Why Charge? Civil War strategy | Charges, tactics, and close action | Battle strategy and logistics

Why did officers order charges in the Civil War?
Why were Civil War battles fought so close?
Why didn't generals use more careful strategy?
There are many examples of disastrous charges in the civil war, ranging from regimental actions to entire divisions. Sometimes these daring charges work, most famously with Chamberlain's charge down Little Round Top on July 2 at Gettysburg. But oftentimes these charges are just disastrous, like the back-and-forth actions at the cornfield at Antietam.
However, there is a simple logistical reason why an army could not utilize a distance strategy. The reality is that infantry units had cartridge boxes with 40 or 60 rounds. A sustained fire would drain ammunition very quickly, even after just twenty minutes. Artillery, also, only have a few hours of firing before all the cannonballs would be expended. A distanced firing action would not result in a decisive action before ammunition was out.
Civil war generals actually used the land to completely hide portions of their forces. Units would be hidden within woods, behind ridges, or among cornfields, out of sight of the enemy, and could be thrown into action to surprise an approaching unit.
Many times, an attacker was completely blindsided by hidden forces at close range. Because this kind of attack is meant as a sudden shock, the action would by design be very close and devastating.
Civil war battles really were not like a game of chess, where each side saw the others' pieces. Movements were often meant to be hidden, and reserves were held out of sight of enemy lines. Oftentimes, an attacking force is essentially going in almost blind, not really sure how much enemy they are walking into. It was actually very nerve-wracking for generals to not see or hear anything happen for an extended period of time, because a stillness meant that an undetected body of enemy might be moving into position.
An extreme example of the use of topography to shield units occurred at Gettysburg. Longstreet moved thousands of men behind Seminary ridge, camouflaged behind the topography, out of sight of union eyes.
Another reason civil war battles were fought so close, resulting in disastrous charges, is a simple matter of logistics. As stated earlier, Civil war cartridge boxes might hold 40 or 60 rounds. If a soldier is firing three times a minute, his ammunition will quickly deplete. A ten-minute action might leave only 10 rounds remaining in a 40-round cartridge box, and the larger 60-round cartridge box will be half empty after ten minutes of heavy action. It's entirely possible for a unit that is engaged for fifteen or twenty minutes to be out of ammunition.
So, if a unit is out of ammunition, but they have an enemy on their front, the only recourse they have is to charge forward with bayonets. Chamberlain's movement down Little Round Top is a classic example of this.
Okay, so a unit is out of ammunition. Why not just fall back instead of committing to a potentially disastrous charge? Well, this is where the reality of logistics--running out of ammunition after fifteen or twenty minutes--intersects with the reality of military service.
Each officer is under orders. A regiment, brigade, or division has been given orders, which may say, "hold this position." General Grant's orders to certain divisions at Shiloh, for instance, including the verbiage "to hold this position at all hazards." This means the brigade or division is under direct orders to remain in position regardless of the cost. So, if a brigade has been engaged heavily for twenty minutes or longer, and no reserves or supply wagons are available, the officers are left with few options.
Finally, there may also be a psychological reason for a charge. A unit may have received terrible fire or be significantly outnumbered. A charge here, though desperate, is the result of a situation that is already desperate. Here, although seemingly counterintuitive, the tactic is psychological based, a shocking action that might throw the enemy off balance.
Rodes, after losing the sunken road at Antietam, threw 150 men against approaching union lines. While the charge was entirely desperate, a last-ditch effort to hold off a collapsing position, it did have the effect of convincing the blue lines to halt. The psychological impact succeeded: if the enemy is daring enough to charge, they may have more fight in them than initially thought, or there might be undetected reserves coming up behind them.
Another factor that required both sides to get so close was smoke. If a regiment of 300 men are firing constantly for several minutes, a smokescreen will impede their line of sight, and the unit will need to advance through the smoke to ensure that they are still facing in the right direction and to ensure that a friendly unit has not advanced in their firing zone. Smoke is a big reason why combatants would end up so close.
A film by Jeffrey Meyer, university librarian and historian

[@automaticmattywhack1470]

I've said it before and I'll keep saying it: the terrain and LIDAR maps are incredibly helpful. Plus I love how slow you speak. Every KZbinr speaks so fast it's really hard to catch and comprehend all of the info they spew out. The slower cadence helps me catch more.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you! Some folks say I am monotone, but I appreciate that the slower pace is helpful for others.

[@leivabernie]

@@JeffreytheLibrarian I don’t find you monotone at all! Thanks for your great work!!

[@Rsama60]

He does not speak slow, he speaks at the right pace. I call it the art of speaking in front of an audience.

[@morefiction3264]

@@JeffreytheLibrarian The tone is good. I watch most KZbin videos at 2x speed anyway so talk as slow as you like.

[@BobSmith-zp2kk]

Interesting -- and thought-provoking. Underscores the old military adage that fighting an action on a map versus fighting an action in-the-field are two, VERY different things...........

[@SergeantAradir]

Maybe you should have just started with: "In a firefight only very few bullets reach the enemy, we are talking below 1% hitrate" This is a factor usually overlooked, but humans dont react good to battle, usually they just miss their target if the target is shooting back. Thats why even professionals like cops or soldiers miss the overwhelming majority of shots. If you stand 200m from each other its really, really hard to hit an enemy. You cant really overstate this factor.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

Indeed. At a range of 200m or further, you are burning through a lot of ammunition for very very little useful effect. If one side believes they are likely to win, assuming no special terrain considerations, they will likely want to close the distance. At 150m to 100m, you will start to see a lot more bullets landing. If you still think you have a strong advantage, you do not want to just stand there and trade shots. At some point, you will order a charge.

[@jedibusiness789]

Depends…Marines qualify hitting an Able target (basketball) at 500 yards. I’ve witnessed them hitting with 5.56 at 600 yards.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

​@@jedibusiness789 Indeed. Modern soldiers are well trained to achieve that. ACW soldiers were given 3-4 weeks training with lesser quality equipment, and then whatever on the job training they could get. According to ACW first hand accounts, massed fire at 300 yards was basically ineffectual. Mind you, there were a few talented individual soldiers who were pretty accurate at 400 yards. But average soldiers, tired & footsore, pumped up on a adrenaline & fear, and squinting through the smoke, were having trouble hitting much at 200 yards.

[@simplymadness8849]

@@jedibusiness789 Making hits on the range and making hits on a moving human target who’s motivated to not be seen by you are 2 wildly different things. It takes something like 45,000 shots fired to kill or wound a single enemy combatant.

[@siler7]

@@jedibusiness789 That's super relevant to this Civil War video.

[@Comradez]

Another command-related reason for charging when out of ammunition rather than retreating to a supply wagon is that, even if officers had been given permission to do that sort of thing, it is more difficult psychologically to pull off an orderly disengagement and retreat while under close fire without having soldiers starting to flee in panic (tossing away their guns that are out of ammo and which will only slow them down, etc.), compared to ordering those same soldiers to charge. There are several psychological reasons: Even though we might think of an attack as more daunting, units tend to remain more cohesive on the attack rather than on the retreat. One big factor is, when you are advancing on the attack, you can keep your eye on the enemy. You can see what you are heading into. Whereas, unless you are going to walk backwards (not practical), when you retreat you have to take your eyes off the enemy as you face and walk in the opposite direction. And the fear of the unknown in that situation outweighs the fear of the known risk that you could see if you were charging into it going forward. One final psychological factor is, when on the attack, the unit feels more of a sense of responsibility to each other to accomplish an objective and prove their worth. There is an element of inspiration that is real, especially in Civil War times when soldiers occasionally griped about NOT seeing pitched battle for long stretches of time (especially early in the war) and fearing that they would have nothing to brag about when they went back home. On the attack, soldiers are resigned that they might die or be wounded, but are confident that the cause is worth it. Feeling resigned that "I am already dead, but it's worth it" can take one's mind off all that. But when retreating, a glimmer of hope arises that "I might escape this after all!" and soldiers start thinking more about their own individual survival, leading to panic and rout.

[@KroM234]

Not to mention, to summon Chamberlain's example again, that both the officers and the soldiers knew very well that they formed the extreme flank of the army, and that their behaviour and actions would discriminate between defeat or victory. Even if that's more complicated than just that, it remains that this was what officers and soldiers believed then. This alone must have been a tremendous argument to push the fighting to the very end, and resort to a desperate bayonet charge that ended in success.

[@roganmuldoon3357]

You left one other factor out... when retreating (vs a rout) you can see your own side's dead and fallen piling up between you and the enemy, increasing the fear factor and sapping morale. When attacking these are all behind you and thus out of focus to you, allowing the adrenaline to flow unimpeded, or at least less so.

[@thabomuso2575]

Psychology is a crucial factor in war and this was a good explanation.

[@rexfrommn3316]

One of the biggest myths of the Civil War is to assume either the Northern armies or the Confederates taught their soldiers the fine points of rifle marksmanship. Many Civil War regiments never even fired their muskets or rifled muskets until first contact with the enemy. The soldiers were taught the nine basic steps of loading a musket. However, most soldiers on either side seldom fired their muskets during training. I have read countless examples of soldiers only firing their muskets a couple of times during training or not at all. Rifle marksmanship requires a soldier to be able to judge distances to a target accurately, then select the proper aiming point based on the "rainbow" trajectory of the Minie ball at the range to the target. The trajectory of a rifled musket with Minie ball was parabolic with the bullet rising well above horizontal line of sight of a human sized target at 150 yards. At this distance, the Minie ball would just fly over the enemy's heads harmlessly unless the soldier firing could understand the distance and proper aiming point. So most Civil War engagements for the double lines of troops were around a 100 yards or so. Civil War battles were similar to Napoleonic battles that opened up at about 80 yards. Officers generally did NOT give the order to fire until the enemy was at about a 100 yards or closer. The soldiers had no ammo to waste on long range shooting. Visibility after a few regimental volleys of black powder weapons was often down to less than 60 yards because of the clouds of smoke hanging over the battlefield like a fog. Most soldiers just pointed and shot their weapons at the general direction because no one could anything on a Civil War battlefield except the reddish-orange flashes of the enemy's volley fire. The average soldier shot back at those reddish-orange flames knowing the enemy was somewhere near there hoping to get a hit. Most soldiers were lucky to only get fleeting images of his enemy through the fog of black powder smoke. Many Union and Confederate regiments kept their old 1842 Springfield smoothbores or older smoothbore muskets converted to the percussion cap to shoot "buck and ball" rounds. Buck and ball rounds were three .30 caliber buckshot rounds and one larger ball, about .69 caliber if memory serves me correctly. The buck and ball rounds used by both sides widely in the Civil War underscores the wisdom of George Washington's times to use buck and ball rounds exclusively. The battlefield was filled with smoke hiding the enemy. So buck and ball rounds increased the number of projectiles fired at the enemy. Buck and ball rounds were a "point and shoot" system that was idiot proof for poorly trained soldiers. A rate of fire with smoothbore muskets was more important than accurate shooting because a volume of fire meant enough projectiles were fired to guarantee some hits on the enemy through the thick blackpowder smoke fog. Most Civil War battles were close ranged affairs of under a 100 yards or often 50 yards or less in ranges between the two lines of infantry firing regimental volleys. Regimental charges of soldiers employing buck and ball rounds also were important for point blank shooting as at Shiloh or many other Civil War battles. Buck and ball rounds were highly effective at close range and a good regimental volley at under a hundred yards often was a mass casualty producing event. So buck and ball rounds fired from smoothbore muskets in regimental volleys for mediocre soldiers poorly trained on rifle marksmanship made lots of sense. The rifled musket and MInie ball had some impact in the Civil War. However, when reading things like, "at least 90 percent of casualties were caused by the Minie ball fired from the rifled musket" put on your critical reading skills. Most soldiers in the double lines only fired at ranges of a 100 yards or less. So the rifled musket and Minie ball, even if causing most of the casualties in a battle, were still only fired at relatively close ranges. No one except sharpshooters or skirmishers working in pairs in open order from behind cover fired from ranges beyond a 100 yards. Even the skirmishers fired at each other at relatively close ranges. Soldiers in the Civil War did NOT waste their ammunition firing at long ranges. Remember, the term "fog of war" comes from black powder weaponry producing thick clouds of smoke. So the Irish Brigade keeping there 1842 smoothbore muskets to fire buck and ball rounds made enormous common sense for the battle of Antietam. Go on a long 12 or 24 mile road march sometime with a pack weighing 40 lbs or more with ammo, water and a 9lbs rifle. Resupply for units was not forthcoming in many units. So every round had to count. It makes lots of sense once you serve in an active duty Army or Marine Corps unit with those long road marches. Every pound hurts your back, your straps dig into your shoulders and you just plain get tired even if you are young and fit. So firing only at close ranges to maximize their ammunition made enormous sense on Civil War battlefields or any other battlefields where soldiers have to carry heavy gear up and down hills, across rivers or up rugged terrain. military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Buck_and_ball

[@Treblaine]

Couldn't an officer or sergeant estimate range and just order every rifleman to set their sights to the required level? Massed infantry were also a very large target, though wider than taller we're talking barn-door size. I think the charges were far more an aberration than design, it was a product of failure of theories to work in practice and just an intermediate stage. In the end, suicidal charges became less relevant and forces found ways to exploit the firepower advantage of rifles. It should be noted that charges on a force that had been utterly shattered by fire and was retreating in a disorganised mess, a charge after them is not the same sort of thing, that's a very prudent decision to finish off a force and take the position that they held.

[@alansewell7810]

This is an enlightening view of the tactics and psychology of hand-to-hand combat in the Civil War. At West Point, the officers studied the writings of Antoine-Henri Jomini, who was the expert on Napoleon's tactics of breaking the enemy's lines with charges in the era of smoothbore, short-ranged muskets. The rifled musket used in the Civil War partially invalidated these ideas, but the armies were slow to adjust, so the casualties incurred in charges over open ground were much higher than planned. They must have worked often enough, though. The Union charge up Lookout Mountain that busted the Confederate position, for example.

[@lllordllloyd]

This has ramifications for the First World War. British officers were taught to engage, exchange fire until superiority was established, then close with the bayonet. The psychological training of the soldier was emphasised. The Civil War was studied, as were the Napoleonic wars. But by this age, units rarely ran out of ammunition. Your point about terrain is also well made. Here in French Flanders the terrain is amazingly flat, with widely-spaced hills, ridges and old mining slag heaps. The slightest of hills and ridges, barely perceptible to see, could be vital locations, fought over for years. Thanks!

[@hanzzimmer1132]

We always run out of ammunition

[@mjfleming319]

WWI artillery was also far more effective than ACW artillery, so charges were even less effective.

[@jonathanallard2128]

Manoeuvering units behind ridge dates much farther back than the civil war, to be clear.

[@joefish4466]

Part of the reasons why trench warfare settled in was due to lack of adequate ammunition (mostly artillery) during the early stages of the war. Both side thought the war would be short, so all sides went to war without enough ammunition, so when neither side could push through with adequate artillery support, it made it more likely for trench warfare to take hold.

[@davidplowman6149]

I’d add one thing. A charge can be decisive. There’s a psychological difference between shooting combat and melee combat. A depleted or demoralized or exposed unit might be willing to go on exchanging fire, no one’s actually forcing them to retreat, but an enemy charge will likely convince them the moment has come to die, surrender, or retreat. Unit cohesion is a fascinating thing. A charge breaks that cohesion for both sides.

[@epsilon3821]

Amen Jeffrey you made this right before the steam sale. Just got UG: Civil War and this could not be so much more relevant to me.

[@automaticmattywhack1470]

Another phenomenal video! I cannot understate how much you help me understand Civil War tactics. I know lots about what and when it happened. You fill in the why and how.

[@lukedog7028]

Never heard anyone talk about this before. I think you could explore this some more. It would be interesting to know how many times charges were successful , why modern armies don’t often fix bayonet, what the soldiers thought of this technique, what officers used the technique the most and many other questions a learned person like yourself might come up with.

[@erwin669]

Bayonets caused something around 2% of casualities during the ACW. To underscore how rare bayonet wouds were there is a letter written by a Confederate surgeon at the Battle of Spotsylvana in 1864 were he reports that he was able to treat two bayonet wounds and that he took the oppurtunity to try two different treatments to see which one worked better. He apparently wrote a paper about it for a medical journel. Normally when there is a bayonet charge more often then not one of two things would happen. Either the defender breaks before the attacker reaches them or the attack breaks before reaching the defender. The whirling melee you see in movies was actually very rare. Modern militaries don't use bayonets (even though they do issue them and train with them) very often because, as I mentioned before, the casualities they cause are generally negligible to warrant their use. The risk of charging someone armed with an automatic weapon while wielding what is effectively a short spear far out weighs any rewards that have (most of the time). And also most military weapons are less than 3ft long, so you don't have an advantage in reach like you did in years past.

[@leonleese4919]

During the Peninsula War and before British Infantry training was to open fire with musketry at 50 paces (40 yards) . This gives the advantage of clean and properly loaded muskets. (No ramrods left in the barrel). This is platoon fire, the advancing troops would falter to reform, the next volley would have almost the same effect depending on training. If the Colonel felt the time was right, (shock and disruption) they would fire 1 more volley, then cheer and charge. This may occur at any time after the first volley. Usually in Spain in particular there was always a reverse slope and the charge was always controlled, so that they didn’t pursue too far. This would work just the same for Union or confederate troops, but some officers would be regulars well drilled and trained. The quality of the Chain of Command from the Colonel down to Sergeants and Corporals would be important, just knowing what was expected of them. If for instance the Colonel has formed his own Regiment of Militia, then he has to find his own Officers and NCO’s you can see that a keen officer and men with no military knowledge his regiment isn’t going to a great deal of use unless the colonel will have an appointed Adjutant to advise on organisation, training on the March to the front. With troops who may never have fired s musket before the war, the necessity of short range fire means how close do they have to be before they hit anything. This is just thinking about possible problems and how much I’ve written is correct or utter rubbish ?

[@leonleese4919]

Getting a raw recruit to stitch a bayonet into someone requires a lot of training and practice. When you get that close to someone it might well occur to you that someone might stick a bayonet into you before you can stick one into him☹️

[@paulceglinski3087]

I enlisted in 1978. Started Infantry School, Ft. Benning Ga on 1/4/79. We were taught how to use the bayonet, but not really emphasized. I carried the thing onto Grenada in '83, but never had any use for it in the "real" world. Never got close enough really. The opposition gave up before that could happen or they got hammered and we didn't have to worry about it anyway. Yeah, I was 75th Inf. Tabbed and scrolled. Just a Corporal then, but in Panama I was a Plt. Sgt. (SSG E-6) and I carried it there too. Only my K-bar broke and the bayonet made a good replacement, not the best mind you, but good enough. Point is modern firepower makes the thing a real last resort kinda thing unless you're Lewis Millett, then all bets are off. He was the last commander to lead a successful bayonet charge in Korea. Cheers.

[@ArchOfficial]

The artillery, tanks and air-power will have blasted the enemy to bits before you get the chance to really shoot at them, let-alone fix bayonet and charge.

[@ChitFromChinola]

Very insightful. Smoke. Limited ammunition. Psychology. Thanks for posting.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Things are much more complicated on the battlefield than one might first imagine.

[@andybarth5928]

very good explanation of something we took for granted and not really knowing why

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

Great discussion, on an oft underconsidered tactical aspect of the ACW. I think it is worth walking through a very simple hypothetical engagement.... I am a commander and through some combination of luck or skill, I find my two brigades engaged with a single enemy brigade. The field of fire is pretty clear, and we are shooting at each other at 300m. At this range there is little effect but to waste ammunition. So I order my brigades forward. At 200m there is some damage on the enemy (and my men, too), but not a lot. Forward, again. At 150m, the massed fire is having a noticeable effect on both sides. So, what do I do? I do not want the enemy to run out of ammo by means of killing my men. I actually winning the engagement already, but I want to end it quickly, hoping to preserve my own troops, to continue the fight later in the day. *So I order my men forward again, to soften up the enemy in preparation for a charge.* At 100m, the damage to both sides is horrific. I order the charge. At this point, it is likely the enemy has down to half effectives, and I am going to hit him with 2X to 3X as men as healthy men. They are very likely to quickly break and run. But....what if the enemy had some reserves rushed to them? If the field of battle is lightly wooded and even very gently hilled terrain, those reserves might hit me on a flank, and it is my men that get chewed up and run. And that is how we got crazy see-saw battles like Chickamauga.

[@psilocybemusashi]

yes no doubt it is a way to win but that doesn't mean it wasn't suicide. of course when you are just giving the orders, lincoln, and not actually dying yourself its not so hard to make that call especially when what you want is absolute power.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

@@psilocybemusashi Suicide compared to what alternative? Simply walking away? I suppose you are right. Those Confederates soldiers were obviously imbeciles for not running, instead of fighting hard to lose and lose and lose. Probably the rampant inbreeding had a lot to do with that. And it does take an iota of courage to think for oneself, something Southerners were famously bad at.

[@EngRMP]

That was fascinating. I could also see that if you have run out of ammunition, it is likely that your enemy has also run out... so it would be a perfect time to charge, if you are forced to hold a position.

[@curiouscoot1987]

Very good piece. Thank you and staff. Your explanation is concise and accurate and to the point.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thanks!

[@phenom568]

Not mentioned but the military doctrine at the time was from the Napoleonic wars. In the case of the Civil War doctrine hadn't caught up to the equipment. Napoleonic battles often consisted of getting close then charging. Weapon inaccuracy and smoke were a driving factor in that decision. Usually they would fire a few volleys then charge if they felt the enemy fire rate had dropped which could be due to casualties or supply. In the civil war, weapons were far more accurate than at the time of Napoleon which led to greater casualties.

[@mattmiller7282]

Great Job Jeffrey!!

[@michaelnewton5873]

You all need to read Herman Hathaway's "Attack and Die" to understand the mindset of the Charge.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thanks for the recommendation!

[@DrSKMetz]

Nicely done. I would add that all of the professional officers were enamored with Napoleon and his offensive approach. It might have seemed that they all would have learned better by 1863 but the US side continued nearly suicidal charges at Cold Harbor and the Crater.

[@thehturt5480]

In the light of your explanations everything is much clearer now. Thanks. Is a fact ,the History must be explained not just learned.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@stevenmqcueen7576]

Well done. Learned a lot from this.

[@anastasiossarikas5510]

Wonderful work. There is clarity in everything you say. Now, I understand. Thank you.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@Squatch_Rider66]

Great vid, interesting perspective. Sounds like a fatal case of “Seemed like a good idea at the time”

[@gettysburgbrian]

Fantastic video and break down... your channel is really great

[@romandacil3984]

Wellington used this strategy successfully all thoughout the Napoleonic WArs. He used reverse slope to shield his usually outnumbered forces from French artillery which was superior. At the Battle of Salamanca, Wellington hid his forces in the surrounding terrain and had One Divison feign a retreat that completely fooled the French and led to complete Allied Victory.

[@jonathanallard2128]

Sure used it again at Waterloo to surprise the Old Guard coming up the ridge and shield his infantry from the Great Battery's shot prior to their assault.

[@romandacil3984]

@@jonathanallard2128 Quite Right. Also the reverse slope at Waterloo was not very deep and the French could see a steady stream of Anglo-Dutch troops (wounded) retreating which led them to believe that Wellington's line was broken. Napoleon needed to break through quickly as the Prussians were already engaging his Right Flank. Quite the surprise when The British stopped the Old Guard and then charged them with bayonets. Napoleon's Army collapsed at that point.

[@jonathanallard2128]

@@romandacil3984 IIRC the one who thought the Allies were retreating was Michel Ney, who then sent his cavalry over the ridge without any other arms' support where they were met by squares and devastated.

[@romandacil3984]

@@jonathanallard2128 It wasn't just Ney but also the other Officers on the Far Side who were tasked with observing the British position. Bernard Cornwell, in his book "WATERLOO; The History of Four Days, Three Armies and Three Battles" gives a pretty accurate description of the battle and what was going on in all 3 armies.

[@jonathanallard2128]

@@romandacil3984 Bro!!! I own this book and I read it many years ago so my Waterloo is a bit rusty, but I remember absolutely devouring it so fascinating it was! One of the things that stayed with me is this exert about a poor artillery carriage horse: "A cannon shot had completely carried away the lower part of the animal's head, immediately below the eyes. Still it lived and seemed fully conscious of all around, whilst his full, clear eye seemed to implore us not to chase him away from his companions. I ordered the farrier to put him out of his misery, which, in a few minutes he reported having accomplished, by running a sabre into the animal's heart. Even he evinced feeling." That one testimony, a single drop into a sea of tragedy, somehow stayed with me. The poor horses. Never asked to be there, total innocents Still, they suffered as much as men on battlefields. I feel for these horses, and that man that had to put it down. War is so, so fucking terrible... No one wins. Like Wellington basically said after the battle, but which applies to most of them: The next thing as melancolic as a battle lost is a battle won. He is right. Now I really feel like reading it again, discussing it with you. Wish I could have a beer with you and talk about this. You look like you're at least as fascinated by the subject as I am. Cheers!

[@paulceglinski3087]

Bee to Jackson: Sir, we are beaten and out of ammunition. Jackson: Then, sir, we shall give them the bayonet!

[@josww2]

Great explanation and animation, thanks! Enjoying your content, looking forward to more.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@dennis2376]

Cool, thank you for explaining this.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thanks for watching!

[@craigrik2699]

Yes, our Immediate Action if ambushed was to turn and charge into the ambush. There are 2 types of ambushes, a quick and deliberate ambush. A quick ambush is when you see or hear the enemy first, once given the command, you will turn off the track at a 45 degree angle (forward) and move off the track to set an ambush. Unlike the deliberate ambush, you have no time to setup, set mines, firing lanes, ambush groups, you just set it. If you are the ambushed, you don't know what type of ambush it is, however, as strange as it might seem, but inside the ambush might be the safest place to be, you don't know if mines have been set, firing lanes established etc. We caught some NVA in a quick ambush, what surprised us is that they had the same drills as us, they turned into the ambush and charged us. Being kiwis, most of us had the .308 SLR FN rifle with our scouts having the M16. My mate beside me fired 3 x M16 rounds into a "large" NVA soldier, he didn't even slow down, my SLR stopped him in his tracks. We suspect the "larger" NVA soldiers were Chinese but could never prove it? Terrible situation, many many years ago

[@jonathanallard2128]

I'm not sure that ''inside the ambush'' is usually the safest place. They call it the kill zone and from what I learned, you must exit it ASAP. Either charge through it or withdraw.

[@akkeut1324]

Really educative explanation. Hope you can do more videos about everything regarding civil war.

[@MrLemonbaby]

What a deliciously layered essay of the CW battlefield along with many erudite comments. I will be watching it again. Very well done sir. It brings up some ideas for other videos. -Logistics: The overlord of all wars. What needed to be gotten to what location and how was it done? -Unit cohesion. Which units were credited with the most cohesion? And not always a good thing as in the mutiny in the French army in WWI. -Lastly, and maybe the most interesting of all would be reports by foreign military "observers" on either or both sides in the CW. For example I read the G. Clemenceau (the French PM during WWI) was a doctor and served with the Union during the CW. Surely he must have wrote some interesting pieces.

[@TomTom-rh5gk]

The fact is tactics changed because they were a bad idea. The tactics were formulated when the front loading musket was the main infantry weapon. The lack of range, accuracy, and rater of fire made charges possible. The use of the cartridge changed the rules have engagement. Toward the end of the war battles began to look more like the kinds they had during World War One due to evolution.

[@berthika1219]

Excellent explanation. One example of topography is Waterloo. Love to see one of your map animations and zooms of Waterloo

[@johnglenn30csardas]

Excellent treatment of a topic that is both neglected and taken for granted. It really helps in understanding what happened and why. Thanks! So well done.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you for watching!

[@hanzzimmer1132]

This concept holds true today. Sustained rate of fire lasts us 10 minutes

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thanks for the confirmation!

[@horstschlammer3504]

really good work

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@kw19193]

Cheers Jeffrey. An excellent and informative video. Logistics, tactical and technical innovation were the poor handmaidens of both sides in the conflict I believe, although there were some obvious exceptions of course. Wouldn't fancy being a divisional or corps commander and having to choose between what works (at least some of the time) and a desire to innovate. There were times I suspect when a commander was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. And what do you do when in spite of all the planning operations were waylaid by subordinates who suffered from the 'slows' or, just as bad, rashness and even impetuosity. Neither Grant nor Lee had an easy time of it I think. Cheers!

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you for your nice comments! The two most decisive victories I can think of are Grant's victory at Fort Donelson and Jackson's victory at Harper's Ferry. Both of those victories involved surrounding isolated units and obtaining a mass surrender. In a sense, the greatest victory would be to isolate and surround an enemy force to such a degree that the only resolution was a mass surrender. It's good for everyone--the victors did not have to sustain casualties to obtain a major victory, and the defeated are stripped of weapons and supplies, but they are also given the dignity of life. From a moral perspective, capturing large numbers of men strip the enemy of weapons and supply and also preserve the lives of men on both sides, all without the horrific carnage of a set-piece battle.

[@mannydiaz3324]

i learned alot thank u 🙏

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@donnyboy2589]

Just curious: Would a flanking maneuver be more beneficial? Great video. Very informative.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thanks for watching. Great question. Flanking maneuvers are the best way to dislodge an enemy position, because two angles are at play. However, in order for a flanking maneuver to work, one side has to have more units in play, so that the flank can be extended. Once a unit is engaged, and facing an enemy unit head on, they are sort of "stuck," because they have to stand their ground and respond to the facing enemy. Another regiment would need to be unengaged, ready to move, and in close communication to turn the angle.

[@charliegerrie]

7:35 based

[@jaydubbyuh2292]

Not too bad as far as you went, sir. The main reason that combat was so relatively close, as compared to so-called modern warfare there are to fundamental reasons that kept battles and movements and relatively close range as compared to so-called modern warfare, and that is: single shot shoulder arms as the primary infantry weapon of both sides, and thus line of sight / earshot command of troops on the field. Even though the Enfield in Springfield rifles had an effective range of 3 to 400 yards, hitting a man size Target on a smokey battlefield with iron sights that were most likely bent damaged or out of adjustment still kept the lethal range of not much further than smoothbore muskets, which would be about 150 to 200 yards. The artillery, the workhorse of both sides being the 1857 light 12 lb. gun, had an effective long range of about a mile and a quarter with solid shot and case shot. It's targets had to be acquired through line of sight.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you for the feedback! 400 yards is definitely too far for anything decisive to happen before supplies were out.

[@jaydubbyuh2292]

@@JeffreytheLibrarian Repeating rifles and radios are what opened up the battlefield. Repeating rifles and machine guns allowed fewer men to lay down a heavier fire and fewer men could hold a larger area of territory. Radio communications enabled the battlefield to expand even further.

[@jefferynelson]

2:40 this effect here, where you first show overhead picture, then this 'elevation' picture, is an excellent idea, I would like to see this done on all the battlefields I've read about

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

I think the Lidar maps are helpful, too. I try to employ them where I can. Thanks for the feedback.

[@jefferynelson]

@@JeffreytheLibrarian as far as I'm aware you are the first person to be doing this with your maps, keep up the good work Jeffrey

[@leonleese4919]

Early war tactics were in essence the tactics were Napoleonic musketry was opened at around 100 yards.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Yes, I think outdated ideas about musket strategy employed with rifle technology.

[@georgedoolittle9015]

Until 1864 this type of fighting was not so common and mainly happened in order to maintain unit cohesion and control for both sides *(show the colors)* One thing the was lacking particularly from the CSA was proper artillery support as the US North "Union Forces" continued to improve upon both infantry firepower and dismounted infantry firepower through repeating rifles and vastly improved logistics. Grant's Campaign through down to Cold Harbor almost entirely due to the lack of any US Naval support which simply failed to built out even a Plan for offering logistical and fire support for what was a truly awesome and ultimately brutal Campaign through down to Richmond the After Action Review being the USA was better off not even having a US Army, Navy or Marine other than for securing the US West for private interests and Corporations. Northern Infantry it must be noted possessed truly awesome amounts of personal firepower advantages but most War in the beginning was *skirmishing* or *sniping* which could last sometimes weeks on end as Generals from both sides tried to decide how to what to do even in real time let alone as Planning and *What's Next?"*

[@huntclanhunt9697]

Curious... Are there cases of troops carrying multiple ammo boxes? For example, in the world wars, many troops would jurry rig extra ammo pouches, or use bandoliers

[@Skipper.17]

Not just the civil war, but wars prior using any sort of gun.

[@Perchpole]

Fascinating stuff. However, all things being equal (numbers, ammunition, etc) is there any advantage to launching a charge if you don't have to?

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

I think it is a "we are out of ammunition and they are coming again" situation. They can't retreat, and they can't just stand there. So the only option is to fix bayonets and charge. Charges are probably only going to happen if you believe the other side is about to route, or you have no other choice and you have no permission to withdraw.

[@joefish4466]

People fighting during the Civil War and WW I weren't stupid or overly callous. They were doing the best they could with what they had. We face similar challenges even now. Instead of rifled muskets for the Civil War combatants, and machine guns for those fighting in WW I, we now have Thermonuclear weapons. Future historians may likewise ask, whether we were stupid in the way we used nuclear weapons.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

We most definitely have "advanced" to much more destructive technology. It's easy to see how these strategies are essentially forced upon the era. In the Civil War, one side is moving 100,000 men with rifles and cannons, so the other side has no choice but to move 100,000 men with rifles and cannons to meet them. These two sides have to match each other in order to face one another.

[@TruthTheTroll]

didnt they have hot air balloons for recon back then?

[@sqike001ton]

so about long range fire and ammo i read once that in ww1 a US machine company used in one day more ammo then the army of the federals expended in 3 days at Gettysburg thats we started with X number of rounds we left with Y number of rounds X-Y=Z is is numbers expended this tends to blow peoples minds

[@davidh5101]

"You can't kill them if you can't see them."

[@jonathanallard2128]

You actually can...

[@AndrewDangerously]

Pretty fucking good video buddy.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Thank you!

[@jedknouse7053]

Can you see clearly and aim a rifle (without a scope) and hit a target at 300 yards? That's a tough ask for iron sight shooting in a smoke clouded battlefield.

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

The cartridge box would run out before anything decisive happened at that range.

[@jonathanallard2128]

@@JeffreytheLibrarian For sure they had logistic platoons that aided in resupplying units, no?

[@petermunk7919]

Historical reasons, too. A lot of officiers/generals were killed, because they rode with their horses in front of their unit to show bravery. Against guns suicide

[@brealistic3542]

Just to play Devil's Advocate, " Didn't the Union use spotter balloons " ?🤔

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

Great point. I have seen photographs of McClellan's army using balloons during the Peninsula campaign. I think that was more specialized equipment that was not normally utilized, but I will have to check on that. That would be an interesting video, though. We will have to explore that.

[@jcopp2031]

Great information. Great illustrations. Great explanation. Great video. Terrible monotone narration. Try a little animation in your narration. It's obviously a topic you like and know well, so make it interesting to your viewers with exciting commentary.

[@natedlc854]

i like his monotone

[@greaserbubtheoriginal7923]

all battles won and lost on logistics !!!!!!!!!! look today over150 years from civil war and the Russian army still have not learned this lesson in Ukraine

[@mitchellanderson3960]

Except Russia does know this...the blitz failed for Kiev due to poor logistics but it also tied down a large force that allowed Russia to make massive gains in the East. Since then, the war has become a stalemate with Russia having a logistical advantage in that the Eastern front is closer to their rail system than it is for Ukraine since the major aid coming to Ukraine is from the West and must cross all of Ukraine to arrive on the front. Don't mistake the failed blitz as Russia losing this war; they are not and logistically they are in a superior position to Ukraine. Go have a look at the railroad network of Russia and Ukraine and it's clear who can support the current front better.

[@greaserbubtheoriginal7923]

@@mitchellanderson3960 AGREEED

[@chrismontgomery4152]

Please don’t imply that the Iron Brigade got its nickname while commanded by that incompetent wannabe Meredith. It was under Reynolds that they got that nickname. Reynolds is a way better man and leader than Meredith ever could be or was

[@psilocybemusashi]

simple answer because that is how war had always been done. the reason the war was so bloody is because new railroads allowed many more reinforcements quickly than ever before. they simply didn't know how to adapt to the new technology and each side had an unlimited supply of 15 year old boys in the north they were the children of immigrants in the south they were the sons of the shop keepers, small farmers, professionals and craftsmen. if you think it was the sons of the wealthy slave owners you are a fool though many of them did seek glory as officers

[@finlayjohnnicolson3734]

Very disappointing presentation. A lot of inaccuracies.

[@markstuber4731]

Starting off a lecture about tactics by conflating strategy with tactics, hurts your credibility.

[@mikem668]

Yep. Unbelievable.

[@hswing11]

Well that was interesting NOT EVEN

[@JeffreytheLibrarian]

I remember saying "Not even!" all the time in the 1990s. It's very versatile.