of free will, but has yet to be addressed: what is the self? So much hinges upon what it means for you to make a choice, so in providing due diligence to the concept of what it means for an agent to make a choice, some requirement is generated for explicitly defining what comprises an agent, or the self. Compatibilists seem to make their bread on some concept of the self. Further, when it comes to the notion of culpability, first, this is an instrumental social concept. If there is a loss of instrumentality in social arrangements from the sense of lacking praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, how does that support any proposition about the truth of free will? It appears to have significant rhetorical effect, in that people desire to place blame or give praise, but the desire itself does not substantiate free will. That said, depending on the definition of the self, an individual can still be blamed or praised for a given action. For example, if we take a physicalist position on reality, a particularized agent who is the collection of cellular, neurological, psychological, etc. properties, that individual can be held accountable and responded to according to their actions based on the desires of those applying the response. The concept of fault is simply applied to the actions of said individual, whatever their composition. It's the same as any other force of nature. If there is a wildfire occurring in a place that a group of individuals doesn't like, they act to put the fire out. Likewise, if an individual acts in such a way that a sufficiently powerful other individual or group doesn't like, that sufficiently powerful individual or group can take responsive action against the individual that is the source of the disliked action (person imprisoned for murder and/or treated for psychological status). In this way, to say that they can be blamed for a given action, is just to say that they were the pragmatically isolated source of the action, for which a response can be taken to address unwanted future actions to a specified degree.

[@cloudoftime]

In other words, so much of this position offered in the podcast hinges on the use of the word "fault." It's being presented as though there is an implication that if we can't use the word fault in this way, then no responsive action can be taken. Do you blame a wildfire? Being that you can't blame a wildfire for a free choice of destruction, can you not take action to put the wildfire out? And this is still an underlying problem for lacking understanding about why people make the decisions they do. Psychology and neurology are far from having conclusive answers. We still take action.