What is a physical property?

[@KaneB]

Challenges to ordinary objects: kzbin.info/www/bejne/Zmizi2SXYsyNrtk

[@Bibibosh]

Maybe I'm a idealist I believe matter doesn't exist. It's just entropy in reverse, entangled energy given enough time will produce something in space. And then 1 hydrogen atoms gets created. Are all atoms created equally? Like .. exactly the same? Down to the each individual tiny packets of quanta? What if. There is Only one type of matter. It's just the entangled energy and the matter's arrangement on a quantum level creates the atoms and to take this further. Think of energy like the spaghetti and meatballs. The meatball is the 'one' matter substance. The spaghetti is the energy that holds shape ... All matter is the same. But furthermore matter doesn't exist either it's just the entangled energy entangling itself thru time. Gravity could be considered little tiny hairs . Like tentacles that travel further and faster than light. So everything is the same but even when scaled/compared to the atom, it's infinitesimal! Conways game of life is very inspiring. Perhaps it's false to think this way. But I think everything stems from the alpha. The one and only. The uniqueness of manipulating just 1 form of reality. (Energy) Everything is energy.. everything!! Perhaps even time. Perhaps even space....

[@carlsagan5189]

Even if magic existed, we'd study how it works and call it physics.

[@athlios7179]

This is a pretty physi-cool video if I do say so myself.

[@KaneB]

Thanks dawg

[@marsglorious]

I loved it when you used to say "What's up, dawgs?!" Now that's a philosophy video intro.

[@Alex.G.Harper]

You look very attractive with the beard

[@KaneB]

Thanks. This is just due to laziness on my part though.

[@uninspired3583]

@@KaneB works for me ;)

[@marcmaticas]

I haven't thought about it very seriously but, perhaps, one way to characterize physical properties and mental properties is through the notions of public and private respectively. We will say that a property is physical if, between observers given the same conditions and at the same instant, we know for sure that it will be measured the same. In this sense, we could say that a property will be physical if and only if it is public. For example, the position of a particle in space is a physical property since, although (in the subatomic world) the presumed indeterminability of the collapse of the wave function could make us doubt if two observers given the same conditions could measure it differently, in reality it would lead to the same position since observers will be under the same conditions AND at the same instant of time. On the other hand, we will say that a property is mental if, between observers given the same conditions and at the same instant, they will not necessarily measure it the same. In this sense, these are private properties. For example, pain: there are people we consider more prone to pain than others. The physicalist, thus, will claim that there are no private properties in this sense. On the other hand, the idealist’s claim is that that there are no public properties. And the dualist will assert that there are properties of both kinds.

[@ubermensch4304]

That’s a bad definition because there are immaterial things such as numbers, universals (Forms), the laws of logic, and so on, which are public, ie. accessible to many people. Also modern science rules out direct realism, so even particular instances of colours as experienced by people are public but non-physical. For example we can both see the colour red looking at a red object, but according to science there is no “red” out there, it’s just light-waves hitting your eyes, which then inexplicably “transform” it into this phenomenal quality of redness. So this is public but not “in the physical world” (if such a bizarre concept even exists).

[@tails86299]

Physicalism starting point (This is a worldview it has to be compared against idealism, panpsychism, supernaturalism... and choose one because it has better theoretical virtues like coherence, unity, more explanatory power, less ontological commitments,... ): 1) If something (S) exists then (S) is physical What do I mean by physical? 2) You can say that something is physical if it shares the quality of extension What is extension? Extension is characterized by two properties: First. It occupies a position within space-time. Second: That thing (S) is characterized by its externality (If two things occupy exactly the same place then they are the same thing) we prevent co-location because it is impossible to tell the difference, it doesn't allow the penetration of immaterial things like a soul or a metaphysical ego that controls the body because there is no possibility to differentiate. How do I know that something has extension? Mainly I appeal to the senses, if you can manipulate S or observe changes in S then that S is physical. Therefore if something can't change (numbers, platonic ideas, God, ...) then it isn't physical, and by modus tollens if S isn't physical (1) then it doesn't exist.

[@georgemissailidis3160]

Well I mean, not all reference frames will agree on all the same stuff. Take velocity for instance. People will measure velocities differently under different inertial reference frames; but measurements of velocity affect those of momentum, and those of kinetic energy too. People will also disagree on time and length even under consistent units of measurement (that is if special relativity is correct, which it probably is, at least for the most part). It's just that we can handle that disagreement pretty well (especially at ordinary speeds which are far less than the speed of light in a vacuum). Are velocity, momentum, kinetic energy, length, and time physical properties? Surely yes. But we just know, thanks to modern science, what is changing when measurements of those properties are changing. So, I wouldn't say that a property is physical if and only if it is public, but rather that a property is physical if and only if it is public _or publicly tracks private properties_ (if that makes sense). Thoughts?

[@fullfungo]

I find your definition of mental properties and the pain example quite problematic. “Given the same conditions” is a very strong requirement. In particular, it would require the two people to have the same body and the same state of mind. But this would likely lead to them registering and processing pain in the exact same way.

[@noah5291]

Hell yes!!!

[@SedgeHermit]

What it seems like is that "physical evidence" for a theory often involves hypothesizing an underlying pattern for the theory, and then deductively inferring what should appear on "more ordinary" objects. For example, to collect evidence for the Higgs boson, physicists hypothesize a pattern for the Higgs, make deductions for how the pattern would cause particles to behave in a scattering experiment, make deductions for how certain scattering experiment results should affect detection instruments, have some knowledge about how the detection instruments process and amplify those results, and then infer what should be on a piece of paper or a data table in order to be consistent with the theory. In the case of the Higgs boson and other elementary particles (if you trust the standard model) it appears possible for the pattern to be made "manifest in ordinary objects". In short, an esoteric object following esoteric patterns is traced to what a certain graph should look like on a piece of paper. Assuming that this is always possible, even if the pattern is "really there", it may be in principle impossible to percolate the results of the pattern occuring in the physical world up to the level of ordinary objects.

[@martinbennett2228]

On duality, you have an interesting theoretical speculation of two physical worlds (perhaps suggested by wave particle duality), however all dualist or even multivist theories suffer from the fundamental problem of how they interact with each other without dissolving into a monism. Without effective interaction between the alternate worlds, each are theoretically sufficient in themselves without the other. Perhaps we have to admit to an element of pragmatism in which side we take. Aside from assorted mystics, idealism is less and less seriously entertained largely because for those who endeavour to develop an explanatory understanding, idealism is a dead end.

[@robheusd]

The more classical philosophical debate is the debate between materialism (the point of view that the material reaity is the primary substance that constitues or founds the world, and consciusness is a secondary phenomena) and idealism (the point of view that consciousness is primary and material reallity is secondary ie a construction of mind). The issue you are debating is however about physicalism vs idealism. Physicalim is however not the same position as materialism (besides the fact that there are also different forms of materialism, some of which are outdated like mechanical materialism), but imho the position of materialism (in contrast to physicalism) is not that matter is "all there is", just that matter or the material reality is ontological prior to consciousness. As a side note, pls. don't equate the materialist perception of matter to physical matter (fermions and bosons), as they are not the same. For materialism matter is just the stuff that a) exists independently of and external toconsciousness b) is in motion/change at all time and c) has space and time as its mode of existence. To the question as to what matter is materialism provides no definite answer as that is left to the physical sciences. Current physical theory acceps the notions of quantum fields as physical existent things which themselves are ontologial prior to physical observable entities like particles (physical matter) ie they are thought of as the excitation states of quantum fields. We do not directly observe quantum fields, we can only measure or interact with these fields through particle interactions (what we call a quantum measureument). Just to clarify what the notion of matter means in materialism, and as dar as modern physical theory allows us to what matter is. As to the debate about what primarily constitutes the world, the material position distinguishes the idealist position into two distinct camps, namely subjective idealism (the position that only one's own mind constitutes or founds the 'real world' ie the position of solipsism) and that of objective idealism (the idea that some other consciouss entity, distinct from one's own mind, constitutes or founds reality). Most idealists belong to the second camp. As to the distinction between materialism and physicalism I would argue that materialists don't deny the existence of mental states as seperate from the physical state, and in that regard differ from physicalism, which argues that only physical entities exist. One could only argue though that a change in mental state also would imply a change in physical state. Like for example when using alcohol or opiates, this change in physical state also emerges in one's mental state. Or the change of social status (loosing a job or promoting to a higher ranking job) also can change one's mental state and/or world view. Etc.

[@Michael_X313]

Lol .@3:44 honestly tho bro.... there's not even a single complete theory of anything and there never has been any like...Im sure we will learn and kinda complete some things but they will lead to more possible questions and novel organization principles.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

The issue with those who say non material or physical things exist is that they have never been demonstrated. If we can observe a phenomenon, it's just imaginary. Yes the brain is a physical thing and it produces imagination. The constructs we imagine don't really exist though. Not physically

[@rath60]

There are only like 5 fiscal properties. Energy, Space-Time, decay-path , electric and color charge. I guess there could be more but you know I would say physical properties are like that. An irreducible observable property. If you define physicalist as someone that believes only physical properties exist well they believe that only properties like the ones I mentioned exist. I think that leaves room for someone that believes all interactions are physical. My reason for pointing this out is that these properties or their consequences have been recognized for some time now. What ever future theory exist will have to explain the existence of these observables.

[@davidzuilhof2272]

I feel like the intuition behind physicalism is that humans are not special, like that we are composed out of the same stuff as other things in the universe, such that you could create a human from only particals that you don't take from humans, if you just put bosons and fermions in the right configuration then you can get a human, but it doesn't matter whether we are right about bosons and fermions are actually fundamental or whether some other particles are.

[@robheusd]

A metaphor for how reality is layered is maybe quite similar to how digital information is layered as per the OSI model, which on top has an application layer directly accessible for the user (like your browser), and each layer builds on top of a lower level layer, and at the bottom resides the physical layer, in which the 0's and 1's are encoded into physical signals (electrons or photons), whith all different layers in between (like a transport layer, a data link layer and so on). Not a perfect metaphor but a rough anology. For us the top layer is most important as that is where the digital encoded information is represented in a form we humans can relate to, and the other layers are just taken for granted. Unless of course in some of the layers an error getd detected which interferes with our digital experience, in which case we realize we can not just take all these lower layers for granted.

[@ChPonsard]

A matter-matter dualism seems quite unlikely, though. I do wonder what our concept of causality would have to be in order for that to be possible.

[@charlesvandenburgh5295]

Physicalism distinguishes itself from idealism by being fundamentally mindless. This fact alone makes the physical forever unintelligible, for a mindless concept is no concept, in this world or in any logically possible world. Physicalism only persists because we mistake our own percepts and concepts for mind-independent things, which they themselves can never be.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

Physicalism isn't mindless. You are incorrect

[@charlesvandenburgh5295]

@@oliviamaynard9372 Logically, no thing can be both mind (A) and non-mind (non-A) at the same time and in the same way. So if the physical does exist, it must itself be mind-less. As no thing can be exhaustively explained in terms of its own contradiction, any attempt to explain the mind in strictly physical terms will, in principle, fail.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

@charlesvandenburgh5295 Physical things exist. We observe them. The mind exists as it is observed and studied by science. The mind is a product of the body. If you assert otherwise show evidence of it. Your statement as it stands is just false. We observe minds in bodies.

[@charlesvandenburgh5295]

@@oliviamaynard9372 So we observe physical things? No consistent physicalist believes that. According to physicalism, all experience takes place within the brain, including the experience of our own bodies. If your experiences were actual physical objects, your head would explode.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

@charlesvandenburgh5295 yes we experience physicality. Understanding and thought takes place in the whole body not just brain. The whole body is an interconnected system

[@ishtaraletheia9804]

How do we even define anything. :(

[@uninspired3583]

I'm not sure it's right to equivocate between incomplete and false. A map can have blank spots and still be accurate in what it does show, I wouldn't say that map is false.

[@KaneB]

I don't think I'm equivocating on those terms. The idea is basically: (1) According to physicalism, everything is physical. (2) Physical properties are whatever properties are postulated by current physical theory. (3) Current physical theory is incomplete - there is more (or perhaps less!) to world than what is postulated in current physical theory. (4) So not everything that exists is physical. (5) So physicalism is false.

[@KaneB]

In any case, it's often thought not just that current physical theory is incomplete, but that it is outright false or idealized in some respects. But the problem for physicalism remains even if it's only incomplete, not false.

[@uninspired3583]

@@KaneB (1) is an ontological statement, where (2) is an epistemic statement. Everything being physical doesn't rely on our theories of it, those theories are incremental discoveries of what it is. So if physicalism is an ontological theory, it can't be defined imperically. If it's an epistemic theory, it can't address ontological questions. Does that sound right?

[@KaneB]

@@uninspired3583 No, (2) is a definition of what "physical properties" are. One way for the physicalist to define what counts as a physical property is to appeal to current science. But this raises the problem that current science will change, so on that definition, it looks like we can't say that everything is physical (i.e. that definition makes physicalism false). The point of the argument is that physicalists should reject (2) -- they shouldn't define physical properties in terms of current science.

[@uninspired3583]

@@KaneB but science itself is an epistemic method... I see. Rejecting (2) seems right. Thank you

[@darcyone6291]

1) What I find more problematic with the first approache you mentioned to define a physical property (picking out an ultimate physical theory) is that it seems to assume physicalism in the first place; that is, science in the first place operates under the assumption that every phenomenon in the world is a physical one. Now, that would need an argument for physicalism, which you're going to introduce in the upcoming video. But, if we haven't decided what is a physical property, can we then know what we are arguing for when we argue for physicalism? This seems like an empty loop 2) There is actually, I think, some similarity here to the problem of the criterion in epistemology. The two approaches you've mentioned seem similar to a particularistic approach, could there be some approaches similar to a methodist one? 3) If we assume Strawson is right about consciousness being a fundamental property in the universe, would there be a way to decide if it's a physical or non-physical property?

[@rath60]

1)If we go by Popper's philosophy a scientific phenomenon is one that is falsifiable. So a physical property is an unfalsified falsifiable observation. 2)The problem of the criterion is an issue for all metaphysics except theism. 3) If "Consciousness is a physical property of the universe." is a falsifiable statement.

[@dimitrispapadimitriou5622]

6:10 ( and afterwards) : There's a serious misunderstanding here: Physicalism, as a philosophical stance, is not restricted by what is considered the " last word" , or the current status of our best, for the time being, physical theories. It's scope is much broader than that. It's based on the basic claim that there exist some fundamental physical laws ( not necessarily fully reductionist) that could describe and explain the whole Physical Reality ( including all emergent epiphenomena). Our current knowledge about physics is restricted , because our best theories are only good approximations , each on its domain. There are many concepts, like that of a dynamical curved spacetime geometry that corresponds to actual observed physical phenomena, like gravitational lensing, waves, black holes, time dilation etc or Quantum mechanical notions like entanglement or irreducible Probabilities that are considered true, even if the underlying theories will be replaced one day by a deeper theory. So, Physicalists claim that there is indeed a fundamental physical theoretical description for everything that exists in Nature, and that's independent of what we know at some historical era or we don't know yet.

[@neilmadden4286]

We can only observe the world through cause and effect, so could we simply say that the physical world is the transitive closure of causation? Or rather that *my* physical world is the transitive closure of everything that I can interact with in some way via cause or effect. (I am happy for there to exist other worlds which I am not causally connected to)

[@rath60]

What are you trying to say by invoking the transitive property(aRb, bRc then aRc). Which is to say what operation is causation closed under? At least as far as scientist can entanglement allows for us to view an effect outside our casual sphere of effect. So yeah I am curious to what your getting at.

[@neilmadden4286]

@@rath60 “x causes y”. If a causes b and b causes c then a causes c (though it might not be the only cause). (I think a counterfactual notion of causation is right: “a causes b” means “if a hadn’t happened, b wouldn’t have happened”). The collection of all chains of x causes y is the transitive closure, creating a network (graph) of cause and effect. This network is ultimately linked to me and you and presumably anchored in the big bang (or God, or whatever your favourite initial cause is). There are some objections to the transitivity of causation, but they seem like straightforward logical mistakes to me. Science depends on observations of effect, and we attempt to infer the causes by developing theories and coming up with careful experiments. We know about entanglement through experiment and (causal) theory based on experiment. (I’m not really sure I get your point-if entanglement causes an effect beyond our sphere of influence then it clearly isn’t beyond our sphere of influence).

[@rath60]

@@neilmadden4286 TLDR the relationship cause likely has elements that I would not call physical. So a relationship, cause, that partially orders events. You claim and I agree that all observations are mediated by caused events. Then we define that which is physical as events exhibit this partial ordering. My only counterpoint is that we are not guarantied to be able to observe all events that can be so partially ordered in fact we can be certain that there ae events outside of observable universe that where like wise caused by the formation of the observable universe. Mostly because those events where observed once the observable universe grew. I am not comfortable calling the unobservable universe physical as this is an unfalsifiable statement. Its just an observable contradiction in our theories. General relativity states that for an event to cause another the event must be within a dístense no greater than that which light could travel in the time between events. A consequence of light traveling at invariant speed in a vacuum. Entanglement allows for a 'cause' to exist outside that 'events' casuals sphere. Therefore a contradiction exist although we already new that relativity and quantum dynamics contradict.

[@howtoappearincompletely9739]

I'm really glad I watched this because, to my shame, this question had never occurred to me before. My historically-ignorant half-baked dough of reflexion suggests that physicalism might have been a doctrine that arose in the context of Cartesian dualism as an attempt to resolve its intersubstantial-interaction problem. Perhaps it was a way hardheadedly to insist that all phenomena are ultimately reducible to bits of stuff (say, more-or-less solid "atoms") knocking into one another, so there's no need to contemplate any of that suspicious, magical woo-woo, thank you very much. I can imagine that such a doctrine arose before the mainstreaming of spooky action at a distance by interpretations of quantum mechanics that postulate nonlocal causation, 'cause that has a decided woo-woo flavour to it. Does anyone have the historical informedness to verify or falsify my inkling? Anyway, I no longer consider the notion of a "physical property" to be intelligible.

[@thebelmont1995]

Science evolves and changes as we know more. As we iron out the kinks we understand more about the universe and how it works in all actuality. Physical things are matter. Matter stems from material. Material exists all around you. We can see, observez measure and interact with most if not all of it. A physical property of matter. That's it. Material. Just because you don't have an explanation for something currently in naturalistic terms doesn't mean there isn't one. Plenty of times all throughout history the metaphysical explanation was proven wrong and peeled back. We know now that yue religous metaphysical explanations fall flat when tested up to the scientific facts we have. For example the argument that the universe was intelligently designed has been destroyed and debunked. The old tiresome argument of "everything has a cause therefore creator" via causality has also been debunked. We know things like quarks exist without a creation cause as far as we have evidence to suggest via quantum foam. We also know that atoms can exist in forms we don't observe via the hydronic collider. Saying things exist outside your senses or outside the observable sphere is simply not true. Not in that way metaphysics want you to believe. It might be true, we don't know. You meet proof that things exist outside your observation. But how do you prove something exists of you can't prove it to bein with? Augments are not proof. I can argue and win a debate about trans theory but that still doesn't make it true. Simply arguments or philosophy is not actually proof of anything. It is purely propositional not evidence based or even existential. A rock is factually a material and composed object that is matter. Physicalism just states the facts. A rock being matter and made of up of material isn't a state of mental thought. It is a proven observable objective fact whether your state of mentality agrees or not. You can disagree that gravity is real, or affects physical objects, but that still won't change the fact that it exists and if you jump off a cliff you won't fall. Rocks are indeed made of particles. Yes, but no, that's a scientific facts. Atoms exist. We can see record and measure them. There is no commitment here. There is simply observing facts and looking at it. Accepting verifiable evidence that you show me in front of my face isn't a commitment. It's just accepting a proven observation that you just showed me.

[@dreamer1870]

In my opinion, the true mark of the physical is the absence of agency. There are three possible general modes of occurrence of events; an event occurs either because it is causally necessitated to occur by prior events, or (truly) randomly, or because some agent wills it to occur. A physical event is an event that occurs necessarily or randomly (and can therefore be subsumed accordingly under deterministic or stochastic physical laws) Should the behavior of all agents be reducible to deterministic event causation and/or randomness, then every event would be physical and physicalism would be true.

[@marcmaticas]

What about epiphenomenalism? An epiphenominalist might claim that mental events are caused by physical events endorsing at the same time that mental events aren’t physical.

[@dreamer1870]

Epiphenomenalism is Eliminativism in Dualist clothing. If every event in the universe is solely due to physical causes, then for all practical purposes the universe is wholly physical. Something that makes no difference whatsoever is as good as nonexistent.

[@fullfungo]

What type would be “a person is pushing a closet across the floor”? It sounds like “some agent wills it to occur”, but to be fair the hands don’t have any mental capacity, so they just move according to the laws of physics because it’s “causally necessitated to occur” due to muscle contractions in the arms. So is the closet pushed by one’s hands and arms as necessitated by prior events? Or is the closet pushed by oneself as the agent?

[@dimitrispapadimitriou5622]

Observers do exist in Physicalist points of view. There aren't primary or fundamental. They are emergent entities.

[@reclawyxhush]

You can't discuss physicalism without making some prior assumptions on what actually physics is. My take on that subject is pragmatic, common sense expectation that physics makes 1. reproducible unambiguous observations of certain phenomena which are subject to 2. measurements providing data that allow to find 3. patterns in their temporal, spatial (or whatever other physical measurable property is concerned) evolution, making possible 4. predictions of their future behaviour or other, yet undisclosed characteristics. Thus the proposition of physicalism could be probably depicted as 'a world view asserting that the realm of all observable phenomena that can be accounted by the means of experimental science, particularly physics, is all that is'. Implied reductionism aside, it's easy to spot critical insufficiencies lurking behind such a bold claim, that of such a definition being nowhere near 'useful predictability possible to obtain by physical theories' just one of a number.

[@koffeeblack5717]

Increasingly my takeaway from these sorts of difficulties is that physicalism is not primarily a metaphysical position but rather is primarily a criteria for intelligibility, and only secondarily is physicalism a position about how reality is given what we know according to the physicalist criteria of intelligibility. I once had a professor who confidently asserted that all philosophy is philosophy of language, and perhaps there is some truth to that. In other words, the physicalist ends up saying "I only understand the meaning of statements that arise from and through scientific process". If this is the case, physicalists ultimately are saying to non-physicalists that "I just do not know what you mean". There is of course here the practical conditions that constrain scientific activity and prediction that we idealize as a causal nexus. Of course, non-physicalists do not have to throw out the causal nexus- they just have a rival standard of intelligibility according to which talk about the mental makes sense.

[@blbphn]

if bosons are the " 'carriers' of energy and forces", then why wouldn't "energy and forces" count as additional fundamental things in the physicalist ontology?

[@NoActuallyGo-KCUF-Yourself]

Energy and forces are properties of things, not things themselves.

[@blbphn]

@mdiem If matter can be converted to energy (e=mc2), then how is energy any less of a real thing than matter?

[@KaibaCorpCEO]

@9:10 What is a physical property? Is it any property postulated by the physical scientists? Nelson Goodman, eat your heart out. Grue seems to be a physical property!

[@wildphysicspianoboy97]

I would love a video about the implications of the tractatus logico philosophicus on physics

[@thanda99]

Let’s stay that monism is the most elegant view. The problem is to define “physical”. Combustion is a chemical property, it is not a physical one. But there is this intuition for which it can be studied by science, so in a sense it is physical. I would say that either, regarding consciousness, it is physical but we cannot explain why, or it is non-physical (where “non-physical” means that it is not reducible to the physical properties which compose it).

[@rath60]

Al chemical properties are physical properties. Specifically combustion is the process by which 1 or more electrons become trapped in the potential well of two or more nucleases.

[@thanda99]

@@rath60 It is one thing to say that there are physical processes underlying combustion (i.e., the electrons you described as being trapped), but another to say that combustion is a physical property. It's like saying that a strike is a physical process because the brains of its participants are regulated by physical processes. There is still the problem of giving a definition of what we need to understand as "physical".

[@rath60]

@@thanda99 A strike is a social event. The individuals composing the strike are acting in a strike like matter. These individuals behave in such a way because they underwent physical processes that convinced them to take physical actions that are strike like. Another group of people had a physical processes called thought that categorized strike like actions as a response to physical processes. Etc. Physicality is the nature of the falsifiable universe every event broken down to a collision of one sort or the other. Mediate by one of four forces of which the electro-magnetic (the force that defines all chemical reactions and properties) is but one. As for the definition of physical a phenomenon that can be proven false. The idea itself is trivial. Our physical theories are the ones that make this idea seem non trivial but I refuse to say they are absolutely true, because they clearly are not.

[@rath60]

@@thotslayer9914 I'm not sure why this is relevant. I'm attempting to define physical property and physical interaction. Personally I'm not a physicalist because there are enumerable unfalsifiable question the answer to which is I don't know. For example: Does god exist? Does the number pie have arbitrary large series of nothing bu one in its decimal expansion? Do you humans have souls? Is human experience limited to the physical? Is there an aspect of the mind that exists outside he body? Etc. Well I don't know. But what is more if the physicalist cares about what is physical, which I would define as falsifiable observation/events then the statement "Reality is physical." is not itself a physical statement. It is as unfalsifiable as god exists.

[@KaibaCorpCEO]

I actually did a Master's thesis on Islamic occasionalism. If I were to speak in the persona of an occasionalist, I would say that there is no natural causation or physical properties. Everything event and regularity is due to the will and power of God.

[@saimbhat6243]

It is not an "islamic" idea per se. It is sure from philosophers of one school of islamic theology i.e. kalam school of theology. It is an ad-hoc idea with only merit that it is compatible with two islamic ideas that: 1) god has absolute sovereignty over the creation 2) Allows for possibility of miracles, because in miracles, laws of physics are supposed to allow for an exception. Any theory that doesn't contradict above two conditions is as islamic as it gets.

[@uninspired3583]

If that were not the case, could it be falsified?

[@rath60]

@@uninspired3583 no

[@jamesgl]

I’ve had a hankering for physicalist elaborations for a long time and you’re way of talking about it is just what I needed. Thanks, dawg

[@shafouingue]

Also isn't there a view held by some quantum physicists that "everything is information" ? That would seem odd to take that everything is matter if the the fondamental substance is information.

[@NoActuallyGo-KCUF-Yourself]

It's not that the substance is information, but that the information can be decoded and interpreted as substance in some contexts.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

Fermeons and Bosons are both physical things.

[@robheusd]

But they consitute less then 5% of the known (mass/energy) contents of the universe, the other constituents (dark matter and dark energy) we don't know they are really. There is some possibility that dark matter is some form of particle, but we haven't detected any of them, despite rigorous efforts.

[@SmellySquid]

Here's a weird thought on how to define physical properties. When we observe stuff scientifically, we look at events in space and time. And various properties like mass or charge are recursively defined in terms of objects interacting effecting behavior in space and time. So mass, for instance, is just resistance to acceleration, which is defined in terms of the second derivative with respect to space and time, so saying some object has some mass is a claim about how that object interacts spatio-temporally with other objects with some defined mass. So maybe we can say that physical properties are properties defined recursively in terms of spatio temporal interactions. And this would cover all those abandoned physical theories like Newtonianism or atomism as well as current theories like QFT and GR. Edit: In summary, it seems like we can define "physical properties" as "behavioral properties with respect to spatio-temporal location."

[@oliviamaynard9372]

Do atoms exist? The idealist doesn't know. Lol dude. Ask Japan if atoms exist .

[@mikealexander1935]

There are entire categories of things which are not amenable to study by science, such as souls. These are not physical. There are things that once were candidates for physical properties such as vital force or ESP. But when subjected to examination by the methods of science no evidence that these existed could be found, which places them in the category of a nonphysical thing. So one can defined a physical property as something fro which evidence for its existence has been obtained using the methods of science.

[@spongbobsquarepants3922]

Those things are things which are not real, and that is why they cannot be found. Science is used to expose quacks.

[@uninspired3583]

If a soul is real, why would it not be amenable to study by science?

[@KaneB]

If this is intended as a metaphysical thesis, it seems to fall to Hempel's dilemma: if we're taking "physical property" as something for which evidence has been obtained by contemporary science, then it looks like physicalism (the claim that everything is physical) is false, since we expect science to change. If we're taking "physical property" as something for which evidence will be obtained over the whole future course of science, then it just isn't clear what we're committing to when we say that everything is physical.

[@pandawandas]

@@spongbobsquarepants3922 I bet none of you two have ever opened a parapsychology paper in your life

[@NoActuallyGo-KCUF-Yourself]

@@pandawandas Why would they?

[@Michael_X313]

I would ask physicalists ,"what's the first physical relationship? Is physicality some sort of inseparable duality of 1? Wait...im already confusing my own self. Haha

[@kinggarlanus982]

Physics is descriptive. Since any term is defined and models made by human for human, naturally there is someone who will challenge it. The question is do you need to challenge it. It's like you disagree with terms of people who defined physics themselves, if you ask, why we say that physical is, what it is. People don't do this, or it doesn't end anywhere, since it is not helpful for practical problems. And struggle with physical explanation of specific phenomenon caused by ignoring or misunderstanging physics appliance. Physics explanation of a rock as particles itself is no worse or better then idealistic explanation of a rock. Physics is helpful while phylosofy is useless when we decide to do something with a rock with as much predictive result as possible. People don't like unintuitive physics descriptions, but do people need good explanation, if they don't want to interact with an object? It does more harm in my experience, for example with quantum experiment with photons and two holes. We don't have means to correctly detect photons to make good model, to predict their behaviour, that's why we use probability model. But then come philosophers and idealists with their spiritual ninjutsu, and start making up claims about time travel, photon conciousness and etc., all because model here is not descriptive enough, means any explanation and theory can exist, which messes up unprepared person head. I once asked professor, how come particle passes potential barrier within tunneling effect like it's teleporting, isn't this nonsense? He replied that we register particle before, and after, but we weren't able to track it's movement inside so we can't say how, so we have only that to say. As I understand physicalism have much in common with materialism, and is more of a worldview, wich principle is to not waste time on unbackuped thought or an act, since if you cannot sensor or detect something, even if it exists, you can't interact with it, and since you can't do anithing with it, why even bother describing it or wasting your time on it.

[@sillysad3198]

this is kinda disappointing. your thumbnail suggests a different interpretation of the question. it depicts a property that is universally nominated "physical", but it is not. properties you are talking about are not ALL physical or non-physical, *some* of them are, and they seriously deserve to be classified, not what you are doing here. QM traditionally ascribes properties to objects that objects themselves do not posess -- these properties are statistical, not physical. A relation between a rock and its weight, is a different relation than the relation between an electron and its spin.

[@absupinhere]

Your 'is physicalism a monism' point is definitely worth considering.

[@justus4684]

* Bernardo Kastrup joined the chat *

[@vensonata]

The problem with the whole discussion, both physicalist and non physicalist is in the roots of logic itself. Logic presumes causality. And quite aside from Hume's questioning of causality, consider the problem of the existence of the universe. If it has a beginning then causality is not necessary, and therefore the "universe is not causal". But if the universe is beginningless then it could not exist, since it never began. Some would say, "the universe came out of nothing, and then was rigidly deterministic". Ok, but that allows that the universe could be continually arising from nothing and ceasing into nothing, and that events are not "caused" but are "spontaneous". "But they flow in a predictable manner," some would insist. Yes, but the paradigm that they are "determined" rather than spontaneous is a presumption which cannot be demonstrated, and which has the basic weakness that the universe's existence itself can't be explained with reference to cause and effect. This argument does not solve any problems, but it prevents easy answers from physicalism. It forces the problem of causality itself to be acknowledged as simply incalculable, and not to be used as a certain foundation for other arguments to be established on.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

Your assumption that eternal things can't exist isn't proven. Why can't the universe be eternal?

[@vensonata]

@@oliviamaynard9372 Because if it is "beginningless" then by definition it hasn't begun. Something which hasn't begun does not exist. This is the famous conundrum which has never been answered, and is still tangling the minds of cosmologists. The real problem is causality and acausality. If the universe appears from "nothing" it is acausal, if eternal it is also "not caused" having no prior cause. This is the mess. Most religions utterly stumble over this and don't give coherent answers. At present it is decidedly unresolved amongst physicists as well. The only real response is to say, "set aside the question and get on with questions that are meaningful for human well being".

[@oliviamaynard9372]

@vensonata no. If it always existed, it always existed and does now also exist. It will also perhaps always exist. You have not shown eternal things that can't exist. You just spend a lot of time assuming something is impossible and then circirled around. You use the logical fallacies of religious apologetics. The hurr durrr. Something can't come from nothing. We don't know that. also, why assume the universe came into being at all. It could always have been.

[@vensonata]

@@oliviamaynard9372 I have pointed out that religious explanations are completely inadequate. The incomprehensibility of two questions remain: Is the universe eternal or does it have a beginning, and, is the universe finite or infinite. These are intrinsically unresolvable. This plays out in questions about physicality and consciousness since there is an assertion about causality itself. These questions have never been answered...including the mind/body problem.

[@oliviamaynard9372]

@vensonata We can prove the universe is finite if we find the end. We cant prove its infinite. It might be. The mind body problem is only a problem if you want to belive that somehow the mind is a separate thing from the body. Which one would need to demonstrate somehow. How the brain works is a area of science. We may one day know how it works

[@marsglorious]

I've pondered this too, and it just seems that anything scientists explain gets called "physical". Like, mind you, magnetic fields seem pretty non-physical magic to me but that doesn't stop us.

[@grimreaper492]

You can observe the effects of magnetic fields consistently. Magnetic fields are a description of the effects.

[@pandawandas]

@@grimreaper492so anything consistent is physical?

[@oliviamaynard9372]

Mass is a physical property. Spin is a physical property. Charge is a physical property. You strawman science. Lazy.

[@TheMahayanist]

What makes is a physical property as opposed to just a property?