Unveiling the Coromandel Express Accident Point Machine Analysis Revealed

[@sugatoroy1254]

As a maritime consultant, i have been involved with Major Incident investigations within the marine industry and have been following media reports on this unfortunate incident and have also been sharing my comments after filtering out media clutter. As events have unfolded, the story developing seems all too familiar as i suspect that this incident is deeply routed and there would be a chain of relatively minor incidents and near misses that would lead up for this particular major incident to occur. An audit of the Quality Management System of the Indian Railways would most likely highlight major non conformities including non compliance of Standard Operating Procedures. The fact that there was a Disconnection Memo & Reconnection Memo issued by the Station Master, we are assuming that the railways team had become aware that there was some problem with the facing point machine on up-loop line x-over and basis the high risk status, a Disconnection Memo was issued by declaring the point Failed, requiring immediate repair & maintenance. The was a serious breach in the implementation of standard operating procedures after issuing the Disconnection Memo until issuance of the Re-connection Memo because if procedures as laid down by the Indian Railways was followed with due diligence this unfortunate incident would never have taken place. In context, the standard operating procedures require that maintenance repair or replacement of the point is carried out by a joint team comprising of experienced personnel from the engineering & signalling dept under the station masters command. Standard practice after boxing up the point and reconnecting the terminal wiring, testing and commissioning requires the point to be function tested from Normal locked position to Reverse locked position and vice versa, ensuring point gets locked at each end position, i.e. tongue rail makes full contact with the stock rail which requires total travel distance of tongue rail to be measured for a pre-determined value and if required the throw slide of the machine is adjusted after confirming self-locking of lock slides at its end positions. During these tests, the point is operated locally by hand cranking the manual lever and thereafter the remote operation is checked from control room. AS PER IR RULES, IT IS MANDATORY FOR STATION MASTER TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT LOCAL SITE TO WITNESS TESTING OF THE POINT, AND ONCE SATISFIED WITH FUNCTION TESTING OF POINT AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM, the station manager is then able to issue a re-connection memo. We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issual of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine. The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point.

[@LetsGrowUp]

Nobody, we don't know the exact reason, but we have tried to clear the doubt if you are thinking this kind of reason for the accident.

[@subbaramaiahmotukur5433]

It is now CRS report is submitted, @Let'us grow up should make a video explaining the incident with all technical details.This clears all the doubts.

[@sugatoroy1254]

There has been information overflow on root cause and unfortunately by providing incorrect or incomplete information, digital media has created a lot of confusion. The very fact that CBI investigation is still ongoing does indicate foul play. Please note that for any accident investigation to be successful, data verification and data accuracy, clarity of thought process, logical data evaluation for root cause is mandatory. In context, assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate towards “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over from main line to loop line . An event summary on the sequence of events ( to be verified by the data logger) as follows: (a) There was a slow-moving goods train running ahead of UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express. (b) In order to clear main line for the fast-approaching passenger train, standard procedure was followed by shunting the goods train on to loop line. (c) The facing point machine for loop line x-over should have been remotely set and locked at reverse position, triggering the point signal to turn Yellow. (d) Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal would automatically changed over from Yellow to Red. (e) For the automatic signal interlock system to clear main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express at speed of nearly 130 kmph, the facing point machine would have to be remotely re-set and locked at normal position triggering point signal to automatically change over from Red to Green. (f) The time in between signal change over from Yellow to Red and thereafter from Red to Green, is the time range within which the automatic signal interlock system would have indicated an abnormal point signal which in turn should have triggered an emergency response by the station master where the point machine should have been locally checked for any external obstruction, apply key to lock supply and test the point by manual crank handle and if the point movemen still defective, the point should be considered declared failed and follow up emergency procedures should be folowed. d(g) If emergency situation described under (f) never occurred, it would insinuate railway team were aware of the point malfunctioning and not taken corrective action or the point malfunctioned after maintenence work due to incorrect adjustment of the control rods or unauthorized tampering with the electrical wiring at either local site or the signal room whereby standard company emergency procedures were completely ignored . Refer link for video on Station Masters responsibility when a point fails. kzbin.info/www/bejne/mJOsZ4CBjrygrbM .In context, please note although the system may be rated as failsafe, by no means can the system be considered as tamper proof. (h) It may be possible to fool the automatic signal interlock system by simple alteration of the feedback circuit, i.e. either by interchanging wiring to feedback signal relays located inside the point machine motor housing or by swapping the signal relays located in the relay room. (i) Irrespective, whether case (f) or ( g), under both counts emergency operating procedures issued by the Indian Railways was not followed. Normally under these circumstances, standard procedures would entail incident reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlock and clamp point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary electrical bypass of the point , employ 24 hours sentry duty at local site to monitor status, carry out permanent repairs, check insulation, measure / adjust distance of travel bars, test for local and remote operation of point machine to the satisfaction of attending Station Master, etc. Serious doubts on due diligence by the railway staff. (j) Please note that before any serious incident, there are tell tale indicators including related minor incidents and near misses and we suspect CBI is taking their sweet time with the investigation as suspect on going through historical data they may have come across serious breach of safety management system , negligence and non-compliance of standard operating procedures . The Railway Board have reported repeated occurrences of similar nature which should have been taken into consideration during the CBI investigation .

[@mrgyan129]

Very informative

[@subbaramaiahmotukur5433]

The following information is required to analyse the incident further: 1.What was the time interval between the goods train passing and Coromandal express arriving on loop line. 2.Was there any maintenance work going on before and after arrival of goods train either in field or relay room.? 3.What was the signal indication on loop line after the goods train has passed the x-point.? And What was the signal indication on main line at that time?.(Red/green/yellow?) Answers for items 1&3 can be got from data logger where chronological events are recorded with time stamping( with an accuracy of milli seconds.) 4.The logics to be satisfied for changing the track from loop line to main line are as under: (a) There is no train present on the main line AND (b)The track switch is connected to loop line When the above 'AND' logic is satisfied and when main line is selected from control panel, the entire logic is processed through the relay room and when found satisfied with the programmed logic Output signal is generated which will be sent to electric track point machine to change the track from loop line to main line. Upon successful transfer as sensed by limit switches,the signal is fed back to relay room and on processing and when found to be in order, output signal so obtained will then be sent to light up green indication lamp in the field permitting the loco pilot to go ahead. In the present incident the very fact that green indication was available ensures that track switch is towards main line and the loco pilot can proceed on main line as per the stipulated procedures.But unfortunately track switch was towards loop line in this case. As informed earlier, initially green signal was available to proceed but withdrawn immediately but due to what reasons?Once route is set it can not be withdrawn immediately unless the system was reset from control panel. Even withdrawing was done, the track will not change back to loop line as there is already goods train present and thus the logics will not permit such an operation. Then how did the accident happen? Where the logics have malfunctioned???

[@ganeshv3549]

Perfectly correct, exceptional details 👌

[@praveencmhydro5826]

is that any camera in station master room ...or any internal coverage system so that panel image at the time of accident will give precise info. on accident,..... is am thinking 🤔 out off!

[@khajapasha7972]

Plz make a video on track reading

[@subbaramaiahmotukur5433]

At 2:35 of video Pl explain how the signal is generated by the point machine to communicate to control panel about presence of stones between the rails

[@dasariramamohana9845]

Signal interlocking system is actually designed such a way that if any abnormal occurs just like stones between stock rail and switch rail system will goes to FAILURE state (All indicator shows Red in control panel in Station master office) and also Hone signal indicates Red. So that train cannot entered into the station just stopped before home signal and waits for signal.

[@subbaramaiahmotukur5433]

I agree with what you have said. But my basic doubt is: .When the point machine operation is stuck because of stones present between the rails, HOW the system/point machine senses the same and sends signal to control panel so that appropriate indications are lighted up. In the video it is said that" if the switch rail is obstructed by stones,the point machine will send information indicating switch did not act with main line" I need clarification in technical terms on the above.

[@hemantsable3791]

Let's grow up ✌️ never stop ✋️ learning ✌️ ✋️ 🥳 👍 ✨️ ❤

[@priyadipswarnakar6935]

Correct Video Correct Data

[@Vinay-zp2zt]

❤

[@f4life-l3v]

In these scenarios Kawach system can't save

[@VamsiKrishnaOliveti]

What if there is an electrical maintenance issue? I mean some internal circuit kind of shorting to give false signals?

[@joemama-yw5rc]

Mean, they are looking for the junior engineer, Amir Khan. I think it is purposeful.

[@praveencmhydro5826]

Human mind lust born corruption may be the the another second reason for intention act ...

[@IjazmasoodMasood]

Cos Rubbish interlocking ( Electrical interlocking very difficult lot of relays used in circuit sum circuit control by voltages refence & sum microprocessor card with plc Control where is safety)

[@ramsurya6668]

🥺🥺

[@amjad10476]

Point machine mein stone nahin hota hai stone dur rahata hai

[@S1S2S3S4]

Bhai koi aadmi stone daal sakta hai na. Jaan bujhke accident karwane ke liye. Aisa hota bhi hai lekin phir signal red hi rahega.

[@prabhatgupta5849]

Poor explanation, animation is only good

[@piyushkumar-iy4vd]

Your illustration is totally wrong.

[@123dsb]

Vai tera English 😂😂😂😂😂😂 nice try nice try😂