The Mary Argument Against Physicalism (Philosophy of Mind)

[@sonamoo919]

Thank you for the brief but clear explanation of Mary's Room Argument. My question is; how can the actual experience of redness be considered as non-physical one? Isn't it, although it's new to Mary, still merely an extension of, or confirmation of her knowledge of redness, so that it is still physical? I can agree that her experience is 'new,' but not necessarily non-physical.

[@CameronBraid]

Seems like the conclusion doesn't follow. You say "There is something about knowledge that cannot be gained through just physical events" However your had previously stated that the only way for Mary to get this knowledge was to have working eyes and see it for herself. Seems to me like that is requiring something physical - an organ - eyes in this case, in order to gain this knowledge. You conclude "Therefore reality itself and the mind is not purely physical" however what you have described as the necessary means of gaining this knowledge is working eyes - something physical.

[@tecategpt1959]

The means necessary of gaining this knowledge does not follow the physicalist philosophy though, because although the eyes are a tool of which we use to see, that’s all they are, it doesn’t explain “the mind”, even Descartes failed at explaining what the mind is. The experiencer

[@REDPUMPERNICKEL]

@@tecategpt1959 The 'experiencer' is the thought that represents its self unlike all other thoughts that represent something else. This thought is what we call 'the self'. When one thinks of one's self and specifically excludes one's body from those thoughts, what is it that one is thinking about but a thought?

[@acolyteofknownnomore7490]

This thought experiment is good because it forces people to at the very least really define closely what they mean by "physical" and "mental" and bite bullets where necessary.

[@giuffre714]

Would the hypothetical procedure to correct her colorblindness be a physical one?

[@johnmichaelcule8423]

"Knowledge about" != "Experience of" A person can know everything about cookery (for example) and tastes and the phusiology of tasting things and still be shocked when they first taste a strawberry. I dont see where the comfident assertion that 'qualia' must be non physical comes from. To say that all knowledge is of one kind or category doesn't work. It is quite possible that the experience and the analysis are seperate and you can learn one without the other. I'm not rejecting a non-physical aspect to consciousness or thought but I don't see this as convincing evidence for it.

[@MathewAlden]

Hey Pastor Cooper! I appreciate the explanation of this argument. Although I believe the conclusions of this argument, I'm not sure that the argument itself holds up. We haven't proven the existence of knowledge that cannot be represented as a "brain-state". We have simply proven that Mary's brain entered a new state (which her brain had never been in while studying red) after she saw red. Or am I misunderstanding? God bless!

[@onseayu]

I'm not exactly sure, but i think it generally touches on the fact that you can't really transmit your first person experience to someone else. which isn't the case for almost any other form of information. like, you could teach a colorblind (let's pretend colorblind means they can't see ANY colors) anything, especially with google. but can you teach them what red looks like? you could pointing to different shades of red and naming them, and they'd see different shades of gray and nod, and you'd think you'd be making progress. i dunno, just my guess.

[@onseayu]

@@RecepCanAltnbag ok, so with this perspective, you believe there is some physical basis for every phenomenon?

[@onseayu]

@@RecepCanAltnbag also you should keep in mind, materialists make the exact same kind of arbitrary assumptions, just at different points in their argument if pressed to justify their worldview.

[@onseayu]

@@RecepCanAltnbag well, let's go back to the original example then. it seems like you would believe something like a subjective experience, or random idea can be fully represented by a combination of particles/waves/fields/etc. just a particular arrangement of "stuff"?

[@onseayu]

@@RecepCanAltnbag kzbin.info/www/bejne/fqiaqqGebdxgqrc

[@saritsotangkur2438]

Why is sensory knowledge/information not physical knowledge? The physical phenomenon of stimulating red cones in the eyes of Mary is physical knowledge that must be included in the knowledge given to her while she was in the room as part of the “total knowledge”. To withhold that knowledge and simultaneously claim that she had total knowledge is absurd.

[@iny966]

How, according to Jackson, does his example of Mary present a problem for a physicalist view of the mind? was a question that was part of my final. I do thank you for this video. It is extremely hard for me to process these theories by just reading it becomes so exhausting.

[@dark6.6E-34]

The red wavelength can only be collected and identified by the eye which would then be stored as a pulse in her brain Failing to collect this wavelength would mean that marry doesn't have the full picture of the colour red as she is missing the information gained through sight, no?

[@dark6.6E-34]

By red wavelength i mean the property of the light wave that let's it appear red

[@onseayu]

@@dark6.6E-34 well, can colorblind people still see everything we see? yea, it just doesn't look the same.

[@dark6.6E-34]

@@onseayu The pigments that capture the specific wavelength of the light are missing for colour blind people Meaning that they are missing information from the upcoming light and their brain replaces them by using the pigments it has at hand

[@onseayu]

@@dark6.6E-34 yes, exactly. like if i hold up a red ball (same thing, colorblind=black and white vision for our purposes), it's not invisible to mary. she sees the ball. in fact, i'd say she can even distinguish it from a differently colored ball. but if we saw it through her eyes, they'd just be shades of gray. also, if i tell her what wavelength red objects reflect light back at, it's not like that would allow her to see red.

[@dark6.6E-34]

@@onseayu right But this still means that the first premise can't be achieved with a colour blind person As she would fail to gather all the information possible about the colour red

[@taulantsalihi5512]

However, Marry experiencing it in first-person is still a physical experience.

[@Allenryan819]

In my opinion its an subjective experience, Because you and me wouldn’t have the same experience as Mary seeing red if you and I were in the same scenario.

[@cocolasticot9027]

I don't see how this could defeat physicalism in any way. So Mary never had this input from her eyes, and now she does, which changes her brain activity. Nothing but physical events involved here. Formulated as is, the whole knowledge and qualia thing looks like shifting the goalpost.

[@REDPUMPERNICKEL]

Yes. The thing that's hard for some to grasp is the fact that movement is both physical yet immaterial.

[@marcobiagini1878]

I am a physicist and I will explain why scientific knowledge refutes the idea that brain processes alone can generate consciouness; this leads us to conclude that our mental experiences cannot be purely physical/biological. The brain operates in a fragmentary manner, with many separate processes happening simultaneously. I prove that such fragmentary structure implies that brain processes are not a sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness; therefore, something else must be involved-something indivisible and non-physical, which we often refer to as the soul. (in my youtube channel you can find a video with more detailed explanations). Emergent properties are often thought of as arising from complex systems (like the brain). However, I argue that these properties are subjective cognitive constructs that depend on the level of abstraction we choose to analyze and describe the system. Since these descriptions are mind-dependent, consciousness, being implied by these cognitive contructs, cannot itself be an emergent property. Preliminary considerations: the concept of set refers to something that has an intrinsically conceptual and subjective nature and implies the arbitrary choice of determining which elements are to be included in the set; what can exist objectively are only the individual elements. Defining a set is like drawing an imaginary line to separate some elements from others. This line doesn't exist physically; it’s a mental construct. The same applies to sequences of processes-they are abstract concepts created by our minds. Mental experiences are necessary for the existence of subjectivity/arbitrariness and cognitive constructs; Therefore, mental experience itself cannot be just a cognitive construct. Obviously we can conceive the concept of consciousness, but the concept of consciousness is not actual consciousness; We can talk about consciousness or about pain, but merely talking about it isn’t the same as experiencing it. (With the word consciousness I do not refer to self-awareness, but to the property of being conscious= having a mental experiences such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories and even dreams) From the above considerations it follows that only indivisible elements may exist objectively and independently of consciousness, and consequently the only logically coherent and significant statement is that consciousness exists as a property of an indivisible element. Furthermore, this indivisible entity must interact globally with brain processes because there is a well-known correlation between brain processes and consciousness. However, this indivisible entity cannot be physical, since according to the laws of physics, there is no physical entity with such properties. The soul is the missing element that interprets globally the distinct elementary physical processes occurring at separate points in the brain as a unified mental experience. Clarifications The brain itself doesn't exist as a completely mind-independent entity. The concept of the brain is based on separating a group of quantum particles from everything else, which is a subjective process, not dictated purely by the laws of physics. Actually there is a continuous exchange of molecules with the blood and when and how such molecules start and stop being part of the brain is decided arbitrarily. An example may clarify this point: the concept of nation. Nation is not a physical entity and does not refer to a mind-independent entity because it is just a set of arbitrarily chosen people. The same goes for the brain. Brain processes consist of many parallel sequences of ordinary elementary physical processes occurring at separate points. There is no direct connection between the separate points in the brain and such connections are just a subjective abstractions used to approximately describe sequences of many distinct physical processes. Indeed, considering consciousness as a property of an entire sequence of elementary processes implies the arbitrary definition of the entire sequence; the entire sequence as a whole (and therefore every function/property/capacity attributed to the brain) is a subjective abstraction that does not refer to any mind-independendent reality. Physicalism/naturalism is based on the belief that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. However, an emergent property is defined as a property that is possessed by a set of elements that its individual components do not possess; my arguments prove that this definition implies that emergent properties are only subjective cognitive constructs and therefore, consciousness cannot be an emergent property. Actually, emergent properties are just simplified and approximate descriptions or subjective classifications of underlying physical processes or properties, which are described directly by the fundamental laws of physics alone, without involving any emergent properties (arbitrariness/subjectivity is involved when more than one option/description is possible). An approximate description is only an abstract idea, and no actual entity exists per se corresponding to that approximate description, simply because an actual entity is exactly what it is and not an approximation of itself. What physically exists are the underlying physical processes. Emergence is nothing more than a cognitive construct that is applied to physical phenomena, and cognition itself can only come from a mind; thus emergence can never explain mental experience as, by itself, it implies mental experience. Conclusions My approach is based on scientific knowledge of the brain's physical processes. My arguments show that physicalism is incompatible with the very foundations of scientific knowledge because current scientific understanding excludes the possibility that brain processes alone can account for the existence of consciousness. An indivisible non-physical element must exist as a necessary condition for the existence of consciousness because mental experiences are linked to many distinct physical processes occurring at different points; it is therefore necessary for all these distinct processes to be interpreted collectively by a mind-independent element, and a mind-independent element can only be intrinsically indivisible because it cannot depend on subjectivity. This indivisible element cannot be physical because the laws of physics do not describe any physical entity with the required properties. Marco Biagini

[@JB-kn2zh]

I think I saw you comment this on another video too. You should start a blog or something. I’d read it.

[@peterrosqvist2480]

Changing brain states changes consciousness, consciousness is dependent on the brain

[@peterrosqvist2480]

@@kiroshakir7935 That's right but causation is correlation

[@peterrosqvist2480]

@@kiroshakir7935 That's true, a statement that is both true and false is a contradiction. To clarify, correlation does not always imply causation, but causation is always correlation.

[@cocolasticot9027]

@@marcobiagini1878 All your arguments hold by its first one, with which I disagree. You state that subjectivity implies consciousness. Those two terms aren't well defined, but from a physicalist point of view each brain receiving a subset of reality and information at a given time can already fit the requirements for "subjectivity", different behaviours for different people. No need for consciousness, just independently biased observations leading to different conclusions. You also implied the reality of free will (the ability to "choose") in the process, which is a circular argument at this point. (Consciousness as an immaterial entity allows for free will, that in return "proves" an immaterial consciousness).

[@anthonyymm511]

Maybe I'm misunderstanding something, but can't Mary's seeing of the color red be counted as a "physical event"? Her not being able to see the color red means she does not actually know all their is to know, physically, about the color red. Correct me if I'm misunderstanding something about the argument.

[@user232349]

You are correct. Seeing red is a physical event. Reading about the properties of red is a different physical event.

[@time4planb]

@@user232349 yes but 'redness' is not.

[@Brasswendigo]

The 3rd person knowledge becomes data to memory. The 1st person knowledge becomes data to memory. Two different sets of data completely even though they may be relatively linked to the same subject.

[@Rob-wg9nz]

There's a subjectivity to the way one would perceive colour which is due to the instruments we use to perceive colour, which are our eyes. Basically if our eyes returned a matrix of numerical values corresponding to the average wavelength of the signal perceived by each cell of our eye using just numbers, I think we would more inclined to say that the theory of vision is correct. If we saw just numbers day after day communicating us the colour of things, we would be more inclined to be objective about vision. Since we see colours in the particular way that we do, we attach meaning to the representation that our eyes give of an unbiased and objective signal which carries no inherent meaning or purpose. To sum it up, if all your life you saw just numbers instead of colours, you would be firmly convinced of the electromagnetic field theory.

[@shrill_2165]

When you mention “attaching meaning” it is precisely this process that seems to render knowledge not-entirely-physical. While it seems physically contingent I’m not so sure it is purely physical

[@REDPUMPERNICKEL]

@@shrill_2165 There is matter and there is movement and both are aspects of the physical but the existential status of matter is very, very different from the existential status of movement. Though movement is physical it is also immaterial. Perhaps thoughts are made of movement. Certainly this would explain the immaterial seeming of them.

[@JohnSmith-qk8rj]

"How can anyone communicate the idea of color by means of words since the ear does not hear colors but only sounds?"

[@MortenBendiksen]

The qualia are primary, and so intimately what our mind swim in that we forget it's there. All the knowledge Mary has about color is only known by her mind and because her mind has made a decision to exclude itself from the equation but still pretend the qualia she experiences are the actual physical underlying thing she pretends exists entirely independent of mind as such, though there is no evidence for that. It is through the qualia she learns anything. It's inherent in the scientific method that anything that does not affect directly the collectively imagined physical qualia will be excluded as evidence. And then people are surprised that this method does not find evidence of anything non-physical (except it kind of does when you actually take physical science seriously and study the interactions between consiousness and the phenomena we observe, but most science pretends this is not really affecting their field). We basically have a huge amount of faith that the qualia that we experience and can physically affect our other qualia, are correct and everlasting, while in reality they are entirely novel. Physical science tells us there is no difference between a rainbow and a rock, only different senses involved. And yet we can perfectly well accept that a rainbow does not exist without a mind that has the capability name it, while a rock we will not, for no particular reason other than faith that our mental images of rocks are not actually mental images.

[@Fatima_33]

Jordan I recommend reading a brilliant/comprehensive book called the Divine Reality by Greek philosopher and convert Hamza Tzortzis.

[@Nyconbr]

Isn't that simply Empiricism vs Rationalism?

[@martin36369]

Another way of approaching the argument is does Mary know whether her brain shows the neural correlates of seeing the colour red & if not why?

[@account2871]

Very interesting thought experiment, I'm new to all of philosophy and this thought experiment, but I'm curious... If Mary knows everything about the color red would that not mean that she has seen red? To know everything about the color would also be to know what it looks like.

[@DrJordanBCooper]

In the thought experiment, Mary knows everything about the color red's impact on the brain from a third person observational scientific perspective. The point is that there is more to knowledge than this.

[@slambam6191]

@@DrJordanBCooper but you cannot claim she knows 'everything' about color if she doesn't.

[@Cklert]

@@slambam6191 The argument that physicalism supposes is that everything needs to be expressed in terms of properties of physical objects. However despite given every single description and fact about the subject, it cannot substitute a physical interaction. For instance, if I told you to describe the smell of someone's breath, how would you do it? If I told you to describe the particular taste of a food, how would you relay that information to me? You could tell me every physical description of it, but if I never interacted with any of these objects, it would be harder for me to retain or relate this information. Finally, in substitute of the Mary argument, if a kid who has never been in a car, reads and learns every single traffic law, every single physical fact of a car to where they know what each part does. Would they know how to drive?

[@user232349]

@@anahata3478 No, it just means we're talking about a different forms of knowledge. Knowledge _about_ something is processed in one part of the brain. Experiencing something is processed in another part. Our brains have a dedicated part (the Occipital lobe) for vision. Exposing the eyes to red activates certain pathways and signals that are impossible to trigger by reading _about_ it.

[@slambam6191]

@@kiroshakir7935 and we are still learning how these colors work, say on biological systems. For example, photobiomodulation uses 660nm = red light.

[@riru363]

What do you think about german Idealism? Is it biblical?

[@joshuaphilip7601]

Yes, I'm not sure about German idealism, but idealism in general works fine with Christianity

[@riru363]

@@joshuaphilip7601 Hey.... I just saw you on insta in biblical and historical post.

[@joshuaphilip7601]

@@riru363 oh hey, small world lol

[@riru363]

@@joshuaphilip7601 Yup

[@thenopasslook]

What kind of camera do you use?

[@milliedunne8673]

This is super helpful! I had a teacher who just didn't teach it correctly but you've made it sound so simple. Thanks!

[@asdfgmnbvczxcv]

Knowing everything about travel to Paris != going to Paris ... We will not teleport to Paris just because we have read enough about it. point: first person experience is irreducible to third person description...

[@philplante6524]

I agree with those who argue that the Mary Argument is not valid. Red does not exist in the world; there are just photons that have a particular frequency. When the eye detects photons of that frequency, it informs the brain. The brain then presents that information to us as the color red. In other words, the information about the photon has been coded into color, which exists only in the brain. If Mary has never seen red, it means that either her eyes cannot distinguish the frequency of those photons from others, or the brain does not process those photons separately from other frequencies. So either her eye or her brain doesn't process the photon correctly. If suddenly she can see red, it's because her eyes and/or brain have been fixed so the photons we see as red can be detected and processed correctly. Hence Mary's brain now conducts processes it has never processed before - different brain states. Mary may well know about these brain processes/states, but her brain has never done them until now. I think all arguments against the physical approach are just "God of the Gaps" arguments. Do not look for God in the gaps in scientific knowledge because those gaps get filled over time and God must retreat. Belief in God is an article of faith. You either believe or you don't. There is no proof.

[@asdfgmnbvczxcv]

Incoherent tosh

[@giuffre714]

People who don't believe the mind is physical should become professional boxers.

[@jerubaal3333]

Yes, dr Dennett is right - there is no such a thing as mind! Dennett himself is the Proof - you can have a brain without mind!

[@REDPUMPERNICKEL]

We are all proof that mind is not a thing.

[@user232349]

There's no problem from a physical point of view to explain what happened. When Mary learns *about* the color red that information is processed and stored in one part of the brain. When Mary sees red, that is registered in another part of the brain. Mary can tell the difference, so it is a new form of knowledge, but with a pure physical implementation. It's similar to the idea that you can't learn to ride a bike by reading books about it. You have to go out and practice.

[@JohnSmith-qk8rj]

Even if it is a new form of knowledge. According to physicalism if you know everything there is to know about the physical world then you know everything there is to know, so when she sees the color red, she shouldn't have gained new knowledge, but she does.

[@matthewmcclure8799]

this is a great introduction to the knowledge argument! the original argument, in jackson's paper 'epiphenomenal qualia', is also very readable, even for nonphilosophers. a more broad overview of the controversy between physicalism & other views is given in this video, which i'd recommend: kzbin.info/www/bejne/kGmTe6ugbp2XsKs (papineau: physicalist; goff: panpsychist)

[@johnsmiff8328]

Gaining knowledge is an additional brain state. A new wiring. Our model has a model for this.

[@onseayu]

i don't think so. it's pretty well-known that we have absolutely no idea of how to even start explaining qualia.

[@johnsmiff8328]

@@onseayu if we could accurately replicate entire brain states (including the entire lifetime of context), I believe we could adequately replicate qualia as an emergent property of brain states. Unfortunately reproducing a lifetime of context with high fidelity is impossible. We can test that qualia are emergent from - or at least dependent on - brain states. We can find individuals who report qualia with shared characteristics, and record MRI data while they experience similar qualia. We find that whilst individuals are experiencing similar qualia, there are very similar patterns of brain activity.

[@onseayu]

@@johnsmiff8328 hmm...you'd hafta be more specific on what you mean by "similar". more importantly, correlation =/= causation. or in this case...correlation doesn't explain or impart any knowledge/experience of qualia. still nowhere close from getting to those scans, and transforming it into something that you could give a colorblind (again, pretend by colorblind i mean they see in black and white) person, and then they'd be like "OOHHHH, so THAT'S what red really is" O_O. same problem. you've just added to their knowledge of red, i.e. "see, red means your brain lights up here and here" etc. etc.

[@johnsmiff8328]

@@onseayu I want to clarify that I don't have any interest in claiming that by explaining how sensations of red may arise, you can induce the sensation of red in colorblind people. I think this might be a bizarre misunderstanding of my claim. Your experience of one qualia is different from mine, and it is as a result of context that this is the case. In the example of red, if you spent much of your childhood playing with a red ball, and I saw my parents killed by a man in a red suit, we might have very different associations with the color red. These associations are really patterns of connection and activation between neurons in our brains. Because of my experiences my brain has strengthened connections between red and dead parents and your brain has strengthened connections between playing with a ball and the color red. This means that our concepts and qualia of red are irreversibly different. Those were two very drastic examples, however, any difference in experiences associated with red may also result in distinctly different qualia. We can at the very least not that Qualia are in part dependent on environmental factors, without our different hypothetical experiences of red, we _could_ have identical qualia. The important point is that any differences in context have the effect of making it extraordinary unlikely or even impossible for identical qualia to manifest. If, your neurons were connected in the same structure and had the exact same amount of myelination, receptor sensitivity etc. as my neurons, that is, your brain is physically identical to mine down to the subatomic level, there is no reason we would predict your qualia of red to be any different than mine. You would even be reminded by the death of my(your) parents by the color red. This would require however, that you have all of my memories and experiences. For all intents and purposes you would have to be me, therefore it is not within humanity's current capabilities to reproduce qualia identically. We instead, have to rely on similarities between the brain structures of individuals. One way we could do this is using one individual at different points in time. An initial subject may associate red to all sorts of things, but we could cause a change in their association by showing them many pictures of red and something they may initially not have associated with red. Then we might ask if their experience of red was slightly different than before the association training, and we might find that learning dictates some aspects of qualia. In pruning brain connections (development), those who are missing functional receptors for certain colors develop different brain structures, often pruning connections to dud receptors. This means that a colorblind person may no longer have the connections in their central nervous system required for the experience of red. If however, one had never experienced red, but had the required physiological structures to do so, they could in theory either experience red by seeing something red, or the experience could be induced by stimulating the nerves which transduce the signal associated with the "red" receptors in they eyes. Either way, there is no perception of red in the absence of that set of nerves being activated. I understand this isnt necessarily causation, however, this is the most feasible and testable model currently proposed as far as I know. I fully support testing this model and finding its flaws.

[@onseayu]

@@johnsmiff8328 i suppose this could be possible with simpler phenomena like colors, but a lot of more complex stuff isn't localized anywhere specific in the brain. and like you said, basically impossible to have the same brain, so probably impossible for a large range of qualia.

[@Bob-jp7vl]

If the mind wasn't part of the brain thoughts wouldn't be affected by chemicals.

[@TheDilla]

This thought experiment is "begging the question". In its premises it assumes that Mary knows everything there is to know about the color red. And in this, suggests that she has knowledge of what its like to experience it. If this were really true, she wouldn't have been surprised at all when she left the room. Or to put it another way, if she TRULY knew everything about color, she would be able to recreate that state in her brain and be able to experience it without there being red. Even if it was something new to her, it doesn't prove dualism, it only proves that knowledge about something doesn't change one's brain state. And experiencing something does.

[@georgepantzikis7988]

The point is that Mary knows what can be quantitatively verified. She knows all the properties of a colour but she still doesn't have an experience of it. This is because consciousness is required for experience, and not knowledge of properties.

[@TheDilla]

​@@georgepantzikis7988 This is simply an assumption. You're assuming that its not possible to know enough about the brain to recreate the experience without actually experiencing it.

[@georgepantzikis7988]

@@TheDilla By definition it is impossible. It's not an assumption. Any experience is necessarily conscious, while even a computer can receive inputs of information. The experience of sight is not the mere collection of wave-length data. If it was, a camera as good as the human eye, of which there are many, would be having a conscious experience. However, wave-length are what colour is materially reducible to. Therefore, there is more to consciousness that physical properties.

[@TheDilla]

@@georgepantzikis7988 bit hard to understand your grammar. But you're proving my point. Conciousness is created by the brain. It is not the actual wavelengths of light, but our brain interpreting those with its eyes. Nothing we see is "real". In a sense. Just what our brain recreates.

[@georgepantzikis7988]

@@TheDilla You're missing the point. Yes, the object in-itself is not the same as the object as it phenomenally appears to us, and the mind plays a part in molding how we perceive the world. But we are not having a discussion about perception, we are talking about consciousness and how you cannot arrive at a conscious experience with purely quantitative data. Consciousness is fundamentally qualitative (of qualia) and this should be taken into account so that we don't end up reducing the entirety of out experiences to matter, despite the fact that, as everyone is aware of, understanding of experience precedes any understanding of matter, since the one and only thing which we are confronted with from birth onwards is conscious experience.

[@benskurbe]

I’m not convinced of dualism or materialism at this point, but I’m still really disappointed by this argument. Your argument commits a huge non-sequitur fallacy and is also begging the question-It doesnt matter at all whether Mary had a different experience or not when she experienced color vs when she studied its physical processes. A dual reality is only a reasonable conclusion if the processes that underly her reactions in either scenario cannot be explained by observable physical processes. If her reaction to seeing the color red is different than her studying the color red, but if neuroscience can explain why the reaction is different (which it almost certainly can), then your entire premise is absurd and begged from a pre-assumed premise that is bunk.

[@Thor.Jorgensen]

I was thinking the exact same thing. I am personally leaning towards the physicality approach of Daniel Dennet. That all "thoughts" are physical reactions in our brains. But contrary to Cooper's presentation of physicalism, abstracts like metaphors are not physical as such. However, when you think about a metaphor, that thought is still physical, as quite easily proven by neuroscience. Without our neurons, these thoughts would not exist for us. Or at least, there is no evidence of them being present, neither by personal experience nor measurement.

[@adaptercrash]

Blah blah you can't prove it's a process argument and all these old people when I'm 70.