What did the US know about the Japanese Navy?

[@dieselsquiggles3557]

Awesome vid mate. Words can't describe on how happy I am that you listened to my suggestion of covering the Pacific Theatre. I had already thought of you covering the composition and the conditions of the theatre in its early stages was awesome enough, but you covering one of the naval aspects of the theatre is even more awesome. Looking forward to more of your work man, especially more Pacific naval stuff.

[@MrMaffy96]

Hi, I really enjoy your content! I suggest you to do a video about the classification of military ships, every nation had his own and it's difficult to make comparisons.

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

well, I think binge watching Soviet Womble the last weeks clearly had some influence :) Enjoy!

[@nukezap6528]

you still playing HOI4?

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

nope, I haven't played HOI 4 since... "last played since 7th of August" according to Steam and I think that was not played but recording a joke that I never published.

[@binaway]

It's often been said, particularly in Britain, that the Balkan and Greece campaign in WW2 delayed operation Barbarossa and helped prevent the fall of Moscow and the loss of other Soviet territory. What's your opinion?

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

well, I did a video on that: kzbin.info/www/bejne/l2Tdd3pnaaikeJo also, before late Mid June it seems most people agree that the ground in Russia is too wet for proper operations, I don't mention that in the video, because then the video would be 5 seconds long and also my knowledge in geography & climate is limited.

[@nomar5spaulding]

This may sound like a dumb question, but is that linked thesis the one that the guy posted on the WoWS NA forum a little while ago?

[@aderek79]

Very interesting. Bean counter is a very common term used to describe a person overly concerned with expenditure.

[@Tclans]

Great format, i really enjoyed this video!

[@hermesthephilosopher]

This is great, please continue to do more interviews.

[@MrOgeidAzip1]

Enjoy very much this format and the your guest knowledge on the matter

[@kalamaroni]

Listen, I know this isn't really relevant, but concerning your CV play MHV: You can press command while targeting torpedo/dive bombers to custom place their attack runs. It means you need to predict the speed/direction of the enemy ship, but it also reduces the firing area, and because there is no minimum distance you can land your torpedos from basically point blank range (just enough time for the fuses to arm). My suggestion would be to set 2-3 fires with dive bombers, wait for the damage repair to be used and then go in with your torp bombers. You can take out a BB in each run using this :) Anyway, lovely video, very interesting.

[@Nekcip]

Very good talks about this topic. Very well put together(as always)

[@binaway]

In all English speaking countries "Bean counter" is a demeaning nick name for accountants but is also understood to mean anybody just counting things.

[@Titus-as-the-Roman]

As a simple enthusiast of the period I found this interesting. The one thing I didn't hear (or maybe I missed it) was an abstract assessment on how aggressive the Japanese navy would ultimately be. Many things has been written on the failure to ferret out Japanese plans concerning Pearl Harbor, but I simply suspect that nobody actually thought they (the Japanese navy) would have the courage to attack a major fortified naval base such as Pearl no matter what kind of intelligence they may have received.

[@Ensign_Cthulhu]

5:16 LOL agree. "What is it which by any other name would smell just as sweet?" Their size and nature of their armament is why the modern Soviet Kirovs get (unofficially) classified this way also.

[@AlphonseZukor]

The time on this video is 19:40 tee hee.

[@corporaltommy4407]

Just curious, what of the US Naval Intelligence of the German fleet? Did the US also actively looked into German Navy or did they rely heavily on British and French sources?

[@justinpyke1756]

Unfortunately, I can't answer this question outright as I haven't seen anything written on it specifically. It could be because nobody actually has, or I just haven't found the relevant work. Intelligence history is a comparatively young discipline, so there are vast areas of knowledge that are still locked away in archives waiting for scholars to discover. I'm 100% that ONI was watching the Kriegsmarine. The same record series I was looking in had reports concerning the Germans, but I didn't look at them since I didn't have the time. I would have liked to do a compare and contrast work on American intelligence assessments of German, Italian, Japanese and British naval power in the interwar years, but it would have been too ambitious for a Master's thesis. Anyway, I'm sure there was cooperation between the British, French and possibly others in regards to the Germans. There was a lot of cooperation where the Japanese navy was concerned. If you have an interest in a brief survey of US military intelligence during the interwar period, I can't recommend this enough: Mahnken, Thomas G. Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. He has a chapter on the Germans, but only their air and land power.

[@harrisionstan3773]

My issue of Playtank is late! I' want to complain. Thanks for a great video, also a beer snorting moment when I saw Playtank.

[@brandonlyon8632]

Interesting interview, I question a couple points made, however I've never written a thesis on the subject.

[@stephenodell9688]

Yes you should use the official designation for the various ships and crafts. It keeps you from looking dumb and stops a lot of confusion. Each ship type has its own mission and capability. When you say cruiser, destroyer or battle ship i can picture that vessel in my mind.

[@65TossTrap]

Question for Dr. Pyke: the American occupation of the Philippines was marked a brutal insurgency war and decisive naval battle. To what extent did the occupation antagonize Japanese plans for expansion?

[@mithrawnudo2152]

Please tell me you sent that image of "PLAYTANK" to Jingles!

[@alexhurlbut]

The IJN was really good about keeping stuff secretive from US's ONI... I mean look at Yamato they didn't figure out what she was really like until 1945 officially. They keep assessing her as a 35 to 45k tonnage battleship with 9x 16" before that.

[@Riceball01]

Cool video and equally cool to see that you play WoWs, do you ever play with or against The Mighty Jingles? While we're on the subject of WoWs, you need to use AP more, namely when ships are nice and broadside to you, you'll do more damage that way and better you chances of hitting their citadel. On to the subject at hand. Wouldn't the US have gotten some intel on various pre-war IJN ships that were built in Britain? The Kongo class comes notably to mind as they were designed and built by the British, although heavily upgraded before and throughout the war going from a battlecruiser to a proper, if lightly armored, battleship.

[@purplefood1]

Think she was built in the pre-1920s so it would have been when Japan was a bit friendlier.

[@justinpyke1756]

Great question! I would like to answer it in a future video actually, hence why I haven't answered it here.

[@lawfuIneutral]

Could you ask him about the information sharing between the Western powers during the period as regards the IJN.

[@justinpyke1756]

Great question! I would love to answer it in a future video.

[@pittsburghmcconnell]

thx man

[@craighagenbruch3800]

Love what you do and didn't know you play world of warships. What is your favourite ship or nation?

[@rjtwins100]

good vid, do more or these plz

[@50043211]

Watch IChase Cap Academy vids to improve your WoWs performance! :) Nextime, pls reduce the sound of the background vid. It was in cases to loud compared to your voices. Thx for the time and effort to making these vids.

[@tiscotisa9731]

do a video on the fesability of the axis capturing iraq and north africa in general

[@tysonfight]

can you please make a video about french campaign and offer your opinion about why Germany did so well in this campaign

[@Joseph101O1]

Hello, I currently am enrolled in Unversity as a history major myself, and I have a question. As I understand it, the Imperial Japanese Navy advanced significantly in the interwar period. I know you have looked at the intelligence of this period by the Americans, which means that the American viewpoint is the window that which your paper is set. However, to determine the quality of the United States information gathering and conclusions requires you to understand the reality of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the period. If I understand you correctly, you have stated that Imperial Japanese Navy's development was much more secretive in terms of ships compared to airplane development. I know overall little of the Imperial Japanese Navy's true progress during the interwar period, but I must assume that like any new industry quickly development to a high quality that external influences played a part in the Navy's development too. My question is as follows: What major foreign factors helped build the Imperial Japanese Navy and at want point did domestic development take the forefront.

[@justinpyke1756]

Hi! The surface fleet was already first rate before the scope of my thesis (since 1904-05 at least), so that aspect of the IJN was fairly mature. Hence why the secrecy in the interwar period had the impact it did. The IJN was originally heavily reliant on foreign assistance and technology, and from the Russo-Japanese War to the outbreak of the First World War was in many ways virtually a carbon copy of the Royal Navy. The IJN had moved away from the need for foreign assistance by the end of the First World War, with the important exception of aircraft and the construction of Hosho. The first large warship class fully designed and built in Japan were the Fuso-class (mid-WWI), though the Japanese used a "cheat sheet" of sorts through various technical info they received along with the Kongo-class. The Satsuma and Kawachi-classes from a few years earlier were also at least mostly designed by the Japanese (with the British looking over their shoulder) and were built in Japan. The Ise-class were just improved Fusos, and the Nagato-class was a full departure from any kind of foreign assistance. Of course the other pre-Washington Naval Treaty designs were also their own thing (Tosa, Amagi, Kii, No. 13). IIRC sub development was linked to German tech in the early 1920s, but it has been ages since I read up on that stuff. The Japanese started designing their own DDs and cruisers through the 1910s as well, along with their own torpedoes and the like. By the time my thesis picks up the thread (1920), the Japanese surface fleet was designing and building their own stuff. Again, the notable exception being discussion of the IJNAS and carriers. For the CVs themselves, the Japanese built Kaga and Akagi through the 1920s on their own, but Hosho was built with British assistance. The Japanese didn't achieve independence in aircraft design, and most things to do with aircraft, until the early and mid-1930s.

[@Joseph101O1]

If I were to summarize your answer: The Imperial Japanese Navy's airplane technology follow the same path of development as the actual naval technology but two decades behind independent domestic development that which naval technology already achieved. That was very informative. Thank you, Justin. I wish you the best. On a side note, I always found the two military branch system and subsequent airforce of each said branch interesting within the Imperial Japanese structure. I feel there is a supportive argument for that structure, but it obviously does not work under the seemingly universal internal military rivalry of all large nations.

[@justinpyke1756]

Yeah, pretty much. Japan had gotten over its early development in a surface fleet before the interwar period, but it still had a lot of development on the air power front. Particularly since aircraft were such a new military tool. There is certainly nothing wrong with having a separate army and navy, but the Japanese inter-service rivalry really caused a lot of problems. Even having two separate air forces is okay in theory (i.e. Navy focusing on carrier aircraft, flying boats, naval bombers, etc., while the Army focuses on land-based fighters and such.), but it caused a lot of issues in Japan's case because they refused to share basically anything. It ended up with a situation where, for example, two land-based fighters were developed and produced in parallel, and even armament was not standardized between the services.

[@Joseph101O1]

I could not agree more with you Justin. I suspect a healthy amount of rivalry to be productive, but extreme cases such as Imperial Japan's military are clearly a hindrance to efficiency in both time and resources. I believe (Groß)Deutsches Reich suffered similarly at certain points. Certainly, I would be curious to find another example of a military alike Imperial Japan's structure between naval and army branches that harbored a more suitable environment. I think this is a good topic on it's on for research and thought, so I will let it end here. It would be exciting to discover Military History Visualized has or plans to create a video of the benefits in military rivalries (if there is any) and the devastation when a rivalry is too intense. Once again, thank you Justin and I wish you the best.

[@autogun290]

Hey is Justin AdmiralPiett from the WoWs forum?

[@alexhurlbut]

Why don't you ask that in AdmiralPiett's thread there?

[@Quokka666]

love how aus just puops up at the botom haha

[@teethirtyfour7394]

Can you do a video about Charlie Brown and Franz Stigler?

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

can yes, but not really that much interested, great story, but my channel is more on the "data" side. Also I have a HUGE backlog.

[@65TossTrap]

Question-was the Japanese naval expansion 1898-1922 due in part to the presence of the US naval presence in the Philippines?? Thank you for any reference or response.

[@grizwoldphantasia5005]

I think it was more due to having seen how westerners treated China and deciding it was better to do the same rather than be a victim themselves; and the bias they saw in the results of both the 1895 war with China (where IIRC they were forced to give back Port Arthur, which the Russians promptly took) and the 1905 war with Russia (where the same pattern evolved), convinced them that they had to be ready to beat not just the Chinese and Russians, but the entire West, especially the US. In the early 1920s, the lack of gratitude at Versailles for their (small) part against Germany, racist US laws, and other blatant racism, all added to their feeling of isolation and their conclusion that the only way to avoid second class treatment was to beat the West at their own game.

[@DrmChsr0]

What was the effect of Kantai Kessen (aka the prevailing school of thought in the IJN by WW2) on IJN doctrine? I know that it affected how they used submarines, but how exactly did it affect IJN doctrine?

[@justinpyke1756]

I'm setting this question aside for a future video!

[@looinrims]

Another video hidden from the masses for some reason, but I’ll take ‘new’ content where I find it

[@diegoviniciomejiaquesada4754]

+Justin Pyke Mr. Pyke, I have a question... On the interview you say that scholars have said (18:35) that "even american reconnaissance was also equally terrible"... I want to know in what point of the war that changed? I ask the question because on all the documentaries I have seen (The list is pretty long but I want to mention "Generals at war:Midway" at least) the american reconnaissance capabilities were always quite better than the Japanese.

[@justinpyke1756]

Straight from the excellent article I was referencing: "Among the reasons for defeat at Midway, one of the most routinely cited is the “inadequate” morning search made by Kidō Butai, wherein seven aircraft were launched to cover most of the fleet’s eastern flank. The analysis made by the U.S. Naval War College’s Admiral Richard Bates in 1948 was one of the first to put across this idea, and in many respects it has stood the test of time. Likewise, it bears noticing that in attempting to fix blame for the defeat, Fuchida and Admiral Ugaki Matome, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet at the time, both chose to criticize retroactively the search methodology used at Midway. However, upon closer examination, it can be seen that Nagumo’s searches were on par with Japanese conventions at that time. Indeed, they were also not worse than contemporary U.S. carrier searches, given similar prebattle intelligence... In cases where carriers were not expected, searches could be scanty to downright nonexistent. For instance, Admiral Yamaguchi, despite his reputation for alertness and aggressiveness, did not bother launching a long-range advance search when CarDiv 2 arrived off Wake Island to deliver its attack on 21 December 1941... Nor were Japanese searches markedly worse than those used by the Americans at this time. For instance, during the U.S. carrier raids in February and March against Makin, Kwaja-lein, Jaluit, Marcus, and other locations, there were apparently no morning searches before the attack launches. Had the three Japanese carriers anchored at Truk in early February (Akagi, Kaga, and Zuikaku) had timely intelligence, they might have surprised the Americans, with disastrous consequences... In sum, Nagumo’s searches at Midway may have turned out to be inadequate, but they represented the norm for both sides at this point in the war. They were certainly not especially different from that norm or lacking in some special way. They cannot be described as “mistaken,” unless one chooses to criticize the bulk of 1942 carrier searches (which would be, perhaps, fair enough). The flaws of Nagumo’s and Genda’s search plan at Midway were systemic and characteristic of everyone’s “learning curve” at the time." Tully, Anthony and Lu Yu. “A Question of Estimates: How Faulty Intelligence Drove Scouting at the Battle of Midway.” Naval War College Review 68:2 (2015): 85-99. This article is publicly available, and I highly recommend giving it a read. www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/fb6e3982-4f6f-43ee-8742-23261fb5f486/A-Question-of-Estimates--How-Faulty-Intelligence-D.aspx As for when this behavior in search patterns changed for both sides, I can't say off the top of my head. Both the Japanese and Americans dramatically improved their air searches throughout the war. There was never a clear advantage of one side's aerial recon over the other when you look back over the carrier battles. They spotted each other at roughly the same time on some occasions (i.e. Battle of Santa Cruz Islands), on others the Americans spotted the Japanese first (i.e. Battle of Midway), and on others the Japanese spotted the Americans first (i.e. Battle of the Philippine Sea, not that it helped them any). This is a brand new argument (a little over a year old) by Tully and Yu, so no documentaries address it. Even good ones tend to rely a lot on badly dated historiography around the Battle of Midway, most notably Fuchida's largely fabricated chain of events.

[@diegoviniciomejiaquesada4754]

Ok, let me see if I understood, basically you are telling me that there is not enough info to say "From this point forward the reconnaissance capabilities of the USN were the best". It's that correct?

[@justinpyke1756]

Not that I have seen, no. Both the Japanese and the Americans seemed to follow a general track of improvement: starting with insufficient searches in 1941/1942 and moving toward far more comprehensive ones. Both sides seemed to keep pace with each other in aerial reconnaissance as related to the carrier battles throughout the war. Even if one side was "superior" over the other on paper, this didn't materialize in the actual battles.

[@Ocrilat]

I don't think I am understanding the point you are making. At the Battle of Midway, Nagumo used seven planes to search...where the Americans had 31 PBYs based at Midway searching, plus each carrier had a scouting group of SBDs as well (56 SBDs at Midway were part of the 'scouting' squadrons). Numbers aren't everything, but clearly the USN had a completely different attitude towards reconnaissance at this point in the war than Japan.

[@diegoviniciomejiaquesada4754]

To who are you asking Mr. +Ocrilat ?

[@iskanderdevalois4702]

How did this chat come about? Did you contact Justin or vice-versa?

[@adrianthepagan129]

Two questions, rather generic perhaps but interesting. Where the big surface ships capable of affecting the overall strategic outcome after the advent of the aircraft carrier?( I know the orthodox answer but I'd like to know if that's changed ) and how effective really were the torpedo bombers in the war? Thank you.

[@Ensign_Cthulhu]

On a large scale the answer would have to be no - the battleship's weapon system is inferior overall in that in the WW2 context it is good for no more than 20 miles at most, whereas the carrier can reach out to much greater distances and its weapon system has a greater degree of autonomy and some terminal guidance (i.e. depending on how well the pilot can place his bomb or torpedo). However, also in the WW2 context, a surface ship can fight in weather which makes it impossible for the carrier to launch or recover aircraft, and if it can bounce the carrier in bad weather or due to inattention (no scouts aloft) and catch it without an adequate surface escort, the carrier is doomed (as the British discovered to their cost in the Norway campaign). Then there is the question of surface fire support - sometimes the big guns are useful for other things than enemy ships - and the carriage of large numbers of AA guns and their fire control systems. Then too, the US Iowa class proved that there is plenty of stretch in a battleship design to take it right through to the 21st Century if necessary.

[@purplefood1]

In theory a raiding battleship like the Germans had envisioned could cause some strategic level damage by destroying supply ships and transports.

[@bmc7434]

Believe the issue had to do with engaging attacks over 16 miles for example Japan did not have good radar for gunnery aiming nor did it have much experience with 18.1 naval guns which had to made from scratch for this class and usually all new weapon systems have serious issues for at least 2-5 years Aircraft had similar problems but if you are using 60+ of them at a target the degree of the issues is far less especially since Torpedoes technology was well polished during WWI and the interwar years Torpedoes were also very effective around late 1800's and early 1900's which is the reason the Battleship went from lots of short range weapons to long range weapon systems do to the fear of torpedo boats and coastal torpedo launchers

[@adrianthepagan129]

The answer essentially confirm what I knew, the vulnerability of battleships to aircraft in large numbers, the effectiveness of torpedo bombers in large, well trained numbers. With luck and good command, or when used as floating artillery, a battleship could be very useful, but overall it could not be relied to provide naval supremacy on the high seas. Was curious if any of these points had more nuance.

[@TheReaper569]

I can see that after it happens like 3-4 times the japanese navy were sick of seeing americans everywhere and not buying into this " we were just passing trough man" american excuse.

[@MAOofDC]

Hey MHV what's your Battlenet handle so I can add you as a friend maybe we can shoot some tanks, planes, or ship together. I like the whole World of ________ series of games.

[@scheimong]

Wow. Like I play the game and I didn't understand the lower portion of the XP chart until I saw this video... No insult but... such popato-ness...

[@michaelaustin310]

The Japanese also seem to have had a mental blind spot in the design of weapon systems and doctrine: Japanese warships and aircraft focused almost exclusively on the offense and neglected defensive system such as adequate damage control features for ships and training for crews and armor plate and self sealing fuel tanks for aircraft as well as the completely inadequate pilot training program. My working hypothesis is that Japan's minimal participation in WW1 helps to explain this. The other major combatants had the WW1 experience of a long, protracted war to guide technological and doctrinal development. Did you come across anything similar in your research?

[@justinpyke1756]

This is added to my list of questions to answer in a future video.

[@marcus7564]

If you know I would like your assessment of evidence for and against prior knowledge of Pearl Harbour. Both in terms of what source knew what was going on or that something was up and, any evidence that the Americans put those dots together.

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

short version, considering that the Japanese would have been unable to supply even Midway properly... it was totally bonkers that they would drive a huge fleet up to Pearl Harbor across the whole Pacific. Considering how often far less ridiculous intelligence was refused as unbelievable. So yeah, that an attack was coming was something that would make sense, but Pearl Harbor? That is a bit like starting Barbarossa with a paradrop on Smolensk or something. just take a look at the map and ranges here: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mWKygIirn5iKitE

[@marcus7564]

www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-quarterly/assets/files/pearlharbor.pdf -I was just reading this. It argues that alot of intel showed what was going on but that the intelligence bureaucracy was weak and was poorly disseminated.

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

thx, the thing is, we now know that they did it. I think back then everyone considered it unlikely or maybe even possible, although I am no expert on this.

[@marcus7564]

I know there are many possible reasons but I always wondered why, after gaining superiority the US did not strike strait for Japan (taking necessary bases along the way). Was it weakness, Germany first, save Australia, wear the Japanese down, an absence of eastern ports? Why did they go Solomon's, Micronesia, Philippines, Okinawa, Japan. Could the US have gone, Alaska, Aleutians, Kuril, Japan or Hawai, Sipan, Iwo Jima, Japan.

[@justinpyke1756]

This is a really huge topic, one that I haven't read up on myself in a few years so details are a bit fuzzy. There are a lot of great sources around the subject, the first stop being Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept." The book's recounting of operational and tactical details are dated, but its coverage of intelligence still serves as a good introduction. In short, the Americans and British had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was imminent by December 1941, so it didn't come as a complete surprise. What the western powers were unable to do was determine EXACTLY where and when the attack or, as it turned out, attacks would fall. There was so much "noise," poor dissemination of information and other such things going on. The Americans were fixated on the obvious Japanese move south toward the Malay peninsula and Singapore, and they had pretty much convinced themselves that this was where the Japanese would strike first. What the Americans and British missed in the mountain of intelligence reports was that there would be multiple attacks virtually everywhere they could think of nearly simultaneously. The evidence for an attack against Pearl Harbor was there, but none of it was a slam-dunk and what little there was ended up being buried in a mountain of information. Then, as is now, the problem often isn't a lack of intelligence, it is a lack of analysis capability. Intelligence agencies can gather absurd amounts of information, but struggle to find the crucial pieces of a given puzzle and analyze it quick enough for decision makers to act.

[@Amadeus8484]

Video on torpedo effectiveness? :)

[@israelamaccabee9569]

Hilarious comments, way too open for the global public LOL Great assessment!

[@c.brewer1222]

i thought this was the best part, very down to earth. lol

[@fXBorgmeister]

Jingles deserves some credit, no?

[@dubsy1026]

MHV, what is your opinion on the Scharnhorst being a battleship or battlecruiser?

[@MilitaryHistoryVisualized]

never thought about it.

[@MakeMeThinkAgain]

Yeah, I don't consider 11 and 12" guns reasonable armament for battlecruisers in the 1940s. The Germans can maybe get away with it as they usually opted for smaller guns, but the U.S.N. planned for 16" guns on the Lexington class.

[@dubsy1026]

But it's not the armament that decides battleship or battlecruiser. It's the armour. And Scharnhorst's belt was thicker than Iowa's (not that that's hard to do)

[@kreol1q1q]

But German battlecruiser design did always prefer armor and speed over powerful guns, unlike the British. So in German terms, the Scharnhorst was more of a battlecruiser than a battleship, while using British terminology it would be an undergunned fast battleship.

[@dubsy1026]

Then why did they want to fit 15 inch guns to it?

[@MikhaelAhava]

Okay.

[@Captain-Jinn]

Is... is that Stakuyi?

[@attilarischt2851]

That was fun. You're still a bit hard to understand, but I'm getting slowly better in decyphering accented english.

[@TheReaper569]

its not hard

[@chaoctic7278]

What game is that?

[@FrankReddick]

Sketchy, very sketchy. Americans sent officers to Japan. That the officers failed to do due diligence is understated.

[@phil9265]

Lol,this video was 19 minutes and 41 seconds.

[@Gurumze]

Dude, i love your videos but can you please try not to use World of Warships footage in a supposedly ''serious'' video about a serious subject?

[@Saturn-uz6jc]

not first

[@thebestoza]

Nice content, as usual, but damn, you're not the best WoWS player, to be honest.

[@connarcomstock161]

STOP USING HE AGAINST OTHER CRUISERS. LOAD AP, ESPECIALLY IN A GERMAN CRUISER, C'MON MAN.